TOE  GREAT  PROBLEMS 
R[T1SH  STATESMANSHIP 


J.  ELLIS  BARKER- 


THE  GREAT  PROBLEMS 
OF  BRITISH  STATESMANSHIP 


THE  GREAT  PROBLEMS 


OF 


BRITISH  STATESMANSHIP 


BY 

J.  ELLIS  BARKER 

4.UTHOB  OP    '  MOD«a»   aKBBtANT,'    '  OBHAT   AJSO   OBBATIB   BBTTADI  * 
'THl    TOlTin>ATI0!f3   0»   aSBMAlfY,'    BIO. 


NEW  YORK 

B.  P.  DUTTON  AND  COMPANY 

1917 


3^i  ff 


PREFACE 

The  World  War  has  created  a  number  of  most  important 
problems  which  statesmanship  will  have  to  solve  during 
the  coming  Peace  Congress  and  afterwards.  These  may 
conveniently  be  divided  into  three  classes  :  Problems  of 
foreign  pohcy,  such  as  the  deHmitation  of  the  national 
frontiers  and  the  creation  of  an  international  organisation 
devised  to  ensure  a  durable  peace  ;  economic  problems, 
such  as  the  re-creation  of  national  prosperity  among  the 
war-stricken  nations,  the  management  and  the  repayment 
of  the  gigantic  war  debt,  the  improvement  of  the  relations 
between  capital  and  labour,  &c. ;  problems  of  internal  organi- 
>-sation,  such  as  the  reform  of  democratic  government  which, 

Oi.  .  .  . 

g  during  the  War,  in  many  mstances  has  proved  disappomt- 
Sing  because  of  its  amateurishness,  dilatoriness,  improvidence, 
zrand  inefficiency.  All  these  problems  will  be  considered  in 
5c  the  following  pages. 

o       Nothing  is  permanent  in  this  world  except  change.     The 
3  great    problems   of   statesmanship    can    be   given   only    a 
temporary  solution.     States  and  nations  rise,  grow,  stand 
still,  dechne,  decay,  and  ultimately  disappear.    The  civilisa- 
tion and  even  the  languages  of  the  world  empires  of  antiquity 
have  vanished.    Caesar,  when  conquering  the  savage  inhabi- 
tants of  Britain  who  were  dressed  in  skins  and  who  oma- 
4      mented  themselves  by  painting  their  bodies  with  woad, 
^     would  have  laughed  had  a  native  Druid  told  him  that  the 
^     Eoman  Empire  would  fall,  and  that  the  British  savages 
would  not  only  conquer  but  civilise  the  larger  part  of  the 
^     world,  and  create  an  Empire  far  greater  than  the  Ptoman, 

r  34551)7 

0* 


vi  Preface 

for  he  looked  upon  the  native  Briton  as  we  do  upon  African 
negroes.  The  process  of  national  agglomeration  and 
dissolution  will  continue  to  the  end  of  time.  If  we  look 
into  history  we  find  that  it  takes  centuries  to  settle  per- 
manently the  territorial  conflicts  which  are  apt  to  arise 
among  neighbour  States.  It  took  centuries  to  determine 
definitively  the  differences  between  Britain  and  France,  to 
solve  the  question  whether  Britain  should  or  should  not 
possess  territory  on  the  south  shore  of  the  English  Channel. 
For  centuries  France  and  Germany  have  fought  for  the 
possession  of  the  borderland,  for  Alsace-Lorraine,  for  the 
control  of  Belgium,  Holland,  and  Switzerland,  and  for  all 
we  know  they  may  continue  for  centuries  to  fight  for  these 
objects.  For  centuries  Eussia  and  Germany  have  fought 
and  intrigued  for  the  possession  or  the  control  of  Poland, 
the  Balkan  Peninsula,  and  Constantinople,  and  their  struggle 
also  may  be  renewed.  Between  certain  nations  there  exists 
Htigation  in  perpetuity  in  respect  of  certain  objects  which 
are  valued  by  either.  The  Peace  Congress  cannot  bring 
about  a  permanent  settlement  of  these  great  questions, 
for  they  will  continue  to  trouble  mankind.  It  can  at  best 
bring  about  a  lasting  one.  It  can  give  to  the  world  a  long 
period,  perhaps  a  century,  of  peace. 

The  roots  of  nations  lie  deep  in  the  past.  We  can 
understand  the  interests  and  the  poHcy  of  States  and  gauge 
the  character,  attitude,  and  probable  conduct  of  nations 
only  by  studying  their  history  and  development,  their 
experiences,  and  their  traditions.  We  can  neither  fully 
understand,  nor  hope  successfully  to  solve,  the  great  inter- 
national questions,  the  great  international  quarrels,  unless 
we  are  acquainted  with  their  historical  genesis  and  with 
the  views  and  actions  of  the  claimants  in  the  past.  Hence, 
in  considering  the  great  problems  of  diplomacy,  due  weight 
should  be  given  not  only  to  their  present  aspect  and  future 
possibilities,  but  also  to  their  historic  development.  This 
has  been  done  in  the  following  pages.  I  have  given  in 
them  a  vast  number  of  secret  treaties,  despatches,  and  other 


Preface  vii 

documents  of  the  highest  importance  which  will  not  be 
found  elsewhere. 

Economic  policy  should  be  based  not  upon  theory,  but 
upon  experience ;  not  upon  fancy,  but  upon  fact.  In  con- 
sidering the  problem  of  developing  the  prosperity  of  Great 
Britain  and  of  the  Empire,  of  paying  off  the  war  debt,  and 
of  improving  the  lot  of  the  workers,  I  have  availed  myself 
of  the  lessons  afforded  by  England's  war  with  Eepubhcan  and 
Napoleonic  France  and  by  the  American  Civil  War.  Both 
were  proportionately  about  as  costly  as  the  present  struggle 
seems  hkely  to  prove.  Both  were  followed  not  by  industrial 
collapse  and  financial  ruin,  as  was  behoved  by  many  at  the 
time,  but  by  unprecedented  economic  development  and 
boundless  prosperity.  I  have  endeavoured  to  show  that 
the  Great  War,  far  from  impoverishing  Great  Britain  and 
the  British  Empire,  should  greatly  enrich  them,  provided 
a  wise  economic  poHcy  in  accordance  with  historical  ex- 
perience is  pursued.  The  exhaustive  and  authoritative 
figures  given  in  support  of  that  contention  will  be  new 
to  most  readers  and  should  prove  of  the  highest  interest 
to  financiers,  business  men,  and  others. 

Government,  rightly  considered,  is  not  a  pastime,  but 
a  business.  Like  every  business,  it  has  its  rules,  which  may 
be  learned  from  those  who  have  been  most  successful  in 
the  science  and  art  of  directing  pubHc  affairs.  National 
organisation  and  administration,  like  economic  poHcy, 
should  be  based,  not  upon  abstract  principles,  which  may 
prove  inappHcable,  nor  upon  historic  precedents,  which 
may  be  misleading,  but  upon  universal  experience.  In 
considering  the  inefficiency  of  democratic  government 
as  revealed  by  the  War  and  the  necessary  reform  of  Great 
Britain's  national  organisation,  I  have  availed  myself  of 
the  views  of  the  greatest  statesmen  and  administrators 
and  the  soundest  thinkers  of  all  times  from  Aristotle, 
Isocrates,  Thucydides,  and  Polybius  to  Cardinal  Eicheheu, 
the  elder  Pitt,  Frederick  the  Great,  Napoleon,  Alexander 
Hamilton,  and  Bismarck.     The  numerous  quotations  given 


viii  Preface 

should  prove  of  value  to  all  who  desire  to  be  acquainted  with 
the  views  of  the  greatest  experts  in  national  organisation. 

The  present  volume,  like  my  other  books,  is  perhaps 
rather  a  storehouse  of  facts  than  an  expression  of  my  own 
views.  I  hope  that,  nevertheless,  it  will  prove  thoroughly 
readable.  It  may  be  of  value  to  statesmen,  politicians, 
publicists,  and  the  general  public  because  of  the  important 
documentary  and  statistical  evidence  which  it  contains. 

The  contents  of  the  book  are,  for  the  convenience  of 
readers,  briefly  summed  up  in  its  first  chapter,  '  The  Peace 
Congress  and  After.'  All  the  other  chapters  have  previously 
appeared  in  The  Nineteenth  Century  and  After.  They 
attracted  a  great  deal  of  attention  at  the  time.,  and  many 
of  them  were  reprinted  in  extenso  not  only  on  the  Continent, 
in  the  British  Dominions,  and  in  the  United  States,  but  even 
in  Japan  and  China.  I  have  been  urged  to  collect  and  to 
republish  them  in  book  form,  and  I  am  allowed  to  do  so  by 
the  courtesy  of  Mr.  Skilbeck,  the  editor  of  The  Nineteenth 
Century  review,  to  whom  I  herewith  give  my  best  thanks. 
The  original  articles  have  been  revised,  brought  up  to 
date,  and  organically  connected,  and  considerable  additions 
have  been  made  to  them. 

Although  it  may  seem  immodest,  I  would  in  conclusion 
say  a  few  words  as  to  my  literary  activity  in  the  past. 
Ever  since  1900,  when  I  began  my  career  as  a  pubHcist,  I 
have  warned  this  country  of  the  danger  of  a  war  with 
Germany.  In  all  my  books  and  in  innumerable  articles 
printed  in  the  leading  reviews  and  elsewhere  I  have  urged 
unceasingly  the  necessity  of  diplomatic,  miHtary,  and 
economic  preparation,  the  necessity  of  abandoning  the 
pohcy  of  '  splendid  isolation '  for  one  of  alHances  with 
France,  Eussia,  Japan,  and  the  United  States,  the  necessity 
of  strengthening,  developing,  and  organising  the  Empire 
towards  the  day  of  trial,  the  necessity  of  strengthening 
the  fleet,  the  necessity  of  creating  a  national  army,  the 
necessity  of  strengthening  the  British  industries,  and  espe- 
cially the  iron  and  steel  industry,  by  a  policy  of  deliberate 


Preface  ix 

development,  by  a  protective  tariff,  the  necessity  of  vastly 
increasing  agricultural  production  by  peasant  proprietor- 
ship and  various  other  means,  the  necessity  of  developing 
the  neglected  railway  and  canal  systems  of  Great  Britain, 
the  desirabiHty  of  an  Anglo-American  reunion,  &c.  I;have 
co-operated  with  Mr.  Joseph  Chamberlain,  Lord  Eoberts, 
and  other  prominent  men.  It  is  a  certain  satisfaction  that 
all  the  reforms  which  so  many  have  urged  in  vain  before 
the  War  seem  likely  to  be  carried  out  in  consequence  of  it. 
The  ways  of  Providence  are  wonderful.  Iron  is  tried  by 
fire  and  nations  by  war.  A  new  and  a  greater  Britain  is 
arising.  The  War  may  not  only  make  the  British  Empire 
a  reahty,  but  bring  about  an  Anglo-American  reunion. 
The  Vfar,  far  from  being  an  unmitigated  evil,  may  prove 
a  blessing  to  the  British  race. 

Many  eminent  people  have  facihtated  my  task  by  their 
assistance,  their  advice,  and  their  encouragement.  I  would 
herewith  most  cordially  thank  them  for  their  kindness  and 
support. 

J.  ELLIS  BARKER. 

LoNDOK,  June  1917. 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER 

"I.  The  Peace  Congress  and  After 

II.  The  Problem  of  Constantinople 

III.  The  Problem  of  Asls^tio  Turkey 

IV,  The  Problem  of  Austria-Hungary 
V,  The  Problem  of  Poland  . 

VI.  The  German  Emperor's  Position 

VII.  Britain's  War  Finance  and  Economic  Future 

VIII,  Britain's  Coming  Industrial  Supremacy  . 

IX.  Democracy  and  the  Iron  Beoom  of  War 

X,  How  America  became  a  Nation  in  Arms 

XI,  An  Anglo-American  Reunion  . 

Analytical  Index 


PAGE 
1 

14 
55 
105 
146 
190 
216 
257 
293 
349 
398 
433 


THE  GREAT  PROBLEMS 

OF 

BRITISH  STATESMANSHIP 

CHAPTEE  I 

THE    PEACE    CONGRESS    AND    AFTER 

The  Allies  arrayed  against  Germany  are  practically  agreed 
on  the  broad  principles  which  will  guide  their  action  at  the 
Peace  Congress.  The  differences  between  them  are  rather 
apparent  than  real.  The  young  Russian  democracy  has 
demanded  a  settlement  '  without  annexations  and  without 
indemnities.'  That  seems  a  purely  negative  programme. 
The  other  Powers  have  declared  themselves  in  favour  of 
a  positive  policy,  which  likewise  has  been  summed  up  in 
two  words.  They  have  demanded  a  peace  which  is  based 
on  the  principle  of  '  Restitution  and  Reparation.'  Rightly 
considered,  the  two  demands  are  identical.  Men  who  have 
thrown  over  a  Government  which  they  detest,  who  have 
suddenly  freed  themselves  from  heavy  shackles,  naturally 
rejoice,  and  are  apt  to  form  in  their  joy  vast  plans  which 
spring  rather  from  the  heart  than  from  the  head.  Time  is 
needed  to  awaken  such  men  to  the  sober  realities  of  this 
workaday  world.  The  heady  wine  of  democracy  has  had 
the  same  effect  in  Russia  which  it  had  in  France  at  the 
end  of  the  eighteenth  century.    The  Russian  declarations 

1  B 


2  The  Peace  Congress  and  After 

remind    one  of  Article  VI    of    the  French  Eevolutionary 
Constitution  : 

La  nation  fran^aise  renonce  a  entreprendre  aucune 
guerre  dans  la  vue  de  faire  des  conquetes,  et  n'emploiera 
jamais  ses  forces  contre  la  liberte  d'aucun  peuple. 

This  ideal  resolution  was  soon  forgotten.  The  French 
revolutionaries  embarked  upon  wars  of  conquest,  the 
solemn  declarations  notwithstanding.  It  is  to  be  expected 
that  the  Eussian  people  will  before  long  awake  to  the 
realities  of  the  situation. 

All  the  democracies  are  fighting  for  the  principle  of 
liberty,  for  the  right  of  nationalities  to  govern  themselves 
in  their  own  way.  All  are  strongly  opposed  to  the  principle 
of  absolutism,  of  monarchical  tyranny,  of  race  subjection 
and  of  race  exploitation.  They  are  fighting  for  the  freedom 
of  the  oppressed  nationalities.  They  are  pledged  to  free 
the  exploited  races  and  to  enable  them  to  organise  and  to 
govern  themselves  in  their  own  way.  By  setting  free  the 
subject  nationahties,  the  non-German  parts  of  Germany  will 
be  enabled  to  rule  themselves  and  to  choose  their  allegiance. 
The  territory  of  Germany  will  be  slightly  reduced.  By 
setting  free  the  subject  nationalities  the  Austrian  and 
Turkish  Empires,  where  the  governing  race  is  in  a  small 
minority,  will  be  dissolved  into  their  component  parts. 
However,  their  dissolution  cannot  honestly  be  described  as 
partition  and  be  compared  with  the  partitions  of  Poland. 
No  democrat  can  wish  to  thrust  back  the  Armenians, 
Czechs,  Poles,  &c.,  under  their  ancient  yoke. 

The  word  *  war-indemnity  '  has  during  the  last  few  decades 
changed  its  meaning.  Originally  a  war-indemnity  signified 
adequate  compensation  for  the  cost  of  an  unjust  war  which 
was  exacted  from  the  aggressor.  It  was  a  bill  for  damages 
wantonly  done.  It  was  unobjectionable  from  the  highest 
moral  point  of  view.  Since  the  time  when  powerful  military 
States  have  robbed  the  defeated  nations,  whom  they  had 
wantonly  attacked,  not  only  of  territory  upon  which  they 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship      3 

had  no  claim  on  racial  grounds,  but  have  in  addition  exacted 
from  them  outrageous  sums  of  money  merely  in  order  to 
make  their  aggression  both  territorially  and  financially 
profitable  to  themselves,  the  word  *  indemnity  '  has  become 
synonymous  with  spoliation,  and  spoliation  is  detestable. 
The  word  '  indemnity  '  has  acquired  a  bad  odour.  The  Alhes, 
Belgium,  Serbia,  France,  Eussia,  and  the  rest,  are  certainly 
entitled  to  claim  from  the  Central  Powers  compensation  for 
their  gigantic  losses  caused  by  a  war  which  was  forced  upon 
them,  but  they  will  scarcely  make  a  profit  out  of  such 
indemnities  as  they  may  obtain.  The  damage  done  is 
too  large.  Germany  and  her  Allies  are  not  rich  enough  ever 
to  repay  their  victims.  They  can  pay  no  more  than  a  tithe 
of  the  damage,  and  they  may  have  to  rebuild  with  their 
own  labour  what  they  have  destroyed. 

The  territorial  settlement  at  the  Peace  Congress  will  be 
effected  in  accordance  with  the  principle  of  nationaUties. 
Eacial  and  State  limits  will  be  made  to  coincide  wherever 
possible.  However,  there  may  be  certain  exceptions  to  the 
rule.  Sometimes  various  nationalities  are  inextricably  mixed 
in  certain  districts,  and  must  be  disentangled.  Besides, 
the  smaller  States  created  on  a  racial  basis  must  be  secured 
against  an  attack  from  their  warlike,  powerful,  and  possibly 
revengeful  neighbours,  and  they  must  be  able  to  make  a 
living ;  they  must  be  economically  independent.  Lastly, 
those  nations  which  caused  the  War,  and  which  may  be 
inclined  to  renew  it,  must  give  guarantees  for  their  good 
behaviour  in  the  future.  They  cannot  be  allowed  to  dominate 
their  smaller  neighbours  strategically  or  economically,  and 
may  have  to  lose  certain  vantage  points.  Poland  and 
Serbia  must  have  adequate  outlets  to  the  sea.  To  avoid 
racial  injustice,  men  of  one  race  who,  for  pressing  strategical 
or  economic  reasons  may  have  to  be  included  in  another 
nation,  should  be  given  the  option  of  rejoining  their  brothers 
across  the  frontier  and  be  entitled  to  adequate  compensation 
for  disturbance. 

There  are  a  number  of  instances  where  friction  may  arise 


4  The  Peace  Congress  and  After 

between  several  nations  through  conflicting  claims  to 
territory  based  on  racial,  strategical,  or  economic  grounds. 
Where  there  is  a  conflict  of  claims,  a  settlement  should  as 
a  rule  be  effected  on  the  principle  that  the  weaker  claim  must 
give  way  to  the  stronger.  This  should,  of  course,  not  mean 
that  the  smaller  Power  should  be  sacrificed  to  the  greater, 
for  the  settlement  should  be  based  not  on  might,  but  on 
justice.  Differences  may,  for  instance,  arise  in  arranging 
the  claims  of  Italy  and  Serbia  to  certain  portions  of  the 
Adriatic,  the  future  of  Macedonia  may  become  a  matter  of 
contention,  &c.  Most  of  these  questions  are  not  of  first-rate 
importance,  and  they  should  easily  be  settled,  although  they 
may  call  for  unHmited  patience  on  the  part  of  the  assembled 
statesmen. 

Among  the  greatest  and  most  difficult  problems  of  the 
Peace  Congress  are  the  problem  of  Constantinople,  the 
problem  of  Asia  Minor,  the  problem  of  Austria-Hungary, 
the  problem  of  Poland,  and  the  position  of  the  German 
Empire  and  its  Emperor.  All  these  have  been  considered 
in  the  present  volume. 

Shortly  after  the  revolution  the  representatives  of  the 
Eussian  democracy  have  waived  Eussia's  historic  claim  to 
the  possession  of  Constantinople  on  the  principle  of  '  No 
Annexation  and  No  Indemnities.'  A  young  democracy  is 
guided  rather  by  the  heart  than  by  the  head.  It  follows 
easily  the  generous  impulses  of  the  moment.  By  the  time 
the  Peace  Congress  assembles,  the  Eussian  people  may  have 
changed  their  representatives,  and  may  have  changed  their 
mind  as  to  Constantinople.  It  seems  doubtful  whether  the 
desire  of  acquiring  Constantinople  was  merely  based  upon 
the  ambition  of  Eussia's  rulers.  Eussia's  most  valuable 
territories  lie  in  the  south,  for  the  bleak  north  produces 
little.  The  Black  Sea  and  the  mighty  rivers  leading  to  it 
constitute  Eussia's  principal  outlet.  The  most  precious 
part  of  Eussia's  foreign  trade  is  the  Black  Sea  trade.  It  is 
bound  to  increase  indefinitely  in  value.  Eather  for  economic 
than  for  strategical  reasons  Eussia  requires  free  access  from 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship       5 

the  Black  Sea  to  the  Mediterranean.  Eussia's  historic 
desire  for  the  acquisition  of  Constantinople  was  principally 
due  to  the  fact  that  she  found  it  intolerable  that  the  bulk 
of  her  trade  should  be  at  the  mercy  of  the  Turks.  At  the 
beginning  of  the  War  an  overwhelming  majority  of  the 
Duma  demanded  for  these  reasons  the  acquisition  of  the 
Bosphorus  and  the  Dardanelles.  The  Eussian  people  may 
earher  or  later  change  their  mind  with  regard  to  Constanti- 
nople. That  should  be  remembered  by  statesmen  and 
publicists  before  and  duruig  the  Congress.  Besides,  it  is 
difficult  to  find  a  satisfactory  alternative  solution  of  the 
problem  of  Constantinople.  As  the  Narrows  are  of  great 
strategical  value,  they  cannot  safely  be  entrusted  to  a  small 
Power,  for  various  Great  Powers  would  endeavour  to  obtain 
influence  over  it.  The  old  intrigues  for  the  possession  of 
Constantinople  would  recommence.  There  remains  the 
possibility  of  neutralising  that  precious  site,  of  entrusting 
the  guardianship  to  some  international  body.  Neutrals, 
unless  they  are  powerful,  may  suddenly  be  attacked  by  their 
warhke  neighbours,  and  international  guarantees  do  not 
always  act  as  a  deterrent.  That  has  been  shown  in  the 
case  of  Belgium.  International  control,  on  the  other  hand, 
is  apt  to  lead  to  international  intrigue,  as  was  seen  in  the 
case  of  Egypt  and  of  Macedonia,  and  international  occu- 
pation is  apt  to  lead  to  war,  as  is  proved  by  the  example 
of  Schleswig-Holstein.  As  Eussia  has  on  strategical  and 
economic  gromids  the  strongest  claims  to  Constantinople, 
she  will  probably,  on  consideration,  alter  her  mind,  and  the 
Powers  will  be  wise  not  to  take  as  permanent  Eussia's 
recent  declarations,  which  some  day  she  may  regret.  It  would 
be  a  calamity  and  a  danger  to  the  peace  of  the  world  if  some 
years  hence  the  Eussian  people  should  say  that  the  nations 
took  an  unfair  advantage  of  Eussia's  momentary  mood 
and  deprived  them  of  Constantinople,  for  which  they  have 
fought  and  bled  for  centuries,  at  a  time  when  they  could  have 
had  it  for  the  asking. 

The  Constantinople  position  connects  the  Black  Sea  and 


6  The  Peace  Congress  and  After 

the  Mediterranean  on  the  one  hand  and  Europe  and  Asia 
on  the  other.  It  is  strategically  very  important,  but  it  is 
far  less  important  than  Asia  Minor.  Asia  Minor  connects, 
separates,  and  dominates  the  three  oldest  and  most  populated 
Continents.  It  hes  across  the  most  direct  route  from  Central 
Europe  to  Calcutta,  Bombay,  Canton,  and  Peking.  Asia 
Minor,  being  surrounded  by  gigantic  mountain  ranges,  vast 
deserts,  and  the  sea,  is  a  natural  fortress  of  the  greatest 
strength,  whence  Egypt,  North  Africa,  the  Caucasus,  the 
Eussian  Black  Sea  Provinces,  the  Mediterranean  countries, 
and  Persia  and  India  may  easily  be  attacked.  Asia  Minor 
is  at  present  sparsely  populated,  but  is  able  to  nourish  a  vast 
number  of  people.  Its  wealth  in  minerals  of  all  kinds  may 
be  utiHsed  for  military  purposes.  Its  central  position,  its 
impregnable  natural  frontiers,  and  its  vast  agricultural  and 
mineral  potentialities  might  become  dangerous  to  the  peace 
of  the  world.  A  strong  military  Power  occupying  the 
country  might  convert  it  into  a  gigantic  fortress  and  arsenal, 
and  provide  it  with  numerous  railways  leading  towards 
Egypt,  the  Caucasus,  and  Persia.  A  strong  miHtary  Power 
controlling  Asia  Minor  might  strive  for  the  domination  of  the 
three  old  continents,  and  its  power  for  mischief  would  be 
enhanced  by  the  fact  that  it  would  dominate  the  two  issues 
of  the  Eed  Sea,  and  that  it  could  threaten  from  its  central 
position  not  only  the  Suez  Canal  route,  but  also  the  trade  of 
the  Mediterranean  and  the  sea-route  to  India  by  way  of  the 
Cape.  I  have  very  fully  considered  the  problem  of  Asia 
Minor  from  every  point  of  view  and  have  made  proposals 
for  its  solution. 

Austria-Hungary  has  about  55,000,000  inhabitants. 
The  Austro- Germans  and  the  Magyars  number  together 
only  about  20,000,000,  and  they  bitterly  hate  each  other. 
By  freeing  the  35,000,000  Slavs,  Eoumanians,  and  Italians 
from  Austrian  misrule  the  State  of  the  Habsburgs  would 
be  reduced  to  20,000,000  people.  Germany  has  controlled 
the  policy  of  Vienna  in  the  past  by  making  use  of  the 
differences  between  the  Austrians  and  Magyars.    She  has 


Great  Problems  of  British  StaiesmanshijJ      7 

ruled  Austria  with  the  assistance  of  Budapest.  The  loss 
of  her  Slavs  and  Latins  would  increase  Austria's  dependence 
upon  the  goodwill  of  Berlin  and  of  Budapest.  Austria 
and  Hungary  might  be  forced  to  attach  themselves  to  the 
German  Empire.  As  a  consequence  of  the  War,  Germany- 
might  be  far  stronger  than  she  has  been  hitherto.  The 
Allies  have  pledged  themselves  to  set  free  the  subject 
nationalities  of  the  Dual  Monarchy.  The  Habsburgs,  who 
at  one  time  were  supreme  in  Germany,  and  who  gave  to  the 
Hohenzollems  the  Brandenburg  Electorate  and  raised  them 
to  royal  rank,  have  suffered  grievously  at  the  hands  of  their 
former  vassals.  Brandenburg-Prussia  has  grown  great  at 
Austria's  cost.  Silesia  was  conquered  by  Prussia  in  1740, 
and  the  South  German  States  were  detached  from  Austria 
in  1866.  Austria  has  been  Germany's  tool  in  bringing  about 
the  Great  War.  The  senile  Francis  Joseph  scarcely  knew 
what  he  was  doing.  The  Princes  of  the  proud  house  of 
Habsburg  would  no  doubt  Hke  to  recover  their  indepen- 
dence. They  have  no  love  for  Prussia  and  the  Hohen- 
zollems. It  seems  not  inconceivable  that  as  a  result  of  the 
War,  Austria  should  recover  her  independence,  that  the 
Habsburg  Monarchy  should  obtain  a  new  lease  of  hfe.  If 
Austria  should  conclude  a  separate  peace,  she  would  be  en- 
titled to  compensation  for  the  inevitable  loss  of  her  Slavonic 
and  Latin  citizens,  and  she  might  be  given  Silesia  and  South 
Germany.  By  receiving  these,  Vienna  would  once  more 
rule  over  30,000,000  Germans,  and  the  7,000,000  or  8,000,000 
Magyars  would  no  longer  prove  unmanageable.  A  balance 
of  power  would  be  created  within  Germany.  Vienna  might 
once  more  dominate  Berlin,  and  if  Austria  should  follow  a 
liberal,  tolerant,  and  generous  policy  she  might  once  more 
attract  to  herself  the  smaller  nations  of  South-Eastern  Europe 
and  overshadow  Prusso- Germany.  A  similar  situation 
might  arise  if  the  War  should  be  fought  to  the  bitter  end, 
and  if  the  South  German  States  should  revolt  against 
Prussia's  rule  and  attach  themselves  to  Austria. 

It  remains  to  be  seen  whether  Austria-Hungary  and  Ger- 


8  The  Peace  Congress  and  After 

many  will  patiently  bear  with  their  rulers  if  the  War  which 
they  began  should  lead  to  disaster  and  general  ruin. 
Possibly  both  the  German  and  the  Austrian  peoples  may 
revolt,  but  it  seems  more  Hkely  that  the  Germans  will  hold 
their  Sovereign  to  account,  for  the  young  Austrian  Emperor 
was  not  responsible  for  the  War.  Germany  has  a  written 
Constitution  according  to  which  the  sovereignty  of  the 
Empire  lies  not  in  the  hands  of  the  Emperor,  but  in  those 
of  all  the  allied  States  and  their  rulers.  The  Emperor  is 
merely  the  hereditary  president  of  the  federation.  Accord- 
ing to  the  Constitution,  he  is  not  entitled  to  declare  war 
unless  Germany  has  actually  been  attacked.  For  a  war  of 
aggression  the  consent  of  the  Federal  Council,  which  officially 
represents  all  the  German  States,  is  required.  In  embarking 
upon  a  war  of  aggression  WiUiam  the  Second  has  violated 
the  Constitution.  He  is  not  only  morally  but  also  legally 
responsible  if  disaster  should  overtake  his  country.  A 
German  defeat  may  lead  either  to  the  severe  limitation  of 
the  Emperor's  power  or  to  the  conversion  of  Germany  into 
a  repubhc.  We  may  experience  in  Germany  a  revolution 
accompanied  by  civil  war.  A  special  chapter  has  been 
devoted  to  the  Emperor's  position. 

The  problem  of  Poland  is  particularly  important  because 
of  the  vast  change  which  the  resuscitation  of  that  State 
would  effect  on  the  map  of  Europe.  An  independent 
Polish  State  of  20,000,000  inhabitants  might  serve  as  a 
buffer-State  between.  Eussia  and  Germany.  The  lands  of 
the  Poles  possess  vast  agricultural,  industrial,  and  mineral 
possibilities.  The  PoHsh  territories  are  more  densely  popu- 
lated than  is  France.  Within  the  Pohsh  zone  He  the  largest 
coalfields  on  the  Continent  of  Europe.  Lodz  is  the  Eussian 
Manchester.  As  Brazil  is  the  land  of  the  Amazon  and  the 
United  States  that  of  the  Mississippi,  so  Poland  is  the  country 
of  the  Vistula.  On  that  mighty  river  lie  the  two  PoHsh 
capitals,  Warsaw  and  Cracow,  and  innumerable  important 
towns.  Poland  may  become  politically  and  economically 
the  Belgium  of  Eastern  Europe,  it  may  become  a  most 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship       9 

important  industrial  country,  but  this  is  possible  only  if 
she  has  a  sufficient  outlet  for  her  manufactures  and  can 
obtain  cheaply  the  necessary  imported  raw  materials,  such 
as  cotton.  Poland's  natural  harbour  is  Danzig,  on  the 
mouth  of  the  Vistula.  That  town  may  become  the  Polish 
Hamburg.  If  Danzig  should  once  more  become  Polish, 
East  Prussia  would  be  separated  from  Brandenburg  by  a 
broad  belt  of  Polish  territory,  as  it  was  in  olden  times.  How- 
ever, if  the  question  should  arise  whether  Brandenburg 
should  be  separated  from  the  province  of  East  Prussia,  or 
whether  Poland  should  be  separated  from  the  sea  by  Danzig 
remaining  in  Prussian  hands,  it  is  probable  that  the  weaker 
claim  would  have  to  give  way  to  the  stronger.  Agricultural 
Eastern  Prussia,  though  separated  from  Brandenburg,  would 
have  access  to  the  sea.  If  Danzig  remained  in  Germany's 
hands  Poland  would  remain  cut  off  from  the  sea,  and  the 
State  might  languish,  decline,  and  decay. 

Many  Poles  desire  that  their  country  should  obtain 
complete  independence.  It  seems  doubtful  whether  their 
wishes  are  wise.  In  the  course  of  time  Poland  has  grown 
into  Eussia  and  Eussia  into  Poland.  Her  vast  coalfields 
make  Poland  a  natural  home  of  the  manufacturing  indus- 
tries. A  completely  independent  Poland  might  find  both 
the  Eussian  and  the  German  frontiers  closed  against  her 
productions.  Hence  it  may  be  best  for  the  Poles  to  aim 
at  a  modified  form  of  independence  which  would  guarantee 
to  them  Eussia's  military  protection  in  case  of  need  and 
which  would  leave  open  to  the  Polish  industries  the  vast 
and  most  valuable  Eussian  markets. 

The  territorial  claims  of  the  various  nations  cannot  be 
permanently  settled  at  the  Peace  Congress,  for  history  knows 
no  permanent  settlements.  The  settlement  made  may  come 
up  for  revision.  Unsatisfactory  settlements  often  lead  to 
war.  Therefore  the  representatives  of  the  Powers  should 
avoid  not  only  injustice,  but  even  the  appearance  of  in- 
justice and  of  unfairness.  The  settlement  made  at  the  Con- 
gress of  Vienna  should  serve  them  as  a  warning  example. 


10  The  Peace  Congress  and  After 

It  led  to  a  series  of  wars  in  the  course  of  which  the  Treaty 
of  Vienna  was  torn  to  pieces. 

The  great  international  questions  mentioned  will  not 
be  definitively  solved  at  the  Peace  Congress.  They  will 
occupy  the  nations  during  many  ensuing  decades.  How- 
ever, during  the  period  immediately  following  the  peace  the 
problems  of  foreign  policy  will  probably  be  overshadowed 
by  economic  problems  and  by  questions  of  domestic  policy. 
The  gigantic  War  has  created  huge  national  debts  and  has 
destroyed  incalculable  values.  The  British  War  debt 
seems  likely  to  amount  to  at  least  £5,000,000,000.  It  seems 
questionable  whether  the  British  people  will  receive  any 
compensation  from  their  opponents,  for  the  devastated 
countries,  Belgium,  Serbia,  Poland,  Eoumania,  France,  and 
Eussia,  have  the  first  claim  upon  German  indemnities.  It 
may  also  happen  that  Britain's  allies  will  not  be  able  to 
repay  the  bulk  of  the  sums  advanced  to  them.  The  ex- 
perience of  the  Napoleonic  wars,  when  England  financed 
the  AlHes,  may  repeat  itself. 

British  taxation  has  been  trebled  in  the  course  of  the 
War,  and  trebled  taxation  may  continue  indefinitely.  The 
vast  war  expenditures  incurred  may,  however,  not  ruin 
Great  Britain.  I  have  shown  in  two  lengthy  chapters 
devoted  to  the  economic  problems  that  the  War,  far  from 
impoverishing  the  country,  may  greatly  enrich  it.  The 
twenty  years'  war  against  Eepublican  and  Napoleonic 
France  created  a  gigantic  burden  of  debt.  It  led  to  the 
trebling  of  taxation.  The  vast  increase  in  taxation  stimu- 
lated the  latent  energies  of  the  nation.  I  have  shown  that 
Great  Britain's  industrial  prosperity  arose  during  and  after 
the  Great  War,  and  was  caused  chiefly  by  the  vastly  increased 
demands  of  the  tax-collector.  I  have  further  shown  by 
most  interesting  and  important  statistics  that  the  American 
workers  engaged  in  manufacturing,  mining,  transport,  agri- 
culture, &c.,  produce  per  head  about  three  times  as  much 
as  their  English  colleagues  because  they  employ  better  and 
three  times  as  powerful  machmery  and  possess  a  better 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     11 

economic  organisation,  &c.  It  follows  that  Great  Britain 
can  treble  her  yearly  output,  her  yearly  income,  and  her 
national  wealth  by  Americanising  her  industries.  The 
Americanisation  of  the  British  industries  has  already  begun. 
I  have  shown  in  the  chapter,  '  Britain's  Coming  Industrial 
Supremacy,'  that  in  the  course  of  the  War  production  per 
man  has  approximately  doubled.  Production  per  man  can 
once  more  be  doubled,  and  more  than  doubled,  to  the  great 
benefit  of  the  workers  and  of  the  nation  as  a  whole.  In- 
creased production  must  be  based  upon  improved  machinery, 
and  the  better  machinery  is,  the  smaller  is  the  exertion  of 
the  worker. 

America's  vast  industrial  advance,  as  that  of  Great 
Britain,  was  caused  by  a  ruinously  expensive  war.  The 
vastly  increased  demands  of  the  tax-collector  consequent 
upon  the  Civil  War  led  not  only  to  the  greatest  improve- 
ment in  industrial  production,  but  also  to  the  rapid  opening 
up  of  the  West.  The  British  Dominions  have  advanced 
comparatively  slowly  in  wealth  and  population  because  life 
has  been  too  easy  for  the  inhabitants.  Men  work  hard 
only  if  compelled.  The  Dominions  would  be  forced  to  open 
up  their  gigantic  domain  with  the  greatest  energy  should 
they  decide  to  take  over  an  adequate  part  of  the  financial 
burden  imposed  by  the  War.  The  War  has  been  fought 
for  the  benefit  of  future  generations.  It  is  therefore  only 
fair  that  posterity  should  help  in  bearing  the  burden. 

The  War  Debt  should  become  an  imperial  obligation. 
Part  of  the  undeveloped  resources  of  the  Empire  should  be 
assigned  to  its  service  and  repayment.  Part  should  be  paid 
by  the  present  generation.  The  Americans  combine  with 
their  census  of  population  a  census  of  production  and  wealth. 
By  taking  regularly  a  similar  census  of  production  and  of 
wealth  throughout  the  British  Empire,  the  ability  of  every 
part  of  the  Empire  to  assist  in  bearing  the  financial  burden 
caused  by  the  War  might  most  easily  and  most  fairly  be 
ascertained.  Every  five  or  ten  years  the  financial  burden 
might  be  redistributed  in  accordance  with  the  changes  in 


12  The  Peace  Congress  and  After 

wealth  and  income  which  have  taken  place  in  the  mean- 
time. 

High  taxation  in  countries  of  boundless  latent  resources 
is  a  vast  advantage.  It  is  as  necessary  to  a  State  which 
desires  to  advance  quickly  as  adequate  ballast  is  to  a  ship. 
The  Empire  is  four  times  as  large  as  the  United  States. 
Nevertheless  the  United  States  are  far  wealthier  than  is 
the  gigantic  British  Empire.  The  wealth  of  the  United 
States  is  greater  than  that  of  the  British  Empire,  not  because 
the  former  has  larger  natural  resources,  but  because  the 
boundless  resources  of  the  British  Empire  have  either 
been  insufficiently  developed  or  have  been  completely 
neglected.  If  the  War  should  bring  about  the  dehberate  and 
energetic  development  of  the  Empire,  and  if  the  Imperial 
domain  should  become  as  highly  developed  as  the  territory 
of  the  great  Eepublic,  the  wealth  of  the  British  Empire 
should  no  longer  be  inferior  to  that  of  the  United  States, 
but  should  be  four  times  as  great. 

Among  the  internal  problems  of  Great  Britain  which 
will  come  up  for  settlement  after  the  War,  the  reorganisation 
of  the  body  pohtic  will  probably  occupy  the  foremost  place. 
It  has  been  treated  fully  in  the  chapter,  '  Democracy  and 
the  Iron  Broom  of  War.'  Democracy  has  displayed  its 
faihngs  during  the  struggle.  The  great  problem  consists 
in  combining  liberty  and  popular  government,  which  means 
control  by  the  many,  with  efficiency  in  administration  and 
execution.  The  jointly  responsible  Cabinet  has  proved 
improvident,  dilatory,  and  extremely  inefficient.  The  reform 
introduced  by  Mr.  Lloyd  George  is  only  a  temporary  make- 
shift. The  question  will  have  to  be  settled  whether  the 
national  executive  should  b6  in  the  hands  of  a  single  man 
or  of  an  inexpert  committee.  The  views  of  the  greatest 
statesmen  of  all  times  favour  decidedly  a  one-man  executive. 
The  Americans,  when  estabhshing  their  republic,  after 
mature  consideration  and  dehberation,  chose  a  one-man 
executive.  I  believe  Great  Britain  will  be  wise  in  following 
America's    example.     The    reform    could    most    easily    be 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     13 

effected  by  making  the  Prime  Minister  solely  responsible 
for  governmental  action,  by  making  the  heads  of  the 
great  departments  the  Prime  Minister's  subordinates.  The 
American  Constitution  proved  its  excellence  in  time  of 
danger  at  the  outbreak  of  the  Civil  War.  In  the  chapter, 
'  How  America  became  a  Nation  in  Arms,'  I  have  shown 
how  a  one-man  executive  saved  the  United  States  from 
disaster.  During  the  Civil  War  the  United  States  raised 
a  gigantic  army  and  defeated  in  the  course  of  four  years 
the  rebellious  South.  That  war  destroyed  nearly  a  million 
lives  and  cost  two-thirds  of  America's  national  wealth. 
America's  Civil  War  should  be  to  the  democracies  an  in- 
spiration and  a  warning  against  unpreparedness.  Had  the 
United  States  possessed  an  army  of  30,000  men,  the  war 
would  either  not  have  broken  out  or  it  would  have  been  ended 
in  a  few  weeks.  Democracy  has  to  pay  dearly  for  its  short- 
sightedness and  neglect.  It  is  inspiring  that  an  unmilitary, 
unruly,  unorganised,  and  peaceful  people  should  have  been 
able  to  raise  a  gigantic  and  most  efficient  army.  Successful 
improvisation  should,  however,  not  blind  us  to  the  danger 
of  neglecting  mihtary  preparation  in  time  of  peace.  The 
United  States  in  1861  and  England  in  1914  were  able  to 
create  colossal  armies  because  they  were  given  sufficient 
time  to  organise  themselves  for  war.  The  greatest  latent 
resources  and  the  highest  patriotism  would  prove  unavaiHng 
if  in  a  future  war  a  strong  military  Power  should  succeed 
in  sei2dng  at  its  outbreak  the  indispensable  centres  ^  of 
resistance,  such  as  the  seats  of  the  iron  and  steel  industry. 

From  the  British  point  of  view  the  most  important 
results  of  the  War  are  two.  The  War  should  lead  to  the 
unification  of  the  Empire,  and  it  may  possibly  lead  to  the 
reunion  of  the  British  race.  I  have  advocated  for  many 
years  an  Anglo-American  reunion,  and  I  have  summed  up 
the  arguments  in  favour  of  such  a  reunion  in  the  concluding 
chapter  of  this  book. 


CHAPTEE  II 

THE   PROBLEM    OF    CONSTANTINOPLE  ^ 

As  foresight  is  the  essence  of  statesmanship,  it  seems  oppor- 
tune to  consider  the  greatest  and  most  difficult  problems 
with   which   the    future    Peace    Conference   will   have    to 
deal.     This  is  all  the  more  necessary  as  some  of  the  questions 
which  will  have  to  be  settled  may  cause  differences  among 
the  AlUes,  unless  the  nations  and  their  statesmen  have 
previously  arrived  at  some  understanding  as  to  the  great 
lines  on  which  the  settlement  should  take  place.     Such  a 
prehminary  agreement  had  unfortunately  not  been  effected 
when,  a  hundred  years  ago,   at  the  Congress  of  Vieima, 
the  entire  map  of  Europe  was  recast.     Owing  to  the  re- 
sulting differences  and  the  return  of  Napoleon  from  Elba, 
the   diplomats  hastily  concluded   a  treaty  which  left  the 
greatest    and    most    dangerous  problems  badly  solved  or 
not  solved  at  all.     Guided  by  the  principle  of  legitimacy, 
they  considered  the  claims  of  the  rulers,  but  disregarded 
those  of  the  nations.    At  the  Congress  of  Vienna,  Germany 
and  Italy  were  cut  up,  notwithstanding  the  protests  of 
the  German  and  Itahan  people.     It  was  only  natural  that 
the    work    done    in    haste    and    under   pressure    by   the 
diplomats  at  Vienna  led  to  a  series  of  avoidable  wars,  and 
especially  to  the  Wars  of  Nationahty  of  1859,  1866,  and 
1870-71,  by  which  a  united  Italy  and  a  united  Germany 
were  evolved. 

The  nations  and  their  rulers  seem  fairly  agreed  as  to 

^  The  Nineteenth  Century  and  After,  March  1915. 
14 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     15 

the  broad  principles  on  which  the  map  of  Europe  should 
be  reconstructed  at  a  future  Congress.  In  the  first  place, 
the  desires  of  the  various  nationalities  to  be  united  under  a 
Government  of  their  own  are  to  be  fulfilled.  In  the  second 
place,  territorial  rearrangement  will  be  made  which  will 
strengthen  the  peaceful  nations,  which  will  make  unHkely 
a  war  of  revenge,  and  which  will  secure  the  maintenance 
of  peace  for  a  very  long  time.  In  the  third  place,  the 
nations  which  have  fought  and  suffered  are  to  receive 
suitable  compensation,  while  those  which  have  merely 
looked  on  will  presumably  derive  little  or  no  advantage 
from  the  general  recasting  of  frontiers.  Apparently  there 
are  only  four  questions  which  might  lead  to  serious  dis- 
agreement among  the  Allies.  These  are  the  question  of 
Austria-Hungary,  the  question  of  Poland,  the  question 
of  Constantinople,  and  the  question  of  Asia  Minor.  All 
four  questions  are  closely  interwoven. 

Eussia  is  a  Power  which  is  viewed  by  many  Englishmen 
with  a  good  deal  of  distrust.  Many  people  in  this  country 
fear  that  when  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  have  been 
defeated,  Eussia  will  become  too  powerful.  They  ask. 
Where  will  be  the  counterpoise  to  Eussia  if  Germany  should 
suffer  great  territorial  losses,  and  if  the  Dual  Monarchy 
should  no  longer  form  a  single  State,  but  should  become 
dissolved  into  its  component  parts  in  accordance  with  the 
principle  of  nationahty  ?  To  many  Englishmen  who  have 
watched  with  concern  the  constant  and  apparently  irre- 
sistible progress  of  Eussia  in  Asia,  that  country  is  a 
dangerous,  aggressive  Power.  They  remember  that  many 
Eussian  generals  and  writers  have  recommended  an 
expedition  against  India ;  that  Czar  Paul,  during  his 
short  and  tragic  reign,  actually  prepared  such  a  venture  ; 
that  his  successor,  Alexander  the  First,  also  contemplated 
an  attack  on  India  by  land  ;  that  more  than  once  Eussia 
has  been  at  war  with  Great  Britain.  However,  most  of 
those  who  are  thinking  of  Eussia's  aggressiveness  and  her 
former  hostility   to   England  are   probably  unaware   that 


16  The  Problem  of  Constantinople 

her  hostility  was  not  without  cause  ;  that  England,  fearing 
that  Eussia  might  become  too  powerful,  endeavoured,  at 
the  bidding  of  her  enemies,  to  prevent  Eussia's  expansion, 
especially  in  the  direction  of  Constantinople  and  of  the 
Far  East ;  that  at  the  time  of  the  Crimean  War,  not  Eussia, 
but  England,  was  apparently  in  the  wrong  ;  that  Lord 
Beaconsfield  prevented  Eussia  reaping  the  fruit  of  her 
victory  after  her  last  war  with  Turkey  ;  that,  angered  by 
England's  attitude  and  incited  by  Bismarck  and  his 
successors,  Eussia  not  unnaturally  endeavoured  to  revenge 
herself  upon  this  country  in  the  only  part  where  it  seemed 
vulnerable. 

The  problems  of  Poland,  of  Austria-Hungary,  and  of 
Asia  Minor,  which  will  be  very  fully  considered  in  other 
chapters,  are  perhaps  less  dangerous  to  the  maintenance 
of  good  relations  among  the  AUies  than  is  that  of  Con- 
stantinople. The  question  of  Constantinople  has  for  many 
decades  been  considered  the  most  dangerous  problem  in 
Europe.  Constantinople  is  supposed  to  be  a  point  of 
vital  interest  not  only  to  Eussia,  but  to  Austria-Hungary, 
France,  Italy,  and  this  country  as  well.  As  the  Turks 
have  plunged  into  the  War  and  have  attacked  the  Allies, 
they  have  forfeited  England's  good  will  and  traditional 
protection.  The  settlement  of  the  problem  of  Constan- 
tinople can  no  longer  be  shelved.  Therefore,  it  seems 
best  to  consider  it  frankly,  dispassionately,  and  without 
prejudice. 

We  have  been  taught  in  the  past  that  '  the  possession 
of  Constantinople  will  decide  the  fate  of  the  world,'  that 
'  Constantinople  dominates  the  world,'  and  that  '  Eussia's 
possession  of  that  position  would  be  fatal  to  Great  Britain's 
position  in  India.'  In  these  circumstances  it  seems  necessary 
not  only  to  consider  the  character  of  Eussia's  foreign  policy 
and  of  the  Eussian  people,  but  to  study  the  problem  of 
Constantinople  in  the  hght'  of  history  and  with  special 
reference  to  Eussia's  future. 

Since  the  time  of  Napoleon  the  question  of  Constanti- 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     17 

nople  has  loomed  particularly  large,  and  probably  unduly 
large,  on  the  pohtical  horizon.  Apparently  the  strategical 
importance  of  Constantinople  is  at  present  generally  over- 
estimated, because  the  last  few  generations,  instead  of 
studying  critically  and  without  prejudice  the  real  impor- 
tance of  that  town,  have  been  mesmerised  by  the  pronounce- 
ments of  the  great  Corsican  warrior,  and  have  repeated 
his  celebrated  saying  that  Constantinople  is  '  the  key  of 
the  world,'  although  it  is  nothing  of  the  kind. 

According  to  many  popular  historians,  Eussia  has 
'  always  '  tried  to  wrest  India  from  England  and  to  make 
herself  mistress  of  the  world  by  seizing  Constantinople. 
From  some  of  the  most  serious  historical  books,  and  even 
from  dry  diplomatic  documents,  we  learn  that  Eussia's 
pohcy  of  seizing  with  Constantinople  the  dominion  of  the 
world  was  initiated  by  her  greatest  ruler,  Peter  the  Great, 
who  recommended  that  poHcy  to  his  successors  in  his 
celebrated  pohtical  testament.  History,  as  Napoleon  has 
told  us,  is  a  fable  convenue.  Napoleon  himself  has  skilfully 
created  a  fahle  convenue  around  the  town  of  Constantinople, 
and  most  of  the  mistaken  views  as  to  Eussia's  world-con- 
quering aims  have  been  engendered  by  that  great  genius 
who  has  mystified  England  during  a  whole  century,  and 
who  has  been  responsible  for  a  century  of  misunderstandings 
between  England  and  Eussia.  It  seems  therefore  timely 
and  necessary  to  consider  Eussia's  actions  in  the  direction 
of  Constantinople  and  of  India  by  means  of  the  most 
authoritative  documents  existing,  the  vast  majority  of 
which  are  not  given  in  English  books.  They  will  be  new 
to  most  British  readers,  and  they  may  help  in  destroying 
a  century-old  legend  which  has  served  Napoleon's  purpose 
of  sowing  enmity  between  Eussia  and  this  country. 

The  pohtical  testament  of  Peter  the  Great,  which  plays 
so  great  a  part  in  historic  and  diplomatic  hterature,  has, 
as  far  as  I  know,  not  been  translated  into  English.  There 
are  several  versions  of  that  document.  The  following  pas- 
sages, which  are  taken  from  the  combined  versions  given 


18  The  Problem  of  Constantinople 

by  Sokolnicki  and  Lesur,  are  those  which  should  be  of  the 
greatest  interest  to  English  readers  : 

Austria  should  be  induced  to  assist  in  driving  the  Turks 
out  of  Europe.  Under  that  pretext  a  standing  army  should 
be  maintained  and  shipyards  be  estabhshed  on  the  shores  of 
the  Black  Sea.  Constantly  progressing,  the  forces  should 
advance  towards  Constantinople. 

A  strict  alHance  should  be  concluded  with  England.  .  •  . 
Predominance  in  the  Baltic  and  in  the  Black  Sea  should  be 
aimed  at.  That  is  the  most  important  point.  On  it  depends 
the  rapid  success  of  the  plan. 

My  successors  should  become  convinced  of  the  truth  that 
the  trade  with  India  is  the  world  trade,  and  that  he  who 
possesses  that  trade  is  in  truth  the  master  of  Europe.  Con- 
sequently no  opportunity  for  stirring  up  war  with  Persia 
and  hastening  its  decay  should  be  lost.  Eussia  should 
penetrate  to  the  Persian  Gulf  and  endeavour  to  re-establish 
the  ancient  trade  with  the  East. 

The  influence  of  rehgion  upon  the  disunited  and  Greek 
dissenters  dwelling  in  Hungary,  Turkey,  and  Southern 
Poland  should  be  made  use  of.  They  should  be  won  over. 
Eussia  should  become  their  protector  and  obtain  spiritual 
supremacy  over  them.  .  .  . 

Soon  after  opportunities  will  become  precious.  Every- 
thing should  be  prepared  in  secret  for  the  great  coup.  In 
the  deepest  secrecy  and  the  greatest  circumspection  the 
court  of  Versailles  and  then  that  of  Vienna  should  be 
approached  with  the  object  of  sharing  with  them  the 
domination  of  the  world. 

In  the  followng  paragraphs  the  author  recommends 
that  Eussia  should  bring  about  a  world-war  ostensibly 
regarding  Turkey,  that  she  should  set  all  the  other  Great 
Powers  by  the  ears,  and  while  they  are  engaged  in  inter- 
necine struggles  seize  Constantinople,  make  war  upon  all 
her  opponents,  subdue  them,  and  make  herself  supreme 
throughout  the  world. 

Peter  the  Great  died  in  1725.  He  greatly  enlarged 
the  Eussian   frontiers,   organised,  modernised,    and   Euro- 


Great  Problems  of  British  Siatesmonship     19 

peanised  the  country,  and  fought  hard  to  give  it  an  outlet 
on  the  Swedish  Baltic,  where  he  created  Petrograd.  His 
successors,  guided  by  Catherine  the  Second,  endeavoured 
with  equal  energy  to  give  Eussia  a  second  outlet  to  the 
sea  in  the  south,  at  Turkey's  cost,  and  apparently  they 
carried  out  to  the  letter  the  recommendations  contained 
in  the  political  testament  of  Peter  the  Great.  Prophecies 
are  usually  correct  if  they  are  made  after  the  event.  The 
famous  political  testament  was  apparently  written,  not 
in  Peter  the  Great's  hfetime,  but  a  century  after,  when 
Eussia  had  succeeded  in  acquiring  the  shores  of  the  Black 
Sea  and  had  become  the  leader  of  the  Slav  nations  belonging 
to  the  Greek  Church.  Peter  the  Great's  political  testament 
was  first  published  in  a  book,  '  De  la  Politique  et  des  Progres 
de  la  Puissance  Eusse,'  written  by  Lesur  in  1811,  at  a  time 
when  Napoleon  had  resolved  upon  a  war  with  Eussia. 
It  was  published  to  influence  European,  and  especially 
Enghsh,  opinion  against  that  country.  According  to 
Berkholz  ('  Napoleon  I,  Auteur  du  Testament  de  Pierre 
le  Grand  '),  Napoleon  himself  was  the  author.  The  abrupt 
telegraphic  style  of  the  composition  indeed  greatly  resembles 
that  of  its  putative  author.  The  best  informed  now 
generally  consider  the  will  of  Peter  the  Great  to  be  a  forgery. 
Bismarck,  who  was  on  the  most  intimate  terms  with  Czar 
Alexander  the  Second,  described  it  as  '  apocryphal '  in 
the  fifth  chapter  of  his  '  Memoirs.'  The  value  of  Peter 
the  Great's  v/ill  as  a  document  revealing  the  traditional 
pohcy  and  traditions  of  Eussia  is  nil. 

The  desire  of  Peter  the  Great's  successors  to  conquer 
the  Turkish  territory  to  the  south  of  Eussia,  and  to  acquire 
for  the  country  an  outlet  on  the  Black  Sea,  was  not  un- 
natural, for  at  a  time  when  transport  by  land  was  almost 
a  physical  impossibihty  in  Eussia  the  country  could  be 
opened  up  and  developed  only  by  means  of  hor  splendid 
natural  waterways  and  of  seaports.  As  Eussia's  most 
fruitful  territories  are  in  the  south,  access  to  the  Black 
Sea  was  for  her  development  far  more  important  than  an 


20  The  Problem  of  Consiantinaple 

opening  on  the  Baltic.  Besides,  to  the  deeply  religious 
Eussians  a  war  with  the  Turks  was.  up  to  the  most  recent 
times,  a  Holy  War.  a  kind  of  crusade.  The  Empress 
Catherine  succeeded  in  conquering  the  shores  of  the  Black 
Sea,  but  failed  in  conquering  Constantinople,  which  she 
desired  to  take.  With  this  object  in  view  she  proposed 
the  partition  of  Turkey  to  Austria  in  the  time  of  Maria 
Theresa  and  of  Joseph  the  Second.  Ac<?ording  to  her 
historian  Castera,  she  urged  the  Minister  of  France  to 
advise  his  Government  that  France  should  join  Eussia 
for  the  purpose  of  partitioning  the  Turkish  Empire.  As 
a  reward  she  offered  Egypt  to  France,  the  conquest  of 
which  she  beheved  to  be  easy. 

Catherine's  offer  of  Egypt  to  France  is  significant,  and 
shoidd  be  carefully  noted.  For  centuries  France,  guided 
by  a  sure  instinct  of  territorial  values,  had  been  hankering 
after  the  possession  of  Egypt,  seeing  in  that  country  a 
door  to  the  lands  of  the  Far  East  and  one  of  the  most 
important  strategical  positions  in  the  world.  The  great 
historian  Sorel  wrote  in  '  Bonaparte  et  Hoche  en  1797  ' 
that  the  possession  of  Egypt  was  '  le  reve  qui,  depuis  les 
croissades,  hante  les  imaginations  francaises.' 

France  hungered  after  Egypt.  Her  thinkers  had 
planned  the  construction  of  the  Suez  Canal  a  century 
before  de  Lesseps.  After  the  outbreak  of  the  Eevolution 
her  historic  ambition  seemed  likely  to  be  fulfilled.  The 
French  Eepubhc  was  at  war  with  England  and  Eussia. 
England  might  be  attacked  in  India  by  way  of  Egypt, 
and  Egypt  might,  at  the  same  time,  be  made  a  base  of 
operations  for  an  attack  upon  Eussia  in  the  Black  Sea  in 
conjunction  with  Turkey.  While  England  and  Eussia 
were  thus  being  attacked  a  revolution  should  be  engineered 
in  Ireland  to  complete  England's  discomfiture.  On  the 
23rd  Germinal  of  the  year  VI — that  is,  on  April  12,  1798 — 
the  Directoire  appointed  the  youthful  General  Bonaparte 
commander  of  the  Armee  d'Orient,  and  ordered  him  to  take 
Egypt,  to  cut  the  Suez  Canal,  and  to  secure  to  the  French 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     21 

Eepnblic  the  free  and  exclusive  possession  of  the  Eed  Sea. 
The  aim  and  object  of  that  expedition,  and  of  the  greater 
plan  of  operations  of  which  it  was  to  be  a  part,  is  clearly 
and  fully  disclosed  in  a  lengthy  memorandmn  on  the  foreign 
situation,  written  by  Talleyrand,  who  at  the  time  was  the 
French  ISlinister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  and  placed  by  him 
before  the  Directoire  on  July  10,  1798.  We  read  in  that 
most  valuable  and  most  interesting  document  : 

Si  Bonaparte  s'etabht  en  Egypte,  quand  il  aura  dirige 
une  part  de  ses  forces  contre  les  Anglais  dans  I'lnde,  qui 
empechera  que  la  flotte  franeaise,  penetrant  dans  la  Mer 
Noire  et  s'unissant  a  celle  des  Turcs,  aille,  pour  consohder 
cette  puissance  de  Toccupation  de  TEgypte,  I'aider  a  recon- 
querir  la  Crimee  qui  est  pour  elle  d'un  bien  autre  interet 
que  cette  region  Hvree  depuis  des  siecles  aux  rerokes  des 
beys  ?  n  n'y  aura  pas  toujours  dans  la  Mediterranee  une 
nombreuse  liotte  angkise.  Attaques  dans  Tlnde,  menaces 
cur  leurs  cotes,  frappes  au  coeur  de  leur  puissance  par 
I'insurrection  de  I'lrlande,  dont  les  progres  peuvent  d'un 
moment  a  Tautre  desorganiser  leur  armee  navale,  ils  doivent 
finir  par  abandonner  la  station  qu'ils  auront  etablie  au  fond 
de  la  Mediterranee,  et  des  lors  pour  que  nous  soyons  bien 
recus.  La  destruction  de  Cherson  et  de  Sebastopol  serait  a 
la  fois  la  plus  juste  vengeance  de  Tachamement  rnsense 
des  Piusses,  et  le  meilleur  moyen  de  negociation  avec  les 
Turcs  pour  en  obtenir  tout  ce  qui  pourrait  consoHder  notre 
etabhssement  en  Afrique.  ... 

L'expedition  de  Bonaparte,  s'il  met  pied  en  Egypte, 
assure  la  destruction  de  la  puissance  britannique  dans  I'lnde. 

Deja  Make  est  en  notre  pouvoir  ;  ce  succes  miraculeux 
serait  seul  un  coup  terrible  pour  le  commerc-e  de  I'Angleterre, 
et  quand  notre  armement  n'obtiendrait  pas  un  autre  fruit, 
celui-la  serait  suffisant.  ^Mais  des  attentes  encore  plus 
sensibles  sont  reservees  a  cette  nation,  hvree  a  tons  les 
dechirements  interieurs  qu'elle  a  si  longtemps  entretenus 
chez  nous.  L 'insurrection  de  I'lrlande,  cimentee  deja  par 
le  sang  de  quelques  victimes  celebres,  parait  faire  des  progres 
remarquables.  C'est  dans  cette  contree  que  doivent  aboutir 
maintenant  tous  nos  efforts.    Des  armes,  des  munitions,  des 


22  The  Problem  of  Constantinople 

hommes  liatons-nous  de  les  y  porter,  rendons  a  I'Angleterre 
les  rnaux  qu'olle  nous  a  faits.  Qu'une  Kepublique  s'eleve  a 
cote  d'elle  pour  son  instruction  ou  pour  son  chatiment.  .  .  . 
Si  nous  sommes  bientot  en  mesure  de  faire  ce  que  j'ai 
indique  en  parlant  de  la  Eussie,  au  moins  d'en  annoncer 
I'intention,  je  ne  doute  pas  que  la  Porte  ne  sente  le  prix 
de  ce  service  et  n'associe  ses  forces  aux  notres  pour  repousser 
la  Eussie  loin  des  bords  de  la  Mer  Noire. 

The  war  programme  of  the  French  Directoire  against 
England,  which  included  an  attack  on  Egypt,  an  expedition 
against  India,  the  support  of  Turkey,  the  raising  of  Ireland 
in  rebellion,  and  war  upon  British  commerce,  bears  a  curious 
resemblance  to  the  comprehensive  and  world-wide  war  plans 
of  modern  Germany. 

Napoleon  seized  the  Government  of  France  and  became 
the  heir  of  the  grandiose  world-embracing  policy  of  the 
Eepublic.  He  took  up  the  plan  which  was  designed  to 
destroy  simultaneously  the  power  of  England  and  Eussia 
and  to  make  France  all-powerful  throughout  the  world. 
Catherine  the  Second,  the  great  enemy  of  the  French  Eevolu- 
tion,  had  died  in  1796,  and  had  been  succeeded  by  the 
weak,  eccentric,  violent,  and  scarcely  sane  Czar  Paul  the 
First.  During  the  first  years  of  his  reign  he  also  was  hostile 
to  revolutionary  France  and  had  made  war  upon  that 
country,  but  in  1800  he  quarrelled  with  England.  Napoleon 
at  once  utiHsed  the  opportunity  and  persuaded  him  to 
attack  England  in  Asia  in  conjunction  with  France.  In 
O'Meara's  book,  '  Napoleon  on  St.  Helena,'  we  read  that 
Napoleon  described  to  his  Irish  surgeon  the  invasion  planned 
in  the  time  of  Paul  the  First  as  follows  : 

If  Paul  had  lived  you  would  have  lost  India  before  now. 
An  agreement  was  made  between  Paul  and  myself  to  invade 
it.  I  furnished  the  plan.  I  was  to  have  sent  thirty  thousand 
good  troops.  He  was  to  send  a  similar  number  of  the  best 
Eussian  soldiers  and  forty  thousand  Cossacks.  I  was  to 
subscribe  ten  milKons  for  the  purchase  of  camels  and  other 
requisites  for  crossing  the  desert.     The  King  of  Prussia  was 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship      23 

to  have  been  applied  to  by  both  of  us  to  grant  a  passage  for 
my  troops  through  his  dominions,  which  would  have  been 
immediately  granted.  I  had  at  the  same  time  made  a 
demand  to  the  King  of  Persia  for  a  passage  through  his 
country,  which  would  also  have  been  granted,  although  the 
negotiations  were  not  entirely  concluded,  but  would  have 
succeeded,  as  the  Persians  were  desirous  of  profiting  by  it 
themselves.  My  troops  were  to  have  gone  to  Warsaw,  to 
be  joined  by  the  Russians  and  Cossacks,  and  to  have  marched 
from  thence  to  the  Caspian  Sea,  where  they  would  have 
either  embarked  or  have  proceeded  by  land,  according  to 
circumstances.  I  was  beforehand  with  you  in  sending  an 
Ambassador  to  Persia  to  make  interest  there.  Since  that 
time  your  ministers  have  been  imbeciles  enough  to  allow 
the  Russians  to  get  four  provinces,  which  increase  their 
territories  beyond  the  mountains.  The  first  year  of  war 
that  you  will  have  with  the  Russians  they  will  take  India 
from  you. 

It  will  be  noticed  that  Napoleon  did  not  suggest  to  Russia 
an  advance  upon  India  by  way  of  Constantinople,  but  by 
way  of  the  Caspian  Sea,  by  a  route  similar  to  that  which 
she  would  follow  at  the  present  time,  when  an  expedition 
against  India  would  be  carried  by  the  railways  running 
from  the  Caspian  Sea  and  the  Aral  Sea  towards  the  north- 
west frontier  of  India.  That  is  worth  bearing  in  mind 
if  we  vfish  to  inquire  whether  Russia's  occupation  of  Con- 
stantinople would  threaten  India. 

Paul  the  First  was  assassinated  in  1801  before  he  could 
embark  upon  his  fantastic  expedition,  and  was  succeeded 
by  his  eldest  son,  Alexander  the  First.  Born  in  1777, 
Alexander  came  to  the  throne  as  a  youth  of  twenty-four. 
He  had  been  educated  by  the  Swiss  philosopher  Laharpe 
in  accordance  with  the  principles  of  Rousseau.  The  great 
Polish  statesman.  Prince  Adam  Czartoryski,  an  intimate 
friend  of  his  youth  and  of  his  maturer  age,  drew  the  follow- 
ing portrait  of  Alexander  in  his  '  Memoirs  '  : 

Young,  candid,  inoffensive,  thinking  only  of  philan- 
thropy and  hberalism,  passionately  desirous  of  doing  good, 


24  The  Problem  of  Constantinople 

but  often  incapable  of  distinguishing  it  from  evil,  he  had 
seen  with  equal  aversion  the  wars  of  Catherine  and  the 
despotic  foUios  of  Paul,  and  when  he  ascended  the  throne 
he  cast  aside  all  the  ideas  of  avidity,  astuteness,  and  grasp- 
ing ambition  wliich  were  the  soul  of  the  old  Eussian 
policy.  Peter's  vast  projects  were  ignored  for  a  time,  and 
Alexander  devoted  himself  entirely  to  internal  reforms, 
with  the  serious  intention  of  making  his  Eussian  and  other 
subjects  as  happy  as  they  could  be  in  their  present  condi- 
tion. Later  on  he  was  carried  away,  almost  against  his 
will,  into  the  natural  current  of  Eussian  poHcy,  but  at  first 
he  held  entirely  aloof  from  it,  and  this  is  the  reason  why 
he  was  not  really  popular  in  Eussia. 

Alexander  was  a  good  man  and  a  great  idealist.  His 
dearest  wish  was  to  free  the  serfs  and  to  make  the  people 
happy  and  prosperous.  General  Savary,  Napoleon's  tempo- 
rary Ambassador  in  Eussia,  reported  to  him  on  Novem- 
ber 4,  1807,  the  following  words  of  the  Czar  :  '  Je  veux 
sortir  la  nation  de  cet  etat  de  barbaric.  Je  dis  meme 
plus,  si  la  civilisation  etait  assez  avancee,  j'abolirais  cet 
esclavage,  dut-il  m'en  couter  la  tete.'  Alexander  the  First, 
like  the  recent  occupant  of  the  throne,  Nicholas  the  Second, 
was  a  warm-hearted  idealist,  a  lover  of  mankind,  and  a 
friend  of  peace,  anxious  to  elevate  Eussia  and  to  introduce 
the  necessary  reforms.  However,  Alexander  the  First,  like 
Nicholas  the  Second,  was  forced  into  a  great  war  against 
liis  will. 

In  a  number  of  campaigns  Napoleon  had  subdued  the 
Continent,  and  the  French  longed  for  peace.  Still  Napoleon 
desired  to  carry  out  the  great  policy  of  the  Directoire,  to 
destroy  the  power  of  England  and  Eussia  and  make  France 
supreme  in  the  world.  But  as  long  as  the  Continent  was 
ready  to  rise  against  the  French,  Napoleon  could  not  safely 
enter  upon  a  lengthy  campaign  in  far-away  Eussia.  He 
feared  Eussia  as  an  opponent  as  long  as  Europe  was  un- 
wiUing  to  bear  his  yoke.  An  alhance  with  Eussia  would 
have  been  invaluable  to  him.     By  securing  Eussia's  support 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     25 

he  could  hope  to  hold  Prussia  and  Austria  in  awe  and  to 
attack,  or  at  least  to  threaten,  England  in  India.  Russia's 
support  could  best  be  secured  by  promising  to  her  exphcitly, 
or  at  least  impHcitly,  the  possession  of  Constantinople 
and  by  making  her  believe  that  she  was  not  interested  in 
the  fate  of  the  other  European  States,  that  their  enslave- 
ment by  Napoleon  was  no  concern  of  hers.  In  December 
1805,  while  he  was  at  war  with  Eussia,  Napoleon  significantly 
said  to  Prince  Dolgoruki,  the  Czar's  aide-de-camp,  who  had 
been  sent  to  him,  according  to  the  Prince's  report  of  the 
23rd  of  that  month,  pubhshed  by  Tatistcheff : 

Que  veut-on  de  moi  ?  Pourquoi  Temper eur  Alexandre 
me  fait-il  la  guerre  ?  Que  lui  faut-il  ?  II  n'a  qu'a  etendre 
les  frontieres  de  la  Eussie  aux  depens  de  ses  voisins,  des 
Turcs  surtout.  Sa  querelle  avec  la  France  tomberait  alors 
d'elle-meme.  ...  La  Eussie  doit  suivre  une  tout  autre 
poHtique  et  ne  se  preoccuper  que  de  ses  propres  interets. 

While,  in  vague  words,  Napoleon  promised  to  Alexander 
the  First  the  possession  of  Turkey,  he  endeavoured  to 
raise  the  Turks  against  the  Eussians.  On  June  20,  1806, 
Napoleon  dictated,  in  his  characteristic  abrupt  style,  the 
following  instruction  for  the  guidance  of  General  Sebastiani, 
the  French  Ambassador  in  Turkey,  which  will  be  found  in 
Driault,  '  La  Pohtique  Orientale  de  Napoleon  '  : 

1.  Inspirer  confiance  et  securite  a  la  Porte,  la  France  ne 
veut  que  la  fortifier. 

2.  Triple  Alhance  de  Moi,  Porte  et  Perse  contre  Eussie 

7.  Fermer  lo  Bosphore  aux  Eusses,  fermer  tous  les  ports, 
rendre  a  la  Porte  son  empire  absolu  sur  la  Moldavie  et  la 
Valachie. 

8.  Je  ne  veux  point  partager  I'Empire  de  Constantinople, 
vouliit-on  m'en  offrir  les  trois  quarts,  je  n'en  veux  point. 
Je  veux  raffermir  et  consolider  ce  grand  empire  et  m'en 
servir  tel  quel  comme  opposition  a  la  Eussie. 

In  1806  Napoleon  made  war  upon  Prussia.  In  October 
of  that  year  the  Prussians  were  totally  defeated  at  Jena 


26  The  Problem  of  Constantinople 

and    Auerstadt.     The    Eussians    came    to    their    aid,    and 
Napoleon  feared  a  lengthy  campaign  so  far  from  his  base. 
On  February  7  and  8,  1807,  he  defeated  the  Eussians  at 
Eylau.     However,  the  French  suffered  such  fearful  losses 
that  Napoleon's  position  was  seriously  endangered.     Hence 
he  urgently  desired  to  make  peace  with  Eussia.     Eelying 
upon    the    youth,    the    generous    enthusiasm,    the    warm- 
heartedness, the  lack  of  suspicion,  and  the  inexperience  of 
Alexander  the  First,   Napoleon  attempted  once   more   to 
convert  liis  enemy  into  a  friend  and  ally  and  wiUing  tool. 
With  this  object  in  view  he  caused  articles  to  be  pubhshed 
in   the    papers    advocating    a   reconcihation   of    Napoleon 
and  Alexander  in  the  interests  of  humanity,  and  recommend- 
ing joint  action  by  France  and  Eussia  against  England, 
the  enemy  of  mankind.     Napoleon  knew  how  to  convey 
indirectly  to  the   Czar  numerous  messages  expressing  his 
sorrow   at   the   fearful   and  needless   slaughter,   his  desire 
for   peace,  his   goodwill   for   Eussia,  and  his  high  esteem 
for  Eussia's  youthful  ruler.     Alexander  became  interested 
in  Napoleon's  suggestions,  and  at  last  became  infatuated 
by  him.     He  had  been  fascinated  by  Napoleon's  success. 
He   was   keenly    aware    of    the    backwardness   of   Eussia. 
Desiring  to  advance  his  country,  he  wished  to  learn  from 
his  great  antagonist  the  art  of  government  and  administra- 
tion,  for  in  Napoleon  he  chiefly   admired   the  organiser. 
On  June  14,  1807,  Napoleon  severely  defeated  the  Eussians 
at  Friedland,   and  the  Czar,  following  the  advice  of  his 
generals,  asked  Napoleon  for  peace.     A  few  days  later  the 
celebrated  meeting  of  the  two  monarchs  in  a  httle  pavihon 
erected  on  a  raft  anchored  in  the  river  Niemen  took  place. 
According  to  Tatistcheff,  the  Czar's  first  words  to  Napoleon 
were,    '  Sire,   je   liais  les   Anglais   autant   que   vous,'   and 
Napoleon  replied,  '  En  ce  cas  la  paix  est  faite.' 

On  the  Niemen,  and  at  the  prolonged  meeting  of  the 
monarchs  at  Tilsit  which  followed.  Napoleon  unceasingly 
preached  to  the  Czar  the  necessity  of  Franco-Eussian 
co-operation  in  the  interests  of  peace,  and  the  necessity 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     27 

of  breaking  the  naval  tyranny  of  England.  He  suggested 
to  Alexander  that  he  should  seize  Turkey,  spoke  of  the 
Turks  as  barbarians,  and  proposed  that  the  two  monarchs, 
after  having  destroyed  the  power  of  England  by  an  attack 
upon  India,  should  share  between  them  the  dominion  of 
the  world.  He  urged  that  they  should  conclude  at  the 
same  time  a  treaty  of  peace  and  a  treaty  of  alhance  which 
provided  for  their  co-operation  throughout  the  world. 
Taking  advantage  of  the  Czar's  easily  aroused  enthusiasm 
and  of  his  lack  of  guile,  Napoleon  dehberately  fooled 
Alexander  the  First  and  tricked  him  into  an  alhance  with 
France  by  which  all  the  advantages  fell  to  Napoleon.  How 
the  Czar  was  treated  is  described  as  follows  in  his  '  Memoirs  ' 
by  Talleyrand,  who  drafted  the  Treaty  of  Tilsit : 

In  the  course  of  the  conferences  preceding  the  Treaty  of 
Tilsit  the  En^peror  Napoleon  often  spoke  to  the  Czar  Alex- 
ander of  Moldavia  and  Wallachia  as  provinces  destined 
some  day  to  become  Eussian.  Affecting  to  be  carried  away 
by  some  irresistible  impulse,  and  to  obey  the  decrees  of 
Providence,  he  spoke  of  the  division  of  European  Turkey 
as  inevitable.  He  then  indicated,  as  if  inspired,  the  general 
basis  of  the  sharing  of  that  empire,  a  portion  of  which  was 
to  fall  to  Austria  in  order  to  gratify  her  pride  rather  than 
her  ambition. 

A  shrewd  mind  could  easily  notice  the  effect  produced 
upon  the  mind  of  Alexander  by  all  those  fanciful  dreams. 
Napoleon  watched  him  attentively  and,  as  soon  as  he 
noticed  that  the  prospects  held  out  allured  the  Czar's 
imagination,  he  informed  Alexander  that  letters  from  Paris 
necessitated  his  immediate  return  and  gave  orders  for  the 
treaty  to  be  drafted  at  once. 

My  instructions  on  the  subject  of  that  treaty  were  that  no 
allusion  to  a  partition  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  should  appear 
in  it,  nor  even  to  the  future  fate  of  the  two  provinces  of 
Wallachia  and  Moldavia.  These  instructions  were  strictly 
carried  out.  Napoleon  thus  left  Tilsit,  having  made  pros- 
pective arrangements  which  could  serve  him  as  ho  pleased 
for  the  accomphshment  of  his  other  designs.     He  had  not 


28  The  Problem  of  Constantinople 

bound  himself  at  all,  whereas,  by  the  prospects  he  held  out, 
he  had  allured  the  Czar  Alexander  and  placed  him,  in  rela- 
tion to  Turkey,  in  a  doubtful  position  which  might  enable 
the  Cabinet  of  the  Tuileries  to  bring  forth  other  preten- 
sions untouched  in  the  treaty. 

According  to  the  Treaty  of  Tilsit,  which  was  signed 
on  July  7,  1807,  Napoleon  and  Alexander  were  to  support 
one  another  on  land  and  sea  with  the  whole  of  their  armed 
forces.  The  alhance  was  defensive  and  offensive.  The 
two  nations  were  to  act  in  common  in  making  war  and  in 
concluding  peace.  Kussia  was  to  act  as  mediator  between 
England  and  France,  and  to  request  England  to  give  up 
to  France  and  her  Allies  all  her  conquests  made  since  1805. 
If  England  should  refuse  to  submit,  Kussia  was  to  make 
war  upon  England.  Thus  the  duties  of  the  Czar  under 
the  Treaty  of  Alhance  were  clearly  outlined.  The  corre- 
sponding advantages,  however,  were  only  vaguely  hinted 
at.  Only  the  last  article.  Article  8,  treated  of  Turkey,  and 
it  was  worded  as  follows  : 

Pareillement,  si  par  une  suite  des  changements  qui 
viennent  de  se  faire  a  Constantinople,  la  Porte  n'acceptait 
pas  la  mediation  de  la  France,  ou  si,  apres  qu'elle  I'aura 
acceptee,  il  arrivait  que,  dans  le  delai  de  trois  mois  apres 
I'ouverture  des  negociations,  elles  n'eussent  pas  conduit  a 
un  resultat  satisfaisani,  la  France  fera  cause  commune  avec 
la  Eussie  contre  la  Porte  Ottomane,  et  les  deux  hautes 
parties  contractantes  s'entendront  pour  soustraire  toutes  les 
provinces  de  I'Empire  ottoman  en  Europe,  la  ville  de  Con- 
stantinople et  le  province  de  Eomelie  exceptees,  au  joug  et 
aux  vexations  des  Turcs. 

In  return  for  making  war  upon  England,  Alexander 
the  First  received  merely  the  promise  that  in  certain 
eventualities  France  and  Eussia  would  act  together  against 
Turkey,  and  that  in  the  event  of  such  joint  action  they 
would  come  to  an  understanding  with  a  view  to  freeing 
all  the  European  provinces  of  Turkey  from  the  Turks. 
However,    Constantinople   and   the   Province   of   Eumelia 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship)      29 

were  to  be  reserved,  and  not  to  be  partitioned  by  the  Allies. 
In  return  for  valuable  service,  Alexander  the  First  received 
merely  a  vague  and  worthless  promise. 

As,  in  numerous  conversations,  Napoleon  had  promised 
to  Alexander  all  he  could  desire,  and  as  the  Czar  imphcitly 
beheved  in  his  new  friend,  he  probably  did  not  look  too 
closely  into  the  wording  of  the  one-sided  treaty,  and  left 
Tilsit  full  of  admiration  for  the  Emperor  of  the  French. 
Meanwhile  Napoleon  began  a  most  cynical  game  with 
Alexander.  Although  the  Treaty  of  Tilsit  did  not  provide 
for  the  partition  of  Turkey,  Napoleon  continued  using 
the  partition  of  Turkey  as  a  bait  with  which  to  secure 
Russia's  support  against  England.  He  went  even  so  far 
as  to  offer  her,  though  only  verbally,  Constantinople  itself. 
On  November  7,  1807,  Count  Tolstoi,  the  Czar's  repre- 
sentative in  France,  reported  to  Alexander  that  Napoleon 
had  offered  Constantinople  to  Russia  in  the  following 
words  : 

II  (Napoleon)  me  dit  que  lui  ne  voyait  aucun  avantage 
pour  la  France  au  demembrement  de  I'empire  ottoman,  qu'il 
ne  demandait  pas  mieux  que  de  garantir  son  integrite,  qu'il 
le  preferait  memo.  .  .  .  Cependent,  que  si  nous  tenions 
infiniment  a  la  possession  de  la  Moldavie  et  de  la  Valachie, 
il  s'y  preterait  volontiers  et  qu'il  nous  of&i'ait  le  thalweg 
du  Danube,  mais  que  ce  serait  a  condition  qu'il  put  s'en 
dedommager  aillem'S. 

II  consent  meme  a  un  plus  grand  partage  de  Tempire 
ottoman  s'il  pouvait  entrer  dans  les  plans  de  la  Russie.  II 
m'autorise  a  offrir  Constantinople,  car  il  m'assure  de  n'avoir 
contracts  aucun  engagement  avec  le  gouvernoment  turc, 
et  de  n'avoir  aucune  vue  sur  cette  capitale.  .  .  .  Dans  la 
troisieme  supposition  qui  annoncerait  un  entier  demembre- 
ment de  la  Turquie  europeenne,  il  consent  a  une  extension 
pour  la  Russie  jusqu'a  Constantinople,  cette  capitale  y 
comprise,  contre  des  acquisitions  sur  lesquelles  il  ne  s'est 
point  expUque. 

Under    unspecified    circumstances    Napoleon    verbally 


30  The  Problem  of  Constantinople 

agreed    to    Eussia's    occupying    Constantinople    in    return 
for  equally  unspecified  compensations  for  France  ! 

While,  on  November  7,  1807,  Napoleon  professed  to 
be  completely  indifferent  to  Turkey's  fate,  and  expressed 
his  willingness  to  the  Eussian  Ambassador  that  Eussia 
should  have  Constantinople,  he  sent  five  days  later,  on 
November  12,  instructions  to  M.  de  Caulaincourt,  the 
French  Ambassador  in  Petrograd,  in  which  he  frankly 
stated  that  he  desired  the  maintenance  of  Turkey's  integrity, 
and  that  he  had  put  the  project  of  partitioning  Turkey 
before  Alexander  solely  for  the  purpose  of  attaching  him 
to  France  with  the  bonds  of  hope.  In  these  most  important 
instructions  to  Caulaincourt  we  read  : 

Cette  chute  de  I'empire  ottoman  pent  etre  desiree  par 
le  cabinet  de  Petersbourgh  :  on  sait  qu'elle  est  inevitable, 
mais  il  n'est  point  de  la  pohtique  des  deux  cours  imperiales 
de  I'accelerer  ;  elles  doivent  la  reculer  jusqu'au  moment 
ou  le  partage  de  ces  vastes  debris  pourra  se  faire  d'une 
maniere  plus  avantageuse  pour  I'une  et  pour  I'autre  et  ou 
elles  n'auront  pas  a  craindre  qu'une  puissance  actuellement 
leur  ennemie  s'en  approprie,  par  la  possession  de  I'Egypte 
et  des  lies,  les  plus  riches  depouilles.  C'est  la  plus  forte 
objection  de  I'Empereur  contre  le  partage  de  I'empire 
ottoman. 

To  these  instructions  Napoleon  added  himself  the 
following  marginal  note  emphasising  his  desire  to  preserve 
the  integrity  of  Turkey  : 

Ainsi,  le  veritable  desir  de  I'Empereur  dans  ce  moment 
est  que  I'empire  ottoman  reste  dans  son  integrite  actuelle, 
vivant  en  paix  avec  la  Eussie  et  la  France,  ayant  pour 
limites  le  thalweg  du  Danube  plus  les  places  que  la  Turquie 
a  sur  ce  fleuve.  .  .  . 

The  instructions  to  M.  de  Caulaincourt  then  continued 
as  follows  : 

Telles  sont  done,  Monsieur,  sur  ce  point  important  de 
politique,  les  intentions  de  I'Empereur.     Ce  qu'il  prefererait 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship      81 

a  tout  serait  que  les  Turcs  pussent  rester  en  paisible  posses- 
sion de  la  Valachie  et  de  la  Moldavie.  .  .  . 

Et  enfin,  quoique  tres  eloigne  du  partage  de  I'empire 
turc  et  regardant  cette  mesure  comme  funeste,  il  ne  veut 
pas  qu'en  vous  expliquant  avec  I'Empereur  Alexandre  et 
son  ministre,  vous  la  condamniez  d'une  maniere  absolue  : 
mais  il  vous  prescrit  de  representor  avec  force  les  motifs  qui 
doivent  en  faire  reculer  I'epoque.  Get  antique  projet  de 
I'ambition  russe  est  un  lien  qui  peut  attacher  la  Eussie 
a  la  France  et,  sous  ce  point  de  vue,  il  faut  se  garder  de 
decourager  entierement  ses  esperances. 

After  informing  his  Ambassador  that  the  projected 
partition  of  Turkey  was  nothing  but  a  piece  of  deception 
whereby  to  secure  Alexander's  support,  Napoleon  told 
him  in  the  same  instructions  that  the  projected  Franco- 
Kussian  expedition  against  India  was  a  sham,  and  that  he 
had  put  it  forward  only  with  the  object  of  frightening  the 
English  into  making  peace.  That  most  extraordinary  and 
most  significant  passage  runs  as  follows  : 

On  pourra  songer  a  une  expedition  dans  les  Indes  ;  plus 
elle  parait  chimerique,  plus  la  tentative  qui  en  serait  faite 
(et  que  ne  peuvent  la  France  et  la  Eussie  ?)  epouvanterait 
les  Anglais.  La  terreur  semee  dans  les  Indes  Anglaises 
repandrait  la  confusion  a  Londres,  et  certainement  quarante 
mille  Fran^ais  auxquels  la  Porte  aurait  accorde  passage  par 
Constantinople,  se  joignant  a  quarante  mille  Eusses  venus 
par  le  Caucase,  suffiraient  pour  epouvanter  I'Asie  et  pour 
en  faire  la  conquete.  C'est  dans  de  pareilles  vues  que 
I'Empereur  a  laisse  I'ambassadeur  qu'il  avait  nomme  pour 
la  Perse  se  rendre  a  sa  destination. 

Napoleon's  saying,  '  The  more  fantastic  an  attempt  to 
attack  India  will  be,  the  more  it  will  frighten  the  Enghsh,' 
is  very  amusing.  There  is  some  reason  in  Ms  observation. 
England  is  more  easily  frightened  by  bogies  than  by  reah- 
ties,  and  one  of  the  bogies  which  has  frightened  her  most 
frequently  during  many  decades  is  the  bogey  of  Constanti- 
nople which  Napoleon  set  up  a  century  ago. 


32  The  Problem  of  Constantinople 

Being  carried  away  by  his  enthusiasm  and  simple 
trustfulness,  Alexander  the  First,  remembering  and  often 
repeating  the  words  which  Napoleon  had  uttered  at  Tilsit, 
beheved  that  Constantinople  was  in  his  grasp.  However, 
he  and  his  advisers  doubted  that  the  joint  expedition 
against  India  projected  by  Napoleon  was  easy  to  carry 
out.  According  to  Caulaincourt's  report  of  December  31, 
1807,  Alexander  the  First  and  his  minister  received  with 
some  reserve  the  French  proposals  relating  to  that  expedi- 
tion. They  obviously  estimated  more  correctly  the  diffi- 
culties which  such  an  undertaking  would  encounter  owing 
to  the  vast  distances  and  the  wildness  of  the  route.  They 
did  not  share  the  illusions  of  Paul  the  First. 

The  French  Ambassador  in  Eussia  was  in  constant 
and  intimate  relations  with  Alexander  the  First,  and  he 
reported  his  conversations  like  an  accomphshed  shorthand- 
writer.  According  to  a  conversation  with  the  Czar,  which 
he  communicated  to  Napoleon  on  January  21,  1808, 
Napoleon  himself  had  admitted  at  Tilsit  the  impossibihty 
of  striking  at  India  by  a  march  overland.  The  Ambas- 
sador reported  : 

Alexandre  I :  L'Empereur  (Napoleon)  m'en  a  parle  a 
Tilsit.  Je  suis  entre  la-dessus  en  detail  avec  lui.  II  m'a 
paru  convaincu  comme  moi  que  c'etait  impossible. 

L'Ambassadeur  :  Les  choses  impossibles  sont  ordinaire- 
ment  celles  qui  reussissent  le  mieux,  parce  que  ce  sont  celles 
auxquelles  on  s'attend  le  moins. 

Alexandre  I :  Mais  les  distances,  les  subsistances,  les 
deserts  ? 

L'Ambassadeur  :  Les  troupes  de  Votre  Majeste  qui 
sont  venues  d'Irkoutsk  en  Autriche  ou  en  Pologne  ont  fait 
plus  de  chemin  qu'il  n'y  en  a  des  frontieres  de  son  empire 
dans  rinde.  Quant  aux  subsistances,  le  biscuit  est  si  sain 
et  si  portatif  qu'on  pent  en  emporter  beaucoup  avec  peu  de 
transport.     Tout  n'est  pas  desert. 

Alexandre  I :  Mais  par  ou  pensez-vous  nos  armees 
devraient  passer  ? 

L'Ambassadeur  :    II  faudrait  prealablement  des  conven- 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship      33 

tions  avec  la  Perse  et  la  Turquie.  L'Armee  frangaise, 
par  exemple,  en  ferait  une  avec  la  Porte,  puis  que  Constanti- 
nople est  son  chemin  naturel.  Celle  de  Votre  Majeste 
passerait  par  le  Caucase,  si  on  n'avait  pas  les  moyens  neces- 
saires  pour  lui  faire  traverser  la  mer  Caspienne. 

Alexandre  I :  Mon  cher  general,  c'est  un  bien  grand 
projet.     Mais  que  de  difficultes,  pour  ne  pas  dire  plus. 

While  in  the  time  of  Paul  the  First  the  combined 
French  and  Eussian  armies  were  to  march  upon  India  via 
Warsaw  and  the  Caspian  Sea,  Napoleon  now  proposed  that 
the  French  army  should  march  via  Constantinople.  He 
evidently  sought  for  a  pretext  of  occupying  and  controlKng 
that  town  and  the  Straits,  and  with  them  the  Eussian  Black 
Sea.  Meanwhile  he  continued  playing  with  Alexander. 
On  February  2,  1808,  he  wrote  to  his  Ambassador  in  Eussia 
that  he  was  on  the  point  of  arranging  for  an  expedition 
to  India,  combined  with  the  partition  of  Turkey,  that  a 
joint  army  of  twenty  to  twenty- jfive  thousand  Eussians, 
eight  to  ten  thousand  Austrians,  and  thirty  to  forty  thousand 
Frenchmen,  should  be  set  in  motion  towards  India ;  '  que 
rien  n'est  facile  comme  cette  operation ;  qu'il  est  certain 
qu'avant  que  cette  armee  soit  sur  I'Euphrate  la  terreur 
sera  en  Angleterre.'  On  February  6,  1808,  Napoleon  told 
the  Eussian  Ambassador,  Count  Tolstoi,  according  to 
the  report  of  the  latter,  '  Une  fois  sur  I'Euphrate,  rien 
n'empeche  d'arriver  aux  Indes.  Ce  n'est  pas  une  raison 
pour  echouer  dans  cette  entreprise  parce  qu'Alexandre  et 
Tamerlan  n'y  ont  pas  reussi.  II  s'agit  de  faire  mieux 
qu'eux.' 

While  Napoleon  was  amusing  Alexander  with  vain 
hopes  and  fantastic  proposals,  the  Czar  had  begun  a  very 
costly  war  with  England  in  accordance  with  the  stipulations 
of  the  Treaty  of  Tilsit.  Feeling  at  last  that  the  question  of 
Turkey  was  being  treated  dilatorily  and  with  the  greatest 
vagueness  by  Napoleon,  he  pressed  for  some  more  definite 
arrangement,  and  a  series  of  non-official  conferences  regarding 
that  country  took  place  between  the  French  Ambassador 


34  The  Problem  of  Constantinople 

in  Eussia  and  the  Eussian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 
Acting  upon  his  secret  instructions  given  above,  Caulain- 
court  prevaricated  and  at  first  refused  to  consider  the 
question  of  Constantinople  because  that  position  was  stra- 
tegically too  important  to  be  rashly  disposed  of.  Being 
anxious  to  dispossess  the  Turks,  largely  for  reasons  of 
humanity,  Alexander  then  proposed  to  make  Constantinople 
a  free  town.  According  to  Caulaincourt's  report  of  March  1, 
1808,  the  Czar  said  to  the  French  Ambassador,  '  Constanti- 
nople est  un  point  important,  trop  loin  de  vous  et  que  vous 
regardez  peut-etre  comme  trop  important  pour  nous. 
J'ai  une  idee  pour  que  cela  ne  fasse  pas  de  difficultes,  faisons- 
en  une  espece  de  ville  Hbre.' 

The  question  arose  what  equivalent  could  be  given 
to  France  if  Eussia  should  take  Constantinople.  At  the 
second  conference,  which  took  place  on  March  2,  the  Eussian 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  suggested  that  France  should 
occupy  Egypt,  stating, '  La  France  a  toujours  desire  I'Egypte. 
Sous  le  regne  de  I'imperatrice  Catherine,  elle  nous  avait 
fait  proposer  par  I'empereur  Joseph  II  de  nous  laisser  aller 
a  Constantinople  si  nous  lui  laissions  prendre  I'Egypte.' 
The  question  of  Constantinople  itself  had  to  be  tackled. 
On  March  4  the  French  Ambassador,  speaking,  of  course, 
without  authority,  offered  Constantinople  to  Eussia,  but 
claimed  at  the  same  time  the  Dardanelles  for  France. 
In  other  words,  he  suggested  that  although  Eussia  might 
possibly  be  allowed  to  occupy  Constantinople,  France 
ought  to  dominate  that  town  by  the  possession  of  the 
Dardanelles  !  Not  unnaturally,  the  Czar,  who  was  apprised 
of  these  demands,  refused  even  to  consider  that  suggestion. 

In  course  of  time,  the  real  intentions  of  Napoleon  were 
revealed  to  Eussia.  The  Czar  recognised  that  Napoleon 
had  fooled  him  and  had  used  him  as  a  tool.  The  Alliance 
was  followed  by  a  breach  between  the  two  monarchs,  by 
Napoleon's  defeat  in  1812,  and  by  his  downfall. 

The  most  important  documents  quoted  in  these  pages 
show   conclusively   that   the   Eussian   expeditions   against 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship      35 

India  prepared  or  discussed  in  the  time  of  Napoleon  were 
inspired  not  by  Paul  the  First  and  Alexander  the  First, 
but  by  the  great  Corsican,  that  Alexander  desired  to  ac- 
quire Constantinople  chiefly  owing  to  Napoleon's  incitement, 
that  the  joint  Franco-Eussian  expedition  against  India 
was  sheer  and  dehberate  humbug  to  frighten  the  Enghsh. 
In  the  words  of  the  great  historian  Vandal,  the  author  of 
the  best  book  on  Napoleon  and  Alexander  the  First : 

The  idea  of  partitioning  Turkey  was  rather  a  Napoleonic 
than  a  Eussian  idea.  Napoleon  rather  intended  to  make  a 
demonstration  than  an  attack.  He  thought  that  if  the 
French  troops  crossed  the  Bosphorus,  Asia  would  be  tremb- 
hng,  and  England's  position  be  shaken  to  its  very  founda- 
tions ;  that  in  view  of  the  menace  she  would  be  willing  to 
make  peace  with  France. 

The  documents  given  clearly  estabhsh  that  Napoleon 
neither  intended  to  give  Constantinople  to  Eussia,  nor  to 
attack  England  in  India,  that  on  the  contrary  he  wanted 
Constantinople  for  France,  and  that  he  attached  greater 
value  to  Egypt  than  to  Constantinople.  In  his  instructions 
to  Caulaincourt,  Napoleon  confessed  that  his  plans  could 
be  carried  out  only  if  he  ruled  the  sea,  that  a  premature 
movement  on  Constantinople  would  result  in  England 
occupying  Egypt,  the  most  valuable  part  of  the  Turkish 
empire.  Napoleon  might  conceivably  have  given  to  Eussia 
Constantinople  for  a  time,  but  he  would  have  done  so 
only  with  the  object  of  involving  Eussia  in  trouble  with 
Engla.:d.  According  to  Villemain,  he  said  :  '  J'ai  voulu 
refouler  amicalement  la  Eussie  en  Asie  ;  je  lui  ai  offert 
Constantinople.'  Commenting  on  these  words.  Vandal 
tells  us  that,  in  danghng  the  bait  of  Constantinople  before 
Eussia,  Napoleon  merely  aimed  at  involving  that  country 
in  a  hfe-and-death  struggle  with  England. 

Eather  by  his  threats  of  attacking  India  in  company 
with  Eussia  overland  than  by  any  actual  attempt  at 
carrying   out   that   mad   adventure,    did   Napoleon  create 


36  The  Problem  of  Constantinople 

profound  suspicion  against  Eussia  among  the  English, 
and  that  suspicion  has  been  the  cause  of  a  century  of  Anglo- 
Eussian  suspicion,  friction,  and  misunderstandings.  At 
the  Congress  of  Vienna,  Lord  Castlereagh  opposed  Eussia's 
acquisition  of  Poland,  fearing  that  that  country  might 
become  dangerously  strong.  Eeplying  to  the  expressions 
of  the  British  representative's  fears,  Alexander  sent  Lord 
Castlereagh,  on  November  21,  1814,  a  most  remarkable 
memorandum — the  clumsy  translation  is  that  given  in  the 
British  Blue  Book — ^in  which  we  read  : 

Justice  established,  as  an  immutable  rule  for  all  the 
transactions  between  the  coalesced  States,  that  the  advan- 
tages which  each  of  them  should  be  summoned  to  reap  from 
the  triumph  of  the  common  cause  should  be  in  proportion 
to  the  perseverance  of  their  efforts  and  to  the  magnitude  of 
the  sacrifices. 

The  necessity  for  a  pohtical  balance  in  its  turn  prescribed 
that  there  should  be  given  to  each  State  a  degree  of  con- 
sistency and  of  pohtical  Conventions  in  the  means  wliich 
each  of  them  should  possess  in  itself  to  cause  them  to  be 
respected. 

By  invariably  acting  in  accordance  with  the  two  principles 
which  have  been  just  stated  the  Emperor  resolved  to  enter 
upon  the  war,  to  support  it  alone  at  its  commencement,  and 
to  carry  it  on  by  means  of  a  coalition  up  to  the  single  point 
at  which  the  general  pacification  of  Europe  might  be  based 
on  the  sohd  and  immovable  foundations  of  the  independence 
of  States  and  of  the  sacred  rights  of  nations.  The  barrier 
of  the  Oder  once  overstepped,  Eussia  fought  only  for  her 
Allies  :  in  order  to  increase  the  power  of  Prussia  and  of 
Austria,  to  deliver  Germany,  to  save  France  from  the  frenzy 
of  a  despotism  of  which  she  alone  bore  the  entire  weight  after 
her  reverses. 

If  the  Emperor  had  based  his  poHcy  upon  combinations 
of  a  private  and  exclusive  interest  when  the  army  of  Napo- 
leon, collected  together,  so  to  speak,  at  the  expense  of 
Europe,  had  found  its  grave  in  Eussia,  His  Majesty  could 
have   made   peace   with   France ;    and    without   exposing 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     37 

himself  to  the  chances  of  a  war  the  issue  of  wliich  was  so 
much  the  more  uncertain  as  it  depended  on  the  determina- 
tion of  other  Cabinets,  without  imposing  fresh  sacrifices 
on  his  people,  might  have  contented  himself,  on  the  one 
hand,  with  the  security  acquired  for  his  Empire  ;  and,  on 
the  other  hand,  have  acquiesced  in  the  conditions  which 
Bonaparte,  instructed  by  a  sad  experience,  would  have 
been  eager  to  propose  to  him.  But  the  Emperor,  in  the 
magnanimous  enterprise  to  which  he  had  appHed  himself, 
availed  himself  of  the  generous  enthusiasm  of  his  people 
to  second  the  desu-es  of  all  the  nations  of  Europe.  He 
fought  with  disinterested  views  for  a  cause  with  which  the 
destinies  of  the  human  race  were  connected.  Faithful  to 
his  principles.  His  Majesty  has  constantly  laboured  to  favom- 
the  interests  of  the  Powers  which  had  raUied  round  the 
common  cause,  placing  his  own  interests  only  in  the  second 
rank.  He  has  lavished  his  resources  in  order  to  render 
their  united  efforts  prosperous  under  the  firm  conviction 
that  his  Alhes,  far  from  finding  in  a  conduct  so  pm'e  grounds 
for  complaint,  would  be  grateful  to  him  for  having  made 
all  private  consideration  subordinate  to  the  success  of  an 
enterprise  which  had  the  general  good  for  its  object. 

The  Czar  spoke  truly.  He  had  fought  in  1813  and  1814 
against  Napoleon  for  purely  ideal  reasons.  After  Napoleon's 
disastrous  defeat  in  Eussia  in  1812  Eussia  herself  was 
secure  against  another  attack  from  France.  Had  she 
followed  a  purely  selfish  poHcy,  she  would  have  left  the 
Western  Powers  to  their  fate.  While  they  were  weakened 
in  their  struggle  against  Napoleon  the  powerful  Eussian 
army  might  have  secured  the  most  far-reaching  advantages 
to  the  country,  and  it  might  certainly  have  taken  Constanti- 
nople. In  1813  Alexander  obviously  joined  in  the  war 
against  Napoleon  actuated  by  the  wish  of  giving  at  last 
a  durable  peace  to  Europe.  How  strongly  the  Czar  was 
inspired  by  ideal  and  rehgious  motives  may  be  seen  from 
the  Holy  AUiance  Treaty  which  he  drew  up  in  his  own 
handwriting,  and  which  estabHshed  that  henceforth  aU 
rulers  should  be  guided  in  their  pohcy  solely  by  th,  dictates 


38  The  Problem  of  Constantinople 

of    the    Christian    religion.     That    httle-known    document 
was  worded  as  follows  : 


In  the  name  of  the  Most  Holy  and  Indivisible  Trinitij. 

Their  Majesties  the  Emperor  of  Austria,  the  King  of 
Prussia,  and  the  Emperor  of  Eussia  having  in  consequence 
of  the  great  events  which  have  marked  the  course  of  the 
three  last  years  in  Europe,  and  especially  of  the  blessings 
which  it  has  pleased  Divine  Providence  to  shower  down  upon 
those  States  which  place  their  confidence  and  their  hope  in  it 
alone,  acquired  the  intimate  conviction  of  the  necessity  of 
setthng  the  steps  to  be  observed  by  the  Powers  in  their 
reciprocal  relations  upon  the  subhme  truths  which  the 
Holy  Kehgion  of  our  Saviour  teaches  : 

They  solemnly  declare  that  the  present  Act  has  no  other 
object  than  to  pubHsh,  in  the  face  of  the  whole  world,  their 
fixed  resolution,  both  in  the  administration  of  their  respec- 
tive States  and  in  their  poUtical  relations  with  every  other 
Government,  to  take  for  their  sole  guide  the  precepts  of 
that  Holy  Eeligion,  namely,  the  precepts  of  Justice,  Christian 
Charity,  and  Peace,  which,  far  from  being  appHcable  only 
to  private  concerns,  must  have  an  immediate  influence  on 
the  councils  of  princes,  and  guide  all  their  steps  as  being 
the  only  means  of  consohdating  human  institutions  and  re- 
medying their  imperfections.  In  consequence  their  Majes- 
ties have  agreed  to  the  following  Articles  : — ■ 

Article  1.  Conformably  to  the  words  of  the  Holy  Scrip- 
tures, which  command  all  men  to  consider  each  other  as 
brethren,  the  Three  Contracting  Monarchs  will  remain  united 
by  the  bonds  of  a  true  and  indissoluble  fraternity,  and  con- 
sidering each  other  as  fellow-countrymen  they  will,  on  all 
occasions  and  in  all  places,  lend  each  other  aid  and  assist- 
ance and,  regarding  themselves  towards  their  subjects  and 
armies  as  fathers  of  famihes,  they  will  lead  them,  in  the 
same  spirit  of  fraternity  with  which  they  are  animated, 
to  protect  Eeligion,  Peace,  and  Justice. 

Article  2.  In  consequence  the  sole  principle  of  force, 
whether  between  the  said  Governments  or  between  their 
Subjects,  shall  be  that  of  doing  each  other  reciprocal  service, 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     39 

and  of  testifying  by  unalterable  goodwill  the  mutual  affec- 
tion with  which  they  ought  to  be  animated,  to  consider 
themselves  all  as  members  of  one  and  the  same  Christian 
nation  :  the  three  aUied  Princes  looking  on  themselves  as 
merely  delegated  by  Providence  to  govern  three  branches 
of  the  one  family,  namely,  Austria,  Prussia,  and  Eussia, 
thus  confessing  that  the  Christian  world,  of  which  they  and 
their  people  form  a  part,  has  in  reaUty  no  other  Sovereign 
than  Him  to  whom  alone  power  really  belongs,  because  in 
Him  alone  are  found  all  the  treasures  of  love,  science,  and 
infinite  wisdom,  that  is  to  say,  God,  our  Divine  Saviour, 
the  Word  of  the  Most  High,  the  Word  of  Life.  Their 
Majesties  consequently  recommend  to  their  people,  with  the 
most  tender  sohcitudei  as  the  sole  means  of  enjoying  that 
Peace  which  arises  from  a  good  conscience,  and  which  alone 
is  durable,  to  strengthen  themselves  every  day  more  and 
more  in  the  principles  and  exercise  of  the  duties  which  the 
Divine  Saviour  has  taught  to  mankind. 

Article  3.  All  the  Powers  who  shall  choose  solemnly  to 
avow  the  sacred  principles  which  have  dictated  the  present 
Act,  and  shall  acknowledge  how  important  it  is  for  the 
happiness  of  nations,  too  long  agitated,  that  these  truths 
should  henceforth  exercise  over  the  destinies  of  mankind 
all  the  influence  which  belongs  to  them,  will  be  received 
with  equal  ardour  and  affection  into  this  Holy  AlHance. 

After  the  Peace  of  Vienna  an  era  of  reaction  began,  and 
the  hostility  shown  by  the  Governments  to  the  people  was 
attributed  not  to  Prince  Metternich,  who  was  chiefly 
responsible  for  it,  but  to  the  Czar  and  to  the  Holy  Alhance, 
which  was  considered  to  be  an  instrument  of  oppression. 
However,  the  fact  that  the  Holy  Alhance  was  a  purely  ideal 
compact  is  attested  by  Prince  Metternich  himself  in  his 
Memoirs.     After  describing  its  genesis,  Metternich  wrote  : 

Voila  I'histoire  de  la  Sainte  Alhance,  qui  meme  dans 
I'esprit  prevenu  de  son  auteur,  ne  devait  etre  qu'une  mani- 
festation morale,  tandis  qu'aux  yeux  des  autres  signataires 
de  Facte  elle  n'avait  pas  meme  cette  signification ;  par 
consequent  elle  ne  merite  aucune  des  interpretations  que 


40  The  Problem  of  Constantinople 

I'esprit  cle  parti  lui  a  donnees  dans  la  suite.  .  .  .  Ulterieure- 
ment  il  n'a  jamais  ete  question,  entre  les  cabinets,  de  la 
'  Sainte  Alliance,'  et  jamais  il  n'aurait  pu  en  etre  question. 
Les  partis  hostiles  aux  Souverains  ont  seuls  exploite  cet 
acte,  et  s'en  servis  comme  d'une  arme  pour  calomnier  les 
intentions  les  plus  pures  de  leurs  adversaires.  La  '  Sainte 
Alliance  '  n'a  pas  ete  fondee  pour  restreindre  les  droits  des 
peuples  ni  pour  favoriser  I'absolutisme  et  la  tyrannic  sous 
n'importe  quelle  forme.  EUe  fut  uniquement  I'expression 
des  sentiments  mystiques  de  I'Empereur  Alexandre  et 
I'application  des  principes  du  Christianisme  a  la  politique. 

Metternich  described  Alexander's  liberal  and  generous 
views  as  '  chimerical,  revolutionary,  and  Jacobinic  '  in  his 
letters  to  the  Austrian  Emperor,  and  in  his  Memoirs  and 
his  correspondence  he  prided  himself  that  he  had  succeeded 
in  regaining  the  Czar  to  reaction.  Metternich  and  other 
Austrian  and  German  statesmen  strove  to  keep  Eussia 
backward  and  weak  by  recommending  a  pohcy  of  repression 
and  persecution.  Austria  and  Germany  have  been  largely 
responsible  for  Eussian  ilUberahsm  and  Eussian  oppression 
in  the  past. 

Let  us  now  cast  a  brief  glance  at  the  events  which 
brought  about  the  Crimean  War. 

During  the  first  half  of  the  nineteenth  century  Turkey 
was  almost  continually  in  a  state  of  the  gravest  disorder, 
and  its  downfall  seemed  to  be  imminent.  Alexander  the 
First  had  died  in  1825,  and  had  been  succeeded  by  Nicholas 
the  First.  Beheving  a  catastrophe  in  Turkey  possible, 
he  appointed,  in  1829,  a  special  committee,  consisting  of 
the  most  eminent  statesmen,  to  consider  the  problem  of 
Turkey.  According  to  de  Martens,  '  Eecueil  des  traites 
de  la  Eussie,'  Count  Nesselrode,  the  Vice-Chancellor  of 
the  Empire,  stated  before  that  Committee  that  the  preserva- 
tion of  Turkey  was  rather  useful  than  harmful  to  the  true 
interests  of  Eussia,  that  it  was  in  the  interest  of  the  country 
to  have  for  neighbour  a  weak  State  such  as  Turkey.  After 
thorough  and  lengthy  discussion,  the  following  resolutions 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship      41 

were    adopted   at    a    sitting    presided    over    by   the   Czar 
himself : 

(1)  That  the  advantages  of  maintaining  Tm:key  in 
Em:ope  are  greater  than  the  disadvantages  ; 

(2)  That  consequently  the  downfall  of  Turkey  would  be 
opposed  to  Eussia's  own  interests  ; 

(3)  That  therefore  it  would  be  prudent  to  prevent  its 
fall  and  to  take  advantage  of  the  opportunity  which  might 
offer  for  concluding  an  honourable  peace.  However,  if  the 
last  hour  of  Turkey  in  Europe  should  have  struck,  Eussia 
would  be  compelled  to  take  the  most  energetic  measures 
in  order  to  prevent  the  openings  leading  to  the  Black  Sea 
falHng  into  the  hands  of  another  Great  Power. 

During  the  period  preceding  the  outbreak  of  the  Crimean 
War,  Eussia's  poHcy  was  directed  by  the  principles  laid 
down  in  1829,  and  the  war  itself  was  obviously  due  to  mis- 
understandings between  England  and  Eussia,  and  to  the 
prevalence  of  that  distrust  of  Eussia  among  Englishmen 
which  Napoleon  had  created  in  the  past.  Foreseeing  the 
possibility  of  Turkey's  collapse,  the  Czar  desired  to  provide 
toward  such  an  event  in  conjunction  with  England.  With 
this  object  in  view,  he  told  the  British  Ambassador  on 
January  9,  1853  : 

The  affairs  of  Turkey  are  in  a  very  disorganised  condi- 
tion ;  the  country  itself  seems  to  be  falHng  to  pieces  ;  the 
fall  will  be  a  great  misfortune,  and  it  is  very  important  that 
England  and  Eussia  should  come  to  a  perfectly  good  under- 
standing upon  these  affairs  and  that  neither  should  take 
any  decisive  step. 

Tenez  ;  nous  avons  sur  les  bras  un  homme  malade — un 
homme  gravement  malade  ;  ce  sera,  je  vous  le  dis  franche- 
ment,  un  grand  malheur  si,  un  de  ces  jours,  il  devait  nous 
echapper,  surtout  avant  que  toutes  les  dispositions  neces- 
saires  fussent  prises.  Mais  enfin  ce  n'est  point  le  moment 
de  vous  parler  de  cela. 

Five  days  later,  on  January  14,  the  Czar  disclosed  his 
intentions  more  clearly  to  the  British  Ambassador.    Fearing 


42  The  Problem  of  Constantinople 

that  in  case  of  Turkey's  downfall  England  might  seize 
Constantinople,  and  desiring  to  prevent  that  event  in 
accordance  with  the  principles  laid  down  by  the  Committee 
of  1829  and  given  above,  he  stated  : 

Maintenant  je  desire  vous  parler  en  ami  et  en  gentleman  ; 
ei  nous  arrivons  a  nous  entendre  sur  cette  affaire,  I'Angleterre 
et  moi,  pour  le  reste,  peu  m'importe  ;  il  m'est  indifferent 
ce  que  font  ou  pensent  les  autres.  Usant  done  de  franchise, 
je  vous  dis  nettement,  que  si  I'Angleterre  songe  a  s'etablir 
un  de  ces  jours  a  Constantinople,  je  ne  le  permettrai  pas  ; 
je  ne  vous  prete  point  ces  intentions,  mais  il  vaut  mieux 
dans  ces  occasions  parler  clairement  ;  de  mon  cote,  je  suis 
6galement  dispose  de  prendre  I'engagement  de  ne  pas  m'y 
etabhr,  en  proprietaire,  il  s'entend,  car  en  depositaire  je  ne 
dis  pas  ;  il  pourrait  se  faire  que  les  circonstances  me  misent 
dans  le  cas  d'occuper  Constantinople,  si  rien  ne  se  trouve 
prevu  si  Ton  doit  tout  laisser  aller  au  hasard. 

Commenting  upon  the  Czar's  confidential  statements, 
the  Ambassador  reported  that  he  was  '  impressed  with  the 
belief  that  ...  his  Majesty  is  sincerely  desirous  of  acting 
in  harmony  with  her  Majesty's  Government.'  In  a  further 
conversation  the  Czar  told  the  Ambassador  on  February  21  : 

The  Turkish  Empire  is  a  thing  to  be  tolerated,  not  to  be 
reconstituted.  As  to  Egypt,  I  quite  understand  the  impor- 
tance to  England  of  that  territory.  I  can  then  only  see  that 
if,  in  the  event  of  a  distribution  of  the  Ottoman  succession 
upon  the  fall  of  the  Empire,  you  should  take  possession  of 
Egypt,  I  shall  have  no  objections  to  offer.  I  would  say  the 
same  thing  of  Candia  ;  that  island  might  suit  you,  and  I  do 
not  know  why  it  should  not  become  an  EngHsh  possession. 

The  intentions  of  the  Czar,  though  somewhat  vaguely 
expressed,  were  perfectly  clear.  He  wished  to  bring  about 
a  peaceful  solution  of  the  Turkish  problem  in  case  of  Turkey's 
downfall.  In  accordance  wath  the  principles  laid  down 
in  1829,  he  did  not  desire  to  see  the  Dardanelles  in  the 
hands  of  a  first-rate  Power,  and  was  unwilling  to  see  England 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship      43 

established  in  Constantinople  and  dominating  the  Black 
Sea.  He  was  apparently  quite  wilhng  that  Constantinople 
and  the  Straits  should  be  held  by  some  small  Power  instead 
of  Turkey,  or  that  the  position  should  be  internationalised 
in  some  form  or  other  in  accordance  with  the  ideas  expressed 
by  his  brother  in  1808,  so  long  as  he  could  feel  reasonably 
secure  that  no  foreign  Power  would  seize  the  openings 
of  the  Black  Sea  and  attack  Eussia  in  its  most  vulnerable 
quarter.  If  England  should  meet  him  in  his  desire  to 
regulate  the  position  of  Constantinople  in  a  way  which 
would  not  threaten  Eussia's  security  in  the  Black  Sea, 
he  was  quite  wilhng  that  England  should  occupy  Egypt. 
Possibly  the  idea  that  Eussia  should  acquire  Constantinople 
was  at  the  back  of  his  mind,  but  as  Egypt  was  far  more 
valuable  than  Constantinople,  he  had  offered  beforehand 
the  most  ample  compensation  to  this  country.  Un- 
fortunately, the  distrust  existing  against  Eussia  since  the 
time  of  Napoleon  was  too  deeply  rooted.  The  Czar's 
proposals  were  treated  almost  contemptuously.  In  reply- 
ing to  the  Czar,  the  British  Government,  adverting  to  the 
sufferings  of  the  Christians  hving  in  Turkey  upon  which 
Nicholas  had  dwelt,  stated  on  March  28  : 

.  .  .  The  treatment  of  Christians  is  not  harsh,  and  the 
toleration  exhibited  by  the  Porte  towards  this  portion  of  its 
subjects  might  serve  as  an  example  to  some  Governments 
who  look  with  contempt  upon  Turkey  as  a  barbarous  Power. 

Her  Majesty's  Government  beheve  that  Turkey  only 
requires  forbearance  on  the  part  of  its  Alhes,  and  a  deter- 
mination not  to  press  their  claims  in  a  manner  humiliat- 
ing to  the  dignity  and  independence  of  the  Sultan. 

The  English  Government,  being  filled  with  suspicions, 
did  not  even  make  a  serious  attempt  to  discover  the  aims 
and  intentions  of  the  Czar.  Vaguely  dreading  Eussia, 
England  supported  Turkey  against  that  country.  Thus 
Great  Britain  has  been  largely  responsible  not  only  for 
the  Crimean  War  and  the  Eusso-Turkish  War  of  1877,  but 


44  The  Problem  of  Constantinople 

also  for  the  ill-treatment  of  the  Christians  and  the  massacres 
which  have  taken  place  throughout  Turkey  during  many- 
decades. 

What  has  created  England's  instinctive  fear  of  Eussia  ? 
If  we  look  at  the  map,  if  we  consider  size  to  be  a  criterion 
of  national  strength,  then  Eussia  is  immensely  powerful. 
However,  the  Eusso-Turkish  War,  the  Eusso-Japanese 
War,  and  the  present  War  have  shown  that  we  need  perhaps 
not  have  feared  Eussia's  strength  so  much  as  her  weakness. 
If  Eussia  had  been  stronger,  if  Eussia's  strength  had  been 
in  accordance  with  the  views  which  until  lately  were  gener- 
ally held  here,  the  present  War  would  not  have  broken  out. 
German  soldiers  evidently  appraised  the  military  power 
of  Eussia  far  more  correctly  than  did  British  statesmen, 
who  are  habitually  ill-informed  on  military  matters.  By 
opposing  Eussia  in  the  past,  England  has  worked  not  for 
her  own  advantage  and  for  the  security  of  India,  but  for 
the  benefit  of  Germany  and  Austria.  England's  anti- 
Eussian  poHcy  and  Eussia's  anti-British  policy  were  largely 
inspired  first  from  Paris  and  then  from  Berlin  and  Vienna. 
That  is  plain  to  all  who  are  acquainted  with  recent  diplo- 
matic history. 

The  century-old  antagonism  between  England  and 
Eussia  has  been  the  work  of  Napoleon,  of  Bismarck,  and 
of  Bismarck's  successors.  The  Eussian  danger,  Eussia's 
aggressiveness,  and  Eussia's  constant  desire  to  seize  India, 
are  largely  figments  of  the  imagination.  Eussia  has  Httle 
desire  to  possess  India.  If  she  had  it  she  would  probably 
be  unable  to  administer  it.  The  late  Czar  said  to  Prince 
Hohenlohe  on  September  6,  1896  :  '  Who  is  to  take  India 
from  the  English?  We  are  not  stupid  enough  to  have 
that  plan.'  It  would  be  as  difficult  for  Eussia  to  attack 
India  at  the  present  day  as  it  was  in  the  time  of  the  Emperor 
Paul.  It  is  true  Eussia  has  now  a  couple  of  railways  which 
run  up  to  the  Indian  frontier,  but  India  also  has  railways  ; 
these  will  facilitate  the  concentration  of  troops  at  any 
point  at  which  that  country  may  be  attacked,  and  with 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship      45 

the  development  of  transport  by  land  and  sea,  and  the 
growth  of  the  Empire,  the  danger  of  an  attack  upon  India 
by  Eussia  seems  to  be  growing  smaller  from  year  to  year. 
In  the  picturesque  language  of  the  late  Lord  Salisbury, 
England  backed  the  wrong  horse  in  opposing  Eussia's 
policy  towards  Turkey  in  the  past. 

National  policy  is,  as  a  rule,  in  accordance  with  the 
national  character.  The  Eussians  are  rather  dreamers 
than  men  of  action,  rather  men  of  quiet  thought  than 
men  of  ambition.  The  heroes  of  Tolstoy  and  of  other 
great  Eussian  authors  are  not  men  of  the  Nietzsche  type, 
but  men  of  peace,  idealists,  desiring  the  best,  animated 
by  a  deep  sense  of  rehgion.  The  strong  idealist  strain 
in  the  Eussian  character  has  found  expression  not  only 
in  the  ideahst  poHcy  followed  by  Alexander  the  First  and 
Nicholas  the  Second,  but  in  that  of  other  Eussian  Czars  as 
well.  Eussia  has  had  a  Peter  the  Great,  but  she  has  not 
had  a  Napoleon,  and  she  is  not  hkely  to  have  one.  Those 
who  believe  that  Eussia  aims  at  dominating  the  world,  at 
conquering  all  Asia,  and  invading  India,  are  neither 
acquainted  with  the  Eussian  character  nor  with  the  re- 
sources, the  capabihties,  and  the  needs  of  the  country. 

Eussia  is  a  very  large  State.  It  is  extremely  powerful 
for  defence,  because  it  is  protected  by  vast  distances,  a 
rigorous  chmate,  and  very  inferior  means  of  communica- 
tion. The  same  circumstances  which  make  Eussia 
exceedingly  powerful  for  defence  make  her  very  weak 
for  a  war  of  aggression.  That  has  been  seen  in  all  her 
foreign  wars  without  a  single  exception.  Last,  but  not 
least,  the  Eussian  people  and  their  rulers  have  become 
awakened  to  the  necessity  of  modernising  the  country. 
A  new  Eussia  has  arisen.  Eussia  has  made  rapid  progress 
during  the  last  two  decades,  but  her  progress  has  perhaps 
been  slower  than  that  of  other  nations.  Hence  Eussia 
is  still  very  poor  and  backward.  She  has  some  railways, 
but  her  means  of  inland  transport  are  totally  insufficient. 
She  has  scarcely  any  roads,  except  a  few  military  ones. 


46  The  Problem  of  Constantinople 

France  has  ten  times  the  mileage  of  roads  possessed  by 
Russia.  During  the  Great  War  we  have  frequently  heard 
of  the  absence  of  roads  in  Poland  and  of  the  impossibility 
of  moving  troops  through  a  sea  of  mud.  Yet  Poland  is 
that  district  of  Eussia  which  is  best  provided  with  roads. 

The  peasants  throughout  Russia  use  still  almost  ex- 
clusively wooden  ploughs  with  which  only  the  surface  can 
be  scratched.  By  changing  their  wooden  ploughs  for  iron 
ones  they  could  plough  twice  as  deeply  and  double  their 
harvests,  but  they  are  too  poor  to  provide  modern  agri- 
cultural implements.  In  many  Russian  villages  no  iron 
implements,  not  even  iron  nails,  may  be  seen,  and  the 
methods  of  Russia's  agriculture  are  still  those  of  the  Dark 
Ages. 

The  manufacturing  industries  of  the  country  are  in 
their  infancy.  The  vast  majority  of  the  people  can  neither 
read  nor  write,  and  newspapers  exist  only  in  the  large 
towns.  If  we  compare  the  economic  and  social  conditions 
of  Russia  with  those  existing  in  other  countries,  it  becomes 
clear  that  the  principal  need  of  Russia  is  not  further 
expansion,  but  internal  development,  and  in  view  of  the 
poverty  of  the  country  the  development  of  the  great  Russian 
estate  is  possible  only  in  time  of  peace.  For  her  the 
restriction  of  armaments  is  more  necessary  than  it  is  for 
any  other  Great  Power.  The  principal  interest  of  Russia 
is  peace.  That  has  become  clear  to  every  thinking  Russian 
and  to  the  whole  Russian  nation. 

When  the  great  Peace  Congress  assembles  the  question 
of  Conatantinople  will  come  up  for  settlement,  and  from 
interested  quarters  we  shall  be  told  once  more  that  Constanti- 
nople is  '  the  key  of  the  world.'  A  glance  at  the  map 
shows  that  Constantinople  is  not  the  key  of  the  world, 
and  is  not  even  the  key  of  the  Mediterranean,  but  that  it 
is  merely  the  key  of  the  Black  Sea.  Prince  Bismarck 
possessed  mihtary  ability  of  the  highest  kind,  and,  being 
keenly  aware  that  foreign  policy  and  strategy  must  go 
hand  in  hand,  he  kept  constantly  in  touch  with  Germany's 
leading    soldiers.    He    clearly    recognised    the    fallacy    of 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship      47 

Napoleon's  celebrated  epigram.  Hence,  when  a  member 
of  the  Eeichstag,  referring  to  the  Eastern  Question,  spoke 
of  the  Dardanelles  as  the  key  to  the  dominion  of  the  world, 
Bismarck  smilingly  rephed,  '  If  the  Dardanelles  are  the 
key  to  the  dominion  of  the  world  it  obviously  follows  that 
up  to  now  the  Sultan  has  dominated  the  world.'  Constanti- 
nople has  been  possessed  by  various  States,  but  none  of 
them  has  so  far  dominated  the  world.  In  Bismarck's 
words,  Constantinople  has  disagreed  with  aU  the  nations 
which  have  possessed  it  hitherto.  Why  that  has  been 
the  case  will  presently  be  shown. 

So  far  Constantinople  has  not  given  a  great  accession 
of  strength  to  the  nations  which  have  held  it.  Far  from 
considering  Constantinople  in  the  hands  of  Eussia  as  a 
source  of  strength,  Bismarck  rather  saw  in  it  a  source  of 
weakness  and  of  danger.  He  wrote  in  his  '  Memoirs  '  : 
'  I  beheve  that  it  would  be  advantageous  for  Germany  if 
the  Eussians  in  one  way  or  another,  physically  or  diplo- 
matically, were  to  estabHsh  themselves  at  Constantinople 
and  had  to  defend  that  position.' 

Eussia  is  almost  invulnerable  as  long  as  she  can  defend 
herself  with  her  best  weapons,  her  vast  distances,  her  lack 
of  railways  and  roads,  and  her  rigorous  cHmate.  But  the 
same  elements  become  disadvantageous  to  Eussia's  defence 
if  a  highly  vulnerable  point  near  her  frontier  can  be  attacked. 
In  the  Crimean  War  Eussia  almost  bled  to  death  because 
of  the  difficulty  of  sending  troops  to  the  Crimea.  Her 
failure  in  Manchuria  arose  from  the  same  cause. 

At  present  Eussia  possesses  only  one  point  of  capital 
importance  on  the  sea,  St.  Petersburg,  which  can 
comparatively  easily  be  attacked  by  an  army  landed  in 
the  neighbourhood.  If  she  occupies  Constantinople,  she 
must  be  ready  to  defend  it,  and  a  very  large  number  of 
troops  will  be  required  to  protect  the  shores  of  the  Sea  of 
Marmora  and  the  Straits  against  an  enemy. 

It  is  not  generally  known  that  the  Constantinople 
position  is  not  circumscribed  but  very  extensive,  and  that 
it  is  not  easy  to  defend  it  against  a  mobile  and  powerful 


48  The  Problem  of  Constantinople 

enemy,  especially  if  it  is  simultaneously  attacked  by  land 
and  sea.  The  small  maps  of  Turkey  are  deceptive.  It  is 
hardly  realised  that  the  distance  from  the  entrance  of  the 
Dardanelles  to  the  exit  of  the  Bosphorus  is  nearly  two 
hundred  miles.  Strategists  are  agreed  that  a  Power  holding 
Constantinople,  the  Bosphorus,  and  the  Dardanelles  must 
possess  territory  at  least  as  far  inland  as  the  Enos-Midia 
line— that  is,  the  hne  from  the  town  of  Enos  opposite  the 
island  of  Samothraki  to  the  town  of  Midia  on  the  Black 
Sea.  A  straight  line  connecting  these  two  towns  would 
be  120  miles  long,  or  exactly  as  long  as  the  distance  which 
separates  London  from  Cardiff,  Paris  from  Boulogne,  or 
Strasburg  from  Coblenz.  It  is  clear  that  a  large  army  and 
extensive  fortifications  are  needed  to  defend  so  broad  a 
front  against  a  determined  attack.  In  addition,  Eussia 
would  have  to  defend  the  shore  of  the  Gulf  of  Saros  and 
the  sea-coast  of  the  peninsula  of  GahpoU  against  a  landing. 
This  shore-line  extends  to  about  one  hundred  miles.  Lastly, 
she  would  have  to  defend  the  opening  of  the  Dardanelles 
and  to  prevent  an  attack  upon  the  Constantinople  position 
across  the  narrows  from  the  Asiatic  mainland. 

It  would  be  difficult  enough  to  defend  this  vulnerable 
and  extensive  position  if  it  was  organically  connected  with 
Eussia.  It  will  of  course  be  still  more  difficult  to  defend 
it  in  view  of  the  fact  that  Eoumania  and  Bulgaria,  two 
powerful  States,  separate  Eussia  from  Constantinople. 
Eussia  can  reach  Constantinople  only  by  sea  unless  she 
should  succeed  in  incorporating  Eoumania  and  Bulgaria 
in  some  way  or  other,  or  unless  the  entire  north  of  Asia 
Minor  should  fall  into  Eussia's  hands,  enabling  that  country 
to  create  a  land  connection  between  her  Caucasian  provinces 
and  the  southern  shores  of  the  Sea  of  Marmora  and  the 
two   Straits.     Both  events  appear  unlikely. 

The  Constantinople  position,  if  held  by  Eussia,  would 
be  detached  from  that  country.  The  Eussian  troops 
garrisoning  it  would  be  cut  off  from  the  motherland  in 
case  of  war.     Hence  they  would  have  to  be  prepared  for 


Gi^eat  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship      49 

a  sudden  attack  and  to  be  always  strong  enough  to  defend 
the  peninsula  unaided  for  a  very  long  time.  They  would 
have  to  be  provided  with  gigantic  stores  of  food  and  of 
ammunition.  It  is  therefore  clear  that  Russia  would 
require  a  very  large  permanent  garrison  for  securing  the 
integrity  of  Constantinople.  In  case  of  war  she  would 
undoubtedly  require  several  hundred  thousand  men  for 
that  purpose.  Possibly  she  would  need  as  many  as  500,000 
men  if  a  determined  attack  by  land  and  sea  was  Mkely  ; 
and  herein  Kes  the  reason  for  the  opinion  of  the  Commission 
of  1829  that  it  would  be  to  Russia's  advantage  if  the  status 
quo  at  Constantinople  was  not  disturbed,  if  a  weak  Power 
was  in  the  possession  of  the  Bosphorus  and  the  Dardanelles. 
There  are  two  points  of  very  great  strategical  importance 
in  the  Eastern  Mediterranean  :  the  position  of  Constanti- 
nople and  Egypt ;  and  Egypt  is  undoubtedly  by  far  the 
more  important  of  the  two.  When  in  1797  Napoleon 
reached  the  Adriatic  he  was  struck  by  the  incomparable 
advantages  offered  by  the  position  of  Egypt,  and  he  ear- 
marked that  country  for  France  in  case  of  a  partition  of 
Turkey.  A  year  later  he  headed  an  expedition  to  Egypt, 
not  merely  in  order  to  strike  at  England,  but  largely,  if 
not  chiefly,  in  order  to  conquer  that  most  important 
strategical  position  for  France.  While  the  Sea  of  Marmora 
and  the  Straits  are  merely  the  connecting  Unks  between 
the  Black  Sea  and  the  Mediterranean,  Egypt,  especially 
since  the  construction  of  the  Suez  Canal,  is  the  connecting 
Hnk  of  the  Mediterranean  and  the  Indian  Ocean,  of  Europe 
and  Asia,  of  the  most  populated  continents  and  the  busiest 
seas.  Hence  the  Suez  Canal  route  is,  and  will  remain  for 
centuries,  the  most  valuable  strategical  and  trade  route  in 
the  world,  and  it  is  of  course  of  particular  importance  to 
the  nation  which  possesses  India.    Bismarck  said  to  Busch  : 

Egypt  is  as  necessary  to  England  as  is  her  daily  bread, 
because  of  the  Suez  Canal,  which  is  the  shortest  connection 
between  the  Eastern  and  Western  halves  of  the  British 


50  The  Problem  of  Constantinople 

Empire.     The  Suez  Canal  is  like  the  nerve  at  the  back  of 
the  neck  which  connects  the  spine  with  the  brain. 

Those  who  believe  in  Napoleonic  epigrams  will  find 
several  remarkable  epigrams  relating  to  Egypt.  The  great 
Corsican  said  to  Montholon,  '  Si  j'etais  reste  en  Egypte, 
je  serais  a  present  empereur  d'Orient.  .  .  .  L'Orient  n'attend 
qu'un  homme.'  He  said  to  Las  Cases,  '  De  I'Egypte  j'aurais 
atteint  Constantinople  et  les  Indes ;  j'eusse  change  la 
face  du  monde.'  He  dictated  to  Gourgaud,  '  Qui  est 
maitre  de  I'Egypte  Test  de  I'lnde.'  The  last  maxim 
should  be  particularly  interesting  to  Englishmen.  How 
great  a  value  Napoleon  attached  to  Egypt  will  be  seen 
from  his  '  Memoirs  '  dictated  to  Las  Cases,  Gourgaud,  and 
Montholon  at  St.  Helena,  and  from  volumes  xxix.,  xxx., 
and  xxxi.  of  his  '  Correspondence.' 

If  we  wish  to  compare  the  relative  importance  of  Con- 
stantinople and  of  the  Suez  Canal,  we  need  only  assume 
that  another  Power  possessed  Egypt  and  Great  Britain 
Constantinople.  While  Constantinople  would  be  useless 
to  Great  Britain,  the  occupation  of  Egypt  by  a  non-British 
Power  would  jeopardise  Britain's  position  in  India  and  her 
Eastern  trade.  Napoleon,  with  liis  keen  eye  for  strategy, 
told  O'Meara  : 

Egypt  once  in  possession  of  the  French,  farewell  India 
to  the  Enghsh.  Turkey  must  soon  fall,  and  it  will  be  im- 
possible to  divide  it  without  allotting  some  portion  to  France, 
which  will  be  Egypt.  But  if  you  had  kept  Alexandria,  you 
would  have  prevented  the  French  from  obtaining  it,  and  of 
ultimately  gaining  possession  of  India,  which  \\dll  certainly 
follow  their  possession  of  Egypt. 

In  the  saiHng-ship  era  the  position  of  Constantinople 
was  far  more  important  to  England  than  it  is  at  present. 
Then  Eussia,  dominating  Constantinople,  might  conceivably 
have  sent  a  large  fleet  into  the  Mediterranean  and  have 
seized  Malta,  Egypt,  and  Gibraltar  before  England  could 
have  received  any  news  of  the  saihng  of  the  Eussian  armada. 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     51 

With  the  advent  of  the  electric  cable,  wireless  telegi'aphy, 
and  steam  shipping,  that  danger  has  disappeared. 

From  the  Eussian  point  of  view  Constantinople  is 
valuable  partly  for  ideal,  partly  for  strategical  reasons,  and 
partly  because  the  Narrows  are  economically  of  the  highest 
importance  to  Eussia.  Their  closure  destroys  the  most 
important  part  of  Eussia's  sea  trade. 

The  glamour  of  Constantinople  and  its  incomparable 
position  on  the  Golden  Horn  has  fascinated  men  since  the 
earliest  times.  Constantinople  might  become  the  third 
capital  of  Eussia,  and  it  would,  for  historical  and  rehgious 
reasons,  be  a  capital  worthy  of  that  great  Empire.  From  the 
strategical  point  of  view  Russia  desires  to  possess  Constan- 
tinople not  for  aggression,  but  for  defence,  for  protecting 
the  Black  Sea  shores.  Whether,  however,  she  would  be 
wise  in  accepting  Constantinople,  even  if  it  were  offered 
to  her  by  all  Europe,  seems  somewhat  doubtful.  It  is 
true  that  Constantinople  dominates  the  Black  Sea.  At 
the  same  time  Constantinople  is  dominated  by  the  lands 
of  the  Balkan  Peninsula.  In  Talleyrand's  words  :  *  Le 
centre  de  gravite  du  monde  n'est  ni  sur  I'Elbe,  ni  sm*  I'Adige, 
il  est  la-bas  aux  frontieres  de  I'Em'ope,  sur  le  Danube.' 
Similarly  Marshal  Marmont,  Duke  of  Eagusa,  one  of 
Napoleon's  best  generals,  said  in  his  '  Memoirs '  that 
Wallachia,  Macedonia,  and  Bulgaria  were,  in  his  opinion, 
the  key  of  the  Orient.  He  thought  that  the  security  of 
Europe  was  less  threatened  by  Eussia  possessing  Constan- 
tinople, supposing  the  Austrians  occupied  the  countries 
at  the  mouth  of  the  Danube,  than  if  Constantinople  was 
held  by  French  and  Enghsh  troops  while  the  Eussians  were 
masters  of  the  lower  Danube.  The  reasoning  of  Talleyrand 
and  Marmont  seems  faultless.  It  will  probably  be  con- 
firmed by  the  British  strategists,  who  ought  to  be  consulted 
by  our  statesmen  on  the  strategical  value  of  Constantinople. 
A  [demonstration  of  the  Balkan  States,  especially  if  it 
were  backed  by  their  Central  Ejjropean  supporters,  against 
the  120  miles  of  the  Enos-Midia  line  would  obviously  convert 


52  The  Problem  of  Constantinople 

the  Constantinople  position  from  a  strategical  asset  into 
a  very  serious  strategical  liability.  It  is  true  that  in  the 
event  of  a  Eussian  attack  upon  India,  England  could  no 
longer  attack  Eussia  in  the  Black  Sea  in  conjunction  with 
Turkey.  However,  as  Constantinople  is  a  far  more  valuable 
point  to  Eussia  than  the  Crimea  or  Odessa,  and  as  the 
Balkan  States  themselves  may  desire  to  possess  Constan- 
tinople, it  is  obvious  that  by  occupying  it  Eussia  would 
not  increase  her  power,  but  would  merely  expose  herself 
to  greater  dangers  than  heretofore. 

Various  proposals  have  been  made  for  dealing  with 
Constantinople  and  the  Straits  after  the  expulsion  of  the 
Turks.  Some  have  advocated  that  Constantinople  should 
be  given  to  Eussia,  some  that  the  position  should  be  given 
to  some  small  Power,  such  as  Bulgaria,  or  be  divided  between 
two  or  more  Powers,  one  possessing  the  southern  and  the 
other  the  northern  shore  ;  others  have  recommended  that 
that  much  coveted  position  should  be  neutralised  in  some 
form  or  other.  The  importance  of  Constantinople  to 
Eussia  Ues  in  this,  that  it  is  the  door  to  her  house,  that  he 
who  holds  Constantinople  is  able  to  attack  Eussia  in  the 
Black  Sea.  Consequently  Eussia  and  Eussia 's  principal 
opponents  would  continue  to  strive  for  the  possession  of 
the  Narrows,  supposing  they  had  been  given  to  some  small 
Power,  to  several  Powers  in  joint  occupation,  or  had  been 
neutralised.  The  struggle  for  Constantinople  can  obviously 
end  only  when  the  town  is  possessed  by  a  first-rate  Power. 
That  seems  the  only  solution  which  promises  finaUty,  and 
the  only  Power  which  has  a  strong  claim  upon  the  possession 
of  Constantinople  is  evidently  Eussia. 

Until  recently  it  seemed  possible  that  Constantinople 
would  become  the  capital  of  one  of  the  Balkan  States  or 
of  a  Balkan  Confederation.  Many  years  ago  Mazzini, 
addressing  the  awakening  Balkan  nations,  admonished 
them  :  '  Stringetevi  in  una  Confederazione  e  sia  Constan- 
tinopoli  la  vostra  citta  anfizionica,  la  citta  dei  vostri  poteri 
centrali,  aperta  a  tutti,  serva  a  nessuno.'     The  internecine 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship      53 

war  of  the  Balkan  States  has  destroyed,  apparently  for 
ever,  the  possibility  that  Constantinople  will  belong  to 
the  Balkan  peoples,  and  perhaps  it  is  better  that  it  is  so. 
Constantinople  might  have  proved  as  fatal  an  acquisition 
to  the  Balkan  peoples  as  it  has  proved  to  the  Turks,  and 
for  all  we  know  it  may  not  prove  a  blessing  to  Russia. 

Those  who  fear  that  Eussia  might  become  a  danger 
to  Europe  in  the  future,  and  who  would  therefore  like  to 
see  the  status  quo  preserved  both  in  Austria-Hungary  and 
at  Constantinople — at  first  sight  Austria-Hungary,  as  at 
present  constituted,  appears  to  be  an  efficient  counterpoise 
to  Russia — seem  very  short-sighted.  I  think  I  have  shown 
that  Russia's  acquisition  of  Constantinople,  far  from  in- 
creasing Russia's  mihtary  strength,  would  greatly  increase 
her  vulnerabihty.  Hence  the  possession  of  Constantinople 
should  make  Russia  more  cautious  and  more  peaceful. 
Similarly,  the  dissolution  of  Austria-Hungary  into  its  com- 
ponent parts — an  event  which  at  present  is  contemplated 
with  dread  by  those  who  fear  Russia's  powfer — would  ap- 
parently not  increase  Russia's  strength  or  the  strength 
of  Slavism,  but  would  more  likely  be  disadvantageous  to 
both.  The  weakness  of  Austria-Hungary  arises  from  its 
disunion.  Owing  to  its  disunion  the  country  is  militarily 
and  economically  weak.  If  Austria-Hungary  should  be 
replaced  by  a  number  of  self-governing  States  these  will 
develop  much  faster.  Some  of  these  States  will  be  Slavonic, 
but  it  is  not  hkely  that  they  will  become  Russia's  tools. 
Liberated  nations,  as  Bismarck  has  told  us,  are  not  grate- 
ful, but  exacting.  The  Balkan  nations  which  Russia  has 
freed  from  the  Turkish  yoke,  Greece,  Bulgaria,  Serbia,  and 
Roumania,  have  promptly  asserted  their  independence 
from  Russia,  and  have  developed  a  strong  individuaHty 
of  their  own.  The  Slavonic  nationalities  of  Austria-Hun- 
gary also  would  probably  assert  their  independence.  For 
economic  reasons  the  small  and  medium-sized  nations  in 
the  Balkan  Peninsula  and  within  the  limits  of  present-day 
Austria-Hungary    would    probably    combine,    and    if   they 


54  The  Problem  of  Constantinople 

were  threatened  from  Eussia  they  would  naturally  form 
a  strong  political  union.  A  greater  Austria-Hungary,  a 
State  on  a  federal  basis,  would  arise  in  the  place  of  the 
present  State,  and,  strengthened  by  self-government,  the 
power  of  that  confederation  would  be  far  greater  than 
that  possessed  by  the  Dual  Monarchy. 

Since  the  time  when  these  pages  were  written  the  Eussian 
autocracy  has  disappeared  and  has  been  replaced  by  the 
republic.  Many  of  the  Eussian  democratic  leaders  have 
proclaimed  that  they  are  opposed  to  the  autocratic  policy  of 
conquest,  that  they  do  not  wish  to  possess  Constantinople. 
It  remains  to  be  seen  whether  the  new  leaders  of  Eussia 
will  abandon  the  century-old  aim  of  their  country.  Not 
only  the  Eussian  sovereigns  but  the  Eussian  people  them- 
selves have  for  centuries  striven  to  control  the  Narrows 
which  connect  the  Black  Sea  with  the  Mediterranean, 
guided  not  merely  by  ambition  but  by  the  conviction  that 
Eussia  required  an  adequate  outlet  to  the  sea  for  economic 
reasons.  The  EuSsian  sovereigns  who  tried  to  conquer 
Constantinople  followed,  therefore,  not  a  personal  but  a 
national  pohcy.  When,  at  the  beginning  of  the  War,  Eussia's 
war  aims  were  discussed  in  the  Imperial  Duma,  practically 
all  the  speakers  demanded  the  acquisition  of  Constantinople. 
The  wealthiest  districts  of  Eussia  He  in  the  south.  The 
north  is  largely  barren.  The  productions  of  Southern 
Eussia  go  towards  the  Black  Sea  by  the  magnificent  Eussian 
rivers  and  by  railways.  The  War  has  shown  that  the  Power 
which  controls  the  Bosphorus  and  the  Dardanelles  can 
blockade  Eussia,  can  strangulate  the  economic  life  of  the 
country.  That  is  a  position  wliich  may  appear  undesirable 
even  to  the  most  enthusiastic  Eussian  democrats  and  to 
the  most  convinced  anti-annexationists.  After  all,  a  great 
nation  requires  adequate  access  to  the  sea. 


CHAPTER  III 

THE    PROBLEM    OF   ASIATIC    TURKEY  ^ 

The  problem  of  Constantinople  has  perplexed  and  dis- 
tressed the  world  diu'ing  many  centuries.  Numerous  wars 
have  been  waged,  and  irmumerable  lives  have  been  sacrificed 
by  the  nations  desiring  to  possess  or  control  that  glorious 
city  and  the  wonderful  Narrows  which  separate  Em'ope 
from  Asia  and  which  connect  the  Black  Sea  and  the 
Mediterranean,  the  East  and  the  West,  the  Slavonic  and 
the  Latin-Germanic  world.  Hitherto  it  was  generally 
beheved  that  an  attempt  to  settle  the  question  of  Constan- 
tinople would  inevitably  lead  to  a  world  war  among  the 
claimant  States,  that  their  agreement  was  impossible. 
Hence  diplomats  thought  with  dread  of  the  question  of 
Constantinople,  which  seemed  insoluble.  The  Great  War 
has  broadened  men's  minds,  and  has  bridged  many  historic 
differences.  It  has  created  new  enemies,  but  it  has  also 
created  new  friends,  and  it  appears  that  the  problem  of 
Constantinople  will  peacefully  and  permanently  be  settled 
when  the  Entente  Powers  have  achieved  their  final  victory. 
However,  while  we  may  rejoice  that  the  ever-threatening 
problem  of  Constantinople  has  at  last  been  eHminated,  it 
seems  possible  that  another,  a  far  greater  and  a  far  more 
dangerous  one,  may  almost  immediately  arise  in  its  place. 
The  question  of  Asiatic  Turkey  is  forcing  itself  to  the  front, 
and  it  may  convulse  the  world  in  a  series  of  devastating 

^  The  Nineteenth  Century  and  After,  June  1916. 
55 


56  The  Problem  of  Asiatic  Turkey 

wars  unless  it  be  solved  together  with  the  other  great 
questions  which  will  come  up  for  settlement  at  the  Peace 
Congress. 

Sufficient  for  the  day  is  the  evil  thereof.  Not  only 
the  map  of  Eui'ope,  but  that  of  the  world,  will  have  to  be 
re-drawn.  The  coming  settlement  will  be  greater,  and 
may  be  far  more  difficult,  than  that  made  at  Vienna  a 
hundred  years  ago.  It  would  therefore  not  be  surprising 
if  those  of  the  assembled  statesmen  who  are  not  sufficiently 
acquainted  with  the  significance,  the  importance,  and  the 
danger  of  the  problem  of  Asiatic  Turkey  should  say,  '  We 
have  our  hands  full.  Let  us  not  touch  the  question  of 
Asiatic  Turkey.  That  is  a  matter  for  another  generation.' 
That  attitude  is  understandable,  but  it  should  not  deter 
those  statesmen  who  realise  the  portent  and  the  peril  of 
the  Turco-Asiatic  problem,  and  the  danger  of  leaving  it 
in  abeyance,  from  impressing  upon  their  less  well-informed 
colleagues  the  necessity  of  a  settlement. 

The  question  of  Asiatic  Turkey  is  undoubtedly  a  far 
more  difficult  question  than  that  of  Constantinople.  Con- 
stantinople and  the  Straits  are,  as  I  have  shown,  not  the 
key  to  the  Dominion  of  the  World,  as  Napoleon  the  First 
asserted,  but  merely  the  key  to  the  Black  Sea.  Former 
generations,  uncritically  repeating  Napoleon's  celebrated 
dictum,  have  greatly  overrated  the  strategical  importance 
of  that  wonderful  site.  The  importance  and  value  of 
Asiatic  Turkey  on  the  other  hand  can  scarcely  be  ex- 
aggerated, for  it  occupies  undoubtedly  the  most  important 
strategical  position  in  the  world.  It  forms  the  nucleus 
and  centre  of  the  Old  World.  It  separates,  and  at  the 
same  time  connects,  Europe,  Asia,  and  Africa,  three  con- 
tinents wliich  are  inhabited  by  approximately  nine-tenths 
of  the  human  race. 

If  we  wish  clearly  to  understand  the  importance  of 
Asiatic  Turkey,  we  must  study  its  position  not  only  from 
the  strategical  point  of  view,  but  also  from  the  religio- 
political  and  from  the  economic  points  of  view. 


G7'eat  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     57 

Asiatic  Turkey  occupies  a  most  commanding  position, 
both  for  war  and  for  trade.  A  glance  at  a  map  shows 
that  Asiatic  Turkey  is  the  link  and  the  bridge  which  connects 
Africa  with  Asia  and  both  with  Europe.  It  occupies  a 
position  whence  three  continents  may  easily  be  threatened 
and  attacked.  The  strategical  importance  of  a  site  depends 
obviously  not  only  on  its  geographical  position,  but  also 
on  its  mihtary  value,  on  the  faciUties  which  it  offers  both 
for  defence  and  for  attack.  Looked  at  from  the  defensive 
point  of  view,  Asiatic  Turkey  forms  an  enormous  natural 
fortress  of  the  greatest  strength.  The  waters  of  the  Black 
Sea,  of  the  Mediterranean,  of  the  Eed  Sea,  and  of  the  Persian 
Gulf  efficiently  shelter  the  larger  part  of  its  borders,  while 
its  land  frontiers  are  equally  powerfully  protected  by 
gigantic  waterless  deserts  and  lofty  mountain  ranges. 
Eange  after  range  of  mountains  protect  Asiatic  Turkey 
towards  Eussia  and  Persia.  The  non-Tm'kish  part  of 
Arabia  is  a  torrid  desert,  and  one  of  the  least-known  and 
least-explored  countries  in  the  world.  In  the  south-west 
Asiatic  Turkey  is  protected  by  the  barren  waste  of  the 
Sinai  Peninsula,  the  Suez  Canal,  and  the  Sahara.  Thus, 
Asiatic  Turkey  enjoys  virtually  all  the  advantages  of  an 
island,  being  surrounded  on  all  sides  by  the  sea  and  sandy 
and  mountainous  wastes. 

Asia  Minor  is  the  nucleus,  the  territorial  base,  and  the 
citadel  of  Asiatic  Turkey.  High  mountain  walls  rise  on 
its  Black  Sea  and  Mediterranean  shores,  and  it  is  sheltered 
towards  the  south  by  the  mighty  Taurus  chain  of  mountains 
which  stretches  from  the  Gulf  of  Alexandretta,  opposite 
Cyprus,  to  the  Persian  frontier.  Thus  the  Taurus  forms 
a  wall  of  defence  from  7,000  to  10,000  feet  high  against 
aa  enemy  advancing  upon  Asia  Minor  from  the  east  or 
from  the  south,  from  the  Eed  Sea  and  Syi'ia,  or  from  the 
Persian  Gulf  and  Mesopotamia. 

The  best  defence  is  the  attack.  The  importance  of  a 
fortress  hes  not  so  much  in  its  strength  for  purely  passive 
defence  as  in  its  usefulness  as  a  base  for  an  attack.    An 


58  The  Problem  of  Asiatic  Turkey 

impregnable  fortress  which  cannot  serve  as  a  base  of  attack 
because  it  lies  on  an  inaccessible  mountain  or  on  an  out- 
of-the-way  island  can  safely  be  disregarded  by  an  enemy, 
and  is  therefore  miUtarily  worthless.  Asiatic  Tm'key  is 
a  natural  fortress  wliich  possesses  vast  possibilities  for 
attack,  for  it  borders  upon  some  of  the  most  valuable  and 
most  vulnerable  positions  in  the  world,  and  it  is  able  to 
dominate  them  and  to  seize  them  by  a  surprise  attack.  In 
the  north  it  can  threaten  the  rich  Caucasian  Provinces 
of  Eussia  and  their  oil-fields  with  Tiflis,  Batum,  Baku. 
From  its  600  miles  of  Black  Sea  coast  it  can  attack  the 
rich  Kussian  Black  Sea  provinces  with  the  Crimea,  Odessa, 
Nikolaeff,  and  Kherson.  It  can  easily  strike  across  the 
narrow  Bosphorus  at  Constantinople.  Towards  the  west 
of  Asia  Minor,  and  in  easy  reach  of  it,  lie  the  beautiful 
Greek  and  Itahan  islands  in  the  ^gean,  which  until  recently 
belonged  to  Tm'key,  and  hes  Greece  itself,  which  for  centuries 
was  a  Turkish  possession.  West  of  Turkish  Syria  He  the 
Suez  Canal,  Egypt,  Erythrea,  and  the  Itahan  and  French 
Colonies  of  North  Africa. 

A  powerful  Asiatic  Turkey  can  obviously  dominate 
not  only  the  Bosphorus,  the  Dardanelles,  and  the  Suez 
Canal,  but  the  very  narrow  entrance  of  the  Eed  Sea  near 
Aden,  and  that  of  the  Persian  Gulf  near  Muscat  as  well. 
It  must  also  not  be  forgotten  that  only  a  comparatively 
short  distance,  a  stretch  of  country  under  the  nominal 
rule  of  weak  and  decadent  Persia,  separates  Asiatic  Tm-key 
from  the  Indian  frontier.  It  is  clear  that  Asiatic  Tmkey, 
lying  in  the  centre  of  the  Old  World,  is  at  the  same  time 
a  natural  fortress  of  the  greatest  defensive  strength  and 
an  ideal  base  for  a  surprise  attack  upon  Southern  Eussia, 
Constantinople,  the  J5gean  Islands,  Greece,  the  Suez 
Canal,  Egypt,  Persia,  Afghanistan,  and  India. 

Time  is  money.  From  year  to  year  international 
traffic  tends  more  and  more  toward  the  shortest  and  the 
most  direct,  the  best  strategical,  routes.  Asia  Minor  hes 
across  one  of  the  greatest  lines  of  world  traffic.     It  hes 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship      59 

across  the  direct  line  which  connects  London,  Paris,  and 
BerHn  with  Karachi,  Delhi,  Bombay,  Calcutta,  Canton, 
and  Shanghai.  The  enormous  mountains  of  Afghanistan 
and  of  Tibet  and  the  great  Eussian  inland  seas  compel 
the  main  railway  lines  connecting  Europe  and  Asia  which 
undoubtedly  will  be  built  in  the  future  to  be  led  via  Con- 
stantinople and  Asia  Minor,  and  not  via  Eussia  and  Southern 
Siberia.  Year  by  year  the  importance  of  the  land  route 
to  India  and  China  by  way  of  Asia  Minor  will  therefore 
grow.  Year  by  year  the  strategical  value  of  the  railways 
running  through  Asia  Minor  from  Constantinople  towards 
Mosul  and  Baghdad  will  increase.  Asiatic  Turkey  com- 
mands by  its  position  the  shortest,  and  therefore  the  best, 
land  route  to  India  and  China,  the  route  of  the  future. 
By  commanding  the  Suez  Canal  and  the  Narrow  Straits 
which  lead  from  the  Indian  Ocean  to  the  Eed  Sea  and  to 
the  Persian  Gulf,  that  country  is  able  to  threaten  with 
a  flank  attack  the  sea  route  to  India  and  China  not  merely 
in  one  but  in  three  places.  As  the  opening  of  the  Persian 
Gulf  lies  not  far  from  the  Indian  coast,  it  is  obvious  that 
a  strong  Power  holding  Asiatic  Tm-key  would  be  able  to 
threaten  with  its  navy  not  only  the  Mediterranean  route 
to  India  and  the  Far  East,  but  the  Cape  route  as  well. 

The  strategical  position  of  Asiatic  Turkey  curiously 
resembles  that  of  Switzerland.  Being  surrounded  by 
lofty  mountains,  vast  deserts,  and  the  sea.  Nature  has 
made  Asiatic  Turkey  an  impregnable  fortress,  another 
Switzerland.  However,  while  httle  Switzerland  dominates 
by  its  natural  strength  and  strategical  position  merely 
three  European  States — Germany,  France,  and  Italy — 
Asiatic  Turkey  dominates  the  three  most  populous,  and 
therefore  the  three  most  important,  continents  of  the  world. 

Asiatic  Turkey  looks  small  on  the  ordinary  maps  ; 
but  it  is,  as  the  table  on  page  60  shows,  a  very  large  and 
extremely  sparsely  populated  country. 

Asiatic  Turkey  is  three  and  a  half  times  as  large  as 
Germany,   and  nearly  six  times  as  large  as  the   United 


60 


The  Problem  of  Asiatic  Turkey 


Kingdom.  Its  population  io  quite  insignificant.  Compared 
with  Asiatic  Turkey  even  Eussia  is  a  densely  populated 
country.  Asiatic  Turkey  is  at  present  almost  a  desert, 
although  it  may  be  made  to  support  a  very  large  popula- 
tion, for  it  possesses  vast  possibilities,  as  will  be  shown 
further  on.  The  country  has  certainly  room  for  at  least 
a  hundred  million  inhabitants. 

Austria-Hungary  has  become  an  appendage  of  Germany, 
and  Turkey  a  German  vassal  State.  During  many  decades 
patriotic  Germans  dreamed  of  creating  a  Greater  Germany, 
reaching  not  merely  from  Hamburg  to  Trieste,  but  from 
Antwerp  to  Aden,  to  Koweyt  and  perhaps  to  Muscat  and 


Square  Miles 

Inhabitants  at 
Last  Census 

Population  per 
Square  Mile 

Asiatic  Turkey 

United  Kingdom     . 

Germany 

France    .... 

Spain      .        ". 

European  Russia.   . 

699,342 
121,633 
208,780 
207,054 
194,783 
1,862,524 

19,382,900 
45,370,530 
64,925,993 
39,601,509 
19,588,688 
122,550,700 

28-0 
372-6 
310-4 
189-5 
100-5 

64-6 

far  into  Southern  Persia.  German  thinkers  were  attracted 
towards  Asiatic  Turkey  not  only  because  of  its  great  past 
and  its  vast  economic  possibilities,  but  also  because  of  its 
matchless  position  at  a  spot  where  tliree  continents  meet, 
whence  three  continents  may  be  dominated,  whence  Eussia 
and  the  British  Empire  may  most  effectively  be  attacked, 
whence  the  rule  of  the  world  may  be  won.  The  present 
War  undoubtedly  was  largely  a  war  for  the  control  of  Asia 
Minor. 

In  the  middle  of  the  last  century  leading  German 
economists  and  thinkers  who  exerted  a  most  powerful 
influence  upon  German  statesmanship  and  upon  German 
pubhc  opinion,  such  as  Wilhelm  Eoscher,  Friedrich  List, 
Paul  de  Lagarde,  Ferdinand  Lassalle,  J.  K.  Eodbertus, 
Karl  Eitter,  the  great  Moltke,  and  others,  wTiting  long 
before  the  unification  of  Germany,  advocated  the  creation 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanshijy      61 

of  a  Greater  Germany  embracing  all  the  German  and  Austro- 
Hungarian  States  and  the  acquisition  of  Asia  Minor  in 
some  form  or  other,  and  dreamt  of  the  creation  of  an  organic 
connection  between  Berhn  and  Baghdad  by  including 
the  Balkan  States  in  an  Austro- German  Federation.  The 
creation  of  a  Greater  Germany,  stretching  from  the  North 
Sea  to  the  Bosphorus,  and  across  the  Straits  to  the  Persian 
Gulf  and  the  Indian  Ocean,  was  lately  advocated  unceasingly 
by  many  Pan-Germans.  The  acquisition  of  Asia  Minor 
was  urged  by  many  eminent  writers  and  men  of  action, 
such  as  Hasse,  Dehn,  Kohrbach,  Sprenger,  Sachau,  Von 
der  Goltz,  Karger,  Naumann,  Schlagintweit,  and  many 
others.  I  would  give  a  characteristic  example  out  of 
many.  Professor  Dr.  A.  Sprenger,  the  former  director  of 
the  Mohammedan  College  of  Calcutta,  wrote  in  his  book 
'  Babylonia  the  Kichest  Land  of  Antiquity,  and  the  most 
Valuable  Field  of  Colonisation  at  the  Present  Time,' 
pubHshed  in  1886  : 

The  Orient  is  the  only  territory  of  the  earth  which  has 
not  yet  been  seized  by  the  expanding  nations.  It  is  the 
most  valuable  field  of  colonisation...  If  Germany  does  not 
miss  its  opportunity  and  seizes  it  before  the  Cossacks  have 
put  their  hands  upon  it,  the  whole  German  nation  will  gain 
by  the  colonisation  of  the  East.  As  soon  as  several  hundred 
thousand  German  soldier-colonists  are  at  work  in  that 
glorious  country  the  German  Emperor  can  control  the  fate 
of  Western  Asia  and  the  peace  of  all  Asia. 

Similar  views  were  expressed  by  many  eminent  Germans. 
The  Baghdad  Kailway  was  evidently  not  merely  a  financial 
enterprise  of  the  Deutsche  Bank,  undertaken  for  the  develop- 
ment of  Asia  Minor.  Konia,  the  natural  capital  of  Asiatic 
Turkey,  lying  on  the  Baghdad  Eailway,  is  situated  almost 
exactly  midway  between  Berlin  and  Karachi. 

Let  us  imagine  the  Turkish  Government  in  Asia  replaced 
by  that  of  a  strong  and  ambitious  miHtary  Power.  Such 
a  Power  would  develop  the  country  in  every  way,  and  would 


62  The  Problem  of  Asiatic  Turkey 

double  and  treble  its  population.  It  would  open  the 
country  in  every  direction  by  means  of  railways.  It  would 
construct  lines  capable  of  carrying  a  vast  amount  of  traffic 
towards  the  Eussian,  Egyptian,  and  Persian  frontiers, 
and  it  would  continue  the  latter,  '  on  economic  grounds,' 
through  Persia  towards  Baluchistan,  towards  India.  It 
would  create  a  powerful  navy  and  construct  strong  naval 
bases  on  the  shores  of  the  Black  Sea  and  near  the  southern 
openings  of  the  Eed  Sea  and  of  the  Persian  Gulf.  Having 
done  all  this,  it  would  be  able  to  throw  at  the  shortest  notice 
an  immense  arm^y  either  across  the  Bosphorus  into  Constan- 
tinople, or  across  the  Suez  Canal  into  Egypt,  or  across 
Persia  into  India.  A  strong  European  mihtary  Power, 
firmly  settled  in  Asiatic  Turkey,  disposing  of  2,000,000 
Turkish-Asiatic  soldiers  and  of  a  sufficiency  of  railways 
and  of  a  fleet,  could  make  Constantinople  and  Egypt  almost 
untenable.  It  could  gravely  threaten  Southern  Eussia 
and  India  and  the  most  important  sea-route  of  the  world. 
At  the  same  time,  such  a  Power,  if  it  should  become  a 
danger,  could  not  easily  be  dislodged  or  defeated,  because 
the  enormous  defensive  strength  of  the  country  would 
make  its  resistance  most  formidable. 

If  we  wish  clearly  to  understand  the  strategic  importance 
of  Asiatic  Turkey  and  the  dangers  with  which  the  world 
might  be  threatened  from  that  most  commanding  point, 
we  need  not  draw  upon  the  imagination,  but  may  usefully 
turn  towards  the  history  of  the  past.  In  the  Middle  Ages 
a  small  but  exceedingly  warhke  Power  arose  within  the 
borders  of  Asiatic  Turkey.  Using  as  their  base  of  operations 
that  most  wonderful  position  where  three  continents  meet, 
Mohammedan  warrior  tribes  swept  north,  south,  east,  and 
west.  They  rapidly  overran  and  conquered  Egypt,  Tripoh, 
Tunis,  Algeria,  Spain,  Sicily,  and  even  invaded  France 
and  Italy.  They  conquered  all  the  lands  around  the  Black 
Sea,  and  subjected  to  themselves  Arabia,  Persia,  Afghanistan, 
and  Northern  India  as  far  as  the  Indus  and  the  Syr-Daria, 
the   ancient    Jaxartes.     They   crossed   the   Straits,   seized 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship      63 

Constantinople,  the  whole  Balkan  Peninsula,  and  Hungary, 
and  advanced  up  to  the  walls  of  Vienna.  They  seized  the 
rule  of  the  sea.  The  word  '  admiral,'  from  '  amir,'  the  Arabic 
word  for  '  chief,  commander,'  the  same  word  as  '  ameer '  or 
'  emir,'  reminds  us  of  their  former  naval  pre-eminence. 

The  strategical  value  of  Asiatic  Turkey  is  very  greatly 
increased  by  the  vast  religio-poHtical  importance  of  the 
country.  Asiatic  Turkey  contains  the  holy  places  of 
Christianity  and  of  Islam.  Mecca  and  Medina  exercise 
an  infinitely  greater  influence  over  Mohammedanism  than 
Jerusalem  and  Bethlehem  do  over  Christianity.  Mecca 
and  Medina  give  an  enormous  power  to  the  nation  which 
possesses  or  controls  these  towns.  Asiatic  Turkey  is  not 
only  the  rehgious,  but  also  the  physical  centre  of 
Mohammedanism.  From  Asiatic  Turkey  Mohammedanism 
spread  in  every  direction.  Starting  thence  it  conquered 
all  North  Africa  dowTi  to  the  tenth  degree  of  northern 
latitude,  and  expanded  eastward  as  far  as  Orenburg  and 
Omsk  in  Eussia,  and  penetrated  through  Afghanistan  as 
far  as  Delhi  and  Kashmir  in  India.  The  followers  of 
Mohammed  form  a  sohd  block  which  stretches  from  the 
west  coast  of  Morocco  and  from  Sierra  Leone  across  Asia 
Minor  deeply  into  Eussia  and  Siberia  and  into  India. 

Lying  in  the  centre  of  the  Mohammedan  world,  Asiatic 
Turkey  would  be  an  ideal  spot  whence  to  organise  and 
to  govern  a  great  Mohammedan  Federation  or  Empire. 
Mohammedanism  may  conceivably  have  a  new  lease  of 
life.  Pan-Islamism  need  not  necessarily  remain  an  idle 
dream.  A  strong  leader  and  able  organiser,  possessed 
of  the  necessary  prestige,  might  make  it  a  reality.  Turkey 
as  the  guardian  of  Mecca  and  Medina,  and  therefore  of 
Islam,  has  naturally  exercised  little  influence  over  the 
Islamic  world.  The  Mohammedans  throughout  the  world 
have  rejected  with  scorn  the  Turks  as  their  leaders,  be- 
cause they  have  incm'red  the  contempt  of  their  brother 
Mohammedans  by  their  moral  and  material  degeneration. 
However,  it  seems  not  impossible  that  a  strong  mihtary 


64  The  Problem  of  Asiatic  Turkey 

Power  controlling  the  Holy  Places  might  succeed  once  more 
in  controlKng  all  Islam,  and  might  thus  be  able  to  utiHse 
the  serried  ranks  of  300,000,000  Mohammedans  against 
its  enemies.  That  idea  was  probably  in  the  German 
Emperor's  mind  when,  on  November  8,  1898,  speaking 
in  the  ancient  town  of  Damascus  and  addressing  his 
Mohammedan  guests,  he  emphatically  proclaimed  :  '  May 
the  Sultan  of  Turkey,  and  may  the  three  hundred  milHon 
Mohammedans  throughout  the  world  who  worship  him 
as  their  CaHph,  be  assured  that  the  German  Emperor  will 
be  their  friend  for  all  time.'  Since  then  the  German 
Emperor  has  assumed  the  r61e  of  Protector  of  Islam. 

Mahomet  was  a  warrior.  Islam  is  a  conqueror's  creed. 
A  strong  mihtary  Power,  controlling  Mecca  and  Medina, 
might  bring  about  a  revival  of  conquering  Mohammedanism, 
and  might  make  Pan-Islamism  a  dangerous  reahty.  The 
greatest  Mohammedan  Powers  are  the  British  Empire, 
Kussia,  and  France.  British  India  alone  has  70,000,000 
Mohammedans,  all  French  North  Africa  is  Mohammedan, 
and  Eussia  has  no  less  than  20,000,000  Mohammedan 
citizens.  The  rehgio-poHtical  importance  of  Asia  Minor 
is  so  very  great  that  its  control  by  a  strong  mihtary  Power 
might  endanger  not  only  France,  Eussia,  and  the  British 
Empire,  but  the  whole  world.  France,  Eussia,  and  the 
British  Empire  desire  the  maintenance  of  peace,  and  are 
therefore  most  strongly  interested  in  preventing  a  revival 
of  a  fanatically  aggressive  Mohammedanism,  especially 
if  it  be  directed  by  a  non-Mohammedan  Power  for  non- 
Mohammedan  ends. 

The  economic  importance  of  Asiatic  Turkey  is  exceed- 
ingly great.  Asiatic  Turkey  is  the  oldest  and  by  far  the 
most  important  nucleus  of  Western  civiHsation.  All  the 
most  glorious  seats  of  ancient  power  and  culture  had 
the  misfortune  of  being  conquered  by  Tm^kish  barbarians. 
The  wonderful  empires  of  Babylonia,  Assyria,  Egypt,  Phoe- 
nicia, Lydia,  Media,  Carthage,  Persia,  Greece,  Palestine,  and 
the  Arab  Empire  were  seized  by  the  followers  of  Sultan 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     65 

Othman  and  his  successors,  and  wherever  the  Turks  went 
they  created  nothing  except  disorder,  ruin,  and  utter 
desolation.  The  country  which  gave  rise  to  the  far-famed 
towns  of  Babylon,  Nineveh,  Seleucia,  Ctesiphon,  Opis, 
xirtemita,  ApoUonia,  Corsote,  Thapsacus,  Baghdad,  Ilii^m, 
Pergamon,  Magnesia,  Smyrna,  Sardes,  Susa,  Ephesus, 
Tralles,  Miletus,  HaHcarnassus,  Antiochia,  Laodicea, 
Iconium,  Tarsus,  Berytus,  Sidon,  Tyre,  Damascus,  Palmyra, 
Memphis,  Thebes — this  country  became  a  wilderness. 
Poverty-stricken  villages,  or  mere  heaps  of  debris,  indicate 
the  sites  of  nearly  all  the  greatest  and  most  flourishing 
cities  of  the  Ancient  World. 

How  great  and  how  general  is  the  desolation  of  Asiatic 
Tm'key,  which  formerly  was  one  of  the  most  densely 
populated  countries  of  the  world,  may  be  seen  from  the 
following  figures  : 


Square  Miles 

Inhabitants 

Population  per 
Square  Mile 

Asia  Minor  . 

Armenia  and  Kurdistan 

Mesopotamia 

Syria   .... 

Turkish  Arabia     . 

199,272 
71,990 
143,250 
114,530 
170,300 

10,186,900 
2,470,900 
2,000,000 
3,675,100 
1,050,000 

52 
34 
14 
33 

6 

Total  Asiatic  Turkey  . 

699,342               19,382,900 

28 

The  most  densely  populated  vilayet  of  Asia  Minor  is 
that  of  Trebizond,  wdth  76  people  per  square  mile.  It  is 
followed  by  Ismid  with  71,  Smyrna  with  64,  and  Brussa 
with  64  people  per  square  mile.  How  small  the  population 
is  even  in  the  most  favoured  and  most  advanced  vilayets 
of  Asia  Minor  may  be  seen  by  the  fact  that  all  Bulgaria 
has  a  population  of  116-4  per  square  mile,  Serbia  144*0, 
and  Italy  31 3 -.5  per  square  mile.  The  cultivated  part  of 
Egypt  had,  according  to  the  census  of  1907,  a  population 
of  915  per  square  mile,  but  it  should  now  amount  to  about 
1000  per  square  mile. 


66  The  Problem  of  Asiatic  Turkey 

How  wonderfully  countries  which  have  been  under  the 
withering  rule  of  the  Turk  may  flourish  when  this  rule 
has  been  abolished  may  be  seen  by  the  example  of  Greece, 
Bulgaria,  Serbia,  and  Egypt.  In  1882,  in  the  year  of 
England's  intervention,  the  population  of  Egypt  was, 
according  to  the  census  of  that  year,  6,831,131.  At  the 
census  of  1907  it  came  to  11,287,359,  and  by  now  it  should 
amount  to  about  13,000,000.  During  the  brief  span  of 
England's  occupation  the  population  of  Egypt  has  doubled, 
and  its  wealth  has  grown  prodigiously.  Between  1879 
and  1881,  three  particularly  favourable  years,  Egypt's 
imports  amounted  on  an  average  to  £7,000,000  per  year. 
In  1913  they  came  to  £27,000,000. 

Trade  by  itself  produces  but  little.  The  vast  wealth 
of  ancient  Babylonia,  Assyria,  Lydia,  Media,  Persia, 
Phoenicia,  and  of  the  glorious  Greek  towns  on  the  Western 
Coast  of  Asia  Minor  was  founded  on  the  broad  and  solid 
basis  of  agriculture.  Asiatic  Turkey  was  in  ancient  times 
famous  for  its  agricultural  wealth.  Numerous  existing 
ruins  show  that  even  the  uplands  in  the  interior  abounded 
in  large  and  prosperous  towns.  At  present  Asia  Minor 
has  only  10,000,000  inhabitants.  From  a  statement  con- 
tained in  the  '  Historia  Naturalis  '  of  Phny,  we  learn  that 
Pompey  subjected  in  the  war  against  Mithridates  a  popula- 
tion of  12,183,000.  If  we  deduct  from  that  number  the 
pirates  against  whom  he  fought,  the  soldiers  of  Mithridates, 
the  inhabitants  of  Crete,  and  those  of  Armenia  and  the 
Caucasus,  together  about  3,000,000,  and  add  the  inhabitants 
of  Western  Asia  Minor  who,  according  to  Beloch,  should 
then  have  numbered  from  8,000,000  to  9,000,000,  the 
whole  of  Asia  Minor — that  is,  the  territories  this  side  of  the 
Euphrates — should  have  contained  between  17,000,000  and 
18,000,000  people  two  thousand  years  ago. 

Asiatic  Turkey  has  large  stretches  of  good  soil  and  an 
excellent  cMmate.  Cereals  of  every  kind,  cotton,  rice, 
and  tobacco  flourish.  On  the  lower  slopes  of  the  west 
figs,  oHves,  and  grapes  grow  in  profusion  and  in  perfection, 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship       67 

and  in  the  higher  altitudes  flourish  the  pine,  the  fir,  the 
cedar,  the  oak,  and  the  beech.  Agriculture,  aided  by 
modern  methods  of  production  and  transportation,  should 
be  able  to  nourish  an  enormous  population  in  that  favoured 
land,  and  should  make  it  once  more  highly  prosperous. 
Besides,  Asiatic  Turkey  is  extremely  rich  in  minerals, 
including  coal,  gold,  silver,  nickel,  mercury,  copper,  iron, 
and  lead,  but  these  resources  have  so  far  remained  practically 
untouched.  Under  a  good  Government  Asia  Minor  may 
once  more  become  an  exceedingly  wealthy  and  well-peopled 
country.  The  possession  or  the  control  of  Asiatic  Turkey 
will  produce  both  power  and  wealth.  A  military  State 
controlling  it  would  convert  its  wealth  into  power.  Under 
its  direction  Asiatic  Turkey  would  not  become  a  second 
Egypt  but  another  mihtary  State,  and  its  mineral  wealth 
would  lead  to  the  estabHshment  of  enormous  arsenals  and 
armanent  factories. 

On  the  Turkish  coast  there  are  numerous  excellent 
bays  and  inlets  where  in  olden  times  floui'ishing  city  States 
carried  on  an  active  trade.  Under  the  Turkish  Govern- 
ment these  old  harbour  works,  Hke  the  old  towns,  roads, 
and  canals,  have  been  destroyed  or  have  been  allowed  to 
fall  into  ruin.  In  many  places  good  harbours  could  be 
constructed  at  moderate  expense,  and  the  revival  of 
agriculture  and  the  exploitation  of  the  mineral  resources 
of  the  country  would  once  more  create  a  flourishing  coast 
trade,  would  recreate  the  old  Greek  settlements. 

Asiatic  Turkey  is  economically  very  important,  not  only 
because  it  is  possible  to  increase  enormously  its  stunted 
power  of  production,  but  also  because,  with  the  building 
of  railways,  an  enormous  passenger  and  goods  traffic  may 
be  developed  on  the  direct  line  which  connects  Central 
Europe  with  India  and  China  via  Asia  Minor.  The  inter- 
com'se  between  East  and  West  is  rapidly  increasing.  The 
Suez  Canal  traffic  came  in  1870  to  436,609  tons  net.  In 
1876  it  came  to  2,096,771  tons,  in  .882  to  5,074,808  tons, 
in  1901  to  10,832,840  tons,  and  in  1912  to  20,275,120  tons 


68  The  Problem  of  Asiatic  Turkey 

net.  The  geographical  position  of  Asia  Minor  on  the 
shortest  trade  route  connecting  the  East  with  the  West, 
which  enriched  Phoenicia,  and  which  made  Sidon  and  Tyre 
the  merchants  of  the  Ancient  World  and  the  founders  of 
a  far-flung  sea-empire,  may  greatly  enrich  its  inhabitants. 

The  Turks  have  no  gifts  either  for  government  or  for 
business.  Their  administration  in  all  its  branches  is  a 
byword  for  corruption,  neglect,  disorder,  and  incompetence, 
and  as  the  Turks  display  the  same  quaUties,  or  rather 
defects,  in  business,  their  trade  is  carried  on  almost  entirely 
by  foreigners,  especially  by  Western  Europeans,  Greeks, 
and  Armenians.  In  their  vast  Asiatic  provinces  the  Turks 
possess,  admittedly,  one  of  the  richest  countries  in  the 
world,  a  country  which  imperatively  calls  for  development. 

Asiatic  Turkey  is  the  stronghold  of  the  Turkish  race. 
However,  only  a  part  of  the  inhabitants  are  Turks.  In 
Western  Asia  Minor,  and  especially  in  the  harbour  towns, 
hve  about  1,500,000  Greeks.  Smyrna  is  a  Greek  town. 
In  Eastern  Asia  Minor,  near  the  Eussian  frontier,  dwell 
about  2,000,000  Armenians.  Chiefly  in  the  south  there  are 
about  10,000,000  Arabs.  Besides  these  there  are  numerous 
other  races — Syrians,  Kurds,  Circassians,  Jews,  &c. 

Wherever  the  Turks  rule,  they  rule  by  misrule,  by 
persecution,  by  extortion,  and  by  massacre.  The  Greeks 
in  the  west,  the  Armenians  in  the  east,  and  the  Arabs  in 
the  south  sigh  for  freedom  from  Turkish  oppression. 
Hitherto  Europe  has  been  horrified  chiefly  by  Turkish 
misrule  in  the  Balkan  Peninsula,  the  sufferings  of  which 
have  overshadowed  the  equally  scandalous  misrule  in 
Asiatic  Tm'key.  When  the  Turks  have  lost  Constantinople 
and  have  been  finally  driven  out  of  Europe  their  singular 
capacity  for  misgovernment  will  find  fuU  scope  in  their 
Asiatic  provinces.  They  will  become  a  gigantic  Macedonia, 
and  the  outrageous  treatment  of  the  Greeks,  Armenians, 
and  Arabs  will  bring  about  in  Asia  Minor  the  sam.e  dis- 
orders which  hitherto  prevailed  in  the  Turkish  part  of  the 
Balkan  Peninsula.    Here,  as  in  the  Balkans,  the  sufferings 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship      69 

of  the  subject  nationalities  will  arouse  among  other,  and 
especially  among  the  related,  nations  a  desire  to  interfere 
and  to  protect  the  unfortunate  peoples  against  their  masters. 
The  facts  given  in  these  pages  allow  us,  then,  to  draw 
the  following  conclusions  : 

1.  Asiatic  Tm^key  occupies  a  position  of  great  defensive 
strength  and  of  great  potential  danger  to  its  neighbours, 
a  position  which  dominates  the  three  old  continents.  A 
powerful  military  State,  possessing  or  controlling  the 
country,  would  be  able  to  threaten  its  neighbours  in  some 
highly  vulnerable  quarters.  It  would  be  able  to  convert 
it  into  an  enormous  miHtary  camp,  and  it  might  mobiHse 
Islam  throughout  the  world  and  bring  about  a  gigantic 
catastrophe. 

2.  The  great  latent  wealth  of  Asiatic  Turkey,  its  match- 
less position  for  trade  and  commerce,  and  the  fearful  neg- 
lect from  which  it  suffers  are  bound  to  arouse  among  all 
progressive  nations  a  keen  desire  to  open  up  the  country 
by  means  of  railways  and  harbours,  and  to  exploit  its 
precious  agricultural  and  mineral  resources. 

3.  The  presence  of  subject  nationalities — Greeks,  Ar- 
menians, Arabs,  &c. — ^in  Asia  Minor,  who  are  Hkely  to  suffer 
persecution  at  the  hands  of  the  ruHng  Turks,  is  bound 
to  bring  about  a  desire  for  intervention  on  the  part 
of  other  Powers.  In  view  of  the  commanding  position 
occupied  by  Asia  Minor  and  the  possibihty  of  some  nation 
or  other  wishing  to  make  use  of  that  country  for  aggressive 
purposes,  the  European  Powers  may  as  little  be  able  to 
act  in  harmony  in  endeavouring  to  create  good  order  in 
Asiatic  Turkey  as  they  were  in  European  Turkey.  Once 
more  philo-Turkish  and  anti- Turkish  Powers  may  struggle 
for  ascendancy.  Consequently  the  same  intrigues  and 
counter-intrigues,  dangerous  to  the  peace  of  the  world,  of 
which  during  four  centuries  Constantinople  was  the  scene, 
might  take  place  in  Konia  or  wherever  the  Turks  should 
place  their  new  seat  of  Government. 

Apparently  the  problem  of  Asiatic  Turkey  is  insoluble. 


70  The  Problem  of  Asiatic  Turkey 

If  we  look  merely  at  the  world-commanding  strategical 
position  of  Asiatic  Tm:key  and  the  danger  which  its  occupa- 
tion by  a  strong,  enterprising,  and  ambitious  military  Power 
would  involve,  not  merely  for  its  neighbours,  but  for  the 
whole  world,  the  best  solution  of  the  problem  would  seem 
to  consist  in  preserving  the  integrity  of  Asiatic  Turkey  under 
unrestricted  Ottoman  rule.  It  is  obvious  that  if  one  military 
nation  should  occupy  part  of  Asiatic  Turkey  other  nations 
would  become  alarmed  and,  fearing  that  that  most  valuable 
strategical  position  should  fall  entirely  under  the  control 
of  that  military  State  which  had  first  encroached  upon 
its  integrity,  the  other  States  interested  in  Asiatic  Turkey 
would  naturally  endeavour  to  secure  shares  also.  A  general 
scramble  for  Turkish  territory  would  ensue.  Asiatic  Tur- 
key would  be  partitioned.  Eussia,  France,  Italy,  Greece, 
and  Great  Britain,  and  perhaps  other  nations  as  well, 
would  divide  the  country  among  themselves.  Its  com- 
manding position  would  generate  mutual  suspicion  among 
the  sharing  nations.  A  tension  similar  to  that  which 
prevailed  among  the  Balkan  States  would  prevail  in  Asia 
Minor.  Dangerous  friction  would  ensue  which  might  lead 
to  a  world-war  for  the  control  of  Asia  Minor.  The  pohcy 
of  partition  would  obviously  be  most  dangerous  to  the 
peace  of  the  world. 

The  policy  of  preserving  the  integrity  of  Asiatic  Turkey 
in  its  entirety  and  of  abstaining  from  all  interference  with 
the  Turkish  Government  would,  of  course,  prevent  these 
evils,  but  unfortunately  that  policy  is  not  a  practicable 
one.  As  Asiatic  Turkey  is  one  of  the  richest,  and  at  the 
same  time  one  of  the  most  neglected,  countries  in  the  world, 
and  as  it  lies  right  across  one  of  the  most  necessary  and 
most  valuable  of  the  world's  highways — across  the  direct 
line  which  connects  Central  Europe  with  India  and  China — 
the  importance  of  which  is  bound  to  increase  from  year 
to  year,  the  citizens  of  various  nations  would  naturally 
seek  to  develop  the  country  by  means  of  railways,  public 
works,  &c.     History  would  soon  repeat  itself.     Under  the 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship       71 

cloak  of  economic  development,  important  strategical  rail- 
ways, threatening  one  or  the  other  of  the  States  bordering 
on  Asiatic  Turkey,  would  be  constructed.  Thus  the  eco- 
nomic exploitation  of  the  strategical  centre  of  the  world 
by  private  enterprise  would  in  all  probabihty  lead  to  a 
scramble  among  the  Great  Powers  for  spheres  of  influence, 
and  to  an  economic  partition  of  Asia  Minor  which  might 
be  quite  as  dangerous  as  a  complete  territorial  partition. 

If  the  Powers  should  desire  to  make  Asiatic  Turkey  a 
purely  Turco- Asiatic  buffer-  State,  a  No-man's-land  as 
far  as  Europe  is  concerned,  stipulating  that  both  its  pohtical 
and  economic  integrity  should  be  preserved,  leaving  the 
Turks  entirely  to  themselves  and  solemnly  binding  them- 
selves to  abstain  from  both  political  and  economic  inter- 
ference in  its  affairs,  the  difficulty  would  by  no  means  be 
overcome.  Turkish  misgovernment,  Armenian,  Greek,  or 
Arab  massacres,  or  some  grave  political  incident,  might 
cause  some  Power  or  Powers  to  interfere.  Then  inter- 
national intrigues  similar  to  those  which  formerly  took 
place  about  Constantinople  would  begin,  and  they  would 
be  far  more  dangerous,  because  they  would  concern  a 
position  which  is  not  merely  the  key  to  the  Black  Sea, 
but  which  is  indeed  the  key  to  the  dominion  of  the  world. 
Besides,  as  Asiatic  Turkey  occupies  a  most  valuable  position 
for  effecting  a  flank  attack  either  upon  Russia  in  the  very 
vulnerable  south,  or  upon  the  British  Empire  in  Egypt 
and  Asia,  the  enemies  of  Russia  and  of  Great  Britain  would 
obviously  endeavour  to  stir  up  trouble  between  the  two 
countries.  They  would  strive  to  bring  about  a  struggle 
between  Russia  and  England  for  the  control  of  Asiatic 
Turkey.  They  would  probably  try  once  more  to  recreate 
the  army  of  an  independent  Turkey  and  to  hurl  it  at  Russia 
or  at  Great  Britain  or  simultaneously  at  both  countries. 

Unfortunately  it  appears  that  the  policy  of  leaving 
Asiatic  Turkey  alone  would  be  quite  as  dangerous  as  that 
of  partitioning  it.  Therefore  a  third  pohcy  ought  to  be 
found. 


72  The  Problem  of  Asiatic  Turkey 

The  strategical  position  of  Asiatic  Turkey  closely 
resembles,  as  has  been  shown,  that  of  Switzerland.  Switzer- 
land is  a  small  natural  fortress  which  separates,  and  domi- 
nates, three  important  Central  European  States.  Asiatic 
Turkey  is  a  gigantic  natural  fortress  which  separates,  and 
dominates,  the  three  most  populous  continents.  Switzer- 
land has  been  neutraHsed,  not  for  the  sake  of  the  Swiss, 
but  for  the  sake  of  all  Europe.  The  fact  that  Switzer- 
land was  permanently  neutralised  for  the  security  of  Europe 
may  be  seen  from  the  diplomatic  documents  signed  by  the 
Allied  Powers  a  century  ago.  A  Declaration  made  at  the 
Congress  at  Vienna  on  March  20,  1815,  which  will  be  found 
in  Kliiber's  '  Acten  des  Wiener  Congresses,'  stated  : 

Les  puissances  appelees,  en  execution  du  6^  art.  du 
trait e  de  Paris  du  30  mai  1814,  a  regler  les  affaires  de  la 
Suisse,  ayant  reconnu  que  I'interet  general  demande  que 
le  corps  helvetique  jouisse  des  avantages  d'une  neutrahte 
permanente  .  .  .  declarent,  qu'aussitot  que  la  diete  helve- 
tique aura  accede,  en  bonne  et  due  forme,  aux  articles  con- 
tenus  dans  la  presente  convention,  il  sera  expedie,  au  nom 
de  toutes  les  puissances,  un  acte  solennel,  pour  reconnaitre 
et  garantir  la  neutralite  'permanente  de  la  Suisse  dans  ses 
nouvelles  frontier es. 

It  will  be  observed  that  Switzerland  was  to  be  made 
permanently  neutral  for  the  '  interet  general.'  The  '  acte 
solennel '  above  mentioned  was  signed  in  Paris  on  Novem- 
ber 20,  1815,  and  it  stated  : 

.  .  .  Les  puissances  qui  ont  signe  la  declaration  de  Vienne 
du  20  mars,  reconnaissent,  d'une  maniere  formelle  et  authen- 
tique,  par  le  present  acte  la  neutralite  ferfetuelle  de  la  Suisse, 
et  lui  garantissent  Vinviolahilite  de  son  territoire,  circonscrit 
dans  ses  nouvelles  hmites,  telles  qu'elles  sont  fixees  par  le 
congres  de  Vienne  et  la  paix  de  Paris  d'aujourd'hui.  .  .  . 

Les  puissances  signataires  de  la  declaration  du  20  mars 
font  connaitre,  d'une  maniere  authentique,  par  le  present 
acte,  que  la  neutralite  et  I'inviolabiHte  de  la  Suisse,  ainsi 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     73 

que   son  independance   de  toute  influence   etrangere,   est 
conforme  aux  veritables  interets  de  la  politique  europeenne. 

It  will  be  noticed  that  the  '  acte  solennel '  emphasised 
the  previous  declaration  by  stating  that  the  permanent 
neutrahty  of  Switzerland  was  '  conforme  aux  veritables 
interets  de  la  poHtique  europeenne.' 

It  is  noteworthy  that  Eussia  has  been  one  of  the  most 
convinced  and  one  of  the  most  determined  champions  of 
Swiss  neutrahty.  In  the  instructions  which,  on  January 
14,  1827,  Count  Nesselrode,  perhaps  the  greatest  Eussian 
diplomat  of  modern  times,  sent  on  behalf  of  the  Cabinet 
to  M.  de  Severine,  the  Eussian  Minister  to  the  Swiss  Con- 
federation,^ we  read  : 

Par  sa  position  geographique  la  Suisse  est  la  clef  de 
trois  grands  pays.  Par  ses  lumieres  et  ses  moeurs,  elle 
occupe  un  rang  distingue  dans  la  civihsation  Europeenne. 
Enfin  par  les  actes  des  Congres  de  Vienne  et  de  Paris,  elle 
a  obtenu  la  garantie  de  son  organisation  presente,  de  sa 
neutrahte,  et  de  son  independance.  ... 

Des  que  la  diplomatie,  participant  aux  am^horations  de 
tout  genre  qui  s'operaient  en  Europe,  eut  pour  but  dans  ses 
combinaisons  les  plus  profondes  et  les  plus  utiles,  d'etabhr 
entre  les  di verses  puissances  un  equihbre  qui  assurat  la 
duree  de  la  paix,  Findependance  de  la  Suisse  devint  un  des 
premiers  axiomes  de  la  Pohtique.  Les  Traites  de  West- 
phahe  la  consacrerent,  et  il  est  facile  de  prouver,  I'histoire 
a  la  main,  qu'elle  ne  fut  jamais  violee  sans  que  I'Europe 
n'eut  a  gemir  de  guerres  et  de  calamites  universelles. 

Lors  de  la  revolution  frangaise,  la  Suisse  eprouva  forte- 
ment  la  secousse  qui  vint  ebranler  les  deux  mondes.  Son 
territoire  fut  envahi,  des  armees  le  franchirent,  et  des 
batailles  ensanglanterent  un  sol  que  les  discordes  des  etats 
avait  longtemps  respecte, 

Lors  de  la  domination  de  Buonaparte,  la  Suisse  eut  sa 
part  du  despotisme  qui  pressait  sur  le  continent.  Finale- 
ment  apparut  I'Alhance  avec  ses  nobles  triomphes,  et  la 

1  The  full  text  may  be  found  in  A.  0.  Grenville  Murray's  Droits  et  Devoirs 
des  Envoyis  Diplomaliques. 


74  The  Problem  of  Asiatic  Turkey 

Suisse,  qui  avait  ete  bouleversee  pendant  la  tourmente 
revolutionnaire,  et  asservie  pendant  le  regime  des  conquetes, 
redevint  independante  et  neutre  du  jour  ou  les  droits  des 
Nations  recouvrerent  leur  empire,  et  ou  la  paix  fut  le 
voeu  du  Monarque  dont  le  changement  etait  le  salutaire 
ouvrage. 

Ce  fut  alors  que  la  Confederation  Helvetique  occupa  la 
pensee  de  I'Empereur  Alexandre  de  glorieuse  memoire,  et 
alors  aussi  que  son  independance  regut  par  les  actes  de  1814 
et  1815  une  sanction  solennelle,  qui  completa  et  assura  le 
retablissement  solide  de  la  tranquillite  generale. 

La  Suisse  est  par  consequent,  on  pent  le  dire,  un  des 
points  sur  lesquels  repose  I'equilibre  de  I'Europe,  le  mode 
d'existence  politique  dont  elle  jouit  forme  un  des  elemens 
du  systlme  conservateur  qui  a  succede  a  trente  annees 
d'orages,  et  la  Eussie  doit  souhaiter  que  cet  etat  continue 
a  ne  relever  et  a  ne  dependre  d'aucun  autre. 

Elle  y  est  interessee  comme  puissance,  que  ses  principes 
et  le  sentiment  de  son  propre  bien  portent  a  vouloir  la  paix. 
Elle  en  a  le  droit,  comme  puissance  qui  a  signe  les  actes  de 
1814  et  1815. 

The  irrefutable  arguments  advanced  with  such  force, 
clearness,  and  eloquence  by  Count  Nesselrode  with  regard 
to  Switzerland  apply  obviously  still  more  strongly  to  the 
closely  similar,  but  far  more  important,  case  of  Asiatic 
Turkey. 

A  State  which  has  been  permanently  neutralised  by 
international  agreement  can  preserve  its  neutrahty  only 
if  it  is  sufficiently  strong  and  well  governed.  If  it  is  weak 
its  neutrahty  may  be  disregarded,  as  was  that  of  Belgium. 
If  it  is  badly  governed  and  suffers  from  internal  disorders 
it  cannot  be  strong,  and  foreign  nations  will  find  reasons 
for  interfering  in  its  domestic  affairs.  When,  in  the  course 
of  the  last  century,  Switzerland  was  torn  by  internal  dis- 
sensions, the  great  guarantors  of  its  permanent  neutrahty 
and  independence  became  alarmed.  They  were  anxious 
to  intervene,  and  as  they  took  different  sides  their  inter- 
vention nearly  led  to  a  great  war. 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship       75 

If  the  arguments  given  so  far  should,  on  examination, 
be  found  to  be  unchallengeable,  it  would  appear  that  the 
problem  of  Asiatic  Turkey  can  be  solved  only  by  making 
that  country  another  Switzerland — a  strong,  independent 
and  well-governed  neutral  buffer  State. 

Can  Turkey  be  regenerated  and  converted  into  another 
Switzerland  ?  At  first  sight  the  task  seems  hopeless.  The 
experience  of  centuries  certainly  supports  those  who  doubt 
it.  The  Turkish  Government,  both  under  the  rule  of  the 
Sultans  and  under  a  nominally  constitutional  regime, 
has  proved  a  continuous  cause  of  oppression  and  revolt, 
of  dissatisfaction  and  misery,  of  conspiracy  and  rebeUion. 
In  fact,  the  Turkish  Government,  in  whatever  hands,  is, 
and  always  has  been,  a  public  nuisance,  a  scandal  and  a 
pubHc  danger,  a  danger  not  only  to  Europe,  but  to  the 
Turks  themselves.  The  experience  of  centm-ies  has  sho^\Ti 
that  the  Turks  cannot  govern  other  peoples,  that  they 
cannot  even  govern  themselves.  This  being  the  case,  it 
follows  that  Tui'key  requires,  for  its  own  security  and  for 
that  of  the  world,  guardians,  or  a  guardian,  appointed  by 
Europe.  Only  then  can  we  hope  for  peace  and  order, 
happiness  and  prosperity,  in  that  unfortunate  land. 

The  problem  of  appointing  European  guardians,  or  a 
guardian,  for  Asiatic  Turkey  is  comphcated  by  the  fact 
that  various  European  Powers  possess  strong  separate 
interests  in  that  country.  Before  considering  the  way  in 
which  good  government  might  be  introduced  in  a  neutralised 
Asiatic  Turkey  we  must  therefore  consider  the  special 
interests  of  various  nations  which,  of  course,  have  to  be 
safeguarded. 

Eussia  has  a  twofold  interest  in  that  country — a  senti- 
mental and  a  practical  one.  In  the  Caucasian  Provinces 
of  Eussia,  close  to  the  Turkish  border,  dwell  about  2,000,000 
Armenians.  Their  brothers  in  Turkey  have  suffered  from 
outrageous  pefsecution.  The  fearful  massacres  among 
them  from  1894  to  1897  are  still  in  everybody's  memory. 
Not  unnaturally,  the  Eussian  Armenians  and  the  Eussian 


76  The  Problem  of  Asiatic  Turkey 

people  themselves  desire  that  the  Armenians  in  Asiatic 
Turkey  should  be  humanely  treated.  With  this  object 
in  view  the  i  Eussian  Press  has  demanded  that  Turkish 
Armenia  should  be  ceded  to  Eussia. 

As  I  have  shown  in  the  chapter  on  '  The  Future  of  Con- 
stantinople '  in  considering  the  strategical  question,  the 
possession  of  Constantinople  would  be  for  Eussia  perhaps 
not  so  much  an  asset  as  a  liabihty.  Constantinople  and 
the  Straits  cover  a  very  large  area.  Its  defence  requires 
a  very  considerable  military  force  and  will  by  so  much 
weaken  the  strength  of  the  Eussian  Army.  Furthermore, 
its  defence  entails  considerable  difficulty  because  Eussia 
can  reach  Constantinople  only  by  sea.  As  Eoumania 
and  Bulgaria  separate  Eussia  from  Constantinople  on 
the  European  side  of  the  Black  Sea,  Eussia  can  secure 
an  organic  connection  with  that  town  oiily  from  the  Asiatic 
side,  by  acquiring  the  whole  of  the  Turkish  south  coast  of 
the  Black  Sea.  It  would  not  be  unnatural,  and  indeed 
quite  understandable,  if  Eussian  patriots  should  wish,  or 
at  least  hope,  that  Eussia  should  not  only  acquire  Constan- 
tinople and  Turkish  Armenia,  but  that  she  should  in  addition 
obtain  easy  access  to  that  city  by  a  secure  overland  route. 
A  narrow  strip  of  coast  would,  of  course,  suffice  for  con- 
structing a  railway  from  Southern  Eussia  to  the  Bosphorus. 
However,  as  that  route  would  be  hable  to  be  cut  by  the 
Turks  at  many  points  in  case  of  war,  an  attempt  to  link 
the  Bosphorus  to  Southern  Eussia  would  probably  involve 
Eussia  against  her  will  in  an  attempt  to  occupy  a  large 
part,  or  the  whole,  of  Asia  Minor,  for  thus  only  could  the 
safety  of  the  Black  Sea  coast  railway  be  assured.  That 
would  be  a  very  large  and  a  very  venturesome  undertaking 
which  might  have  incalculable  consequences  to  Eussia 
and  to  the  world,  for  Eussia  would  create,  on  a  very  much 
larger  scale,  a  position  similar  to  that  which  would  arise 
if  Germany  should  seize  Switzerland. 

Greece  has,  on  the  ground  of  nationahty,  a  claim  on 
Smjrrna,   the    busiest    harbour    of    Asia   Minor,   which    is 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     77 

practically  a  Greek  town,  and  on  certain  coastal  districts, 
especially  about  Smyrna,  which  are  largely  inhabited  by 
Greeks.  Naturally  she  would  hke,  with  the  strip  of  coastal 
territory  which  is  primarily  Greek,  a  proportionate  sphere 
of  the  hinterland. 

Italy  retains  the  Island  of  Ehodes,  which,  by  the  way, 
is  very  largely  peopled  by  Greeks,  and  she  is  supposed  to 
be  desirous  of  obtaining  a  piece  of  the  mainland  from  the 
neighbom'hood  of  that  island  to  Syria  to  the  French  sphere. 
The  sphere  claimed  on  her  behalf  is  rather  extensive.  It 
contains  the  excellent  harbour  of  Adaha,  in  the  neighbour- 
hood of  which  she  has  secured  concessions,  and  includes 
territories  of  considerable  agricultural  and  mineral  poten- 
tialities where  large  numbers  of  Italian  emigrants  may  be 
able  to  find  a  home. 

Great  Britain  has  important  claims  upon  Mesopotamia 
and  the  Persian  Gulf,  and  upon  Arabia,  as  will  be  shown 
later  on. 

France  has  strong  historic  and  economic  claims  upon 
Asiatic  Turkey,  especially  upon  Syria  with  the  Holy  Places 
of  Christianity,  and  upon  Cilicia,  which  adjoins  it.  Her 
historic  claims  are  so  very  interesting  and  important  that 
it  is  worth  while  to  consider  them  somewhat  closely. 

From  the  earhest  ages  France  has  followed  a  twofold 
pohcy  towards  Islam.  She  has  been  the  most  determined 
defender  of  Christendom  against  conquering  Moham- 
medanism when  the  latter  was  a  danger  to  the  world.  At 
the  same  time,  considering  a  strong  Turkey  a  necessary 
factor  in  Europe,  she  has  for  centm-ies  endeavom'ed  to 
support  that  country.  France  concluded  her  first  alliance 
with  Turkey  in  1535  and  remained  Tm'key's  ally  up  to 
the  Peace  of  Versailles.  Since  then  her  place  as  Turkey's 
champion  has  been  taken  by  Germany. 

On  October  18,  732,  Charles  Martel  signally  defeated 
the  all-conquering  Arabs  near  Tours  and  thus  saved  Europe 
to  Christianity.  In  the  year  800,  Charlemagne  sent  an 
Embassy  to  the  great  Arab  ruler,  Haroun-al-Kashid,  the 


78  The  Problem  of  Asiatic  Turkey 

Caliph  of  Baghdad,  the  hero  of  the  '  Arabian  Nights  Tales,' 
and  received  from  him  the  keys  of  the  Holy  Sepulchre  at 
Jerusalem.  Henceforward  France  became  the  guardian 
of  the  Holy  Tomb,  and  the  protectress  of  Christianity 
against  Islam.  In  the  Crusades,  which  were  undertaken 
to  rescue  the  Holy  Sepulchre  from  the  infidels,  France 
played  a  leading  part.  Godefroy  de  Bouillon  defeated 
SoHman,  besieged  and  took  the  Holy  City  in  1099  and 
was  elected  King  of  Jerusalem.  Owing  to  the  prominent 
position  occupied  by  the  French  as  leaders  of  all  Christianity, 
European  Christians  in  general  became  known  in  the  East 
as  Franks  and  are  still  so  called  by  the  people.  A  Frankish 
Kingdom  existed  at  Jerusalem  till  1291.  The  power  of 
Islam  grew  and  King  Louis  the  Ninth,  St.  Louis,  one  of 
the  greatest  Kings  of  France,  spent  many  years  of  his  hfe 
in  the  East,  vainly  trying  to  wrest  the  Holy  Land  from  the 
Moslems.  His  attitude,  and  that  of  ancient  France,  towards 
the  Eastern  Christians  may  be  seen  from  the  following 
most  interesting  letter  which  he  sent  on  May  21,  1250,  from 
Saint- Jean- d 'Acre  to  '  I'emir  des  Maronites  du  mont  Liban, 
ainsi  qu'au  patriarche  et  aux  eveques  de  cette  nation  '  : 

Notre  cceur  s'est  remph  de  joie  lorsque  nous  avons  vu 
votre  fils  Simon,  a  la  tete  de  vingt-cinq  mille  hommes,  venir 
nous  trouver  de  votre  part  pour  nous  apporter  I'expression 
de  vos  sentiments  et  nous  ofeir  de  dons,  outre  les  beaux 
chevaux  que  vous  nous  avez  envoy es.  En  verite  la  sincere 
amitie  que  nous  avons  commence  a  ressentir  avec  tant 
d'ardeur  pour  les  Maronites  pendant  notre  sejour  en  Chypre 
ou  ils  sont  etabhs,  s'est  encore  augmentee. 

Nous  sommes  persuades  que  cette  nation,  que  nous 
trouvons  etabhe  sous  le  nom  de  Saint  Maroun,  est  une  partie 
de  la  nation  frangaise,  car  son  amitie  pour  les  Fran^ais 
ressemble  a  I'amitie  que  les  Frangais  se  portent  entre  eux. 
En  consequence  il  est  juste  que  vous  et  tons  les  Maronites 
jouissiez  de  la  protection  dont  les  Fran^ais  jouissent  pres 
de  nous,  et  que  vous  soyez  admis  dans  les  emplois  comme  ils 
le  sont  euxmemes.  .  .  .  Quant  a  nous  et  a  ceux  qui  nous 
succederont  sur  le  trone  de  France  nous  promettons  de  vous 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship       79 

donner,  a  vous  et  a  votre  peuple,  protection  comme  aux 
Fran^ais  eux-memes  et  de  faire  constamment  ce  qui  sera 
necessaire  pour  votre  bonheur. 

Donne  pr5s  de  Saint-Jean-d'Acre,  etc. 

Charles  the  Fifth,  the  great  Habsburg  Prince,  who 
ruled  over  Germany,  the  Netherlands,  the  Franche  Comte, 
Italy,  Spain,  Portugal,  and  their  colonies,  threatened  to 
bring  all  Europe  under  Austria's  sway.  King  Fi'ancis  the 
First  of  France  courageously  opposed  him  and  concluded 
in  1535  an  alliance  with  Sohman  the  Magnificent,  perhaps 
the  greatest  ruler  of  Turkey,  who,  in  1526,  at  the  Battle  of 
Mohacs,  had  destroyed  the  Hungarian  armies,  and  who  in 
1529  had  besieged  Vienna.  France  discovered  in  Turkey 
a  valuable  counterpoise,  fii'st  to  the  house  of  Austria  and 
later  on  to  Eussia.  In  1535,  the  same  year  in  which  she 
concluded  the  alUance  with  Turkey,  France,  who  had  great 
commercial  interests  in  the  East  and  who  was  then  the 
leading  Mediterranean  Power,  concluded  a  commercial 
and  general  treaty  with  Turkey,  the  go-caUed  Capitulations, 
which  were  frequently  renewed.  These  Treaties  gave  to 
France  a  preferential  position  within  the  Tm'kish  dominions 
and  made  her  the  protectress  of  the  Christians  of  aU  nation- 
ahties.  Ever  after  it  became  a  fundamental  principle  of 
French  statesmanship  to  maintain  an  alliance  with  Turkey 
and  with  Switzerland,  because  both  countries  occupied 
very  important  strategical  positions  whence  the  central 
and  eastern  European  Powers  might  be  held  in  check. 
The  celebrated  Brantome,  who  Hved  from  1527  till  1614, 
wrote  in  his  '  Vie  des  Grands  Capitains  Frangois  ' : 

J'ouys  dire  une  fois  a  M.  le  Connetable  [the  highest 
dignitary  of  France]  :  que  les  roys  de  France  avoient  deux 
aUiances  et  affinitez  desqueUes  ne  s'en  devoient  jamais 
distraire  et  despartir  pour  chose  du  monde  ;  I'une  celle  des 
Suysses,  et  I'autre  ceUe  du  grand  Turc. 

France  had  aUied  herself  to  the  Turks  for  a  threefold 
reason  :    For  protecting  the  Christians  in  the  East ;    for 


80  The  Problem  of  Asiatic  Turkey 

protecting  and  extending  the  French  trade  in  the  Levant  ; 
for  creating  a  counterpoise  to  the  ever-expanding  and 
dangerously  strong  power  of  the  House  of  Habsburg.  In 
an  exceedingly  important  Memoir  which  M.  de  Noailles, 
the  French  Ambassador  to  Turkey,  submitted  to  King 
Charles  the  Ninth  in  1572,  the  full  text  of  which  will  be 
found  in  Testa's  '  Eecueil  des  Trait es  de  la  Porte  Ottomane,' 
we  read  : 

Sire,  les  rois,  vos  predecesseurs,  ont  recherche  et  entre- 
tenu  I'intelhgence  de  Levant  pour  trois  principales  causes, 
la  premiere  et  la  plus  ancienne  etait  fondee  sur  leur  pitie 
et  rehgion,  laquelle  tendait  a  deux  fins,  savoir  :  a  la  conserva- 
tion de  Jesus-Christ  en  Jerusalem,  avec  la  surety  du  passage 
tant  par  terre  que  par  mer  des  pelerins  qui  sont  conduits  par 
voeux  et  devotion  a  le  visiter,  et  h,  la  protection  duquel  ils 
ont  toujours  uniquement  recouru  aux  dits  rois  pour  empecher 
que  les  amies  des  infidMes  ne  molestassent  les  terres  de 
I'Eghse,  qui  sont  exposees  aux  surprises  et  passages  de  leurs 
armees  de  mer,  etant  bien  certain  que,  sans  la  continuelle 
et  devote  assistance  que  vos  predecesseurs  ont  fait  a  I'un 
et  a  I'autre,  il  y  a  longtemps  que  ledit  Saint -Sepulcre  fut 
rase,  le  temple  de  sainte  Helene  converti  en  mosquee  et  toute 
la  rehgion  romaine  detruite  et  desolee  par  les  invasions 
circasses  et  turquesses. 

Le  second  a  ete  pour  etabhr  et  conserver  le  traffic  que  vos 
sujets,  et  singuherement  ceux  de  Provence  et  Languedoc, 
ont  de  tout  temps  par  de  9a,  lequel  s'est  tellement  augmente 
sous  le  regne  du  feu  roi  Henri  et  le  votre.  .  .  . 

La  troisieme  cause  pour  laquelle  cette  intelligence  a  ete 
entretenu  par  vos  predecesseurs,  et  depuis  quarante  six  ans 
etreinte  par  les  feus  rois  Fran^ois-le- Grand  et  Henri,  a  ete 
pour  contrepeser  I'excessive  grandeur  de  la  maison  d'Autriche 
qui  avait  accumule  sous  la  domination  sienne,  ou  des  siens, 
par  succession  ou  usurpation,  les  meilleures  couronnes  et 
etats  de  I'Europe  hors  la  France,  laquelle  depuis  ce 
temps-la  a  toujours  ete  seule  au  combat,  tant  pour 
essayer  de  ravoir  le  sien  que  pour  aller  au-devant  de 
Tambition  de  Charles- Quint  et  de  Phihppe,  son  fils,  qui 
ont  toute  leur  vie  trouble  le  mend  et  singuherement  I'Alle- 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship       81 

magne,  la  France  et  I'ltalie,  pour  parvenir  k  la  tyrannie  de 
toute  la  chretiente. 

The  Capitulations  of  1535  were  repeatedly  amplified, 
especially  in  1604  and  1740.  The  Treaty  of  1604,  concluded 
in  the  time  of  the  great  Ejng  Henri  Quatre,  is  so  quaint 
and  interesting  a  document  and  it  throws  so  strong  a  light 
upon  the  character  of  Ancient  Turkey  and  upon  the  unique 
position  which  France  occupied  in  Europe  and  the  East 
three  centuries  ago,  that  it  is  worth  while  giving  some 
extracts  from  it  according  to  the  text  in  St.  Priest's 
'  Memoires  sur  I'Ambassade  de  France  en  Turquie  ' : 

Au  nom  de  Dieu. 

L'Empereur  Amat  [Ahmad  I],  fil  de  I'Empereur  Mehemet, 
toujours  victorieux, 

Marque  de  la  haute  famille  des  Monarques  Otthomans, 
avec  la  beaut  e,  grandeur  et  splendeur  de  la  quelle  tant  de 
pays  sont  conquis  et  gouvernez. 

Moy,  qui  suis,  par  les  infinies  graces  du  Juste,  Grand  et 
tout-puissant  Createur  et  par  I'abondance  des  miracles  du 
chef  de  ses  prophetes,  Empereur  des  victorieux  Empereurs, 
distributeur  des  couronnes  aux  plus  grands  Princes  de  la 
terre,  serviteur  des  deux  tres-sacrees  villes,  la  Mecque  et 
Medine,  Protecteur  et  Gouverneur  de  la  Saincte  Hierusalem, 
Seigneur  de  la  plus  grande  partie  de  I'Europe,  Asie  et  Afrique, 
conquise  avec  nostre  victorieuse  espee,  et  espouvantable 
lance,  h  sgavoir  des  pais  et  royaumes  de  la  Grece,  de  Themis- 
war,  de  Bosnie  de  Seghevar,  et  des  pais  et  Eoyaumes  de 
I'Asie  et  de  la  NatoHe,  de  Caramanie,  d'Egypte,  et  de  tous 
les  pais  des  Parthes,  des  Curdes,  Georgiens,  de  la  Porte  de  fer, 
de  Tiflis,  du  Seruan,  et  du  pais  du  Prince  des  Tartares,  nomme 
Qerim  [Crimea],  et  de  la  campagne  nommee  Cipulac,  de 
Cypre,  de  Diarbekr,  d'Alep,  d'Erzerum,  de  Damas,  de  Baby- 
lone  demeure  des  Princes  des  croyants,  de  Basera,  d'Egypte, 
de  I'Arabio  heureuse,  d'Abes,  d'Aden,  de  Thunis,  la  Goulette, 
Tripoly,  de  Barbarie,  et  de  tant  d'autres  pais,  isles,  destroits, 
passages,  peuples,  families,  generations,  et  de  tant  de  cent 
milhons  de  victorieux  gens  do  guerre  qui  reposent  sous 
I'obeissance  et  justice  de  Moy  qui  suis  I'Empereur  Amurat, 


82  The  Problem  of  Asiatic  Turkey 

fils  de  I'Empereur  Selim,  fils  de  TErapereur  Solyman,  fils  de 
I'Empereur  Selim.  Et  ce,  par  la  grace  de  Dieu,  Eecours 
des  grands  Princes  du  monde,  Kefuge  des  honorables 
Empereurs. 

Au  plus  glorieux,  magnanime,  et  grand  Seigneur  de  la 
croyance  de  Jesus-Christ,  esleu  [elu]  entre  les  Princes  de  la 
nation  du  Messie,  Mediateur  des  differents  qui  survien- 
nent  entre  le  peuple  Chrestien,  Seigneur  de  Grandeur, 
Majeste  et  Eichesse,  glorieuse  Guide  des  plus  grands, 
Henry  IV,  Empereur  de  France,  que  la  fin  de  ses  jours  soit 
heureuse.  .  .  . 

Que  les  Venitiens  et  Anglais  en  la  leur,  les  Espagnols, 
Portugais,  Catalans,  Eagousins,  Genevois,  Napolitains, 
Florentins,  et  generalement  toutes  autres  nations,  telles 
qu'elles  soient,  puissent  librement  venir  trafiquer  par  nos 
pays  sous  I'adveu  et  seurete  de  la  banniere  de  France,  laquelle 
ils  porteront  comme  leur  sauvegarde  ;  et,  de  cette  faQon, 
ils  pourront  aller  et  venir  trafiquer  par  les  lieux  de  nostre 
Empire,  comme  ils  y  sont  venus  d'anciennete,  obeyssans  aux 
Consuls  Francois,  qui  demeurent  et  resident  en  nos  havres 
et  estapes  ;  voulons  et  entendons  qu'en  usant  ainsi,  ils 
puissent  trafiquer  avec  leurs  vaisseaux  et  galions  sans  estre 
inquietez  seulement  tant  que  ledit  Empereur  de  France 
conservera  nostre  amitie,  et  ne  contreviendra  a  celle  qu'il 
nous  a  promise. 

Voulons  et  commandons  aussi  que  les  subjects  dudit 
Empereur  de  France  et  ceux  des  Princes  ses  amis  alliez, 
puissent  visiter  les  saincts  lieux  de  Hierusalem  sans  qu'il 
leur  soit  mis  ou  donne  aucun  empeschement,  ny  faict 
tort. 

De  plus,  pour  I'honneur  et  amitie  d'iceluy  Empereur, 
nous  voulons  que  les  Eeligieux  qui  demeurent  en  Hierusalem 
et  servent  I'Eglise  de  Comame  [Saint  Sepulcre]  y  puissent 
demeurer,  aller  et  venir  sans  aucun  trouble  et  empechement, 
ainsi  soient  bien  receus,  protegez,  aydez,  et  secourus  en  la 
consideration  susdite. 

Derechef,  nous  voulons  et  commandons  que  les  Venitiens 
et  Anglois  en  cela,  et  toutes  les  autres  nations  alienees  de 
I'amitie  de  nostre  grande  Porte,  lesquelles  n'y  tiennent 
Ambassadeur,  voulans  trafiquer  par  nos  pays,  ayent  a  y 


Great  Prohlemfi  of  British  States  men  ship     83 

venir  sous  la  banniere  et  protection  de  France,  sans  que 
TAmbassadeur  d'Angleterre,  ou  autres  ayent  a  les  empescher 
sous  couleur  que  cette  capitulation  a  este  inseree  dans 
les  capitulations  donnees  de  nos  peres  apres  avoir  este 
escrites.  .  .  . 

Et  pour  autant  qu'iceluy  Empereur  de  France,  est  de 
tous  les  Eoys  le  plus  noble  et  de  la  plus  haute  famille,  et  le 
plus  parfait  amy  que  nos  Ayeuls  ayent  acquis  entre  lesdits 
Eoys  et  Princes  de  la  creance  de  Jesus-Christ,  comme  il 
nous  a  temoigne  par  les  effets  de  sa  saincte  amitie  :  sous 
ces  considerations,  nous  voulons  et  commandons  que  ses 
Ambassadeurs  qui  resident  a  nostre  heureuse  Porte  ayent 
la  preseance  sur  I'Ambassadeur  d'Espagne  et  sur  ceux  des 
Roys  et  Princes,  soit  en  nostre  Divan  public  ou  autres  lieux 
ou  ils  se  pourront  rencontrer.  .  .  . 

Que  les  Consuls  Francois  jouissent  de  ces  mesmes  privi- 
leges ou  ils  resideront,  et  qu'il  leur  soit  donne  la  mesme 
preseance  sur  tous  les  autres  consuls  de  quelque  nation  qu'ils 
soient.  ...  '• 

Nous  promettons  et  jurons  par  la  verite  du  grand  Tout- 
puissant  Dieu,  Createur  du  ciel  et  de  la  terre,  et  par  I'ame  de 
mes  Ayeuls  et  Bisayeuls,  de  ne  contrarier,  ni  contrevenir  a  ce 
qui  est  porte  par  ce  Traitte  de  paix  et  Capitulation,  tant  que 
I'Empereur  de  France  sera  constant  et  ferme  en  la  considera- 
tion de  nostre  amitie,  acceptant  des  h  present  la  sienne,  avec 
volonte  d'en  faire  cas  et  de  la  cherir,  car  ainsi  est  nostre 
intention  et  promesse  imperiale. 

Escript  environ  le  20  may  1604. 

It  will  be  noticed  that  by  the  Treaty  of  1604  the 
*  Empereur  de  France  '  was  made  the  Protector  of  all  the 
Christians  in  the  East,  that  France  was  made  the  guardian 
of  the  holy  places  of  Christianity,  that  the  other  great 
Christian  nations,  the  Venetians,  the  English,  the  Spaniards, 
the  Portuguese,  the  Catalans,  the  citizens  of  Eagusa,  the 
Genoese,  the  Neapolitans,  and  the  Florentines  were  allowed 
to  travel  and  trade  freely  and  securely  in  Turkey — under 
the  French  flag  and  protected  by  the  Consuls  of  France. 
At  that  time  France  was  indeed  '  la  grande  nation,'  and 


84  The  Problem  of  Asiatic  Turkey 

enjoyed  the  greatest  prestige  in  the  East.  According  to 
Birch's  '  Memoirs  of  Queen  EHzabeth,'  *  the  Turks  be- 
lieved for  a  long  time  that  England  was  a  Province  of 
France.' 

When,  at  the  time  of  the  French  Eevolution,  nearly  all 
Europe  made  war  upon  France,  France  tried  once  more 
to  use  Turkey  against  her  enemies.  In  1792  Citoyen 
Semonville,  the  French  Ambassador  to  Turkey,  was  given 
instructions  by  the  Convention  Nationale  to  secure  Turkey's 
support  and  8,000,000  livres  were  placed  at  his  disposal, 
of  which  sum  2,000,000  were  to  be  '  exclusively  used  for 
bribing  the  entourage  of  the  Grand  Vizier.'  We  read  in 
that  curious  document  : 

Le  nouveau  ministre  national  doit  chercher  surtout  k 
rompre  la  coaHtion  formee  contre  la  France  par  Autriche, 
la  Prusse  et  la  Eussie,  et  le  meilleur  moyen  d'obtenir  ce 
resultat  sera  de  tacher  de  diviser  ces  puissances.  II  est 
vrai  qu'on  ne  saurait  compter  sur  une  assistance  directe  k  ce 
sujet,  de  la  part  de  la  Turquie,  mais  la  Sublime-Porte  pour- 
rait  etre  tr^s  utile  en  se  melant  seulement,  par  exemple, 
des  affaires  de  Pologne^  et  en  tachant  de  mettre  en  discorde 
les  dites  puissances  dans  ce  pays-la.  Pour  atteindre  plus 
facilement  ce  but,  Semonville  pourra  disposer  de  8,000,000 
de  Uvres,  dont  deux  millions  doivent  etre  exclusivement 
employes  "a'corrompre  les  entours  du  grand  vezir  et  du 
reis-effendi,  et  a  entretenir  de  bons  espions  aupr^s  de  I'inter- 
nonce  d'Autriche  et  des  representants  prussien  et  russe  ; 
car  il  est  tr5s  important  de  s'assurer  comment  chacun  de 
ces  ministres  represente,  k  sa  cour,  les  affaires  polonaises. 

In  1795  Napoleon  Buonaparte,  then  a  young  general 
only  twenty-six  years  old,  had  fallen  into  disfavour  and 
disgrace  with  the  Government.  He  had  been  dismissed 
from  the  army.  He  lived  in  penury  and  obscurity,  and 
was  unemployed  and  practically  destitute.  In  his  despair, 
on  August  30  of  that  year,  he  very  humbly  offered  to  the 
Comite  de  Salut  Public  his  services  as  an  artillery  officer 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship      85 

for  service  in  Turkey  in  a  little-known  letter  which  was 
worded  as  follows : 

Dans  un  temps  ou  I'imperatrice  de  Eussie  a  resserre  les 
liens  qui  I'unissent  a  I'Autriche,  il  est  de  I'interet  de  la 
France  de  faire  tout  ce  qui  depend  d'elle  pour  rendre  plus 
redoutables  les  moyens  mihtaires  de  la  Tuiquie. 

Cette  puissance  a  des  miUces  nombreuses  et  braves,  mais 
fort  ignorantes  sur  les  principes  de  Fart  de  guerre. 

La  formation  et  le  service  de  I'artillerie,  qui  influe  si 
puissamment  dans  notre  tactique  moderne  sur  le  gain  des 
batailles,  et  presque  exclusivement  sur  la  prise  et  la  defense 
des  places  fortes,  est  encore  dans  son  enfance  en  Turquie. 

La  Porte,  qui  I'a  senti,  a  plusieurs  fois  demande  des 
officiers  d'artillerie  et  du  genie  ;  nous  y  en  avons  effective- 
ment  quelques-uns  dans  ce  moment-ci,  mais  ils  ne  sont  ni 
assez  nombreux  ni  assez  instruits  pour  produire  un  resultat 
de  quelque  consequence. 

Le  general  Buonaparte,  qui  a  acquis  quelque  reputation 
en  commandant  I'artillerie  de  nos  armees  en  differents  cir- 
constances,  et  specialement  au  siege  de  Toulon,  s'offre 
pour  passer  en  Turquie  avec  une  mission  du  gouvernement ; 
il  menera  avec  lui  six  ou  sept  ofQciers  dont  chacun  aura  une 
connaisance  particuHere  des  sciences  relatives  a  I'art  de  la 
guerre. 

S'il  pent  dans  cette  nouvelle  carriere,  rendre  les  armees 
turques  plus  redoutables  et  perfectionner  la  defense  des 
places  fortes  de  cet  empire,  il  croira  avoir  rendu  un  service 
signale  a  la  patrie,  et  avoir,  a  son  retour,  bien  merite  d'elle. 

Had  the  Comite  de  Salut  Public  accepted  Napoleon's 
offer,  he  might  have  Hved  and  died  unknown  to  history. 
The  world  might  have  been  spared  some  of  the  greatest 
wars. 

Although  the  first  French  Eepubhc  was  atheistic  and 
anti- Christian,  it  carefully  continued  the  traditional  poHcy 
of  France  in  the  East  in  its  threefold  aspect.  It  strove  to 
maintain  France's  supremacy  in  the  East,  desiring  to  use 
Turkey  as  a  counterpoise  to  France's  enemies,  to  dominate 
the   Near   Eastern  markets  and  to   maintain  its   ancient 


86  The  Problem  of  Asiatic  Turkey 

protectorate  over  the  Christians  in  the  East.  That  may  be 
seen  from  the  instructions  given  to  the  French  Ambassadors. 
In  those  sent  by  the  First  Consul  Buonaparte  to  Ambassador 
Brune  on  October  18,  1802,  we  read,  for  instance  : 

1°.  L'intention  du  gouvernement  est  que  I'ambassadeur 
a  Constantinople  reprenne,  par  tous  les  moyens,  la  supre- 
matie  que  la  France  avait  depuis  deux  cents  ans  dans  cette 
capitaie.  La  maison  qui  est  occupee  par  I'ambassadeur 
est  la  plus  belle.  II  doit  tenir  constamment  un  rang  audessus 
des  ambassadeurs  des  autres  nations,  et  ne  marcher  qu'avec 
un  grand  eclat.  II  doit  reprendre  sous  sa  protection  tous  les 
hospices  et  tous  les  Chretiens  de  Syrie  et  d'Armenie,  et  special- 
ment  toutes  les  caravanes  qui  visitent  les  Lieux-Saints. 

2°.  Notre  commerce  doit  etre  protege  sous  tous  les  points 
de  vue.  Dans  I'etat  de  faiblesse  ou  se  trouve  I'empire  otto- 
man, nous  ne  pouvons  pas  esperer  qu'il  fasse  une  diversion 
en  notre  faveur  contre  I'Autriche,  il  ne  nous  interesse  done 
plus  sous  le  rapport  du  commerce,  Le  gouvernement  ne 
veut  souffrir  aucune  avarie  de  pachas,  et  la  moindre  insulte 
a  nos  commergants  doit  donner  lieu  a  des  exphcations  fort 
vives,  et  conduire  notre  ambassadeur  a  obtenir  une  satisfac- 
tion eclatante.  On  doit  accoutumer  les  pachas  et  beys  des 
dilferentes  provinces  a  ne  regarder  desormais  notre  pavilion 
qu'avec  respect  et  consideration. 

3°.  Dans  toutes  les  circonstances,  on  ne  doit  pas  manquer 
de  dire  et  de  faire  sentir  que  si  la  Eussie  et  I'Autriche  ont 
quelque  interet  de  locahte  a  se  partager  les  etats  du  Grand- 
beigneur,  I'interet  do  la  France  est  de  maintenir  une  balance 
entre  ces  deux  grandes  puissances.  On  doit  montrer  des 
egards  a  I'ambassadeur  de  Eussie,  mais  se  servir  souvent  de 
I'Ambassadeur  de  Prusse  qui  est  plus  sincerement  dans  nos 
inter  ets. 

4°.  S'il  survient  des  evenements  dans  les  environs  de 
Constantinople,  offrir  sa  mediation  a  la  Porte,  et,  en  general, 
saisir  toutes  les  occasions  de  lixer  les  yeux  de  I'empire  sur 
I'ambassadeur  de  France.  C'est  d'apres  ce  principe  que  le 
jour  de  la  fete  du  prophete  il  n'y  a  point  d'inconvenient  a 
illuminer  le  palais  de  France  selon  I'usage  orientale,  apres 
toutefois  s'en  etre  exphque  avec  la  Porte. 


Great  Problems  of  British-  Statesmanship       87 

En  fixant  les  yeux  du  peuple  sur  I'ambassadeur  de  France 
avoir  soin  de  ne  jamais  chequer  ses  moeurs  et  ses  usages, 
mais  faire  voir  que  nous  nous  estimons  les  uns  les  autres.  .  .  . 

It  will  be  noticed  that  the  French  EepubUc  and  Napoleon 
the  First  followed  in  every  particular  the  same  poHcy  in 
Turkey  which  in  more  recent  times  was  pursued  by  Prince 
Bismarck  and  WilUam  the  Second. 

In  the  Middle  Ages  and  in  the  time  of  the  first  Capitula- 
tions, France  could  easily  act  as  the  protectress  of 
Christianity,  for  she  was  the  strongest  Power  in  Europe 
and  in  the  Mediterranean  and  nearly  all  important  States 
were  Eoman  CathoHc.  Times  have  changed.  The  other 
nations  no  longer  trade  in  the  East  under  the  French  flag, 
or  appeal  to  the  French  Consuls  when  they  are  in  need 
of  protection.  Besides,  with  the  rise  of  powerful  Protestant 
and  Greek  Orthodox  States  and  of  influential  Armenian, 
Coptic  and  Abyssinian  Christian  Churches,  France  can 
no  longer  act  as  the  protectress  of  the  Holy  Sepulchre  on 
behalf  of  all  Christendom.  She  acted  in  that  capacity 
for  the  last  time  during  the  reign  of  Napoleon  the  Third. 
It  is  not  generally  known  that  the  Crimean  War  was  not 
merely  a  war  for  the  control  of  Constantinople,  but  was  in 
the  first  place  a  struggle  for  the  key  to  the  Church  in 
Bethlehem.     Small  causes  often  have  great  consequences. 

As  the  question  of  the  Holy  Places  bears  directly  upon 
France's  claim  to  Syria,  it  is  worth  while  looking  into  the 
genesis  of  the  Crimean  War.  Beforehand,  we  must  take 
note  of  the  pecuhar  position  which  the  various  States  and 
reHgions  occupy  at  the  Holy  Sites.  A  map  of  the  Church 
of  the  Holy  Sepulchre  at  Jerusalem  and  of  the  buildings 
attached  to  it  is  as  comphcated  as  a  map  of  the  Holy  Eoman 
Empire.  Certain  parts  of  the  Church  building  belong  to 
the  Latin  and  Greek  Christians  in  common,  while  others 
belong  exclusively  to  Latin  Christians,  Greek  Christians, 
Abyssinian  Christians,  Armenian  Christians,  Copts,  Syrians, 
Eussians,   Prussians.     Every   carpet,   picture,   lamp,  vase 


88  The  Problem  of  Asiatic  Turkey 

has  its  owner.  Of  the  fifteen  lamps  in  the  Angels'  Chapel 
in  Jerusalem,  for  instance,  five  belong  to  the  Greek  Church, 
five  to  the  Latin  Church,  four  to  the  Armenian,  and  one 
to  the  Coptic  Church.  The  greatest  jealousy  prevails 
among  the  different  Churches  and  nationahties.  The 
displacement  of  a  Greek  lamp  or  vase  by  a  Latin  one  might 
create  a  riot.  Property  of  various  Churches  has  been 
displaced,  stolen  or  burned  by  other  Churches  and  sanguinary 
fights  have  often  occurred  within  the  Holy  precincts.  Men 
of  the  same  rehgion,  but  belonging  to  different  Churches, 
are  unfortunately  frequently  animated  by  a  bhnd  and 
passionate  zeal,  and  reUgious  ceremonies  performed  in 
their  presence  in  an  unorthodox  manner  appear  to  them 
not  merely  a  sacrilege  but  a  deadly  insult  which  calls  for 
blood.  To  avoid  a  colhsion,  the  Turks  have  devised  the 
most  minute  regulations.  Still  they  have  not  been  able 
to  prevent  the  Churches  encroaching  upon  the  rights  of 
their  rivals. 

During  the  Napoleonic  period,  France  had  taken 
comparatively  httle  interest  in  the  Holy  Land  and  the 
Greek  Church  had  encroached  upon  the  position  of  the 
Latins.  That  encroachment  was  the  direct  cause  of  the 
Crimean  War.  Li  1854,  when  the  war  began,  the  British 
Government  pubHshed  a  Blue  Book  of  1029  pages,  con- 
taining nearly  1200  largely  abbreviated  documents.  If 
their  full  text  had  been  given  the  volume  would  probably 
have  exceeded  2000  pages.  That  pubHcation  furnished 
an  account  of  the  causes  of  the  war  and  was  significantly 
entitled  '  Correspondence  respecting  the  Rights  and 
Privileges  of  the  Latin  and  Greek  Churches  in  Turkey.' 
In  that  correspondence  various  Church  properties,  and 
especially  the  key  to  the  Church  at  Bethlehem,  played  a 
very  great  part. 

As  early  as  May  20,  1850,  Sir  Stratford  Canning  informed 
Lord  Palmerston  : 

My  Lord, — A  question  likely  to  be  attended  with  much 
discussion  and  excitement  is  on  the  point  of  being  raised 


Ch'eat  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship       89 

between  the  conflicting  interests  of  the  Latin  and  Greek 
Churches  in  this  country.  The  immediate  point  of  diffe- 
rence is  the  right  of  possession  to  certain  portions  of  the 
Church  of  the  Holy  Sepulchre  at  Jerusalem. 

General  Aupick  [the  French  Ambassador]  has  assured 
me  that  the  matter  in  dispute  is  a  mere  question  of  property 
and  of  express  treaty  stipulation.  But  it  is  dithcult  to 
separate  any  such  question  from  pohtical  considerations, 
and  a  struggle  of  general  influence,  especially  if  Russia,  as 
may  be  expected,  should  interfere  in  behalf  of  the  Greek 
Church,  wiU  probably  grow  out  of  the  impending  discussion. 

Soon  the  question  of  the  key  to  the  Bethlehem  Church 
came  to  the  front  and  monopolised  the  attention  of  all 
European  capitals  and  Cabinets.  On  February  9,  1852, 
Aah  Pasha  wrote  to  M.  de  Lavalette  : 

La  Grotte  qui  est  la  Sainte  Creche  est  aujourd'hui  un 
Heu  visit e  par  les  di verses  nations  Chretiennes,  et  il  est 
etabh  depuis  un  tres  ancient  temps  qu'une  clef  de  la  porte  du 
cote  du  nord  de  la  grande  eghse  a  Bethleem,  une  clef  de  la 
porte  du  cote  du  midi  de  cette  eghse,  et  une  clef  de  la  porte 
de  la  grotte  susmentionnee,  doivent  se  trouver  entre  les 
mains  des  pretres  Latins  aussi.  En  cas  done  que  ces  clefs 
ne  se  trouvent  point  en  la  possession  des  Latins,  il  faut  qu'on 
leur  donne  une  clef  de  chacune  de  ces  trois  portes,  pour  qu'ils 
les  aient  comma  par  le  passe. 

The  Sultan,  as  the  sovereign  and  ground  landlord, 
was  called  upon  to  decide  between  the  quarrelling  Churches, 
and  he  endeavom'ed  to  arrange  matters  by  a  Firman  which 
was  to  be  pubhcly  read,  ffis  attempt  proved  a  failure. 
Consul  Finn  reported  to  the  Earl  of  Malmesbury  on 
October  27,  1852,  from  Jerusalem  : 

Afif  Bey  invited  all  the  parties  concerned  to  meet  him 
in  the  Church  of  the  Vngin  near  Gethsemane.  There  he 
read  an  Order  of  the  Sultan  for  permitting  the  Latins  to 
celebrate  Mass  once  a  year,  but  requiring  the  altar  and  its 
ornaments  to  remain  undisturbed.  No  sooner  were  these 
words  uttered  than  the  Latins,  who  had  come  to  receive 


90  The  Problem  of  Asiatic  Turkey 

their  triumph  over  the  Orientals,  broke  out  into  loud  ex- 
clamations of  the  impossibility  of  celebrating  Mass  upon  a 
schismatic  slab  of  marble,  with  a  covering  of  silk  and  gold 
instead  of  plain  linen,  among  schismatic  vases,  and  before 
a  crucifix  which  has  the  feet  separated  instead  of  nailed  one 
over  the  other. 

The  French  Government  backed  up  the  Latin,  and 
the  Eussian  Government  the  Greek,  Church.  The  religious 
differences  soon  assumed  a  political  aspect.  Eussia  began 
to  threaten  the  Sultan  with  her  army,  and  France  with  her 
fleet.  Colonel  Eose  reported  on  November  20,  1852,  to 
the  Earl  of  Malmesbmy  : 

The  Porte's  position  is  most  disadvantageous.  Against 
all  her  wishes  and  interests  she  has  been  dragged  into  a  most 
dangerous  and  difficult  dispute  between  the  Great  Powers, 
who  found  their  respective  claims  on  contradictory  docu- 
ments, which  date  from  remote  and  dark  ages.  The  Porte, 
a  Mohammedan  Power,  is  called  on  to  decide  a  quarrel  which 
involves,  ostensibly,  sectarian  Christian  religious  feelings, 
but  which,  in  reality,  is  a  vital  struggle  between  France  and 
Eussia  for  political  influence,  at  the  Porte's  cost  in  her 
dominions. 

Continuing,  he  reported  that  the  Sultan  had  been 
threatened  by  France  with  a  blockade  of  the  Dardanelles, 
while  the  Eussian  representative  had  declared  that  he 
would  leave  Constantinople  unless  liis  demands  were  ful- 
filled. A  few  weeks  later  Colonel  Eose  informed  the  Earl 
of  Malmesbury  : 

The  complaints  of  the  Eussian  Legation  here  against  the 
Porte  in  the  Jerusalem  question  are  two,  an  ostensible  one 
and  an  undefined  one.  The  first  is  that  the  Firman  to  the 
Greeks  has  not  been  read  in  Jerusalem  in  full  Council,  and 
in  the  presence  of  the  patriarchs  and  clergy  of  all  the  diffe- 
rent sects.  The  second  one  is  as  to  delivery  of  the  key  of  the 
great  door  of  the  Church  at  Bethlehem  to  the  Latins. 

The    quarrel   about    the    Holy    Places,    and    especially 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship       91 

about  the  celebrated  key,  became  more  and  more 
acrimonious.  On  January  28,  1853,  Lord  John  Eussell 
wrote  regretfully  from  the  Foreign  Office  to  Lord  Cowley  : 

To  a  Government  taking  an  impartial  view  of  these 
affairs,  an  attitude  so  thi-eatening  on  both  sides  appears 
very  lamentable.  We  should  deeply  regret  any  dispute 
that  might  lead  to  a  conflict  between  two  of  the  Great 
Powers  of  Europe  ;  but  when  we  reflect  that  the  quarrel  is 
for  exclusive  privileges  in  a  spot  near  which  the  Heavenly 
Host  proclaimed  peace  on  earth  and  goodwill  towards  men 
— when  we  see  rival  Churches  contending  for  mastery  in 
the  very  place  where  Christ  died  for  mankind — ^the  thought 
of  such  a  spectacle  is  melancholy  indeed. 

The  Latins,  backed  by  France,  possessed  keys  to  the 
two  side-doors  of  the  Church  at  Bethleham,  but  not  the 
key  of  the  main  entrance,  which  was  in  the  hands  of  the 
Greek  Church.  FaiUng  to  receive  the  key,  the  French 
Consul  resolved  to  use  force  and  had  the  main  entrance 
broken  open  by  locksmiths.  His  action  led  to  the  following 
protest  on  the  part  of  Eussia  : 

Nous  laisserons  le  Ministere  Fran9ais  juge  de  la  penible 
surprise  que  nous  avons  eprouvee  en  apprenant  qu'a  son 
retour  a  Constantinople,  apres  un  court  sejour  en  France, 
M.  de  Lavalette  avait  souleve  de  nouveau  la  question,  en 
exigeant  de  la  Porte,  en  termes  peremptoires,  et  sous  menace 
d'une  rupture  avec  la  France,  la  suppression  du  dernier 
Firman  ;  I'envoi  a  Jerusalem  d'un  Commissaire  Turc,  avec 
de  nouvelles  instructions  ;  la  remise  au  clerge  Latin  de  la  clef 
et  de  la  garde  de  la  grande  Eghse  a  Bethleem  ;  le  placement 
Bur  I'autel  de  la  Grotte  de  la  Nativite  d'une  etoile  aux  armes 
de  la  France,  qui  s'y  trouvait,  (Jit-on,  jadis,  et  qui  en  avait 
ete  enleveo  ;  I'adjonction  au  Couvent  Latin  de  Jerusalem 
d'une  batisso  attenante  a  la  coupole  du  Saint  Bepulcre  ; 
d'autres  concessions  enfin,  qui  de  loin  peuvent  paraitre  des 
minuties,  mais  qui,  sur  les  heux,  et  aux  yeux  des  populations 
indigenes,  y  compris  meme  les  Musulmans,  sont  autant  de 
passe-droits  et  d'empietements  sur  les  autres  communautes 


92  The  Problem  of  Asiatic  Turkey 

Chi-etiennes,  autant  de  motifs  de  dissensions  et  de  haine 
entre  elle  et  I'Eglise  Eomaine,  dont  on  pretend  soutenir  par 
ces_  moyens  les  interets. 

II  nous  repugne  de  faire  mention  ici  des  scenes  scandal- 
euses  qui  ont  deja  eu  lieu  a  Jerusalem  par  suite  de  ces  mesures, 
auxquelles  la  Porte  a  eu  la  faiblesse  de  preter  la  main,  et 
qui  ont  deja  reQU  en  partie  leur  execution  contrairement  a 
la  teneur  du  dernier  Firman,  dont,  par  une  autre  contradic- 
tion etrange,  on  donnait  lecture  aux  autorites  locales  au 
moment  memo  ou  Ton  chargeait  celles-ci  d'en  violer  les 
dispositions  principales. 

D'apres  les  derniers  rapports  que  nous  avons  de  la  Syrie 
et  de  Constantinople,  les  choses  en  etaient  venues  a  Jerusalem 
a  ce  point  de  confusion  et  de  desordre  que,  tandis  qu'un 
prelat  CathoKque,  assiste  du  Consul  de  France,  appelait  a 
son  aide  les  serruriers  de  la  ville  pour  se  faire  ouvrir  la 
grande  porte  de  I'Eglise  de  Bethleem,  bien  que  I'acces  lui 
fut  ouvert  par  deux  autres  portes  laterales,  le  Patriarche  de 
Jerusalem,  Cyrille,  vieillard  venerable,  et  generalement 
connu  par  son  esprit  conciliant  et  la  moderation  de  son 
caractere,  se  voyait  oblige  de  protester  par  ecrit  contra  ces 
actes  de  violence,  et  de  partir  pour  Constantinople,  afin 
de  porter  ses  plaintes  et  celles  de  sa  nation  au  Sultan. 

On  February  9,  1853,  Sir  G.  H.  Seymour,  the  British 
Ambassador  in  Petrograd,  had  an  important  conversation 
with  Count  Nesselrode,  the  Russian  Chancellor,  regarding 
the  Franco -Russian  dispute,  and  the  celebrated  key  occupied 
once  more  the  place  of  honour.  The  British  Ambassador 
reported  : 

.  .  .  Count  Nessehode  observed  :  '  We  have  no  wish 
to  demand  the  restoration  of  the  key  of  the  Bethlehem 
Church.'  As  it  is  always  desirable  to  guard  against  misap- 
prehensions, I  ventured  to  enquire  whether,  in  this  case,  a 
key  meant  an  instrument  for  opening  a  door,  only  not  to  be 
employed  in  closing  that  door  against  Christians  of  other 
sects  ;  or  whether  it  was  simply  a  key — an  emblem.  Count 
Nessehode  rephed,  unhesitatingly,  that  his  meaning  was 
that  the  key  was  to  be  used  in  giving  the  Latins  access  to 


Ch'eat  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship       93 

the  Church,  but  not  to  be  used  for  securing  the  door  against 
Greeks  and  other  Christians. 

At  last  Piussia  sent  Turkey  an  ultimatum  regarding  the 
Holy  Places  in  the  form  of  proposals  which  were  pressingly 
put  forward  by  Prince  Menchikoff,  and  once  more  the 
Bethlehem  key  was  a  chief  object  of  contention.  It  made 
its  appearance  in  the  first  article  of  that  document.  Com- 
menting on  that  ultimatum,  Lord  Stratford  de  Eedchffe, 
formerly  Sir  -  Stratford  Canning,  wrote  to  the  Earl  of 
Clarendon  : 

All  the  proposals  or  demands  in  question,  with  two  or 
three  exceptions,  refer  to  the  Greek  clergy  and  Churches  in 
Turkey.  They  amount  in  substance  to  the  conclusion  of  a 
Treaty  stipulating  that  Eussia  shall  enjoy  the  exclusive 
right  of  intervening  for  the  effectual  protection  of  all 
members  of  the  Greek  Church,  and  of  the  interests  of  the 
Churches  themselves  ;  that  the  privileges  of  the  four  Greek 
patriarchs  shall  be  effectually  confirmed,  and  the  patriarchs 
shall  hold  their  preferment  for  life,  independently  of  the 
Porte's  approval. 

The  Crimean  War  arose  out  of  a  quarrel  between  the 
Greek  and  Latin  Churches.  It  was  largely  caused  by  the 
fact  that  Eussia  was  unwilHng  to  allow  France  to  remain 
any  longer  the  protectress  of  Christianity  in  the  East. 

The  Holy  Places  have  for  centmies  been  in  the  guardian- 
ship of  the  Turks,  and  the  Turks,  being  Mohammedans, 
have  been  able  to  act  as  disinterested,  and  therefore 
impartial,  guardians.  Great  jealousy  prevails  between 
Catholics  and  Protestants,  between  the  Eastern  and  the 
Western  Chui'ches.  All  the  other  Churches  would  keenly 
resent  it  if  France,  by  the  acquisition  of  Syria,  should 
obtain  the  guardianship  of  the  Holy  Places,  and  even  the 
Eoman  CathoHcs  belonging  to  other  nations  would  bo 
dissatisfied.  Eussia  has  assumed  a  leading  position  in  the 
Holy  Land.  Every  year  enormous  pilgrimages  leave 
Eussia  for  Jerusalem,  and  on  the  heights  which  command 


94  The  Problem  of  Asiatic  Turkey 

Jerusalem  and  Bethlehem  the  Eussian  Church  has  erected 
huge  buildings  for  its  pilgrims  which  overshadow  these 
towns.  In  1896  M.  Emile  Delmas  wrote  very  truly  in  his 
book  '  Egypte  et  Palestine  ' :  'La  Eussie  qui  est  partout 
ailleurs  notre  amie,  est,  dans  le  Levant,  notre  rivale 
per  sever  ante.'  France's  guardianship  of  the  Holy  Places 
would  be  dishked  by  other  nations  and  possibly  by  Eussia 
herself.  It  might  involve  France  in  most  serious  troubles. 
France  has  strong  economic  interests  in  Syria  and  CiHcia, 
where  she  has  built  railways  and  harbour  works,  and  where 
she  possesses  numerous  schools,  clerical  estabhshments,  &c. 
Syria  and  CiHcia  possess  very  great  agricultural  and  mineral 
possibilities.  If  France  wishes  to  occupy  "and  exploit 
these  territories  she  would  probably  act  wisely  in  excluding 
the  Holy  Places,  putting  these  under  an  international 
guardianship.  However,  that  step  would  no  doubt  greatly 
reduce  the  value  of  Syria  in  the  eyes  of  the  French  people. 
Much  of  its  attraction  would  be  gone. 

The  control  of  the  Asiatic  shore  of  the  Black  Sea  would 
be  convenient  to  Eussia,  supposing  she  occupied  Constanti- 
nople, but  it  would,  as  has  been  shown,  scarcely  benefit 
her  unless  she  had  the  hinterland  as  well.  The  possession 
of  Syria  would  gratify,  but  would  only  moderately  benefit, 
France. 

The  control  of  Mesopotamia  and  of  the  Persian  Gulf 
and  of  Arabia  seems  almost  a  necessity  to  the  British 
Empire  for  strategical  and  economic  reasons.  Admiral 
Mahan  wrote  in  his  book  '  Eetrospect  and  Prospect  ' : 

The  control  of  the  Persian  Gulf  by  a  foreign  State  of 
considerable  naval  potentiality,  a  '  fleet  in  being  '  there, 
based  upon  a  strong  mihtary  port,  would  reproduce  the 
relations  of  Cadiz,  Gibraltar,  and  Malta  to  the  Mediterranean. 
It  would  flank  all  the  routes  to  the  Farther  East,  to  India, 
and  to  Austraha,  the  last  two  actually  internal  to  the 
Empire  regarded  as  a  pohtical  system  ;  and,  although  at 
present  Great  Britain  unquestionably  could  check  such  a 
fleet  so  placed  by  a  division  of  her  own,  it  might  well  require 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship       95 

a  detachment  large  enough  to  affect  seriously  the  general 
strength  of  her  naval  position. 

A  glance  at  the  map  confirms  Admiral  Mahan's  state- 
ment. However,  the  control  not  only  of  the  Persian  Gulf 
but  of  Mesopotamia  also  is  an  important  British  interest. 
India  is  strongly  protected  towards  the  north  and  north- 
west by  enormous  mountains,  but  can  comparatively 
easily  be  invaded  by  way  of  Mesopotamia  and  Persia,  by 
the  road  taken  by  Alexander  the  Great  and  other  conquerors, 
by  which,  as  has  been  shown  above,  the  railways  of  the 
future  will  connect  India  with  Central  Em-ope.  Great 
Britain,  as  India's  guardian,  is  therefore  strongly  interested 
that  that  most  important  hne  of  approach  should  not  be 
dominated  by  a  great  miHtary  Power  to  India's  danger. 
Besides,  England  is  on  India's  behalf  strongly  interested 
in  Mesopotamia  for  economic  reasons.  India  suffers  from 
two  evils  :  from  famine  and  from  over-population.  Mesopo- 
tamia Kes  at  India's  door  and  can,  as  will  presently  be 
shown,  produce  enormous  quantities  of  food  and  receive 
many  millions  of  immigrants.  As  the  chmate  of  Mesopo- 
tamia is  not  very  suitable  for  Europeans,  it  is  only  logical 
that  over-populated  India  should  be  given  an  outlet  upon 
the  Euphrates  and  Tigris.  Great  Britain  has  a  good  claim 
upon  the  control  of  Mesopotamia.  She  has  developed 
the  trade  along  its  rivers.  British  archaeologists  and 
engineers  have  explored  the  country,  and  British  men  of 
action  have  for  decades  striven  to  recreate  its  pros- 
perity.    Lastly,  Englishmen  have  conquered  it. 

Mesopotamia  has  almost  unlimited  agricultural  pos- 
sibiHties.  Babylonia  and  Assyria  were  the  cradle  of 
Christian  civihsation  and  perhaps  of  mankind.  Chapter  ii. 
verse  8,  of  the  Book  of  Genesis  tells  us  :  '  And  the  Lord 
God  planted  a  garden  eastward  in  Eden  ;  and  there  he 
put  the  man  whom  he  had  formed.'  The  word  '  Eden  ' 
is  the  Sumerian  word,  as  Assyriologists  have  told  us,  for 
plain.     The  ancient   Babylonians  also  had  a  myth  of  a 


96  The  Problem  of  Asiatic  Turkey 

great  plain  in  the  centre  of  which  stood  the  Tree  of  Know- 
ledge, and  they  possessed  likewise  the  story  of  the  Mood 
and  of  the  Ark.  In  Genesis,  chapter  ii.  verse  14,  we 
read  in  the  description  of  Paradise  :  *  And  the  name  of  the 
third  river  is  Hiddekel :  that  is  it  which  goeth  toward  the 
east  of  Assyria.  And  the  fourth  river  is  Euphrates.' 
Assyriologists  tell  us  that  the  four  rivers  mentioned  in  the 
Bible  were  the  Euphrates  and  Tigris,  and  two  of  the  huge 
artificial  canals  which  the  ancients  had  constructed.  In 
chapter  x.  of  Genesis  we  are  made  acquainted  with  Nimrod, 
Babel,  Erech,  Accad,  Calneh,  Nineveh,  and  other  Baby- 
lonian names.  Ur  on  the  Euphrates  near  Babylon  was 
the  birthplace  of  Abraham.  The  ancient  Jews  placed  their 
Paradise  in  Eden  because  Eden,  the  Mesopotamian  plain, 
was  then  the  garden  of  the  world.  Herodotus,  who  had 
visited  Mesopotamia  and  the  town  of  Babylon,  and  who 
wrote  about  the  year  450  e.g.,  has  told  us — ^the  translation 
is  Eawlinson's : 

But  little  rain  falls  in  Assyria,  enough,  however,  to  make 
the  corn  begin  to  sprout,  after  which  the  plant  is  nourished 
and  the  ears  formed  by  means  of  irrigation  from  the  river. 
For  the  river  does  not,  as  in  Egypt,  overflow  the  corn-lands 
of  its  own  accord,  but  is  spread  over  them  by  the  hand,  or 
by  the  help  of  engines.  The  whole  of  Babylonia  is,  like 
Egypt,  intersected  with  canals.  The  largest  of  them  all, 
which  runs  towards  the  winter  sun,  and  is  impassable  except 
in  boats,  is  carried  from  the  Euphrates  into  another  stream, 
called  the  Tigris,  the  river  upon  which  the  town  of  Nineveh 
formerly  stood. 

Of  all  the  countries  that  we  know,  there  is  none  which  is 
so  fruitful  in  grain.  It  makes  no  pretension,  indeed,  of 
growing  the  fig,  the  olive,  the  vine,  or  any  other  tree  of  the 
kind,  but  in  grain  it  is  so  fruitful  as  to  yield  commonly  two 
hundredfold.  The  blade  of  the  wheat  plant  and  barley 
plant  is  often  four  fingers  in  breadth.  As  for  the  millet  and 
the  sesame,  I  shall  not  say  to  what  height  they  grow,  though 
within  my  own  knowledge,  for  I  am  not  ignorant  that  what 
I  have  already  written  concerning  the  fruitfulness  of  Baby- 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship       97 

Ionia  must  seem  incredible  to  those  who  have  never  visited 
the  country. 

Among  the  many  proofs  which  I  shall  bring  forward  of 
the  power  and  resources  of  the  Babylonians  the  following  is 
of  special  account.  The  whole  country  under  the  domina- 
tion of  the  Persians,  besides  paying  a  fixed  tribute,  is  par- 
celled out  into  divisions  to  supply  food  to  the  Great  King  and 
his  Army.  Now,  out  of  the  twelve  months  of  the  year, 
the  district  of  Babylon  furnished  food  during  four,  the  other 
regions  of  Asia  during  eight  ;  by  which  it  appears  that 
Assyria,  in  respect  of  resources,  is  one-third  the  whole  of 
Asia. 

Quintus  Curtius,  who  wrote  about  50  b.c,  told  us  : 

The  pasturage  between  the  Tigris  and  the  Euphrates  is 
represented  as  so  rich  and  luxuriant  that  the  inhabitants 
restrain  the  cattle  feeding  lest  they  should  die  by  a  surfeit. 
The  cause  of  this  fertility  is  the  humidity  circulated  through 
the  soil  by  subterranean  streams,  replenished  from  the  two 
Rivers. 

The  great  fruitfulness  of  Babylonia  was  praised  by 
many  ancient  writers,  such  as  Theophrastus,  a  disciple  of 
Aristotle,  Berosus,  Strabo,  PHny,  &c.  According  to 
Herodotus  (III.  91,  92)  Babylonia  and  Susiana  paid  to 
Darius  a  tribute  of  1300  talents  per  year,  and  Egypt  of 
only  700.  Apparently  Mesopotamia  was  at  the  time 
almost  twice  as  wealthy  as  Egypt.  According  to  the 
ancient  writers,  the  fruitfulness  of  Babylonia  exceeded 
that  of  Egypt.  The  account  of  the  size  of  the  town  of 
Babylon  given  by  Herodotus  seems  at  first  sight  exaggerated. 
It  seems  incredible  that  Babylon  should  have  covered  an 
area  five  times  as  large  as  that  of  Paris.  According  to  the 
account  of  Herodotus  the  circumference  of  the  town  was 
480  stades,  or  56  miles.  On  the  other  hand,  the  circum- 
ference of  the  town  was,  according  to  Strabo,  385  stades  ; 
according  to  Quintus  Curtius,  368  stades  ;  according  to 
Chtarchus,  365  stades ;  and  according  to  Ctesias,  360 
stades.     Four  of  the  estimates  given  are  strangely  similar. 


98  The  Problem  of  Asiatic  Turkey 

As  Babylon  possessed  an  outer  and  an  inner  wall,  it  is 
assumed  by  many  that  Herodotus  gave  figures  for  the  outer 
and  the  other  writers  for  the  inner  hne  of  fortifications. 

Enormous  towns  testify  to  the  wealth  and  populousness 
of  a  country.  After  Babylon's  destruction  it  became  a 
quarry  and  Seleucia  and  Ctesiphon  were  built  with  the 
stones  of  that  city.  The  former  town  had,  in  the  time  of 
PHny,  600,000  inhabitants,  and  500,000  when  destroyed 
by  Cassius  in  a.d.  165.  Ctesiphon,  when  taken  by  Severus 
in  A.D.  232,  must  have  been  approximately  as  large,  for 
it  furnished  100,000  prisoners. 

Assyria  and  Babylonia  were  the  wealthiest  countries 
of  antiquity,  and  Mesopotamia  was  the  richest  part  of  the 
great  Persian  Empire.  Persia's  wealth  was  chiefly  Baby- 
lonian wealth.  In  the  Middle  Ages,  Baghdad  arose  among 
the  Babylonian  ruins,  and  between  the  tenth  and  eleventh 
centuries  it  had  2,000,000  inhabitants,  60,000  baths,  80,000 
bazaars,  ,&c(i.  It  was  the  capital  of  the  gigantic  Arab  Em- 
pire, the  wealth  of  which  was  founded  upon  the  flourishing 
agriculture  of  the  Babylonian  plain. 

In  olden  times  Babylonia  was  perfectly  irrigated.  Under 
the  Turks,  the  wonderful  system  of  canals  fell  into  neglect. 
The  Babylonian  plain  became  partly  a  desert  and  partly 
a  swamp.  Mesopotamia,  which,  in  olden  times,  was  the 
most  densely  populated  part  of  the  world,  is  at  present  the 
most  sparsely  peopled  part  of  the  Turkish  Empire,  as  will 
be  seen  by  reference  to  the  table  given  in  the  beginning 
of  this  chapter.  All  Mesopotamia  has  at  present  only 
2,000,000  inhabitants,  or  fourteen  people  per  square  mile. 

Sir  WiUiam  Willcocks,  a  very  eminent  engineer,  who 
has  surveyed  the  country  and  planned  a  gigantic  irrigation 
system,  dehvered,  on  March  25,  1903,  before  the  Khedivial 
Geographical  Society  at  Cairo,  a  lecture  on  the  irrigation 
of  Mesopotamia,  in  the  course  of  which  he  stated  : 

We  have  before  us  the  restoration  of  that  ancient  land 
whose  name  was  a  synonym  for  abundance,  prosperity,  and 
grandeur  for  many  generations.    Eecords  as  old  as  those  of 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship       99 

Egypt  and  as  well  attested  tell  of  fertile  lands  and  teeming 
populations,  mighty  kings  and  warriors,  sages  and  wise 
men,  over  periods  of  thousands  of  years.  And  over  and 
above  everything  else  there  is  this  unfaihng  record  that  the 
teeming  wealth  of  this  land  was  the  goal  of  all  Eastern 
conquerors  and  its  possession  the  crown  of  their  conquests. 
The  Eastern  Power  which  held  this  land  in  old  historic 
days  held  the  East.  A  land  such  as  this  is  worth  resuscitat- 
ing. Once  we  have  apprehended  the  true  cause  of  its  present 
desolate  and  abandoned  condition  we  are  on  our  way  to 
restoring  it  to  its  ancient  fertihty.  A  land  which  so  readily 
responded  to  ancient  science  and  gave  a  return  which 
sufficed  for  the  maintenance  of  a  Persian  Court  in  all  its 
splendour  will  surely  respond  to  the  efforts  of  modern  science 
and  return  manifold  the  money  and  talent  spent  on  its 
regeneration.  ...  Of  all  the  regions  of  the  earth,  no  region 
is  more  favoured  by  Nature  for  the  production  of  cereals 
than  the  lands  on  the  Tigris.  Indeed,  I  have  heard  our 
former  President,  Dr.  Schweinfurth,  say,  in  this  very  hall, 
that  wheat,  in  its  wild  uncultivated  state,  has  its  home 
in  these  semi-arid  regions  and  from  here  it  has  been  trans- 
ported to  every  quarter  of  the  globe.  Cotton,  sugar-cane, 
Indian  corn,  and  all  the  summer  products  of  Egypt  will 
flourish  here  as  on  the  Nile,  while  the  winter  products  of 
cereals,  leguminous  plants,  Egyptian  clover,  opium,  and 
tobacco  will  find  themselves  at  home  as  they  do  in  Egypt. 
Of  the  historic  gardens  of  Babylon  and  Bagdad  it  is  not 
necessary  for  me  to  speak.  A  land  whose  cHmate  allows 
her  to  produce  such  crops  in  tropical  profusion,  and  whose 
snow-fed  rivers  permit  of  pereimial  irrigation  over  millions 
of  acres,  cannot  be  barren  and  desolate  when  the  Bagdad 
Eailway  is  traversing  her  fields  and  European  capital  is 
seeking  a  remunerative  outlet. 

According  to  the  painstaking  and  conscientious  investiga- 
tions of  Sir  William  Willcocks,  the  irrigable  area  of  Meso- 
potamia is  from  two  to  three  times  as  large  as  that  of  Egypt. 
It  follows  that  that  country  should  be  able  to  nourish 
from  two  to  three  times  as  many  people  as  Egypt,  that 
its  population  might  be  increased  from  2,000,000  to  about 


100  The  Problem  of  Asiatic  Turkey 

30,000,000.  Mesopotamia  might  once  more  become  one 
of  the  great  granaries  of  the  world,  and  owing  to  its  position 
it  ought  obviously  to  become  the  granary  of  famine-stricken 
and  over-populated  India.  Mesopotamia  might  become, 
and  ought  to  become,  another,  and  a  greater,  Egypt  under 
the  united  efforts  of  Great  Britain  and  India.  Great 
Britain's  experience  in  Egypt  and  in  India  in  the  best 
methods  of  irrigation  should  convert  the  Babylonian  waste 
once  more  into  a  paradise. 

One  of  the  most  important  routes,  if  not  the  most 
important,  of  the  British  Empire  is  the  sea-route  from 
England  to  India  and  Australia  by  way  of  the  Suez  Canal. 
Admiral  Mahan  has  stated  that  the  control  of  the  Persian 
Gulf  is  an  important  British  interest  because  thence  a 
flank  attack  may  be  made  on  the  sea-route  to  India  and 
China.  A  glance  at  the  map  shows  that  the  control  of 
the  Eed  Sea  is  at  least  as  important  because  the  Eed  Sea 
is  merely  a  prolongation  of  the  Suez  Canal.  The  Eed  Sea 
and  the  Persian  Gulf  are  long  and  narrow  inlets  from  the 
shores  of  which  British  shipping  can  easily  be  attacked 
by  means  of  mines,  submarines,  and  torpedo  boats.  It 
is  therefore  clear  that  Great  Britain  is  most  strongly 
interested  in  the  integrity  of  the  shores  both  of  the  Persian 
Gulf  and  of  the  Eed  Sea.  Arabia  forms  the  eastern  shore 
of  the  Eed  Sea  and  the  western  shore  of  the  Persian  Gulf. 
As  Great  Britain  is  vitally  interested  in  the  integrity  of 
the  Persian  Gulf  and  of  the  Eed  Sea,  she  is  equally  strongly 
interested  in  the  integrity  of  Arabia.  A  hostile  Power 
controlling  Arabia  might  make  both  inlets  untenable  to 
Great  Britain  and  block  the  Suez  Canal  somewhere  between 
Suez  and  Aden.  Great  Britain  and  India  have  shown  in 
the  past  that  they  are  strongly  interested  in  the  integrity 
both  of  Southern  Persia,  which  forms  the  eastern  shore  of 
the  Persian  Gulf,  and  of  Arabia.  A  hostile  Power  con- 
trolhng  Arabia  could  not  only  attack  British  shipping  in 
the  Eed  Sea  and  the  Persian  Gulf,  but  could  attack  the 
Suez  Canal  as  well. 


Great  Problems  of  British  StatesmanshijJ     101 

On  the  eastern  shore  of  the  Red  Sea  He  the  Holy  Places 
of  Mohammedanism,  Mecca,  and  Medina.  All  Moham- 
medans desire  that  their  Holy  places  should  be  controlled 
by  an  independent  Mohammedan  Power,  not  by  Christian 
States.     Great  Britain  is  certain  to  respect  that  wish. 

If  the  arguments  given  in  these  pages  should,  after  a 
careful  scrutiny,  be  found  correct,  it  would  appear  that 
the  problem  of  Asiatic  Turkey  can  be  solved  only  by  placing 
the  country  under  a  European  guardianship,  and  the 
question  arises  whether  several  Powers  or  a  single  one 
should  fill  this  office.  As  several  Powers  possess  strong 
interests  in  Asiatic  Turkey,  and  as  the  country  is  of  the 
greatest  strategical  importance,  the  ideal  solution  would 
seem  to  be  a  joint  guardianship  exercised  by  some  body 
either  on  behalf  of  all  Europe  or  on  behalf  of  the  victorious 
Entente  Powers.  It  is  questionable,  however,  whether  the 
Powers  exercising  control  over  one  of  the  most  valuable 
and  important  territories  in  the  world  will  be  able  to  act 
in  harmony. 

Natura  non  facit  saltum.  A  guardianship  should  not 
be  imposed  upon  Turkey  by  violent  measures.  It  might 
be  exercised  by  means  of  the  strictest  financial  control. 
A  European  financial  authority  might  be  made  to  control 
and  direct  the  entire  expenditure  of  Asiatic  Turkey,  and 
might  by  purely  financial  means  keep  the  country  in  order 
and  shape  its  pohcy  and  internal  development.  If  we 
look  for  a  precedent  we  find  one  in  the  Caisse  de  la  Dette, 
a  Turkish  organisation  directed  by  Europeans  which  has 
managed  the  Turkish  finances  with  conspicuous  honesty 
and  ability  without  causing  serious  international  friction. 
However,  the  example  of  the  Caisse  de  la  Dette  supphes 
a  false  analogy.  The  European  nations  acted  in  harmony, 
when  represented  by  that  body,  because  the  Caisse  had  no 
political  pownr.  That  power  was  exorcised  by  the  Sultan 
and  his  advisers.  Hence,  the  European  nations  intrigued 
against  each  other  not  in  the  Caisse  de  la  Dette  but  around 
the  Sultan  and  his  Government.     If  the  Caisse  de  la  Dette 


102  The  Problem  of  Asiatic  Turkey 

should  be  given  control  over  the  Turkish  Government  its 
harmony  would  probably  come  to  an  end  and  the  European 
Powers  would  strive  to  influence  the  policy  of  Asiatic  Turkey 
by  bringing  pressure  to  bear  upon  the  international  financial 
commission  of  supervision. 

A  condominium,  whenever  and  wherever  tried,  has 
proved  a  failure  and  a  danger.  If  the  European  Powers 
should  desire  to  convert  Asiatic  Turkey  into  a  peaceful  and 
prosperous  buffer  State,  into  a  gigantic  Switzerland,  by 
means  of  a  European  guardianship,  the  duty  of  controUing, 
modernising,  and  developing  the  country  should  be  left 
to  a  single  and  a  non-mihtary,  and  therefore  non-aggressive. 
Power  acting  on  behalf  of  Europe.  At  first  sight  it  would 
appear  that  some  small  and  capable  State  such  as  Sweden, 
Holland  or  Belgium  might  act  in  that  capacity.  But  there 
are  several  objections  to  trusting  the  guardianship  of  so 
large  and  so  important  a  country  to  a  small  State.  Swedes, 
Dutchmen, and  Belgians  have  httle  experience  in  deahng  with 
Mohammedans.  Belonging  to  a  small  State,  they  would 
not  enjoy  sufficient  prestige  with  the  Turks.  Last,  but 
not  least,  there  would  always  be  the  danger  that  a  small 
State  furnishing  the  guardians  of  Turkey  might  be  influenced 
in  its  policy  by  the  attitude  of  a  powerful  neighbour  State 
which  thus  would  be  able  to  influence  the  guardian  of 
Asiatic  Turkey  to  its  own  advantage.  If  the  European 
Powers  should  decide  to  place  Tui'key  under  a  guardianship, 
a  single,  a  strong,  a  non-militarj^  and  therefore  non-aggres- 
sive Power  experienced  in  managing  Mohammedans  should 
be  selected.  The  only  Power  possessing  these  qualifications 
is  Great  Britain.  Great  Britain  might  convert  Asiatic 
Tui"key  into  another,  and  a  greater,  Egypt.  Outwardly  it 
would  remain  an  independent  State  with  Sultan,  &c.  How- 
ever, an  inconspicuous  representative  of  the  guardian  Power, 
caUed  Adviser  or  Consul-General,  would  control  the  Turkish 
administrative  and  executive  absolutely  by  controlling  the 
entire  finances  of  the  country. 

Asiatic  Turkey,  hke  Egypt,  would  not  need,  and  should 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     103 

not  possess,  a  real  army.  A  police  force  and  a  gendarmerie, 
possibly  supported  by  a  few  thousand  soldiers  in  case  of 
internal  troubles,  should  suffice.  The  entii'e  energy  of 
the  Asiatic  Turks  should  be  concentrated  upon  the  develop- 
ment of  the  country.  Only  then  would  Turkey  cease  to 
be  a  danger  to  other  nations  and  to  itself. 

Great  Britain  would  derive  no  benefit  from  its  guardian- 
ship, except  the  benefit  of  peace.  Her  activity  on  behalf 
of  Eui-ope  would  be  distinctly  unprofitable  to  herself. 
It  is  true  that  the  Turks  would  have  to  pay  salaries  to  a 
number  of  British  officials — a  paltry  matter — and  that 
Great  Britain  might  possibly  provide  some  of  the  capital 
needed  for  developing  the  country.  However,  Great 
Britain  will,  after  the  War,  have  no  capital  to  spare  for 
exotic  enterprises.  All  her  sm-plus  capital  will  be  required 
for  developing  the  Motherland  and  Empire.  Besides, 
she  has  no  superabundance  of  able  administrators  available 
for  the  service  of  Turkey  and  of  other  semi-civihsed  States. 
Great  Britain  would  see  in  a  guardianship  over  Turkey 
rather  a  duty  than  an  advantage. 

If  the  War,  as  seems  hkely,  should  end  in  the  victory 
of  the  Entente  Powers,  France  will  probably  receive  Alsace- 
Lorraine  and  possibly  further  German  territory.  Russia 
will  probably  obtain  considerable  territory  from  Germany 
and  Austria-Hungary  and  may  receive  Constantinople. 
Great  Britain  wiU  obtain  practically  no  material  com- 
pensation, for  the  German  Colonies  can  scarcely  be  con- 
sidered as  such.  Great  Britain  has  not  fought  for  territory 
but  for  peace.  The  neutrahsation  of  Asiatic  Turkey  appears 
to  be  the  most  necessary  step  for  preventing  the  outbreak 
of  another  world- war.  While  Russia  and  France  demand 
valuable  territories  as  a  reward.  Great  Britain  is  surely 
entitled  to  demand  stabihty  and  peace  as  a  compensation. 
No  EngHshman  has  expressed  the  wish  that  Great  Britain 
should  acquire  Asiatic  Turkey.  The  aim  of  the  British 
Government  and  of  all  Em'ope  should  be  to  enable  Turkey 
to  govern  herself.    But  in  order  to  be  able  to  govern  herself 


104  The  Prohlem  of  Asiatic  Turkey 

Turkey  must  be  taught  the  art  of  government,  and  Great 
Britain  might  be  her  teacher. 

It  seems  necessary  for  the  peace  of  the  world  that  Asiatic 
Turkey  in  its  entirety  should  be  neutralised,  and  it  seems 
hkely  that  its  neutrality  can  be  maintained  only  if  order 
and  good  government  are  introduced  into  the  country 
under  the  auspices  of  a  strong  but  non-military  and  unaggres- 
sive State,  such  as  Great  Britain,  which  is  not  likely  ever 
to  use  the  unrivalled  position  occupied  by  the  Turkish 
provinces  as  a  base  for  attacking  the  neighbouring  Powers 
with  a  large  army.  A  British  guardianship  would  of  course 
not  prevent  French,  Eussian,  ItaUan,  and  Greek  capital 
and  labour  participating  ^vith  England  in  the  Government 
and  economic  development  of  the  country,  in  accordance 
with  the  policy  laid  down  by  the  European  Powers  in  concert 
and  executed  by  Great  Britain  as  their  appointed  guardian. 
Thus  Eussia  might  develop  Armenia,  France  Syria  and 
CiUcia,  Italy  the  district  of  Adalia,  and  Greece  that  of 
Smyrna. 

If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  Powers  should  not  be  able 
to  agree  to  a  British  guardianship,  it  would  become  necessary 
to  divide  Asiatic  Turkey  into  zones  of  influence.  In  that 
case,  the  Turks  would  probably  be  restricted  to  a  compara- 
tivelj''  narrow  territory  in  the  centre  of  Asia  Minor.  Being 
cut  off  from  the  sea  and  lacking  great  natural  resources, 
the  few  milhon  Turks  would  scarcely  be  able  to  retain 
their  independence  for  long.  Asiatic  Turkey  in  its  totality 
would  be  partitioned  by  the  Powers.  Great  Britain  would 
probably  claim  the  control,  in  some  form  or  other,  of  both 
Mesopotamia  and  Arabia  as  her  share.  However,  it  seems 
very  doubtful  whether  the  partition  of  Asiatic  Turkey 
would  prove  a  final  one.  It  is  much  to  be  feared  that  it 
would  lead  to  a  disaster  perhaps  as  great  as  the  present 
War. 


CHAPTEE  IV 

THE    PROBLEM    OF    AUSTRIA-HUNGARY  ^ 

The  War,  as  far  as  the  land  campaign  is  concerned,  may- 
end  in  three  different  ways.  It  may  end  in  the  victory 
of  Germany  and  of  Austria-Hungary,  it  may  lead  to  the 
exhaustion  of  the  land  Powers  engaged  in  it,  and  may  thus 
remain  undecided,  or  it  may  result  in  the  defeat  of  Germany 
and  Austria-Hungary.  In  each  of  these  three  eventualities, 
the  question  as  to  the  position  and  future  of  the  Dual 
Monarchy  ^vill  be  of  the  very  greatest  interest  and  importance 
not  only  to  all  Europe  but  to  the  world. 

The  War  has  yielded  a  twofold  surprise  to  all  who  are 
interested  in  miHtary  affairs.  The  Germans  have  fought  far 
better,  and  the  Austrians  infinitely  worse,  than  was  generally 
expected.  At  the  beginning  of  the  War  the  Austrian  armies 
utterly  collapsed.  It  was  expected  by  the  German  General 
Staff  that  their  Austrian  alHes  would  be  able  to  hold  back 
the  Eussian  hosts  from  the  Austro-German  frontiers  until 
the  Germans  had  destroyed  the  French  armies,  taken  Paris, 
and  occupied  the  most  valuable  portions  of  France.  Instead 
of  this,  Austria  suffered  at  the  hands  of  Eussia  the  most 
disastrous  defeat  in  her  history,  a  defeat  compared  with 
which  her  defeat  at  Koniggratz  and  France's  defeat  at  Sedan 
appear  unimportant.  GaUcia,  the  Bukovina,  and  part  of 
Hungary,  districts  inhabited  by  about  10,000,000  people 
and  possessed  of  enormous  resources  of  every  kind,  with 
Lemberg,  the  third  largest  Austrian  town,  were  overrun  by 

^  The  Nineteenth  Century  and  After,  November,  1914. 
105 


106        The  Problem  of  Austria-Hungary 

Enssia,  and  even  the  little  army  of  poor  and  war-exhausted 
Serbia  utterly  defeated  the  numerically  far  stronger  Austrian 
forces  sent  against  it.  Prince  Lichnowsky,  referring  to 
Austria-Hungary,  said,  not  without  reason,  to  a  friend 
shortly  before  leaving  London  :  '  Germany  goes  to  war  with 
a  corpse  hanging  round  her  neck.' 

Owing  to  the  initial  collapse  of  the  Austrian  army  and 
the  truly  wonderful  acliievements  of  the  Germans  against 
heavy  odds — achievements  which  one  could  frankly  admire, 
had  the  German  soldiers  by  their  brutality  and  unspeakable 
crimes  not  covered  the  German  name  with  everlasting  infamy 
— Germany  took  the  conduct  of  war  completely  into  her 
own  hands  and  Austria  became  a  mere  cypher.  The  Austrian 
army  commanders  and  the  Austrian  Chief  of  the  General 
Staff  were  dismissed,  and  for  all  practical  purposes  the 
Austrian  army  became  an  adjunct  and  a  subordinate  portion 
of  the  German  army.  Austria's  dependence  upon  Germany 
was  formerly  disguised.  Berlin  did  not  wish  to  hurt  the 
susceptibihties  of  Vienna,  and  allowed  the  Austrians  to 
make  a  brave  show  and  to  pose  as  a  Great  Power.  To  humour 
their  vanity,  Austrian  statesmen  were  permitted  to  *  lead 
off '  when  the  War  for  the  hegemony  in  Europe  and  the 
mastery  of  the  world  had  been  resolved  upon  in  Berlin. 
But  the  relations  between  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary 
will  never  again  resemble  those  which  existed  before  the  War. 
The  rulers  and  people  of  the  Dual  Monarchy  have  become 
aware  that  they  depend  upon  Germany's  good  will  for  their 
very  existence.  The  German  people,  and  especially  the 
German  officers,  refer  to  beaten  and  decadent  Austria  with 
undisguised  contempt.  Austria's  independence  is  a  thing  of 
the  past.  She  is  at  present  a  German  vassal.  What  will 
be  her  future  ? 

If  Germany  should  be  victorious  in  the  War  on  land,  or 
if  the  campaign  should  end  undecided,  Austria-Hungary 
will  continue  to  be  a  German  appendage  and  for  all  practical 
purposes  a  subject  State.  There  may  still  be  an  Austrian 
Emperor  in  Vienna,  but  he  will  be  a  German  puppet,  not 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     107 

only  in  all  questions  of  foreign  policy,  but  in  domestic, 
administrative,  and  military  matters  as  well.  Germany  will 
certainly  not  relinquish  her  present  control  over  the  Austrian 
army.  MacJitjpolitih,  the  policy  of  power,  will  exact  pay- 
ment and  punishment  from  Austria's  weakness  and  failure. 
We  must,  therefore,  reckon  with  the  fact  that  if  the  War 
should  end  in  a  draw,  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  will 
form  a  single  State,  possibly  even  in  outward  form.  It  is 
conceivable  that  Austria-Hungary  will  have  to  enter  the 
German  Federation.  At  any  rate,  it  seems  Ukely  that  the 
German  Emperor  will,  in  case  of  a  drawn  war,  rule  in  the 
near  future  over  120,000,000  people  and  dispose  of  an  active 
army  of  12,000,000  men  in  case  of  war  ;  that  Pola,  Fiume, 
and  Cattaro  will  be  German  war  harbours  in  addition  to 
Kiel,  Wilhelmshaven,  and  Emden  ;  that  a  vigorous  pohcy 
of  Germanisation  will  take  place  throughout  Austria- 
Hungary  ;  that  the  Austrian  Slavs  will  gradually  become 
Germans  ;  that  the  power  of  Germany  will  be  doubled  even 
if  she  should  not  be  able  to  retain  any  of  her  conquests.  If, 
on  the  other  hand,  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  should 
be  victorious  on  land,  Germany's  predominance  would  become 
not  merely  European  but  world-wide.  In  that  case,  she 
would  retain  in  the  West  all  Belgium  and  a  large  part  of 
Eastern  France  ;  and  Holland,  wedged  into  German  territory, 
would  undoubtedly  be  compelled  to  enter  the  German 
Federation.  In  the  East  she  would  annex  Eussian  Poland, 
and  the  formerly  German  Baltic  Provinces  of  Eussia, 
Livland,  Esthland,  and  Courland.  In  addition,  Germany 
would  very  hkely  take  the  French  colonies.  Austria- 
Hungary  would  receive  a  portion  of  Western  Eussia  and  all 
Serbia,  and  she  would  probably  punish  Italy's  desertion  by 
once  more  converting  Lombardy  and  Venetia  into  Aus- 
trian provinces.  For  all  practical  purposes  Germany  and 
Austria-Hungary  would  thus  be  a  single  State  of  150,000,000 
inhabitants,  or  more. 

As   France   and   Eussia   would   be   crippled   for   many 
decades,  the  great   German  Empire  would  dominate  the 


108         The  Problem  of  Austria-Hungary 

Balkan  States  and  Turkey,  and  these  would  become  German 
protectorates.  Stretching  from  Calais,  from  Havre,  or 
perhaps  from  Cherbourg,  to  the  vicinity  of  Petrograd, 
and  from  the  Itahan  plain  to  Constantinople,  and  to  the 
lands  beyond  the  Bosphorus  far  into  Asia,  Germany,  together 
with  her  protectorates,  would  form  a  gigantic  and  compact 
State  of  more  than  200,000,000  inhabitants.  It  would 
control  the  most  valuable  strategical  positions  in  Europe 
and  on  the  Mediterranean.  It  would  dispose  of  unUmited 
armies,  unlimited  resources,  and  unhmited  wealth.  The 
HohenzoUerns  would  rule  a  State  far  larger  than  the  Empire 
of  Charlemagne.  WilHam  the  Second  would  rule  the 
world,  for  the  British  Empire  and  the  United  States  com- 
bined would  scarcely  be  able  to  resist  Germany  for  long. 
Although  in  the  present  war  Great  Britain  should  be 
victorious  at  sea,  her  ultimate  downfall  and  that  of  the 
United  States  would  probably  be  merely  a  question  of 
time.  Germany  would  rule  the  world,  unless  the  power 
she  had  gained  was  wrested  fi'om  her  in  a  still  greater  war 
than  the  present  one  by  the  combined  Anglo-Saxon,  Latin, 
and  Slav  nations.  A  subordinate  Austria-Hungary,  which 
would  vastly  increase  Germany's  population  and  army  and 
which,  besides,  would  form  a  bridge  between  Germany 
and  Constantinople,  would  evidently  play  a  very  important 
part  in  enabling  Germany  to  recreate  the  Empire  of 
Charlemagne  on  a  vastly  increased  scale. 

The  military  weakness  of  Austria-Hungary  and  her 
internal  divisions  may  lead  to  her  absorption  into  Germany 
if  the  land  war  should  prove  indecisive  or  if  it  should  end 
in  a  German  victory.  In  either  case,  Austria-Hungary 
might  gradually  become  a  homogeneous,  centralised,  Prus- 
sianised, and  powerful,  though  dependent,  State,  a  kind 
of  Greater  Bavaria,  and  her  accession  would  enormously 
increase  Germany's  power  on  land  and  sea. 

However,  it  seems  unhkely  that  Germany  and  Austria- 
Hungary  will  be  victorious,  or  that  the  War  will  end  in 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     109 

a  draw.  In  these  circumstances  it  is  worth  while  consider- 
ing closely  the  future  of  Austria-Hungary  in  case  of  an 
Austro-German  defeat. 

Austria-Hungary  is  not  a  modern  State  but  a  medieval 
survival.  Modern  States  are  erected  on  the  broad  basis 
of  a  common  nationality.  In  modern  States,  State  and 
nation  are  synonymous  terms,  and  the  people  feel  that 
they  constitute  a  single  family  in  a  world  of  strangers. 
In  Austria-Hungary,  as  in  Tm'key,  the  State  is  not  formed 
by  a  poHtically  organised  nation.  Austria-Hungary,  like 
Turkey,  is  a  country  which  is  inhabited,  not  by  a  nation, 
but  by  a  number  of  nations  which  have  little  in  common 
and  which  hate  and  persecute  one  another. 

The  Habsburg  family  possesses  certain  very  marked 
hereditary  peculiarities.  The  hanging  Habsburg  Hp  and 
the  long  narrow  jaws  may  be  traced  back  through  generation 
after  generation  as  far  as  the  fifteenth  century.  King 
AlphonSo  of  Spain  curiously  resembles  his  great  ancestor, 
the  Emperor  Charles  the  Fifth,  who  ruled  four  centuries 
ago.  Certain  traits  of  character  of  the  Habsburg  family 
are  equally  persistent,  and  among  these  the  spirit  of 
acquisitiveness  is  particularly  marked.  The  Habsburgs 
have  been  the  most  successful  family  of  matrimonial  and 
land  speculators  known  to  history.  While  most  dynasties 
rose  to  eminence  by  placing  themselves  at  the  head  of 
great  nations  and  by  conducting  successful  wars  of  conquest, 
the  Alsatian  family  of  the  Habsburgs  rose  from  obscurity 
to  the  greatest  power  by  acquiring  territories  in  all  parts 
of  the  world  by  judicious  purchase,  by  exchange,  and 
especially  by  highly  profitable  marriages.  Spain  and  the 
countries  of  the  New  World  were  one  of  the  dowries  gathered 
in  by  the  Habsburg  princes.  Four  and  a  half  centuries 
ago  the  witty  Hungarian  King  Matthias  Corvinus  wrote 
the  distich  : 

Bella  gcrant  alii !    Tu  felix  Austria  nube. 
Nam  quae  Mars  aliis  dat  tibi  rcgna  Venus. 


110        The  Problem  of  Austria  Hungary 

(Let  other  nations  wage  war  !  You,  happy  Austria,  marry. 
For  Venus  will  give  you  those  lands  which  usually  Mars 
bestows.)  The  Austrian  Empire  is  not  an  Empire  in  the 
generally  accepted  sense  of  the  term.  It  is  the  result  of 
gigantic  deals  in  land,  and  of  equally  gigantic  matrimonial 
ventures.  Since  the  earliest  times  the  Habsburgs  have 
cared  for  land,  not  for  people.  They  acquired  lands  right 
and  left,  regardless  of  the  nationality  of  the  inhabitants 
whom  they  got  thrown  in.  Thus  the  Habsburgs  ruled 
at  one  time  or  another  not  only  the  ten  nations  which 
constitute  Austria-Hungary,  but  Switzerland,  Burgundy, 
Lorraine,  Germany,  Holland,  Belgium,  Italy,  Spain, 
Portugal,  North  Africa,  and  the  countries  of  the  New  World 
as  well.  Austria-Hungary  is  the  residue  of  a  much  larger 
fortuitous  collection  of  States  and  nations.  Eecognising 
that  Austria- Hungary  is  neither  a  State  nor  a  nation,  but 
a  collection  of  States  and  nations,  Austrian  rulers  speak 
habitually  of  their  peoples,  not  of  their  people,  and  of  their 
lands,  not  of  their  land.  The  curious  genesis  of  the  Habs- 
burg  monarchy,  and  the  fact  that  the  so-caUed  Dual 
Monarchy  is  in  reahty  a  multiple  monarchy,  is  apparent 
from  the  title  of  its  ruler,  who  is  called  Emperor  of  Austria, 
Apostolic  King  of  Hungary,  King  of  Bohemia,  Dalmatia, 
Croatia,  Slavonia,  Gahcia,  Lodomiria  and  lUyria,  King  of 
Jerusalem,  Archduke  of  Austria,  Grand  Duke  of  Toscana 
and  Cracow,  Duke  of  Lorraine,  Duke  of  Salzburg,  Styria, 
Carinthia,  Carniola,  the  Bukovina,  of  Upper  and  Lower 
Silesia,  Modena,  Parma,  Piacenza,  and  Guastalla,  Prince 
of  Transylvania,  Margrave  of  Moravia,  Princely  Count  of 
Tyrol,  &c.,  &c.,  &c. 

The  peoples  of  Austria-Hungary  are  organised  in 
two  self-governing  States,  Austria  and  Hungary.  These 
are  loosely  connected  by  various  hnks,  and  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina  are  a  joint  possession  of  the  two  States. 
If,  for  simpUcity's  sake,  we  credit  each  of  these 
States   with  one    half  of  the    population  of   Bosnia   and 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     111 


Herzegovina,  we  find  that  their  racial  composition  is   as 
follows  : 


Populatiou  of 

Population  of 

Austria  and  Half 

Hungary  and  Half 

of  Bosnia  and 

of  Bosnia  and 

Herzegovina  in 

Herzegovina  in 

1910 

1910 

Germans     . 

9,950,000 

Magyars 

.     10,051,000 

Czechs 

6,436,000 

Roumanian's  . 

.       2,949,000 

Poles 

4,968,000 

Germans 

.       2,037,000 

Ruthenians 

3,519,000 

Serbians 

.       2,006,000 

Slovenes 

1,253,000 

Slovacks 

1,968,000 

Serbians 

1,683,000 

Croatians 

1,833,000 

Italians 

768,000 

Ruthenians     . 

473,000 

Roumanians 

275,000 

Magyars 

11,000 

28,863,000 

21,317,000 

The  ten  nations  enumerated  in  this  table  speak  ten  different 
languages — the  Serbians  and  Croats  are  one  race  and  differ 
only  in  religion — and  each  of  them  has  a  strongly  marked 
character  and  individuality  of  its  own. 

A  composite  State  which  is  peopled  by  different  races 
can  be  ruled  comparatively  easily  either  on  democratic 
or  on  autocratic  lines  ;  democratically  if  the  different 
races  have  full  self-government,  as  they  have  in  Switzerland 
and  Canada,  and  autocratically  if  the  ruling  race  consti- 
tutes the  majority  of  the  population.  Austria  is  ruled  by 
the  Germans  and  Hungary  by  the  Magyars.  The  Germans 
of  Austria  form  about  one-third  of  the  population.  The 
Magyars  are  apparently  about  one-half  of  the  population 
of  Hungary  ;  but  their  number  is  greatly  overstated.  In 
their  anxiety  to  Magyarise  Hungary  and  to  make  a  good 
show,  they  have  manipulated  the  census  statistics,  as  will 
be  shown  later  on.  Hungary  has  in  reality  only  between 
7,000,000  and  8,000,000  bona  fide  Magyars.  In  other  words, 
the  ruhng  race,  both  in  Austria  and  in  Hungary,  constitutes 
only  a  minority.  In  both  halves  of  the  Dual  Monarchy 
one-third  of  the  people  rule  over  the  remaining  two-thirds. 
That  is  not  a  healthy  state  of  affairs. 


112         The  Problem  of  Austria-Hungary 

Austria  and  Hungary,  like  thoir  ally  Germany,  are 
nominally  constitutionally  governed  limited  monarchies 
endowed  with  representative  government  and  all  the  usual 
trappings  of  democracy.  In  reahty  Austria-Hungary, 
hke  Germany,  is  an  autocracy  which  is  governed  by  the 
ruler  and  for  the  ruler  under  the  observation  of  certain 
Parliamentary  forms.  In  Austria-Hungary  and  in  Germany 
the  Emperor  is  the  State.  The  Austrian  Emperor,  Hke 
the  German  Emperor,  directs  the  entire  machinery  of  the 
government  and  administration  in  accordance  with  his 
will.  Thus  in  Austria-Hungary,  as  in  Germany,  the 
bureaucracy  is  the  State,  and  the  officials  are  the  servants 
of  the  Emperor-King,  who  appoints  and  dismisses  them. 
Parliament  has  no  power  whatever  over  the  administrative 
apparatus.  The  people  of  the  Dual  Monarchy  are  ruled 
with  the  assistance  of  the  Civil  Service,  the  army,  the  ex- 
ceedingly powerful  poKtical  police,  which  spies  upon  every 
citizen,  the  law  courts,  the  school,  the  Church,  and  the 
Press,  and  all  seven  are  government  institutions  controlled 
by  the  Emperor.  Church  and  Press  are  no  exception  to 
the  rule.  In  Germany  the  Emperor  is  the  official  head, 
the  Pope,  of  the  Protestant  State  Church.  That  perhaps 
accounts  for  his  intimate  relations  with  the  Deity.  GThe 
Austrian  Church  is  Eoman  Catholic.  Its  head  is  nominally 
the  Pope,  but  in  reality  it  is  the  Emperor.  In  a  decree 
pubHshed  by  the  Emperor  Leopold  the  Second  on  March  3, 
1782,  we  read  : 

Although  the  priest's  province  is  the  cure  of  souls,  he 
must  also  be  considered  as  a  citizen  and  as  a  State  official 
engaged  in  religious  work,  for  he  can  directly  and  indirectly 
exercise  the  greatest  political  influence  over  the  people  by 
working  upon  their  feelings. 

It  may  sound  strange,  but  it  is  a  fact  that  in  Austria 
the  Church  is  a  branch  of  the  bureaucracy.  The  Press 
of  the  Dual  Monarchy  is  Government-inspired,  Government- 
subsidised,     Government-muzzled,    and     Government-con- 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     113 

trolled  to  a  far  greater  extent  than  it  is  in  Germany.  Every 
Department  of  State  has  a  Press  bureau  of  its  own,  and 
enormous  sums  are  spent  by  the  Government  upon  the 
Austrian  Press.  Tlie  judges  of  the  Dual  Monarchy,  being 
a  part  of  the  Civil  Service,  possess  no  real  independence. 
That  may  be  seen  by  their  disgraceful  partisan  behaviour 
in  poHtical  prosecutions,  in  which  they  frequently  brow- 
beat, fine,  and  expel  from  the  court  not  only  the  witnesses 
for  the  defence,  but  even  the  defending  solicitors. 

Austria-Hungary  is  governed  by  absolutism,  and 
absolutism  can  be  successfully  maintained  only  if  the 
people  are  weak  and  ignorant.  Endeavouring  to  keep 
the  people  in  ignorance  and  subjection,  the  Austrian  rulers 
have  habitually  favoured  the  Eoman  Cathohc  Church 
and  opposed  education.  Guided  by  the  principle  '  Cujus 
regio,  ejus  et  religio,'  they  have  persecuted  Protestantism 
in  the  most  savage  manner,  recognising  in  it  a  revolt  of 
the  people  against  estabhshed  authority.  Herein  hes  the 
reason  that,  although  Protestantism  took  powerful  root 
in  the  Dual  Monarchy  in  the  time  of  Huss,  there  are  in 
Austria  at  present  only  588,686  Protestants,  as  compared 
with  no  fewer  than  25,949,627  Eoman  Cathohcs.  While 
the  Austrian  people  are  poor,  the  Austrian  Church  is 
exceedingly  wealthy  and  powerful.  IlHteracy  in  Austria- 
Hungary  is  very  great.  From  the  latest  issue  of  the  '  Hand- 
worterbuch  der  Staatswissenschaften '  we  learn  that  of 
10,000  recruits  only  3  are  illiterate  in  Germany,  2200  are 
ilhterate  in  Austria,  and  2590  in  Hungary.  Among  the 
oppressed  nationahties,  for  instance,  in  the  Slavonic  parts 
of  Austria  and  Hungary,  ilHteracy  rises  to  7000  among 
every  10,000  recruits.  While  the  Austrian  Government 
always  discouraged  knowledge  and  independence  among 
the  people,  keeping  them  down  by  means  of  the  ojfficials, 
the  poUce,  and  the  Church,  it  endeavoui'ed  to  prevent 
popular  dissatisfaction  by  encouraging  amusement  and 
not  discouraging  vice.  The  Austrian  towns,  which  might 
become  hotbeds  of  revolution,  are  the  gayest  and  at  the 


114        The  Problem  of  Austria-Hungary 

same  time  the  most  immoral  towns  in  Europe.  In  1910 
of  all  the  children  born  alive  18*25  per  cent,  were  illegitimate 
in  Upper  Austria,  21*9  in  Lower  Austria,  23'0  in  Styria, 
23*6  in  Salzburg,  and  35'6  in  Carinthia.  In  Vienna  the 
percentage  of  illegitimate  births  is  on  an  average  about 
forty,  according  to  the  official  statistics.  Possibly  they 
understate  the  facts. 

While,  for  the  sake  of  making  their  peoples  obedient, 
the  Austrian  rulers  forced  them  by  the  most  savage  persecu- 
tion into  a  religious  uniformity,  they  had  no  desire  to 
weld  them  together  into  one  nation.  The  old  principle 
of  the  Habsburg  monarchy  is  '  Divide  et  impera.'  Francis 
the  Second,  who  ruled  Austria  at  the  time  of  the  Congress 
of  Vienna,  said  to  the  French  Ambassador  : 

My  peoples  are  strangers  to  each  other.  That  is  all  the 
better.  They  do  not  catch  the  same  political  disease  at  the 
same  time.  If  the  fever  takes  hold  of  you  in  France  all  of 
you  catch  it.  Hungary  is  kept  in  order  by  Italian  troops, 
and  Italy  is  kept  down  by  Hungarians.  Everybody  keeps 
his  neighbour  in  order.  My  peoples  do  not  understand 
each  other,  and  hate  each  other.  Their  antipathies  make 
for  security  and  their  mutual  hatreds  for  the  general  peace. 

Absolutism  is  maintained  by  fear.  Absolute  rulers  in 
the  East  and  the  West  habitually  distrust  their  principal 
advisers,  fearing  that  their  power  may  become  too  great. 
Actuated  by  fear  and  distrust,  the  Austrian  rulers  have 
usually  entrusted  the  government  of  the  country  to 
mediocrities  and  nonentities,  and  have  treated  with 
ingratitude  the  public  servants  who  had  rendered  the 
greatest  services  to  their  country.  If  Austria-Hungary 
entered  upon  a  war  in  which  she  was  absolutely  certain  of 
victory,  her  armies  were  commanded  by  a  member  of  the 
ruling  house,  so  that  the  dynasty  should  receive  new  glory. 
If  she  was  Hkely  to  lose,  the  command  was  given  to  officers 
who  were  afterwards  dismissed  and  disgracea  for  their 
incompetence.     Generals  von  Auffenberg,  Dankl,  and  many 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     115 

other  leading  men  have  shared  the  fate  of  General  von 
Benedek,  who  was  defeated  at  Koniggratz,  while  Admiral 
Tegethoff  was  very  badly  treated  by  the  Government 
because  he  unexpectedly  defeated  the  far  stronger  Italian 
fleet  at  Lissa  and  was  made  a  hero  by  the  people.  Austria's 
stagnation  is  largely  due  to  the  fact  that  she  has  usually 
been  governed  and  administered  by  mediocrities,  and  that 
her  armies  have  been  entrusted  to  military  nonentities 
in  time  of  war. 

Austria-Hungary  curiously  resembles  ancient  Spain. 
In  both  countries  we  have  seen  rulers  actuated  by  tyranny, 
treachery,  cruelty,  and  jealousy.  After  all,  the  Spanish 
and  Austrian  dynasties  are  closely  related.  Both  possess 
the  same  traditions  and  the  same  unbending  Court  cere- 
monial. Austria-Hungary,  hke  ancient  Spain,  pursues 
not  a  national,  but  a  purely  dynastic  policy.  The  people 
are  merely  pawns,  and  they  are  exploited,  oppressed,  and 
treated  with  perfidy  and  ingratitude.  The  attitude  of 
the  Austrian  rulers  towards  their  subjects  will  be  apparent 
from  a  few  examples  out  of  many.  In  1690  the  Emperor 
Leopold  the  First  invited  200,000  Serbs  to  leave  their 
country  and  to  settle  in  Austria.  They  were  to  clear  the 
Eastern  frontier  provinces  of  the  Turks  and  to  defend 
them  against  Ottoman  aggression.  They  were  promised 
freedom  of  religion,  and  their  nationality  was  to  be  respected. 
During  one  hundred  and  sixty  years  the  Serbs  and  their 
descendants  fought  Austria's  battles  against  the  Turks. 
They  fought  for  Austria  in  Italy  and  on  the  Ehine.  Not- 
withstanding Austria's  promises,  they  were  deprived  of  their 
leaders  and  forcibly  denationalised.  Their  religion  was  sup- 
pressed, the  building  of  Serbian  churches  and  convents  was 
prohibited,  and  during  a  century  printing  in  the  Serbian 
language  was  not  allowed.  The  books  required  for  religious 
service  had  to  be  copied  by  hand  as  late  as  the  nineteenth 
century.  The  Serbian  saints  were  excluded  from  the 
calendar,  and  on  the  sacred  days  of  their  Church  Serbs 
were  purposely  sent  to  forced  labour.     These  persecutions 


116  The  Problem  of  Austria-Hungary 

drove  thousands  of  Serbs  from  Austria  to  Eussia  and  even 
to  Turkey,  where  at  least  they  were  allowed  to  practise 
their  religion. 

During  the  struggles  of  the  Serbians  with  the  Turks 
a  century  ago  Austria  disregarded  their  pitiful  appeal  for 
help,  betrayed  them  to  the  Turks,  and  forced  them  to 
surrender  to  them  by  closing  against  them  the  Austrian 
frontier,  whence  alone  they  could  obtain  food.  During  the 
Eevolution  of  1848  the  Eoman  CathoHc  Serbs  of  Austria, 
the  Croatians,  loyally  aided  the  Emperor  against  the 
Hungarian  revolutionists,  defeated  them  and  reconquered 
Vienna.  Yet  after  the  suppression  of  the  Hungarian 
revolution  they  were  handed  over  to  Hungary  to  be  ill- 
used  and  oppressed.  The  Eoumanians,  who  also  had 
loyally  supported  their  Emperor  against  the  rebelHous 
Magyars,  were  hkewise  handed  over  to  their  enemies,  their 
protests  notwithstanding.  When  the  revolution  broke  out 
in  Hungary,  the  Austrian  officers  stationed  there  were 
treated  with  the  greatest  duphcity  by  the  Austrian  Govern- 
ment. BeHeving  that  the  Hungarians  would  succeed  in 
making  themselves  independent,  and  fearing  their  hostihty, 
the  Austrian  Government  wished  to  keep  them  quiet  and 
encouraged  the  Austrian  officers  in  Hungary  to  take  service 
under  the  Hungarian  Government  in  order  to  allay  its  sus- 
picions. A  Httle  later  when,  with  the  help  of  Eussia,  Austria 
succeeded  in  defeating  the  Hungarian  armies,  she  had  many 
of  the  deluded  Austrian  officers  executed  for  high  treason. 

A  king  or  emperor  who  rules  over  a  number  of  different 
nationalities  will,  for  convenience'  sake,  make  one  of  their 
languages  the  official  language  of  the  Government.  The 
Austrian  Habsburgs,  being  German  princes,  not  unnaturally 
made  German  the  official  language  and  handed  over  to  the 
Austro- Germans  the  government  of  the  Austrian  peoples 
and  the  administration  of  their  lands.  German  became 
the  language  of  the  upper  classes,  and  of  literature,  for 
until  lately  only  the  upper  classes  in  Austria  could  read 
and    could    afford    to    buy    newspapers    and    books.     Not 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     117 

very  long  ago  the  Magyar,  Czech,  Polish,  Serbian, 
Roumanian,  Euthenian,  Slovenian,  and  Slovak  languages, 
which  now  have  a  great  and  glorious  Hterature,  were  hardly 
more  than  rude  local  patois  used  only  by  the  common 
people.  Books  in  most  of  these  languages  did  not  exist. 
The  official  language  of  the  Magyars  was  Latin  and  German. 
The  debates  of  the  Hungarian  Parhament  were  conducted 
in  a  mongrel  Latin  until  a  short  time  ago. 

Joseph  the  Second,  who  ruled  from  1765  to  1790,  was 
an  enthusiast  and  a  great  admirer  of  Frederick  the  Great, 
his  contemporary.  Animated,  perhaps,  by  a  premonition 
of  the  rise  of  a  great  German  State  outside  Austria,  he 
endeavoured  to  Germanise  his  numerous  non- German 
possessions.  He  strove  to  Germanise  the  people  of  the 
monarchy  by  forcing  upon  them  a  centralised  German 
administration  and  the  German  language.  Acting  clumsily 
and  liigh-handedly,  he  outraged  the  non- German  peoples 
and  brought  about  a  revival  of  thek  languages.  Patriotic 
native  philologists  began  to  study  the  non- German  patois 
and  to  elevate  them  into  a  language  by  purifying  them. 
Languages  which  had  apparently  died  were  painfully 
reconstructed  out  of  the  debris  at  hand.  PoKsh,  Magyar, 
Czech,  and  other  writers  created  a  great  and  beautiful 
Hterature  in  their  revived  languages.  The  cultured  Magyars 
abandoned  Latin  and  German  for  Magyar,  and  the  leaders 
of  the  other  nationahties  also  took  to  then-  rediscovered 
national  languages.  The  current  of  nationaHsm  could 
not  be  stemmed.  The  nationahties  acquired  race  conscious- 
ness and  race  pride.  The  rapidity  with  which  the  non- 
German  languages  have  progressed  even  during  the  most 
recent  times  will  be  seen  from  the  figures  in  table  on  page 
118,  which  are  taken  from  an  official  Austrian  pubhcation, 
'  Statistische  Riickblicke  auf  Oesterreich,'  wliich  was  pubHshed 
in  Vienna  in  1913. 

Between  1882  and  1912  the  number  of  papers  and 
periodicals  of  the  Czechs  increased  sevenfold,  and  those  of 
the  Poles  more  than  fourfold.     In   1882  there  were  two 


118         The  Problem  of  Austria-Hungary 

German  papers  and  periodicals  to  every  single  non-German 
one  in  Austria.  In  1912  the  number  of  German  and  non- 
German  papers  and  periodicals  had  become  nearly  equal. 
The  huge  increase  of  the  Czech  papers  and  periodicals  is 
particularly  noteworthy.  It  has  been  far  greater  than 
that  of  the  other  nationaUties,  because  the  reawakened 
nationahsm  has  grown  particularly  vigorous  in  Bohemia, 
where  formerly  it  had  been  most  ruthlessly  suppressed. 

The  nationalities  had  been  murmuring  for  many  years 
against  Austrian  misrule,  and  the  German-Austrians  also 
had  become  more  and  more  dissatisfied  with  the  reactionary 


Newspapers  and  Periodicals 

printed 

in  Austria, 

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1882 

912 

176 

89 

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1892 

1252 

374 

108 

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30 

67         90 

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1902 

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2042 

and  oppressive  methods  of  government  which  Metternich 
had  introduced  after  the  downfall  of  Napoleon  in  1815. 
The  great  Ke volution  of  1848  shook  the  monarchy,  to  its 
very  foundations.  The  German,  ItaUan,  and  Hungarian 
lands  rose  in  arms.  The  Emperor  and  Prince  Metternich 
had  to  flee  from  Vienna.  The  revolution  was  overcome 
with  the  greatest  difficulty  and  with  terrible  bloodshed, 
and  the  reconquered  lands  were  treated  with  the  utmost 
barbarity  by  the  victors.  In  1859  the  Italians  rose  once 
more  against  their  Austrian  oppressors  and,  with  the  help 
of  France,  wrested  Lombardy  from  them.  Still  Italy 
remained  dissatisfied,  for  Austria  retained  Venetia.  A 
second  war  with  Italy  was  hkely.  Since  the  early  sixties, 
and  especially  since  the  time  when  Bismarck  had  become 
Prussia's  Prime  IMinister,  Prussia  had  begun  to  arm  with 
feverish  haste  and  was  doubhng  her  mihtary  forces.     Her 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     119 

attitude  towards  Austria  became  more  and  more  menacing. 
It  was  clear  to  all  Austrians  that  before  long  the  Monarchy- 
might  have  to  fight  a  war  on  two  fronts.  In  these  circum- 
stances it  was,  of  course,  most  important  that  Austria,  when 
at  war  in  the  south  and  the  north,  should  not  be  attacked 
in  the  rear  by  the  Hungarians  under  Kossuth's  leader- 
ship. A  reconcihation  between  Austria  and  Hungary  was 
urgently  required,  and  Vienna  began  to  move.  Austria's 
necessity  was  Hungary's  opportunity.  In  the  third  volume 
of  Kossuth's  memoirs,  on  page  649,  there  is  a  report  from 
Budapest  dated  August  16,  1861,  in  which  we  read  : 

The  Vienna  Court  will  not  give  way,  but  is  embarking 
upon  new  and  desperate  experiments.  In  the  meantime 
the  difficulties  with  which  it  is  faced  are  constantly  increas- 
ing. Its  power  keeps  on  diminishing,  and  at  last  a  moment 
will  arrive  when  it  will  have  to  fulfil  all  that  Hungary  desires, 
merely  in  order  to  save  the  Habsburg  dynasty. 

Kossuth's  forecast  came  true.  Before  1866,  when 
Prussia  and  Italy  together  made  war  upon  Austria,  the 
Magyar  leaders  were  promised  self-government.  Austria 
was  defeated  by  Prussia,  but  she  prepared  everything  for 
an  early  war  of  revenge  in  which  she  reckoned  upon  the 
support  of  France.  To  defeat  Prussia  it  was  necessary 
to  satisfy  the  wishes  of  the  Magyars  and  to  convert  them 
from  opponents  into  staunch  and  rehable  supporters  with 
the  least  delay.  In  the  year  following  her  defeat  the 
negotiations  between  Vienna  and  Budapest  were  hastily 
concluded.  By  the  Ausgleich,  the  compromise,  of  1867, 
the  monarchy  was  cut  in  two.  Vienna  was  to  rule  Austria 
and  Budapest  Hungary.  The  Ausgleich  established  the 
Dual  system.  Henceforth  there  was  to  be  an  Empire  of 
Austria  and  a  self-governing  Kingdom  of  Hungary.  The 
monarchy  became  a  Dual  Monarchy.  The  non-Magyar 
nations  in  Hungary  were  handed  over  to  the  tender  mercies 
of  the  Magyars,  while  the  Austro- Germans  continued  to 
rule  over  the  non- German  races  of  Austria. 


120        The  Problem  of  Austria-Hungary 

The  Magyars  had  revolted  against  alien  rule.  They  had 
claimed  self-government  in  the  name  of  equality,  Hberty, 
and  justice.  However,  as  soon  as  they  had  obtained  self- 
government,  they  denied  to  the  non-Magyar  nations  of 
Hungary  that  Hberty,  equality,  and  justice  which  they  had 
claimed  for  themselves  as  a  natural  right.  A  German 
minority  oppressed  and  persecuted  a  non-German  majority 
in  the  Austrian  half  of  the  monarchy,  and  a  Magyar  minority 
introduced  worse  than  Austrian  methods  of  government  in 
the  Hungarian  half.  However,  the  Austrian  Germans  and 
Hungarian  Magyars  did  not  persecute  and  oppress  all  the 
other  nationalities,  but,  faithful  to  the  principle  '  Divide  et 
Impera,'  endeavoured  to  weaken  them  by  giving  favours 
here  and  there  and  setting  them  against  one  another.  The 
Poles  in  Galicia  were  protected  by  the  Austrians  because 
their  goodwill  would  be  precious  in  case  of  a  war  with 
Eussia.  At  the  same  time,  they  allowed  the  Poles  to  oppress 
the  neighbouring  Euthenians,  so  that  the  hostihty  of  the 
Euthenians  could  be  used  as  a  counterpoise  if  the  Poles  should 
become  too  overbearing.  Hungary  patronised  the  Serbo- 
Croats  for  similar  reasons. 

The  Ausgleich  of  1867  divided  Austria-Hungary  into 
two  States,  but  it  did  not  bring  about  a  final  settlement 
between  the  two  leading  races.  Hungary  aimed  at  full 
equality  with  Austria,  if  not  at  supremacy.  Austria,  which 
hitherto  had  been  supreme,  resisted  Hungary's  claims  and 
endeavoured  to  keep  the  control  of  the  foreign  policy  of  the 
Dual  Monarchy  in  her  own  hands,  notwithstanding  Hun- 
gary's objections.  In  numerous  matters  of  national  concern, 
Vienna  required  the  consent  of  Budapest,  and  every  Austrian 
demand  was  used  by  the  Magyars  as  a  means  for  extorting 
fresh  concessions  from  their  unwilling  partner.  Year  by 
year  the  friction  between  the  two  countries  increased. 
Year  by  year  the  feelings  between  Austrians  and  Magyars 
became  more  bitter.  The  Hungarians  openly  threatened 
to  make  themselves  entirely  mdependent  of  Austria,  and 
to  leave  her  in  the  lurch.     On  many  occasions  they  showed 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     121 

their  determination  to  achieve  complete  supremacy  and  make 
Austria  a  subordinate  State.  On  October  1,  1909,  for  in- 
stance, the  Hungarian  Minister,  Count  Albert  Apponyi, 
pubHshed  a  decree  addressed  to  the  educational  authorities, 
demanding  that  in  books  and  maps  the  words  '  Austro- 
Hungarian  Monarchy  '  should  everywhere  be  replaced  by 
the  words  '  Hungary  and  Austria.'  Austrians  and  Magyars, 
Vienna  and  Budapest,  loathe  each  other.  In  1910  Austria- 
Hungary  had  in  round  figures  50,000,000  inhabitants.  Of 
these  about  18,000,000,  the  Germans  in  Austria  and  the 
Magyars  in  Hungary,  form  the  ruHng  nations — the  2,000,000 
Germans  in  Hungary  are  left  out  because  they  are  oppressed 
by  the  Magyars — and  these  rule  over  32,000,000  people, 
the  subject  nationahties.  Now  the  two  ruling  nations  are 
divided  into  10,000,000  Germans  and  8,000,000  Magyars 
who  hate  each  other  with  the  fiercest  hatred,  while  they 
themselves  are  equally  bitterly  hated  by  the  various 
nationahties  which  they  try  to  keep  down.  Hobbes' 
'  Bellum  omnium  contra  omnes '  prevails  in  the  Dual 
Monarchy.  The  Dual  Monarchy  is  a  Dual  Anarchy,  and 
the  Anarchy  which  prevails  in  the  country  is  largely  respon- 
sible for  its  defeats.  A  State  which  is  inhabited  by  ten 
different  nations,  which  persecute  and  hate  one  another, 
cannot  progress  in  peace  and  cannot  offer  a  united  front 
against  an  enemy  in  war. 

The  inter-racial  relations  in  Austria-Hungary  are  most 
comphcated.  As  a  full  and  adequate  account  would 
require  a  book,  I  will  briefly  deal  with  the  position  of 
only  the  more  important  nationahties,  and  especially 
those  which  are  most  hkely  to  be  directly  affected  by  the 
present  War. 

Galicia  is  inhabited  by  Poles  and  Euthenians.  The 
Poles,  as  has  been  previously  stated,  are  the  ruhng  element 
in  Galicia,  for  they  have  been  allowed  by  Austria  to  oppress 
the  Euthenians,  and  they  have  been  given  a  good  deal 
of  freedom.  On  August  5,  the  Grand  Duke  Nicholas, 
Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Eussian  forces,  addressed  the 


122        The  Problem  of  Austria-Hungary 

following  appeal  to  the   Poles  in  Eussia,   Germany,   and 
Austria-Hungary  : 

Poles,  the  hour  has  sounded  when  the  sacred  dream  of 
your  fathers  and  your  forefathers  may  be  realised.  A  cen- 
tury and  a  half  has  passed  since  the  living  body  of  Poland 
was  torn  in  pieces,  but  the  soul  of  the  country  is  not  dead. 
It  continues  to  live,  inspired  by  the  hope  that  there  will 
come  for  the  Pohsh  people  an  hour  of  resurrection  and  of 
fraternal  reconciliation  with  Great  Eussia.  The  Eussian 
Army  brings  you  the  solemn  news  of  this  reconcihation  which 
obhterates  the  frontiers  dividing  the  Pohsh  peoples,  which 
it  unites  conjointly  under  the  sceptre  of  the  Eussian  Czar. 
Under  his  sceptre  Poland  will  be  governed  again,  free  in 
her  religion  and  her  language.  Eussian  autonomy  only 
expects  from  you  the  same  respect  for  the  rights  of  the 
nationalities  to  which  history  has  bound  you.  With  open 
heart  and  brotherly  hand  Great  Eussia  advances  to  meet  you. 
She  believes  that  the  sword  with  which  Poland  struck  down 
her  enemies  at  Griinwald  has  not  yet  rusted.  From  the 
shores  of  the  Pacific  to  the  North  Sea  the  Eussian  Armies 
are  marching.  The  dawn  of  a  new  life  is  beginning  for  you, 
and  in  this  glorious  dawn  is  seen  the  sign  of  the  Cross,  the 
symbol  of  suffering  and  of  the  resurrection  of  peoples. 

During  the  reign  of  the  late  Czar,  Eussia's  policy  towards 
the  Poles  was  influenced  by  various  currents  and  cross- 
currents. Many  prominent  Eussians  were  more  afraid 
of  constitutional  government,  of  democracy,  and  of  internal 
troubles  than  they  were  of  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary. 
Consequently  the  pohcy  of  the  Eussian  Government  towards 
the  Poles  was  hesitating  and  somewhat  contradictory. 
But  even  during  the  reign  of  the  late  Czar  the  tendency  to 
give  to  the  Poles  self-government  and  freedom  became 
constantly  stronger.  The  leaders  of  the  new  Eussian 
democracy  have  completely  abandoned  the  reserve  and 
the  suspicions  with  which  Polish  affairs  have  hitherto  been 
treated.  They  have  whole-heartedly  declared  themselves 
in  favour  of  giving  to  the  Poles  complete  independence  in 
accordance  with  the  principles  of  liberty  and  nationahty 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     123 

which  have  animated  the  revolutionaries  in  converting 
Eussia  into  a  Eepubhc.  The  outlook  for  the  creation  of 
an  independent  Poland,  embracing  all  the  Polish-speaking 
people,  has  never  been  fairer  than  it  is  at  present. 

The  5,000,000  Austrian  Poles  receive  preferential  treat- 
ment from  Austria,  and  they  have  little  reason  to  be  dis- 
satisfied with  their  present  position  Still,  if  Eussia  carries 
out  her  programme  and  reconstitutes  the  ancient  State  of 
Poland,  the  Gahcian  Poles  will  scarcely  care  to  be  left  out. 
Polish  independence  is  bound  to  prove  more  attractive  than 
the  privileges  which  they  receive  at  present  from  Austria, 
and  which  may  be  withdrawn.  Besides,  the  Galician  Poles 
remember  the  wrongs  which  they  have  suffered  at  Austria's 
hands.  They  remember  not  only  the  partition  of  Poland, 
but  also  the  sanguinary  agricultm-al  risings  and  the  fearful 
butcheries  which  Austria  perpetrated  in  Galicia  in  order 
to  weaken  the  Poles,  and  the  infamous  extinction  of  the 
Eepubhc  of  Cracow  in  1846.  After  the  Eevolution  of 
1848  the  Poles  were  treated  worse  than  ever.  Only  after 
her  defeat  of  1866  did  Austria  give  them  greater  freedom. 
If  the  AUies  should  be  victorious,  the  loss  of  the  Pohsh 
districts  of  Austria  seems  inevitable. 

Germans  and  Austrians  have  frequently  told  us  that  the 
Poles  are  unfit  to  govern  themselves,  that  they  are  unpro- 
gressive,  wasteful,  unthrifty,  dirty,  and  drunken.  These 
arguments  as  to  Poland's  unfitness  to  govern  herself  can 
best  be  refuted  by  the  following  most  remarkable  figures  : 

Polish  Co-operative  Societies. 


- 

Number 

Members 

Share  Capital 

Deposits 

Loans 
Outstanding 

1900 
1904 
1909 
1912 

420 

849 

1812 

2686 

297,607 

509,168 

916,476 

1,307,120 

£ 
1,079,929 
2,370,613 
4,439,337 
6,309,926 

£ 
12,420,057 
19,652,581 
34,944,184 
46,970,354 

£ 
12,047,717 
20,165,980 
39,048,734 
55,203,6-2 

These  most  remarkable  figures  are  taken  from  Michalski's 


124        The  Problem  of  Austria-Hungary 

book,  Les  Socieies  Cooperatives  Polonaises  (Lemberg,  1914). 
They  refer  to  all  Poland,  and  they  show  that  the  co-operative 
movement,  the  best  test  of  a  nation's  providence  and  pro- 
gress, has  made  enormous  strides  among  the  Poles.  In  the 
short  space  of  twelve  years  the  number  of  Polish  co-operators 
has  more  than  quadrupled,  the  share  capital  of  the  societies 
has  increased  about  sixfold,  and  the  deposits,  which  repre- 
sent chiefly  the  savings  of  poor  people,  have  increased  from 
£12,420,057  to  no  less  than  £46,970,354.  People  who  dis- 
play such  remarkable  prudence  in  their  own  affairs  may  be 
entrusted  with  self-government. 

The  3,500,000  Kuthenians  who  inhabit  Southern  Galicia 
and  the  neighbouring  districts  of  Hungary  are  part  of  the 
great  Slav  family.  They  are  part  of  the  '  Little  Eussians,' 
who  dwell  in  South  Kussia  in  the  Ukraine.  Desiring  to 
weaken  Kussia,  Austria-Hungary  has  lately  discovered  that 
the  Ukrainains  are  a  separate  race  and  possess  an  ancient 
history  and  language.  The  Austrian  Government,  which 
is  not  at  all  desirous  to  stimulate  nationalism  in  its  own 
borders,  has  suddenly  become  a  passionate  advocate  of 
the  national  and  linguistic  claims  of  the  Ukrainians.  In 
the  realm  of  the  Habsburgs  the  end  justifies  the  means. 
Men  who  are  the  enemies  of  nationalism  in  their  own  country 
have  passionately  championed  the  national  claims  of  Albania 
and  the  Ukraine.  Government  money  has  been  spent  without 
stint  in  placing  the  claims  of  the  Albanian  and  the  Ukrainian 
nations  before  the  public  of  the  principal  countries,  by 
expensive  illustrated  books,  articles,  lectures,  letters  to  the 
Press,  &c.  Besides,  Austria  has  thoughtfully  established 
Euthenian  professorships  at  the  Lemberg  University. 
The  Austrians  have  become  enthusiastic  about  the  Ukrainian 
nationality  in  the  hope  of  producing  a  split  among  the 
Eussians.  According  to  Government-paid  Austrian  writers, 
South-western  Eussia,  with  Kiev,  is  Ukrainian,  and  claims, 
rightly,  an  individuality  and  an  independent  national  exist- 
ence. The  Austrian  Government  has  raised  the  Ukrainian 
question   in    order    to    foment    troubles    in    Eussia.     Its 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     125 

attempts  are  likely  to  prove  unsuccessful.  The  Euthenians 
and  their  Kussian  neighbours  across  the  frontier,  by  what- 
ever name  they  may  be  called,  are  one  people,  and  their 
reunion  after  an  Austro-German  defeat  is  inevitable. 

Until  1866  all  the  non-German  nationahties  in  Austria 
were  brutahsed  by  the  ruling  race.  Austrian  persecution 
was  most  severely  felt  and  most  bitterly  resented  by  that 
highly  gifted  and  energetic  Slav  race,  the  unfortunate 
Czechs  of  Bohemia.  The  Bohemian  Czechs  have  been  ill- 
treated  by  Austria  during  many  centuries.  Johann  Huss, 
following  in  Wycliffe's  footsteps,  introduced  the  Eeformation 
there  about  the  year  1400,  partly  as  a  protest  against  the 
degradation  of  the  Koman  Cathohc  Church,  partly,  and  prob- 
ably chiefly,  as  a  protest  against  German  domination  and 
German  brutahty.  Huss  died  a  martyr.  The  Eeforma- 
tion in  Bohemia  was  suppressed  with  the  greatest  savagery, 
and  Bohemia  was  totally  devastated.  Germans  were 
settled  among  the  Czechs,  Eoman  Cathohc  dragoons  were 
quartered  upon  Protestant  Bohjmians  in  order  to  *  convert  ' 
them.  The  Czechs  were  treated  as  helots  by  the  Germans 
settled  among  them  up  to  a  very  recent  date.  When  the 
Prussian  armies  invaded  Bohemia  in  1866  they  endeavoured 
to  raise  the  Czechs  against  the  Austrians  by  addressing  to 
them  the  following  proclamation  : 

Inhabitants  of  the  Glorious  Kingdom  of  Bohemia  I 
In  consequence  of  the  war,  which  has  been  caused  against 
our  wishes  by  the  Emperor  of  Austria,  we  enter  your  country, 
not  as  enemies  and  conquerors,  but  full  of  respect  for  your 
historic  and  national  rights.  To  the  inhabitants,  without 
regard  of  their  calling,  religion,  and  nationality,  we  bring  not 
war  and  destruction,  but  consideration  and  friendship. 
Do  not  believe,  as  your  enemies  will  tell  you,  that  we  have 
brought  about  this  war  through  lust  of  conquest.  Austria 
has  forced  us  to  fight  by  threatening  to  attack  us.  But 
believe  us  that  we  have  not  the  slightest  intention  to  op'pose 
your  just  desire  for  inde'pendence  and  for  unrestrained  national 
development. 


126        The  Problem  of  Austria-Hungary 

Eemembering  the  heavy  and  ahiiost  unbearable  burdens 
which  the  Government  has  placed  upon  you  in  preparing 
for  this  war,  we  shall  not  impose  additional  taxes,  nor  shall 
we  ask  you  to  act  against  your  convictions.  We  shall 
respect  and  honour  particularly  your  holy  religion.  At 
the  same  time  we  shall  not  tolerate  open  resistance,  and 
must  punish  severely  all  treasonable  acts.  We  leave  the 
issue  of  the  war  confidently  to  the  Lord  of  Hosts.  If  our 
just  cause  should  'prove  victorious,  the  7noment  may  perhaps 
arrive  when  the  national  aspirations  of  the  Bohemians  and 
Moravians  may  he  fulfilled  in  the  same  way  in  which  those  of 
the  Hungarians  have  been  fulfilled,  and  then  may  Providence 
establish  their  happiness  for  all  time. 

The  proclamation  is  very  interesting  because  it  throws 
a  strong  light  not  only  upon  the  dissatisfaction  existing 
in  Bohemia,  but  also  upon  Prussian  methods  of  warfare. 
Of   the   6,700,000   inhabitants   of   Bohemia,   4,240,000, 
or    about   two-thirds,    are    Czechs    and  Slovaks,    and  the 
remaining  third  are  Germans.     In  the  neighbouring  land  of 
Moravia,  which  lies  to  the  east  of  Bohemia,  approximately 
the  same  proportion  of  Germans  and  Slavs  obtains.    Al- 
though the  Czechs  form  the  great  majority  of  the  inhabitants 
of  Bohemia,  their  language  was  suppressed  until  recently. 
German  was  the  official  language  used  throughout  Bohemia 
in  the  law  courts  and  elsewhere.     German  inscriptions  were 
to  be  seen  in  the  Czech  villages  and  towns.    To  the  casual 
visitor,    Bohemia    seemed    to    be    a    German   land.    Step 
by   step   the   Czechs  have   ousted   the   Germans.    To-day 
Prague,  that  old  stronghold  of  Germanism,  is  a  Czech  town. 
So  great  is  the  "hatred  between  Czechs  and  Germans  that 
there  is  practically  no  intercourse  between  the  two  nations. 
A  German  will  not  enter  a  Czech  restaurant  or  hotel  in 
Prague,  nor  will  a  Czech  enter  a  German  place  of  entertain- 
ment.     The  two  nations  have  separate  schools,  theatres, 
concert  rooms,  banks,  savings  banks,  co-operative  societies, 
&c.    At  the  German  University  of  Prague  there  were  in 
1910-11  1726  German  students  and  only  eighty-six  Czechs. 
At  the  Czech  University  of  Prague  there  were  in  the  same 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     127 

year  4225  Czechs  and  only  nine  Germans.  At  the  German 
Technical  High  Schools  of  Prague  there  were  880  Germans 
and  thirty-seven  Czechs.  At  the  corresponding  Czech  estab- 
lishments there  were  2686  Czechs  and  ten  Germans.  In 
Bohemia  the  two  nationaUties  follow  the  policy  of  segrega- 
tion, because  the  Czechs  absolutely  refuse  to  associate  with 
Germans.  A  similar  pohcy  of  non-intercourse  is  noticeable 
between  the  Poles  and  Kuthenians  at  the  Cracow  University, 
where  there  were  in  1910-11  2771  Poles  and  only  thirty- 
four  Euthenians. 

By  their  strength  of  character  and  strength  of  intellect, 
and  by  their  great  artistic  and  scientific  achievements, 
the  Czechs  have  become  the  leading  nation  among  the 
Austrian  Slavs.  Their  intellectual  pre-eminence  may  be 
seen  from  the  extent  and  from  the  wonderful  progress  of 
their  Press,  regarding  which  figures  have  been  furnished 
on  another  page.  The  Czechs  occupy  a  most  important 
position  in  the  Dual  Monarchy.  Owing  to  its  mines,  its 
fruitful  soil,  and  its  very  highly  developed  industries, 
Bohemia  is  the  most  valuable  possession  of  Austria,  and  the 
Dual  Monarchy  would  lose  it  most  unwillingly.  Besides, 
Bohemia  occupies  a  most  valuable  strategical  position. 
Bohemia,  with  its  surrounding  mountain  walls,  is  a  strong 
natural  fortress,  and  it  lies  on  the  most  direct  route  from. 
Berlin  to  Vienna.  At  present  Bohemia  connects  Germany 
and  Austria,  Berhn  and  Vienna.  An  independent  Bohemia 
would  separate  the  two  States  and  their  capitals.  An 
independent  Bohemia  and  Moravia  would  border  to  the 
east  upon  an  independent  Poland.  Prussia,  which  at  present 
is  in  contact  with  Austria  through  Silesia  and  Bohemia, 
would  be  separated  from  the  German  districts  of  Austria 
by  a  sohd  wall  of  Slavonic  nations  if  Poland,  Moravia,  and 
Bohemia  should  become  independent  States.  In  that 
case  the  German  parts  of  Austria  would  be  in  contact 
with  Germany  only  by  means  of  Bavaria.  That  is  an 
important  fact,  the  political  and  strategical  bearings  of 
which  will  presently  be  considered. 

Of  the  inhabitants  of  Bohemia  and  Moravia,  two-thirds. 


128         Tlie  Problem  of  Austria-Hungary 

as  has  been  said,  are  Slavs,  and  one-third  are  Germans. 
The  Germans  form  a  broad  fringe  along  the  Austro-German 
frontier.  If  the  future  frontiers  of  Bohemia  should  be  de- 
termined on  a  racial  basis,  about  one-third  of  its  territory 
should  fall  to  Germany.  It  might  perhaps  fall  to  the 
kingdom  of  Saxony,  upon  which  it  borders,  and  which  then 
would  regain  some  of  its  former  importance,  of  which  it 
was  deprived  by  Prussia  exactly  a  century  ago.  After 
the  War  the  Southern  States  of  Germany  may  require 
strengthening  against  Prussia,  so  as  to  create  a  balance 
of  power  within  Germany. 

As  the  Czechs  have  at  last  conquered  for  themselves  a 
position  in  which  they  can  freely  use  their  language  and  de- 
velop their  individuahty,  and  as  their  influence  in  Austria- 
Hungary,  which  as  yet  is  not  great,  is  bound  to  increase, 
they  may  hesitate  to  cut  the  connection  with  Austria,  espe- 
cially as  their  manufacturing  industries  depend  very  largely 
upon  the  Austrian  market  for  the  sale  of  their  productions. 
The  action  of  Bohemia  will  probably  largely  depend  upon 
that  of  the  other  nationalities.  An  isolated  Bohemia  and 
Moravia,  being  shut  off  from  the  sea,  would  poHtically, 
militarily,  and  especially  economically  occupy  a  very  exposed 
and  insecure  position,  unless  it  could  enter  into  a  federation 
with  some  of  its  neighbours. 

South  of  Bohemia  lie  the  German  districts  of  Austria. 
These  extend  in  a  solid  block  from  Switzerland  and  Bavaria 
in  the  west  to  a  line  about  thirty  miles  east  of  Vienna. 
The  southern  border  of  Bohemia  forms  the  northern  frontier 
of  the  German  territory  of  Austria,  and  the  river  Drau 
its  southern  limit.  If  Bohemia  and  Moravia  should  cut 
themselves  off  from  German  Austria,  the  physical  connection 
between  German  Austria  and  Prussia  would  be  destroyed, 
while  direct  contact  between  German  Austria  and  Bavaria 
would  be  retained.  Bavaria  and  her  neighbour  Baden 
are  the  most  strongly  Eoman  Catholic  States  of  Germany. 
Of  their  joint  population  of  9,000,000,  about  6,100,000, 
or    two-thirds,    are    Roman    Catholics.      The    easy-going 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     129 

Austrians  sympathise  far  more  with  the  people  of  Bavaria 
and  Baden  than  with  the  overbearing  Prussians.  An 
organic  connection  of  German  Austria,  Bavaria,  and  Baden 
would  give  20,000,000  inhabitants  to  German  Austria, 
and  would  correspondingly  weaken  the  power  of  Prussia 
for  mischief.  That  block  of  nations  might  be  joined  by  the 
remaining  South  German  States,  Wiirtemberg,  Saxony, 
and  the  rest,  and  thus  a  fairly  even  balance  of  power  might 
be  produced  in  Germany.  The  German  race  would  be 
di^dded  into  almost  equal  halves,  different  in  character, 
rehgion,  and  tradition,  and  possessing  different  historic 
capitals.  They  would  be  extremely  powerful  for  defence, 
but  would  presumably  be  less  dangerous  for  an  attack. 
By  uniting  with  Bavaria  and  Baden,  Austria  would  border 
on  the  Ehine.  She  would  occupy  once  more  a  position  of 
great  political  and  strategical  importance,  not  only  towards 
Eussia  and  the  Balkan  Peninsula,  but  also  towards  France, 
That  position  should  secure  the  peace  of  Europe  and  of 
the  world. 

If  Austria-Hungary  should  resolve  to  conclude  a  separate 
peace,  the  State  of  the  Habsburgs  might  once  more  become 
the  leading  State  of  Germany.  The  Austrian  monarch 
might  make  it  a  condition  that  he  should  receive  compensa- 
tion for  the  Slavonic  and  Latin  provinces  which  he  is  likely 
to  lose  by  being  given  not  only  the  South  German  States, 
which  until  1866  followed  Austria's  lead,  but  also  Silesia, 
which  was  torn  from  Austria  by  Frederick  the  Great. 
Prussia  has  grown  great  at  Austria's  expense.  It  would 
be  only  a  fit  retribution  if  the  process  should  be  reversed, 
and  if  Vienna  should  regain  its  old  supremacy.  If  the 
10,000,000  Austro- Germans  were  joined  by  25,000,000  or 
30,000,000  South  Germans  and  Silesians,  the  10,000,000 
Magyars  would  no  longer  be  able  to  cause  trouble  to  the 
Habsburg  Emperors.  Berlin  would  no  longer  be  able  to 
play  out  Budapest  against  Vienna.  Austria's  greatest 
internal  difificulty  would  disappear,  and  so  would  her  economic 
troubles.     The  Dual  Monarchy  is  a  poor  country  because 


130         The  Problem  of  Austria-Hungary 

it  lacks  prosperous  manufacturing  industries.  The  wealth 
of  Austria-Hungary  is  supposed  to  be  only  one-third  of 
that  of  Germany.  By  acquiring  the  South  German  States 
and  Silesia  the  State  of  the  Habsburgs  would  both 
poUtically  and  economically  regain  its  old  paramountcy. 
Austria-Hungary  would  become  an  almost  purely  German 
State  organised  on  a  federal  basis,  and  if  the  Habsburgs 
should  act  tolerantly  and  liberally  towards  the  neighbour 
States,  the  Austrian  Federation  might  be  joined  in  course 
of  time  by  some  of  the  secondary  States  which  will  arise 
after  the  present  war  in  the  South-east  of  Europe. 

In  the  south,  Austria  possesses  two  almost,  purely  Italian 
districts  :  the  Italian  Tyrol,  with  towns  such  as  Trento, 
Eovereto,  Ala,  Bondo,  Borgo,  &c.,  and  the  western  part  of 
Istria  and  a  narrow  strip  of  the  Adriatic  coast  with  Trieste, 
Pola,  Fiume,  Capodistria,  Zara,  Sebenico,  Spalato,  Eagusa, 
Cattaro,  &c.  The  names  of  the  towns  mentioned  show 
their  Italian  origin.  The  possession  of  the  Italian  Tyrol  is  a 
matter  of  vital  importance  to  Italy.  The  great  and  wealthy 
plain  of  Lombardy  is  protected  towards  the  north  by  a 
crescent  of  mountain  walls,  the  Alps.  Italy  is  protected 
by  that  powerful  barrier  against  invasion  from  France  and 
Switzerland.  But  by  retaining  the  Italian  Tyrol,  the 
Trentino,  after  withdrawing  from  Italy,  and  by  occupying 
the  mountain  passes  down  to  the  foot  of  the  mountains  as 
far  as  the  Lago  di  Garda,  Atistria  occupies  with  her  army 
a  wide  breach  in  Italy's  ramparts.  Thus  she  can  easily  in- 
vade the  country  and  strike  at  Verona,  Padua,  and  Venice 
by  marching  to  the  east,  or  at  Brescia  and  Milan  by  turning 
to  the  west.  While  the  east  coast  of  Italy  is  flat  and  open, 
the  opposite  coast  of  the  Adriatic,  occupied  by  Austria,  is 
studded  with  an  abundance  of  excellent  natural  harbours, 
the  entrance  to  which  is  protected  by  high  mountains 
and  by  mountainous  islands  lying  in  front  of  it. 

The  positions  occupied  by  Austria  in  the  Trentino, 
in  Istria,  and  in  Dalmatia  threaten  Italy's  security  in  the 
north  and  east,  and  Italy  is  all  the  more  reluctant  to  see 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     181 

them  remaining  in  Austria's  hands,  as  they  are  largely 
inhabited  by  Italians,  who  are  very  badly  treated  by  the 
Austrians.  Possibly  the  disastrous  fire  at  the  Monfalcone 
dockyard,  which  took  place  soon  after  the  outbreak  of  the 
Great  War,  was  caused  by  the  resentment  of  the  ill-treated 
Italians  who  live  in  Austrian  territory.  Many  of  these 
unfortunate  people,  although  born  in  Austrian  territory, 
are  not  allowed  to  acquire  Austrian  citizenship,  and  not 
infrequently  they  are  expelled  without  notice  from  their 
homes  without  adequate  reason.  Ever  since  1866  the  Aus- 
trians have  persecuted  the  Italians  dwelling  in  Austria, 
and  have  endeavoured  to  destroy  their  nationality  by  deny- 
ing them  schools,  colleges,  and  a  university.  Apparently 
the  Austrians  have  tried  to  punish  the  Italians  who  have 
remained  under  their  rule  for  the  loss  of  Lombardy  and 
Venetia. 

Owing  to  Austria's  foohsh  policy,  Italy  has  been  filled 
with  the  bitterest  hatred  against  the  Austrians.  The 
Irredenta  Italia,  Unredeemed  Italy,  is  in  the  thoughts 
of  every  patriotic  Italian,  and  frequent  Austrian  outrages 
on  Italians  living  in  Austria,  on  the  one  hand,  and  Italian 
passionate  agitation  in  favour  of  their  brothers  who  live 
under  the  Austrian,  yoke,  on  the  other,  keep  the  wound 
open.  Many  Italian  societies  and  newspapers  have  been 
preaching  war  with  Austria  for  many  years.  Signor  Pelle- 
grini wrote  in  his  important  book,  '  Verso  la  Guerra  ?  — 
II  dissidio  fra  I'ltalia  e  I'Austria,'  pubhshed  as  long  ago 
as  1906  : 

I  believe  we  cannot  live  any  longer  under  an  illusion 
which  deceives  us.  We  have  lived  under  the  impression  that 
the  internal  difficulties  of  Austria-Hungary  are  so  great  as 
to  prevent  her  from  aggressive  action  towards  ourselves  and 
from  expansion  towards  the  east.  We  have  believed  that 
Austria-Hungary  would  fall  to  pieces  after  the  death  of 
the  present  Emperor.  These  views  are  erroneous.  If  the 
pohtical  crisis  in  Austria-Hungary  should  become  more 
acute,  and  there  is  reason  for  doubting  this,  Austria-Hun- 


132         The  Problem  of  Austria-Hungary 

gary's  need  to  expand  and  to  acquire  new  markets  in  the 
east  will  become  all  the  greater.  And  as  long  as  Italian 
commerce  pursues  its  triumphant  course  in  the  east,  the 
more  are  the  opposing  interests  of  the  two  nations  likely 
to  bring  about  the  final  collision.  .  .  . 

We  cannot  continue  a  policy  of  vassalage  which  will 
compromise  for  all  time  Italy's  future  in  order  to  preserve 
the  outward  form  of  the  Triple  Alhance.  We  must  ask 
ourselves  :  What  are  our  interests  ?  Are  we  ready  to  defend 
them  ?  What  are  the  conditions  of  the  Italians  who  dwell 
on  the  shore  of  the  Adriatic  under  foreign  domination  ? 
What  are  our  interests  on  the  Adriatic  compared  with  those 
of  Austria  ?  What  are  the  wishes  of  our  people,  and  what 
is  Italy's  mission  in  the  Balkan  Peninsula  ?  Is  it  possible 
to  avoid  a  conflict  with  Austria  ?  I  believe  I  have  shown 
that  Austria-Hungary  is  at  the  same  time  our  ally  and  our 
open  enemy  against  whom  wo  must  prepare  for  war.  .  .  , 
We  have  to  calculate  in  the  future  with  the  fact  that  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Empire,  though  nominally  our  ally,  is 
our  determined  enemy  in  the  Balkan  Peninsula. 

Many  similar  views  may  be  found  in  the  writings  of 
Enrico  Corradini,  Salvatore  Barzilai,  Vico  Mantegazza, 
Giovanni  Bertacchi,  Innocenzo  Cappa,  Romeo  Manzoni, 
Filippo  Crispolti,  Scipio  Sighele,  Luigi  Villari,  and  many 
others,  in  the  publications  of  the  '  Societa  Dante  Aligheiri,' 
the  '  Trento  Trieste,'  the  '  Giovine  Europa,'  the  '  Itahca 
Gens,'  and  in  periodicals  such  as  II  Regno,  V Italia  alV 
Estero,  II  Tricolore,  La  Grande  Italia.  The  Austrians 
have  replied  to  the  Italian  threats  with  counter-threats. 
The  '  Oesterreichische  Rundschau,'  the  most  important 
Austrian  periodical,  which  is  edited  by  Freiherr  von 
Chlumecky,  an  intimate  friend  of  the  late  Archduke  Francis 
Ferdinand,  and  Danzer's  Armeezeitung,  the  widely  read 
army  journal,  have  pubhshed  innumerable  articles  recom- 
mending an  Austrian  war  with  Italy. 

On  the  walls  of  the  Ducal  Palace  at  Venice  may  be 
found  some  marble  tablets  giving  the  result  of  a  plebiscite 
taken   in   the   year   1866   in   Venetia,    They   tell  us  that 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     133 

641,000  of  the  inhabitants  voted  for  a  reunion  of  Venetia 
with  Italy,  and  only  68  against  it.  Austria  has  never  known 
how  to  gain  the  affection  of  the  people  over  whom  she 
has  ruled.  She  occupied  Venetia  from  1815  to  1866.  In 
fifty-one  years  she  gained  among  the  inhabitants  68  adher- 
ents and  641,000  enemies.  If  to-day  a  plebiscite  should  be 
taken  in  the  Itahan  Tyrol,  in  Trieste,  Pola,  and  the  other 
Itahan  towns  on  the  Dalmatian  coast,  ^the  result  would 
probably  be  similar.  At  one  time  or  another  Verona, 
Venice,  Milan,  Florence,  Turin,  Naples,  Palermo,  Lombardy, 
Venetia,  Toscana,  the  southern  half  of  Italy,  Sicily,  and 
Sardinia — in  fact,  practically  all  Italy,  except  the  States 
of  the  Church — were  Austrian,  but  nowhere  in  Italy  will 
a  man  be  found  who  regrets  Austria's  departure  or  who 
speaks  of  her  occupation  with  affection,  or  even  with  esteem. 
In  Italy,  as  elsewhere,  Austria  has  solely  been  an  influence 
for  evil. 

Although  Trieste,  Pola,  and  Fiume,  and  part  of  Istria 
and  Dalmatia  are  inhabited  by  many  Itahans,  it  is  by  no 
means  certain  that  these  towns  and  districts  will  revert 
to  Italy  after  a  defeat  of  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary. 
Ports  and  coastal  positions  are  of  value  because  of  the 
hinterland  which  furnishes  them  with  trade.  Large  inland 
States  lying  near  the  coast  have  the  strongest  claims  upon 
natural  outlets  towards  the  ocean.  The  Italian  towns 
on  the  east  coast  of  the  Adriatic  are  ancient  Venetian 
trading  stations,  and  behind  and  around  them  live  about 
10,000,000  Serbs  in  compact  masses,  the  Serbians  in  Serbia 
proper,  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  and  in  Dalmatia, 
and  the  Serbo-Croats  in  Croatia-Slavonia.  The  Itahans 
cannot  expect  that  a  Greater  Serbia  will  consent  to  be 
deprived  of  adequate  harbours.  Italian  and  Serbian  claims 
will  have  to  be  harmonised. 

Serbia  does  not  intend  seizing  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina, 
Dalmatia,  and  Croatia-Slavonia  by  force  ;  but  if  these 
lands  are  dissatisfied  with  Austrian  rule,  and  wish  to  shake 
it  off  and  unite  with  Serbia,  the  Serbs  will  certainly  not 


134         The  Problem  of  Austria-Hungary 

deny  them.  The  Serbians  in  Serbia  have  l)een  ill-treated 
in  the  past  by  Austria,  as  has  been  shown  in  another  part 
of  this  chapter.  Ever  since  the  Eusso-Turkish  War,  Austria- 
Hungary,  covetous  of  Serbia's  territory,  has  endeavoured 
to  ruin  that  country  by  preventing  her  gaining  an  outlet 
to  the  sea,  by  controlling  her  foreign  trade  overland  and 
by  arbitrarily  interrupting  and  destroying  it  by  closing 
the  frontier  against  Serbia  under  mendacious  pretexts. 
In  1885  the  Austrians  brought  about  war  between  Serbia 
and  Bulgaria  for  their  own  ends.  They  favoured  the  out- 
break of  the  first  Balkan  War,  hoping  for  Serbia's  destruction. 
When  the  Allies  were  victorious,  Austria-Hungary  prevented 
Serbia  securing  the  smallest  outlet  on  the  sea,  and  then 
encouraged  Bulgaria  to  attack  that  country,  hoping  that 
the  second  Balkan  War  would  lead  to  Serbia's  downfall. 
Having  suffered  so  much  at  Austria's  hands  in  the  past, 
the  heroic  Serbians  wish  to  make  themselves  secure  for  the 
future  by  establishing  a  Greater  Serbia,  a  State  of  10,000,000 
inhabitants,  at  Austria's  cost,  and  obtaining  adequate 
outlets  to  the  sea.  Probably  they  will  succeed.  Their 
heroism  and  their  sufferings  deserve  a  full  reward. 

Of  the  territory  "of  Hungary,  105,811  square  kilometres 
contain  a  population  of  which  77*61  per  cent,  are  Magyars, 
85,026  square  kilometres  have  a  population  of  which  only 
25-63  per  cent,  are  Magyars,  and  74-32  per  cent.  non-Magyars. 
Of  these,  the  majority  are  Slavs.  Of  the  population  of 
the  remaining  territory  of  88,650  square  kilometres,  25-09 
per  cent,  are  Magyars,  while  the  majority  are  Roumanians. 
Of  the  whole  of  Hungary,  four-tenths  are  essentially  Magyar 
territory,  three-tenths  are  essentially  Slavonic  territory, 
and  three-tenths  are  Eoumanian  territory. 

In  a  table  given  in  the  beginning  of  this  article,  the 
strength  of  the  Magyars  in  Hungary  was  stated  to  be 
10,051,000,  according  to  the  census  of  1910.  This  figure 
is  greatly  exaggerated.  In  order  to  swell  their  numbers, 
the  Magyars  have  manipulated  the  census.  The  citizens 
are  asked,  in  the  census  forms  which  they  have 'to  fill  up, 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     135 

to  state  the  language  which  they  speak  best  or  Uke  best. 
In  view  of  the  pressure  exercised  by  the  ruhng  Magyars, 
many  non-Magyars  profess  that  they  hke  Magyar  best, 
even  if  they  do  not  understand  the  language,  and  they 
appear  as  Magyars  in  the  census.  Besides,  the  ruling 
Magyars  have  put  pressure  upon  the  non-Magyars  to 
Magyarise  their  names.  Schoolmasters,  post-office  officials, 
and  railwaymen  in  Government  services  are  compelled  to 
Magyarise  their  names.  As  a  further  inducement,  the  cost 
of  Magyarising  one's  name  was  reduced  in  1881  from  10 
crowns  to  10  pence.  As  an  aristocratic  Magyar  name  is  a 
great  advantage  in  society  and  in  business,  men  with  com- 
mon non-Magyar  names  have  provided  themselves  for  ten- 
pence  with  the  most  aristocratic  Magyar  names.  Mr.  Seton- 
Watson  has  told  us  in  his  excellent  book,  '  Eacial  Problems 
in  Hungary,'  that  Toldy,  the  author,  was  originally  called 
Schebel ;  Hunfalvy,  the  ethnologist,  Hundsdorfer ;  Munkacsy, 
the  painter,  Lieb  ;  Arminius  Vambery,  Bamberger  ;  Petofi, 
the  poet,  Petrovic  ;  Zsedenyi,  the  pohtician,  Pfannschmied  ; 
Iranyi,  Halbschuh  ;  Helfy,  Heller  ;  Komlossy,  Kleinkind  ; 
Polonyi,  Pollatschek,  &c.  The  Magyars  have  Magyarised 
all  non-Hungarian  place-names.  Ancient  Pressburg  was 
turned  into  Pozsony,  Hermannstadt  into  Nagy-Szeben, 
Kirchdrauf  into  Szepes-Varalja,  &c. 

According  to  official  Hungarian  statistics,  the  Magyars 
are  about  one-half  of  the  Hungarian  population.  According 
to  the  most  reliable  non-Magyar  authorities,  they  are  only 
about  one-third,  numbering  from  7,000,000  to  8,000,000. 
In  Hungary,  as  in  Austria,  one-third  of  the  population 
rules  over  the  remaining  two-thirds. 

On  paper  Hungary  is  the  most  liberal  country  in  the 
world.  It  has  possessed  a  Parliament  and  a  Constitution 
since  the  dawn  of  its  history.  However,  "under  the  cloak 
of  Hberalism  and  legality,  Hungary  exercises  the  most  arbi- 
trary and  tyrannous  government  over  the  non-Magyars. 

Although  Magyars  and  non-Magyars  are  on  paper  equal 
before  the  law,  and  are  nominally  fully  represented  in  the 


136         The  Problem  of  Austria-Hungary 

Parliament  at  Budapest,  the  representatives  in  the  Hun- 
garian Parhament  represent  neither  the  subject  national- 
ities nor  the  masses  of  the  people,  but  only  the  Magyar 
ohgarchy.  This  is  strikingly  proved  by  the  following  table, 
which  shows  the  composition  of  the  Hungarian  Parha- 
ment during  the  five  last  electoral  periods  : 

Besult  of  Hungarian  Elcclion-f. 


JIapyars, 

— 

including  a 
few  Non- 
descripts 

Socialists 

Roumanians 

Slovaks 

Serbs 

Total 

1896 

412 

0 

1 

0 

0 

413 

1901 

408 

0 

0 

4 

1 

413 

1905 

402 

1 

8 

1 

1 

413 

1906 

387 

0 

14 

7 

5 

413 

1910 

404 

1 

;> 

3 

0 

413 

Of  the  413  members  of  the  Hungarian  Parhament 
about  400  are  Magyars.  The  preponderant  number  of 
non-Magyars  and  the  numerous  Socialists  send  the  remain- 
ing thirteen  members.  As  representation  shapes  legislation, 
the  legislation  of  Hungary  is  pro-Magyar  and  hostile  to 
the  non-Magyars,  to  the  Sociahsts,  and  to  the  common 
people.  Of  the  men  of  voting  age  only  about  one-fourth 
are  given  the  franchise.  As  a  high  property  quahfication 
is  required,  only  the  well-to-do  can  vote.  The  non-Magyars 
of  Hungary  are  poor,  partly  because  the  Magyars  settled 
in  the  rich  plains  whence  they  drove  the  non-Magyars, 
partly  because  in  districts  where  Magyars  and  non-Magyars 
dwell  together,  the  former  have  secured  for  themselves  the 
greater  part  of  the  wealth  and  the  best  land  by  violence 
and  by  political  pressure. 

The  non-Magyars  are  disfranchised  not  only  by  a 
high  property  quahfication,  but  by  deliberate  violence  and 
trickery.  If  we  look  into  the  electoral  statistics  we  find 
that  the  more  Eoumanian  a  county  is,  the  fewer  voters 
does  it  possess.     We  find  further  that  the  larger  a  con- 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     137 

stituency  is,  the  farther  from  its  centre  is  placed  the  solitary 
polling  booth.  At  election  time  bridges  are  often  broken 
down  or  declared  unsafe  for  the  passage  of  vehicles,  in 
order  to  force  opposition  voters  either  to  walk  impossible 
distances,  or  lose  their  vote,  and  with  the  same  object  in 
vidw  all  the  horses  in  the  outlying  villages  are  often  placed 
under  veterinary  supervision  at  the  last  moment.  The 
voting  is  not  secret,  but  pubhc,  and  by  word  of  mouth. 
Non-Magyars  are  thus  publicly  terrorised  into  voting 
orally  for  Magyar  members.  Thousands  of  voters  are 
disquahfied  for  flimsy  reasons  by  the  presiding  Magyar 
when  intending  to  vote  for  the  opposition  candidate.  Often 
hundreds  and  thousands  of  voters,  who  have  travelled 
all  day  to  the  polhng  booth,  are  prevented  by  large  forces 
of  mihtary  and  gendarmes  from  voting  or  from  entering 
the  village  where  the  poll  takes  place.  At  election  times 
Hungary  mobilises  her  whole  army  in  order  to  terrorise 
the  opposition  voters,  and  if  these  insist  upon  their  legal 
right  of  voting,  they  are  frequently  attacked  by  armed 
mobs  or  shot  down  by  the  gendarmes  and  the  mihtary. 
Every  Hungarian  election  is  accompanied  by  bloodshed. 
According  to  Danzer's  Armeezeitung  of  June  6,  1910, 
Hungary  mobilised  for  the  election  of  that  year  202  battalions 
of  infantry,  126  squadrons  of  cavalry,  and  in  addition  had 
Austrian  troops  sent  from  Lower  Austria,  Styria,  and 
Moravia  to  Hungary.  The  cost  of  '  maintaining  order ' 
was  estimated  by  the  journal  named  at  from  15,000,000 
crowns  to  20,000,000  crowns. 

The  Magyars  monopolise  not  only  ParUament  but  the 
Civil  Service,  the  law,  and  the  schools  as  well.  Although, 
according  to  the  Law  of  NationaUties,  the  State  should 
erect  schools  of  all  kinds  for  the  non-Magyar  races,  it  has 
never  erected  a  single  secondary  school  where  any  other 
language  but  Magyar  is  used.  Instead  of  this  it  has 
Magyarised  the  few  existing  non-Magyar  secondary  schools 
and  dissolved  the  rest.  Of  the  thirty-nine  intermediate 
schools  in  the  Slovak  counties,  not  a  single  one  provides 


138         The  Frohlem  of  Austria-Hungary 

instruction  in  the  language  of  the  people,  and  in  the  districts 
inhabited  by  Euthenians  the  same  condition  prevails. 
Of  the  eighty-nine  secondary  schools  directly  controlled 
by  the  State  none  are  non-Magyar. 

The  ruHng  Magyars  most  effectively  prevent  the  non- 
Magyar  people  from  improving  their  condition  by  excluding 
them  from  the  intermediate  schools  and  the  universities. 
As  the  Magyars  form  nominally  one-half,  but  in  reality' 
only  one-third,  of  the  population,  they  should  furnish  at 
best  one  half  of  the  scholars  and  students  at  the  intermediate 
schools  and  universities. 

In  reahty  the  overwhelming  majority~of  those  who 
attend  the  higher  educational  establishments  are  Magyars. 
According  to  the  Magyar  statistics  for  the  year  1911,  49,482 
pupils  attending  the  classical  intermediate  schools  were 
Magyars,  and  only  11,131  were  non-Magyars.  For  every 
non-Magyar  there  were  nearly  five  Magyars.  In  the  non- 
classical  intermediate  schools  there  were  2316  non-Magyars 
and  8372  Magyars.  In  the  intermediate  schools  for  girls 
there  were  only  572  non-Magyars  and  5746  Magyars.  In 
the  training  schools  for  male  teachers  there  were  1021 
non-Magyars  and  3856  Magyars.  In  those  for  female 
teachers  there  were  481  non-Magayars  and  4386  Magyars. 
In  the  maternity  schools  there  were  56  non-Magyars  and 
448  Magyars.  In  the  music  schools  there  were  2313  non- 
Magyars  and  7471  Magyars.  In  the  post  and  telegraph 
school  there  were  23  non-Magyars  and  255  Magyars. 
As  all  those  who  wish  to  enter  into  a  professional  career  or 
into  Government  service  must  have  passed  through  the 
intermediate  schools,  the  vast  preponderance  of  Magyar 
pupils  at  these  schools  effectively  prevents  large  numbers 
of  non-Magyars  from  becoming  doctors,  lawyers,  teachers, 
civil  servants,  judges,  miHtary  officers,  &c.  In  1911  there 
were  at  aU  the  Hungarian  universities  10,653  Magyar 
students  and  only  1273  non-Magyar  students.  For  every 
non-]\Iagyar  student  there  were  eight  Magyars.  We  can, 
therefore,  not  wonder  that  Magyars  occupy  all  the  best 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmar.sMjD     139 

places  in  Hungary,  especiall}'-  as  in  making  appointments 
Magyars  are  favoured  and  non-Magyars  discouraged. 

Franz  Deak,  one  of  the  greatest  Hungarian  statesmen, 
said  in  a  speech  delivered  on  January  23,  1872  : 

Every  nationaUty  has  a  right  to  demand  ways  and 
means  for  the  education  of  its  children.  If  we  wish  to  force 
the  children  of  the  nationahties  dwelling  in  Hungary  to 
study  in  the  Magyar  language,  although  they  do  not  know 
it,  or  know  it  only  shghtly,  we  should  make  it  impossible 
for  them  to  make  progress.  Parents  would  in  vain  spend 
their  money  upon  education,  and  the  children  would  waste 
their  time.  If  we  desire  to  win  over  the  nationahties,  then 
we  must  not  endeavour  to  Magyarise  them  at  any  price. 
We  can  Magyarise  them  only  if  we  make  them  satisfied 
citizens  of  Hungary  who  are  fond  of  the  life  and  conditions 
prevaihng  in  it. 

Notwithstanding  the  warning  of  Deak  and  of  other 
founders  of  the  Hungarian  State,  the  ruhng  Magyars  have 
endeavoured  to  force  the  Magyar  language  upon  the  non- 
Magyars  by  the  most  tyrannous  means.  If  we  look  at  the 
educational  statistics,  we  find  that  the  non-Magyar  schools 
are  rapidly  decreasing  in  number  and  the  Magyar  schools 
rapidly  increasing.  In  purely  non-Magyar  districts  Magyar 
schools  are  planted,  and  in  order  to  force  the  children  to 
learn  Magyar  from  the  cradle,  compulsory  kindergarten 
schools  are  opened  in  the  non-Magyar  districts,  where 
children  from  three  to  six  years  old  have  to  attend. 

Notwithstanding  the  most  far-reaching  guarantees  that 
the  character  and  language  of  the  other  nationahties  would 
be  respected,  Magyar  is  the  official  language  in  Hungary. 
All  pubhc  proclamations  and  notices  are  issued  in  Magyar, 
and  the  proceedings  in  the  law  courts  take  place  in  that 
language,  even  when  neither  prosecutor  nor  defendant 
understands  it.  Eoumanian  peasants,  ignorant  of  Magyar, 
and  hving  in  purely  Eoumanian  districts,  have  to  employ 
Magyar  in  their  intercourse  with  the  authorities,  and  if 
they  go  to  law  they  have  to  provide  themselves  with  costly 


140         The  Problem  of  Austria-Hungary 

and  often  inefficient  translators  and  interpreters.  Local 
government,  even  in  practically  purely  non-Magyar  districts, 
is  monopolised  by  Magyars.  The  non-Magyars  are  strangers 
in  their  own  country. 

Numerically  the  most  important  non-Magyar  race  in 
Hungary  are  the  Koumanians.  According  to  the  official 
statistics,  they  number  2,949,000.  In  reahty  their  number 
is  greater,  and  close  to  them  live  275,000  Koumanians 
in  the  Austrian  Bukovina. 

A  glance  at  the  map  shows  that  the  kingdom  of 
Koumania  possesses  a  very  awkward  shape.  It  consists  of 
two  long  and  narrow  strips  of  land  which  are  joined  together 
at  a  right  angle.  The  land  lying  in  the  hollow  of  that  angle 
consists  of  the  Austrian  Bukovina  and  of  the  Hungarian 
districts  of  Transylvania  and  the  Banat.  Owing  to  its 
awkward  shape,  the  concentrated  Eoumanian  army  can 
defend  the  national  territory  only  with  great  difficulty 
against  an  invader.  The  acquisition  of  the  Austrian  and 
Hungarian  territories,  inhabited  nearly  exclusively  by 
Koumanians,  would  fill  up  the  hollow  and  would  convert 
Koumania  into  a  shapely  and  easily  defensible  State. 

The  Roumanians  in  the  kingdom  of  Koumania  have 
during  many  years  observed  with  sorrow  and  indignation 
the  pitiful  position  of  their  brothers  who  live  under  Magyar 
rule,  and  their  leaders  have  frequently  and  most  emphatic- 
ally warned  the  Hungarian  Government  that  its  anti-Kou- 
manian  policy  might  have  very  serious  consequences  to 
Hungary.  When,  in  November,  1868,  Count  Andrassy 
intimated  to  King,  then  only  Prince,  Charles  of  Koumania 
that  Koumania  and  Hungary  should  go  hand  in  hand. 
King  Charles  replied,  according  to  his  Memoirs  : 

I  recognise  the  advantages  of  a  complete  understanding 
between  Hungary  and  Koumania.  However,  I  must  make 
this  reservation — that  I  can  work  hand  in  hand  with  Hungary 
only  when  Hungary  has  changed  her  policy  towards  the 
Koumanians  in  Transylvania.  I  cannot  abolish  the  natural 
sympathies  which  exist  between  the  Koumanians  on  both 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanshi])     141 

sides  of  the  political  boundary.  I  am  therefore  entitled 
to  expect  that  the  Hungarian  Government  will  do  every- 
thing that  is  right  and  fair  in  dealing  with  the  real  interests 
of  its  Eoumanian  subjects.  In  expressing  this  wish  I  do 
not  intend  to  be  guilty  of  pohtical  interference.  I  lay  stress 
unon  this  point  only  because  it  is  the  principal  condition  for 
blunging  about  a  good  understanding  between  the  two 
countries.  Being  a  constitutional  monarch,  who  owes  his 
position  to  the  election  of  the  people,  I  am  obhged  to  be 
guided  by  public  opinion  in  as  far  as  that  opinion  is  reason- 
able. An  open  and  sincere  poHcy  of  kindness  and  goodwill 
on  the  part  of  the  Hungarian  Government  towards  its  non- 
Magyar  subjects  would  most  ably  support  me  in  a  poHcy 
which  I  am  prepared  to  enter  upon. 

Hungary  has  disregarded  the  emphatic  and  frequent 
warnings  of  King  Charles  and  of  the  leading  Eoumanian 
statesmen  and  pubHcists.  Austria-Hungary  was  foohsh 
enough  to  persecute  her  Itahan  and  Eoumanian  citizens 
after  the  outbreak  of  the  present  War,  beheving  that  the 
taking  of  hostages  and  the  execution  of  leaders  would 
assure  their  fidehty.  FideUty  cannot  be  secured  by  fear. 
If,  as  appears  Hkely,  Austria-Hungary  should  break  up, 
Eoumania  will  certainly  see  that  the  Eoumanians  on  her 
border  will  be  re-united  to  the  motherland. 

The  subject  nationaUties  in  Austria-Hungary  have  been 
ruled  by  misrule,  and  most  of  them  are  profoundly  dis- 
satisfied. I  have  shown  in  these  pages  that  some  of  the' 
larger  nations  of  the  Dual  Monarchy  are  likely  to  be  absorbed 
by  their  neighbours.  Gahcia,  with  8,000,000  people,  is 
hkely  to  be  divided  between  Eussia  and  Poland ;  the 
Eoumanian  districts,  with  4,000,000  inhabitants,  should 
fall  to  Eoumania  ;  the  Serbian  district,  with  6,000,000 
people,  may  go  to  the  Serbs  ;  and  the  Itahan  district,  with 
nearly  1,000,000  inhabitants,  may  become  Italian.  Bohemia 
may  once  more  become  an  independent  State.  The  smaller 
subject  nations  of  Austria-Hungary  may  be  expected  to 
follow  the  example  of  the  gi-eater.     Austria-Hungary  seems 


142         The  Problem  of  Austria-Hungary 

likely  to  disintegrate  on  racial  lines.  In  the  South-East 
of  Europe  may  arise  a  Poland  with  20,000,000  inhabitants, 
a  Serbia  with  10,000,000  inhabitants,  a  Hungary  with 
10,000,000  inhabitants,  and  an  Austria  with  10,000,000. 

Many  people,  fearing  the  danger  of  Eussia,  advocate 
that  Austria-Hungary  should  be  preserved  in  its  present 
state  so  as  to  act  as  an  efficient  counterpoise  to  the  Eussian 
colossus.  The  preservation  of  the  Dual  Monarchy  is  parti- 
cularly strongly  urged  by  those  who  fear  the  Pan-Slavonic 
danger,  who  believe  that  the  Slavonic  nations  in  the  Balkan 
Peninsula  and  in  Austria-Hungary  will  amalgamate  with 
Eussia,  that  Eussia  wall,  through  Serbia  and  Bohemia,  stretch 
out  its  arms  as  far  as  the  Adriatic  and  Bavaria.  That 
fear  seems  scarcely  justified.  The  Slavonic  nations  outside 
Eussia  have  looked  to  Eussia  as  a  deliverer  when  they  were 
oppressed,  but  these  nations  have  a  strongly  marked  individ- 
uality of  their  own,  and  they  have  no  desire,  after  having 
painfully  acquired  their  freedom,  to  be  merged  into  Eussia 
and  to  disappear  in  that  gigantic  State.  In  the  spring  of 
1908  representatives  of  the  Austrian  Slavs  attended  a 
great  Slavonic  Congress  at  Petrograd.  Mr.  Karel  Kramarz, 
a  prominent  Czech  politician,  was  at  the  head  of  the  Austrian 
delegation,  and  he  made  to  the  Congress  the  following 
declaration. 

The  Slavonic  movement  and  Slavonic  policy  must  be 
based  on  the  principle  that  all  Slavonic  nations  are  equal, 
and  their  aim  must  consist  not  in  an  endeavour  to  form  all 
Slavs  into  a  single  nation,  but  to  develop  the  individual 
character  of  each  of  the  Slavonic  peoples.  The  aim  of  all 
Slavs  should  be  in  the  first  instance  to  increase  their  own 
national  consciousness  and  strength,  and  in  the  second 
to  secure  their  mutual  co-operation  for  promoting  their 
common  welfare,  ensuring  their  progress  in  every  way  and 
defending  themselves  against  German  aggression. 

This  declaration  is  characteristic  of  the  Slavs  not  only 
in  Bohemia  but  elsewhere.     The  Bulgarians  and  Serbians 


Great  Prohlems  of  British  Statesmanship     143 

differ  greatly,  although  they  are  neighbours,  and  they 
are  not  likely  to  amalgamate.  Democratic  Serbia  will 
merge  itself  neither  in  Bulgaria  nor  in  Eussia.  The  Czechs 
also  have  a  nationahty  and  individuality  of  which  they  are 
proud.  A  number  of  small  and  medium-sized  Slav  States 
are  Hkely  to  arise  in  the  South-East  of  Europe.  Those 
who  desire  to  re-build  Austria-Hungary  after  its  downfall 
are  insufficiently  acquainted  with  the  difficulty  of  such 
an  undertaking.  Besides,  they  should  remember  that 
diplomacy  can  correct,  but  must  not  outrage.  Nature  ; 
that  a  lasting  peace  cannot  be  re-estabhshed  in  Europe 
by  perpetuating  Austria's  tyranny  over  her  unhappy  subject 
nations.  After  all,  Europe's  security  and  peace  are  more 
important  than  a  mechanical  balance  of  power.  We  have 
no  reason  to  fear  Eussia's  aggression.  There  is  no  reason 
to  believe  that  she  intends  to  swamp  her  Western  neighbours. 
After  the  present  War,  Eussia  will  be  exhausted  for  decades. 
Her  task  for  the  future  consists  in  organising  and  developing 
her  colossal  territories,  providing  them  with  roads  and 
railways,  and  improving  the  conditions  of  the  people. 
Besides,  if  in  twenty  or  thirty  years  Eussia  should  embark 
upon  a  great  war  of  conquest  in  the  West,  she  would  have 
to  fight  nations  which  will  be  much  stronger  than  they  are 
at  present.  The  prevention  of  the  actual  German  danger 
is  far  more  important  than  the  prevention  of  a  highly 
problematical  Slav  peril  of  the  future. 

Austria-Hungary  has  outlived  her  usefulness.  She' 
has  always  been  a  bad  master  to  the  unfortunate  nations 
who  have  come  under  her  sway.  Since  1307,  the  year 
when  Wilham  Tell  raised  the  Swiss  in  revolution  against 
the  Habsburgs,  the  history  of  Austria  is  a  long  history  of 
the  revolts  of  their  subject  nations.  The  dissolution  of 
Austria-Hungary  is  merely  the  last  incident  in  its  recent 
evolution.  In  1859  Austria-Hungary  lost  her  supremacy 
over  Italy.  In  1866  she  lost  her  supremacy  over  Germany. 
By  the  present  War  she  will  probably  lose  her  supremacy 
over  the  Slavs.    A  nation  may  rule  over  other  nations  only 


144         The  Problem  of  Austria-Hungary 

if  it  treats  them  with  justice.  Austria  has  always  ruled 
with  barbaric  methods.  The  atrocious  acts  of  which  Ger- 
many has  been  guilty  in  Belgium  and  France  were  taught 
by  Austria.  In  her  campaign  against  Serbia  she  has,  as 
usual,  taken  thousands  of  hostages  among  her  own  peoples 
in  order  to  prevent  their  rising  against  the  tyranny  of 
Vienna,  and  she  has,  as  usual,  made  barbarous  war  upon  the 
weak  and  the  helpless.  Austria-Hungary  is  an  anachronism 
in  a  modern  world.  The  Dual  Monarchy  is,  and  has 
always  been,  only  a  factor  for  evil.  In  Germany's  crime 
Austria-Hungary  has  been  an  accomplice  and  an  accessory 
before  the  fact.  Austria-Hungary  has  existed  during  many 
years,  not  owing  to  its  own  strength,  but  owing  to  Europe's 
toleration.  Austria-Hungary  is  another  Turkey.  Her  hour 
has  struck.  The  Empire  of  the  Habsburgs  in  its  present 
form  is  likely  to  disappear.  In  its  place  will  arise  a  number 
of  independent  States  possessing  a  national  basis  which 
in  time  may  federate  for  mutual  protection. 

The  present  War  has  a  twofold  object.  It  is  a  war 
waged  to  destroy  the  curse  of  militarism  and  to  free  the 
subject  nations  from  their  bondage.  Many  people  have 
asked  by  what  name  the  present  War  should  be  known 
to  history.  It  might  fittingly  be  called  the  War  of  Libera- 
tion. Small  nations,  whether  they  are  called  Belgium 
and  Holland,  or  Bosnia  and  Bohemia,  are  entitled  to  hfe 
and  hberty.  We  need  not  deny  the  small  nations  which 
should  take  the  place  of  Austria-Hungary  their  inborn 
right  to  life  and  prosperity.  It  is  true  that  small  States, 
especially  if  they  have  no  outlet  to  the  sea,  are  greatly 
hampered.  The  future,  and  especially  the  economic  future, 
probably  belongs  to  the  great  nations.  Still,  the  small 
nations  can  survive,  and  if  they  cannot  survive  singly  they 
can  live  and  prosper  by  voluntary  co-operation.  The 
small  nations  which  are  arising  in  the  Balkan  Peninsula 
and  in  that  part  of  Europe  which  is  now  called  Austria- 
Hungary,  may  be  expected  to  conclude  arrangements  with 
their    friends    and    sympathisers    for    mutual    defence.     A 


Qi'eat  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     145 

great  State  may  arise  in  South-Eastern  Europe.  Federalism 
may  provide  the  bond  which  Habsburg  absolutism, 
Habsburg  selfishness,  and  Habsburg  tyranny  failed 
to  create.  The  provision  of  an  efficient  counterpoise  to 
Kussia  may,  and  should  be,  left  to  Nature  and  to  natural 
evolution. 


CHAPTEE  V 

THE   PROBLEM    OF   POLAND  ^ 

A  CENTURY  ago,  at  the  Congress  of  Vienna,  the  question 
of  Poland  proved  extremely  difficult  to  solve.  It  produced 
dangerous  friction  among  the  assembled  Powers,  and 
threatened  to  lead  to  the  break-up  of  the  Congress.  The 
position  became  so  threatening  that,  on  January  3,  1815, 
Austria,  Great  Britain,  and  France  felt  compelled  to  con- 
clude a  secret  separate  alliance  directed  against  Prussia 
and  Russia,  the  allies  of  Austria  and  Great  Britain  in  the 
war  against  Napoleon.  Precautionary  troop  movements 
began,  and  war  among  the  Allies  might  have  broken  out 
had  not,  shortly  afterwards.  Napoleon  quitted  Elba  and 
landed  in  France.  Fear  of  the  great  Corsican  re-united 
the  Powers. 

Because  of  the  great  and  conflicting  interests  involved, 
the  question  of  Poland  may  prove  of  similar  importance 
and  difficulty  at  the  Congress  which  will  conclude  the 
present  War.  Hence,  it  seems  desirable  to  consider  it 
carefully  and  in  good  time.  The  consideration  of  the 
Pohsh  Question  seems  not  only  useful  but  urgent. 

Henry  Wheaton,  the  distinguished  American  diplomat 
and  jurist,  wrote  in  his  classical  '  History  of  the  Law  of 
Nations  '  :  '  The  partition  of  Poland  was  the  most  flagrant 
violation  of  natural  justice  and  International  Law  which 
has  occurred  since  Europe  first  emerged  from  barbarism.' 
In  Koch's  celebrated  '  Tableau  des  Revolutions  de  I'Europe,' 
written  by  a  diplomat  for  the  use  of  diplomats,  and  pubhshed 

^  The  Nineteenth  Century  and  After,  January,  1915. 
146 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanshiqj     147 

in  1825,  when  the  partition  of  Poland  was  still  fresh  in  men's 
minds,  we  read  : 

The  partition  of  Poland  must  be  considered  the  fore- 
runner of  the  total  revolution  of  the  whole  political  system 
of  Europe  which  had  been  estabhshed  three  centuries  before. 
Hitherto  numerous  alhances  had  been  formed  and  many- 
wars  had  been  undertaken  with  a  view  to  preserving  weak 
States  against  the  ambitions  of  strong  ones.  Now  three 
Great  Powers  combined  to  plunder  a  State  which  had  given 
them  no  offence.  Thus  the  barriers  which  had  hitherto 
separated  right  from  arbitrary  might  were  destroyed.  No 
weak  State  was  any  longer  secure.  The  European  balance 
of  power  became  the  laughing-stock  of  the  new  school,  and 
serious  men  began  to  consider  the  European  equilibrium 
a  chimera.  Although  the  Courts  of  St.  Petersburg,  BerHn, 
and  Vienna  were  most  strongly  to  blame,  those  of  London 
and  Paris  were  not  free  from  guilt  by  allowing  without  pro- 
test the  spoliation  of  Poland  to  take  place. 

The  Polish  problem  is  not  only  a  very  great  and  extremely 
interesting  problem,  but  it  is  unique  of  its  kind.  It  can  be 
understood  only  by  those  who  are  acquainted  with  the  history 
of  Poland  and  of  its  partitions.  Many  Englishmen  are 
unacquainted  with  that  history.  Most  beheve  that  Russia 
has  been  the  worst  enemy  of  the  Poles,  that  she  caused  the 
partitions,  that  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  were  merely 
her  accomplices,  and  that  Great  Britain  has  never  taken 
a  serious  interest  in  Polish  affairs. 

Pohsh  history,  as  usually  taught,  is  a  tissue  of  miscon- 
ceptions and  of  falsehoods.  In  the  following  pages  it 
will  be  shown  that  not  Russia,  but  Prussia,  was  chiefly 
responsible  for  the  partitions  of  Poland  and  for  the  subse- 
quent oppression  of  the  Poles,  that  Russia  and  Austria 
were,  in  their  Polish  pohcy,  merely  Prussia's  tools  and  dupes, 
and  that  England,  well  informed  by  able  and  conscientious 
diplomats,  has  %\dth  truly  marvellous  insight  and  consistency 
unceasingly  recommended  the  adoption  of  that  hberal 
and  enhghtened  policy  towards  Poland  which  seems  likely 


148  The  Frohlem  of  Poland 

to  prevail  at  last.  History  has  wonderfully  vindicated 
the  wisdom  and  the  far-sightedness  of  British  statesmen 
in  their  treatment  of  Polish  affairs  from  the  middle  of  the 
eighteenth  century  to  the  present  day.  A  brief  resumi 
of  the  largely  secret  or  unknown  inner  history  of  Poland 
and  of  its  partitions  is  particularly  interesting,  because  it 
throws  a  most  powerful  hght  on  the  true  character  and  the 
inner  workings  of  Prusso-German,  Eussian,  and  Austrian 
diplomacy  from  the  time  of  Frederick  the  Great,  of  the 
Empress  Catherine  the  Second,  and  of  the  Empress  Maria 
Theresa  to  that  of  Bismarck,  Biilow,  and  Bethmann- 
HoUweg.  I  would  add  that  much  of  the  material  given 
in  the  following  pages  has  never  been  printed,  and  has 
been  taken  from  the  original  documents. 

Frederick  the  Great  wrote  in  liis  '  Expose  du  Gouverne- 
ment  Prussieii,'  his  Political  Testament,  which  was  addressed 
to  his  successor  : 

One  of  the  first  political  principles  is  to  endeavour  to 
become  an  ally  of  that  one  of  one's  neighbours  who  may 
become  most  dangerous  to  one's  State.  For  that  reason  we 
Prussians  have  an  alliance  with  Kussia,  and  thus  we  have 
our  back  free  of  danger  as  long  as  the  alliance  lasts. 

He  wrote  in  his  '  Histoire  de  Mon  Temps  '  : 

Of  all  neighbours  of  Prussia  the  Eussian  Empire  is  the 
most  dangerous,  both  by  its  power  and  its  geographical 
position,  and  those  who  will  rule  Prussia  after  me  should 
cultivate  the  friendship  of  those  barbarians  because  they  are 
able  to  ruin  Prussia  altogether  through  the  immense  number 
of  their  mounted  troops.  Besides,  one  cannot  repay  them 
for  the  damage  which  they  may  do  to  us  because  of  the 
poverty  of  that  part  of  Eussia  which  is  nearest  to  Prussia, 
and  through  which  one  has  to  pass  in  order  to  get  into  the 
Ukraine. 

These  two  passages  summarise  and  explain  Prussia's 
poHcy  towards  Eussia  during  the  last  century  and  a  half, 
and  furnish  a  key  to  her  subtle  and  devious  Pohsh  pohcy. 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     149 

During  the  Seven  Years'  War  Kussia  had  given  to 
Prussia  the  hardest  blows.  Guided  by  the  considerations 
given  above,  Frederick  the  Great  was  most  anxious  to  make 
peace  and  to  conclude  an  alliance  with  Russia.  He  stated 
in  his  '  Memoirs  on  the  Events  following  the  Peace  of 
Hubertusberg  of  1763,'  referring,  like  Julius  Caesar,  to 
himself  in  the  third  person  : 

England's  faithlessness  (during  the  Seven  Years'  War) 
had  broken  the  bonds  between  Prussia  and  that  country. 
The  Anglo -Prussian  alliance,  which  had  been  founded  upon 
mutual  interests,  was  followed  by  the  most  lively  hostihty 
and  the  most  serious  anger  between  the  two  States.  King 
Frederick  stood  alone  on  the  field  of  battle.  No  one  was 
left  to  attack  him,  but  at  the  same  time  no  one  was  ready  to 
take  his  part.  That  position  of  isolation  was  tolerable  as 
long  as  it  was  only  temporary,  but  it  could  not  be  allowed 
to  continue.  Soon  a  change  took  place.  Towards  the  end 
of  the  year  negotiations  were  begun  with  Russia  with  a  view 
to  concluding  a  defensive  alhance  with  that  country.  .  .  . 

The  King  of  Prussia  desired  to  obtain  influence  over 
Russia.  .  .  . 

The  power  of  the  Russians  is  very  great.  Prussia  still 
suffers  from  the  blows  which  she  had  received  from  them 
during  the  Seven  Years'  War.  It  was  obviously  not  in  the 
interest  of  the  Prussian  King  to  contribute  to  the  growth  of 
so  terrible  and  so  dangerous  a  Power.  Therefore  two  ways 
were  open  :  Prussia  had  either  to  set  bounds  to  Russia's 
conquests  by  force,  or  she  had  to  endeavour  to  take  skilful 
advantage  of  Russia's  desire  for  expansion.  The  latter 
policy  was  the  wiser  one,  and  the  King  neglected  nothing  in 
order  to  carry  it  into  effect. 

The  desired  opportunity  of  concluding  an  alliance  with 
Russia  arose  owing  to  the  death  of  the  Empress  EHzabeth, 
his  great  opponent,  which  took  place  on  January  5,  1762. 
Her  successor,  the  foolish  and  imbecile  Peter  the  Third, 
became  a  tool  in  Frederick's  hands.  He  made  peace  with 
Prussia  on  May  5,  1762,  and  five  weeks  later,  on  June  8, 


150  The  Problem  of  Poland 

ho  concluded  with  Frederick  a  treaty  of  alliance  to  which 
the  followinj:^  secret  articles  were  appended  ; 

Articles  Secrets  : 

.  .  .  Comme  I'interet  de  S.M.I,  de  toutes  les  Eussies  et 
de  S.M.  le  roi  de  Prusse  exige  qu'on  porte  un  soin  attentif  a 
ce  que  la  republique  de  Pologne  soit  maintenue  dans  son 
droit  de  libre  election,  et  qu'il  no  soit  permis  ni  concede  a 
personne  d'en  faire  un  royaume  hereditaire,  ou  bien  meme 
de  s'eriger  en  prince  souverain,  LL.MM.  I'Empereur  de  toutes 
les  Eussies  et  le  roi  de  Prusse  se  sont  promis  mutuellement 
et  se  sonfc  engagees  de  la  rnaniere  la  plus  solennelle,  a  ce  que, 
dans  tous  les  cas  et  dans  toutes  les  circonstances,  si  quelqu'un 
et  qui  que  ce  soit  voulait  entreprendre  de  depouiller  la  repub- 
lique de  Pologne  de  son  droit  de  libre  election,  ou  d'en  faire 
un  royaume  hereditaire,  ou  de  s'eriger  soi-meme  en  souverain, 
LL.MM.  de  Eussie  et  de  Prusse  ne  le  permettront  pas  ; 
mais  qu'au  contraire  elles  ecarteront,  repousseront  et  met- 
tront  a  neant  de  toutes  manieres  et  par  tous  les  moyens,  des 
projets  si  injustes  et  si  dangereux  aux  puissances  voisines, 
en  se  concertant  mutuellement,  en  reunissant  leurs  forces  et 
meme  en  ayant  recours  aux  armes,  si  les  circonstances 
I'exigeaient.  De  plus,  les  deux  puissances  s'uniront  pour 
faire  tomber  le  choix  sur  un  Piast,  apres  la  mort  du  roi  actuel 
Auguste  II,  et  elles  se  concerteront  sur  le  choix  du  candidat 
le  plus  convenable. 
Articles  Se'pares  : 

.  .  .  S.M.I,  de  Eussie  efc  S.M.  le  roi  de  Prusse,  voyant  avec 
beaucoup  de  chagrin  la  dure  oppression  dans  laquelle  vivent, 
depuis  bien  des  annees,  leurs  coreligionnaires  de  Pologne  et 
de  Lithuanie,  se  sont  reunies  et  alliees  pour  proteger  de  leur 
mieux  tous  les  habitants  de  la  Pologne  et  du  grand-duche 
de  Lithuanie,  qui  professent  les  rehgions  grecque,  reformee 
et  lutherienne,  et  qui  y  sont  connus  sous  le  nom  dissidents, 
et  veulent  faire  tous  leurs  efforts  pour  obtenir  du  roi  et  de 
la  republique  de  Pologne,  par  des  representations  fortes  et 
amicales,  que  ces  memes  dissidents  soient  reintegres  dans 
leurs  privileges,  libertes,  droits  et  prerogatives  qui  leur 
avaient  ete  accordes  et  concedes  par  le  passe. 

Exactly  a  month  later,  during  the  night  from  July  8 


G7-eat  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     151 

to  9,  Czar  Peter  was  deposed  and  his  wife,  Catherine  the 
Second,  was  elevated  to  the  throne.  On  July  17  Peter 
the  Third  was  assassinated. 

By  the  Secret  Articles  quoted,  Eussia  and  Prussia 
pledged  themselves  to  maintain  with  their  whole  united 
strength  the  right  of  free  election  in  Poland,  to  prevent  the 
establishment  of  a  hereditary  PoHsh  kingship,  to  cause 
the  election  of  a  '  Piast  '  suitable  to  Eussia  and  Prussia  in 
case  of  the  death  of  the  ruhng  King,  Augustus  the  Second. 
By  the  Separate  Article  given  above,  Eussia  and  Prussia 
further  agreed  to  protect  with  all  their  power  the  Poles 
belonging  to  the  Eussian  Orthodox  and  to  the  Lutheran 
rehgion  who  at  the  time  did  not  enjoy  full  citizen  rights 
in  that  Eoman  CathoHc  State. 

Many  years  before  that  treaty  of  alliance  was  concluded, 
when  Eussia  was  disunited,  weak  and  overrun  by  Eastern 
hordes,  Poland  was  a  powerful  State.  It  had  conquered 
large  portions  of  Eussia,  including  the  towns  of  Moscow 
and  Kieff.  Hence,  many  Eussians  saw  in  Poland  their 
hereditary  enemy  and  endeavoured,  not  unnaturally,  to 
keep  that  country  weak  and  disunited.  Poland  was  a 
repubhc  presided  over  by  an  elected  king.  All  the  power 
was  in  the  hands  of  a  numerous  and  mostly  impecunious 
nobility.  The  State  was  weak  because  of  two  peculiar 
institutions — an  elected  king,  who  might  be  either  a  Pole 
or  a  stranger,  and  the  Liberum  Veto.  In  consequence 
of  the  latter  the  resolutions  of  the  Polish  Diet  had  to  be 
unanimous.  The  Veto  of  a  single  man  could  prevent  the 
passage  of  any  measure  and  cripple  the  Government.  The 
Liberum  Veto,  possessed  by  the  numerous  aristocracy,  and 
the  election  of  a  king,  whose  power  was  jealously  circum- 
scribed by  the  ruling  nobihty,  made  anarchy  and  disorder 
permanent  in  Poland,  and  weakened  that  country  to  the 
utmost.  While  patriotic  Poles  desired  to  estabhsh  the 
strength  and  security  of  the  State  by  reforming  their  Govern- 
ment, by  abohshing  the  Liberum  Veto,  replacing  it  by 
majority  rule,  and  by  making  kingship  hereditary,  their 


152  The  Problem  of  Poland 

enemies  wished  to  perpetuate  Polish  anarchy  in  order  to 
take  advantage  of  it.  In  the  Treaty  of  Constantinople, 
concluded  between  Turkey  and  Eussia  in  1700,  during  the 
reign  of  Peter  the  Great,  we  find  already  an  attempt  on 
Russia's  part  to  perpetuate  disorder  and  anarchy  in  Poland 
by  *  guaranteeing  '  the  preservation  of  the  vicious  Pohsh 
constitution.     In  Article  Twelve  of  that  Treaty  we  read  : 

Le  czar  declare  de  la  maniere  la  plus  formelle  qu'il  ne 
s'appropriera  rien  du  territoire  de  la  Pologne,  et  qu'il  ne  se 
melera  point  du  gouvernement  de  cette  Republique.  Et 
comme  il  importe  aux  deux  empires  d'empecher  que  la 
souverainete  et  la  succession  hereditaire  ne  soient  point 
attachees  a  la  couronne  de  Pologne,  ils  s'unissent  a  I'effet  de 
maintenir  les  droits,  privileges  et  constitutions  de  cet  Etat. 
Et  au  cas  que  quelque  puissance  qui  que  ce  soit  envoyat 
des  troupes  en  Pologne,  ou  qu'elle  cherchat  a  y  introduire  la 
Bouverainete  et  la  succession  hereditaire,  il  sera  non  seule- 
ment  permis  a  chacune  des  puissances  contractantes  de 
prendre  telles  mesures  que  son  propre  interet  lui  dictera, 
mais  les  deux  Etats  empecheront,  par  toutes  les  voies 
possibles,  que  la  couronne  de  Pologne  n'acquiere  la  souve- 
rainete et  la  succession  hereditaire  ;  que  les  droits  et  constitu- 
tions de  la  Republique  ne  soient  point  violes  ;  et  qu'aucun 
demembrement  de  son  territoire  ne  puisse  avoir  lieu. 

Following  the  policy  which  Peter  the  Great  had  initiated 
with  some  reason  against  Poland,  Russia  and  Prussia  agreed 
by  the  Secret  Articles  quoted  not  only  to  keep  Poland 
weak  and  distracted  by  preserving  the  constitutional  dis- 
order of  that  country,  and  preventing  all  reform,  but  they 
further  agreed  to  use  all  their  influence  with  a  view  to 
having  elected  a  king  suitable  to  themselves.  Besides, 
they  agreed  to  create  the  most  serious  difficulties  to  the 
Republic  by  protecting  the  non-Roman  Catholic  Poles. 
In  her  secret  instructions,  sent  on  November  6,  1763,  to 
Count  Keyserling  and  Prince  Repnin,  her  Ambassadors 
in  Warsaw,  Catharine  the  Second,  acting  in  conjunction 
with   Frederick  the   Great,   gave   orders   that   the  gentle 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanskij)     153 

Count  Poniatowski,  her  former  favourite  and  lover,  should 
be  elected.  She  placed  large  funds  at  the  disposal  of  her 
Ambassadors  for  the  purpose  of  bribery,  and  gave  directions 
that,  if  the  Poles  should  oppose  Poniatowski's  election, 
Kussian  troops,  acting  in  conjunction  with  Prussian  soldiers, 
should  treat  all  opponents  to  the  Eusso-Prussian  candidate 
as  rebels  and  enemies.  We  read  in  that  most  interesting 
secret  document  : 

...  II  est  indispensable  que  nous  portions  sur  le  trone 
de  Pologne  un  Piast  a  notre  convenance,  utile  a  nos  interets 
reels,  en  un  mot  un  homme  qui  ne  doive  son  elevation 
qu'a  nous  seuls.  Nous  trouvons  dans  la  personne  du  comte 
Poniatowski,  panetier  de  Lithuanie,  toutes  les  conditions 
necessaires  a  notre  convenance,  et  en  consequence  nous  avons 
resolu  de  I'elever  au  trone  de  Pologne.  .  .  . 

.  .  .  Que  si  quelqu'un  osait  s'opposer  a  cette  election, 
troubler  I'ordre  public  de  la  republique,  former  des  confedera- 
tions contre  un  monarque  legitimement  elu  ;  alors,  sans 
aucune  declaration  prealable,  nous  ordonnerons  a  nos 
troupes  d'envahir  en  meme  temps  sur  tous  les  points  le 
territoire  polonais,  de  regarder  nos  adversaires  comme 
rebelles,  perturbateurs,  et  de  detruire  par  le  fer  et  par  le  feu 
leurs  biens  et  leurs  proprietes.  Dans  ce  cas,  nous  nous 
concerterons  avec  le  roi  de  Prusse,  et  vous,  de  votre  cote, 
vous  vous  entendrez  avec  son  ministre  resident  a  Varsovie. 

Soon  it  was  whispered  that  Eussia  and  Prussia  had 
agreed  to  partition  Poland.  These  rumours  were  indignantly 
and  most  emphatically  denied  by  Frederick  the  Great  and 
Catharine  the  Second.  Frederick  the  Great  made  on 
January  24,  1764,  the  following  public  declaration  through 
his  Ambassador  in  Warsaw  : 

.  .  .  Les  faux  bruits  qui  se  sont  repandus  dans  le  royaume 
et  que  les  ennemis  de  la  tranquillite  publique  ne  cessent  de 
divulguer,  que  les  cours  de  Prusse  et  de  Eussie  voulaient 
profiter  des  circonstances  presentes  pour  demembrer  la 
Pologne  ou  la  Lithuanie,  et  que  le  concert  de  ces  deux  cours 
tendait  uniquement  a  y  faire  des  acquisitions  aux  depens 


154  The  Problem  of  Poland 

de  la  republique  ;  ces  bruits,  qui  sont  aussi  denues  de  vrai- 
semblance  que  de  fondement,  ont  porte  le  soussigne  a  les 
contredire,  non-seulement  de  bouche,  mais  aussi  par  une 
note  prealable  remise  au  prince  primat.  .  .  . 

.  .  .  Sa  Majeste  le  roi  de  Prusse  ne  travaille  et  ne  travail- 
lera  constamment  qu'a  maintenir  les  Etats  de  la  republique 
en  leur  entier.  S.M.  I'imperatrice  de  Eussie  ayant  le  meme 
en  vue,  ce  n'est  que  dans  un  pareil  but  que  le  roi  s'est  con- 
certe  avec  elle. 

The  statement  of  the  Prussian  Ambassador  was  followed 
by  a  letter  from  Frederick  the  Great  himself  to  the  Prince 
Primate  of  Poland  on  July  24,  in  which  the  King,  in  sonorous 
Latin  phrases,  stated  that  he  was  most  anxious  '  ut  libertates 
et  possessiones  reipublicae,  sartae  omnino  et  intactae 
maneant.  Haec  est  sincera'  '•  et  constans  animi  nostri 
sententia.'  Catharine  the  Second,  with  similar  unequivocal 
directness,  pubhcly  declared  : 

...  Si  jamais  I'esprit  de  mensonge  a  pu  inventer  une 
faussete  complete,  c'est  lorsqu'on  a  audacieusement  repandu 
que,  dans  le  dessein  que  nous  avons  de  favoriser  I'election 
d'un  Piast,  nous  n'avions  pour  but  que  de  nous  faciliter  les 
moyens  d'envahir,  par  son  secours  ou  son  concours,  quelque 
morceau  du  territoire  de  la  couronne  de  Pologne  ou  du 
grand-duche  de  Lithuanie,  pour  le  demembrer  du  royaume 
et  le  mettre  sous  notre  domination  par  usurpation.  Ce 
bruit,  si  peu  fonde  et  invente  aussi  mal  a  propos,  tombe 
de  lui-meme  comme  denue  de  toute  sorte  de  vraisemblance. 

The  British  diplomats  hesitated  to  accept  these  solemn 
declarations.  Mr.  Thomas  Wroughton,  the  British  Am- 
bassador to  Poland,  reported  on  June  15,  1763,  from 
Dresden  to  his  Government,  enclosing  the  Empress's  Declara- 
tion of  May  2,  1763  : 

The  enclosed  declaration  of  the  Empress  of  Eussia  ap- 
pears to  me  to  be  very  vague  ;  the  idea  here  is  that  there  is 
certainly  an  understanding  between  the  King  of  Prussia  and 
that  Sovereign  to  divide  the  major  part  of  the  Polish  Do- 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanshi-p     155 

minions  between  them.  I  cannot  by  any  means  adopt  this 
sentiment,  conceiving  it  to  be  inconsistent  with  the  interest 
of  either  of  them.  The  manner  in  which  that  unfortunate 
country  is  treated  on  both  sides  shows  that  they  are  as  much 
absolute  masters  of  it  as  possible,  and  that  without  awaken- 
ing the  jealousy  of  their  neighbours.  Russia  is  inattackable 
on  that  side  at  present,  which  she  would  not  be  if  she  appro- 
priated to  herself  that  barrier.  I  can  easily  imagine  Polish 
Prussia  and  the  town  of  Dantzig  to  be  tempting  objects  to 
the  King  of  Prussia,  but  would  even  Eussia,  on  whatever 
amicable  footing  she  may  be,  permit  him  to  make  so  formid- 
able an  acquisition  on  that  side  and  so  dangerous  for  the 
Baltick  Navigation  when  in  the  hands  of  so  great  a  Prince  ? 

By  bribery  and  persuasion,  and  by  ruthless  intimida- 
tion, supported  by  the  threatening  presence  of  a  large 
body  of  Eussian  troops  brought  into  the  Polish  capital, 
the  Eussian  and  Prussian  Ambassadors  secured  in  1764 
the  election  of  Count  Poniatowski  to  the  Pohsh  throne. 
He  reigned  in  the  name  Stanislaus  Augustus.  Soon  after 
his  election  the  Empress  Catharine,  supported  by  Frederick 
the  Great,  demanded  that  the  dissenters  of  Poland  should 
be  given  equal  rights  with  the  Eoman  Cathohcs,  and  these 
demands  were  backed  by  force. 

In  his  '  Memoirs  '  Frederick  the  Great  described  this 
as  follows  : 

Towards  the  end  of  1765  the  Pohsh  Diet  came  again 
together.  The  Empress  of  Russia  had  declared  herself 
Protectress  of  the  Dissenters,  part  of  whom  belonged  to  the 
Greek  religion.  She  demanded  that  they  should  be  per- 
mitted to  exercise  their  religion  freely  and  to  obtain  official 
positions  on  a  footing  of  equality  with  the  other  Poles. 
This  demand  was  the  cause  of  all  the  disturbances  and  wars 
which  soon  broke  out.  The  Prussian  Ambassador  handed 
to  the  Polish  Diet  a  memoir  demonstrating  that  his  Master, 
the  King  of  Prussia,  could  not  view  with  indifference  the 
abolition  of  the  Liberum  Veto,  the  introduction  of  new  taxa- 
tion, and  the  increase  of  the  Polish  Army,  and  the  Polish 
Eepublic  acted  in  accordance  with  Prussia's  representations. 


156  The  Problem  of  Poland 

The  Dissenters  were  hostile  to  the  ruhng  Poles.  In  view 
of  the  existence  of  the  Liberum  Vote,  by  means  of  which  a 
single  dissentient  could  bring  the  machinery  of  Parliament 
and  Government  to  a  standstill,  the  demands  made  by 
Eussia  and  Prussia  could  be  fulfilled  only  if  the  Liberum 
Veto  was  replaced  by  majority  rule.  However,  acting 
in  accordance  with  their  secret  treaty,  Russia  and  Prussia 
opposed  that  most  necessary  reform.  The  demands  made 
by  Russia  and  Prussia  on  behalf  of  Dissenters  were 
particularly  unwarrantable  if  we  remember  that  even 
now  Poles  cannot  obtain  '  official  positions  on  a  footing 
of  equality  '  either  in  Prussia  or  in  Russia.  However, 
notwithstanding  the  unreasonableness  of  the  request, 
the  new  King,  who  possessed  far  more  patriotism  than 
Frederick  the  Great  and  Catharine  the  Second  had  believed, 
promised  to  fulfil  their  demands  if  he  was  given  sufficient 
time.  Sir  G.  Macartney,  the  British  Ambassador  in  St. 
Petersburg,  reported  on  November  28  (December  7),  1766  : 

The  King  of  Poland  five  months  ago  declared  to  Mr. 
Panin  by  his  Minister  that  if  Russia  would  act  moderately 
he  would  undertake  in  this  Diet  to  obtain  for  the  dissidents 
the  free  exercise  of  their  religion,  and  in  the  next  he  would 
endeavour,  nay  promise,  to  render  them  not  only  capable 
of  Juridicatory  Starosties,  but  of  being  elected  to  the  Nuncia- 
ture. Unfortunately  this  proposal  did  not  content  the 
Court  of  Petersburg.  She  [the  Empress]  thought  it  possible 
to  obtain  everything  she  demanded,  and  did  not  compre- 
hend the  difficulty,  the  impossibility,  of  persuading  a  Great 
Assembly  [the  most  august  part  of  which  consists  of  Ecclesi- 
asticks]  to  grant  all  at  once  without  hesitation  free  participa- 
tion of  their  privileges  to  a  set  of  men  whom  they  have  been 
taught  to  look  upon  as  equally  their  spiritual  and  temporal 
enemies.  The  King  of  Prussia  by  his  minister  here  en- 
deavours by  all  methods,  per  fas  et  nefas,  to  irritate  this  Court 
against  the  Poles,  and  as  an  indiscreet  zeal  for  religion  has 
never  been  reckoned  among  that  Monarch's  weaknesses,  his 
motives  are  shrewdly  suspected  to  be  much  deeper  than 
they  are  avowed  to  be. 


Great  Problems  of  British  StatesmanshiiD     157 

Driven  to  despair  by  the  threats  of  armed  interference, 
made  by  the  Bussian  and  Prussian  Ambassadors,  King 
Stanislaus  Augustus  appealed  on  October  5,  1766,  to 
Catharine  the  Second  in  a  most  touching  private  letter, 
which,  alluding  to  their  former  intimacy  and  love,  ended 
as  follows  : 

Lorsque  vous  m'avez  recommande  au  choix  de  cette 
nation,  vous  n'avez  assurement  pas  voulu  que  je  devinsse 
I'objet  de  ses  maledictions  ;  vous  ne  comptiez  certainement 
pas  non  plus  elever  dans  ma  personne  un  but  aux  traits  de 
vos  armes.  Je  vous  conjure  de  voir  cependant  que  si  tout  ce 
que  le  prince  Kepnin  m'a  annonce  se  verifie,  il  n'y  a  pas  de 
milieu  pour  moi :  il  faut  que  je  m' expose  a  vos  coups,  ou 
que  je  trahisse  ma  nation  et  mon  devoir.  Vous  ne  m'auriez 
pas  voulu  roi,  si  j'etais  capable  du  dernier.  La  Foudre  est 
entre  vos  mains,  mais  la  lancerez-vous  sur  la  tete  innocente 
de  celui  qui  vous  est  depuis  si  longtemps  le  plus  tendrement 
et  le  plus  sincerement  attache  ?  Madame,  De  Votre  Majeste 
Imperiale  le  bon  frere,  ami  et  voisin, 

Stanislas-Auguste,  roi. 

The  King  pleaded  in  vain.  Catharine  the  Second  and 
Frederick  the  Great  were  freethinkers.  Their  championship 
of  the  rights  of  the  Dissenters  was  merely  a  pretext  for 
crippling  Poland  completely  and  for  interfering  in  that 
country  with  a  view  to  partitioning  it.  Mr.  Thomas 
Wroughton,  the  British  Ambassador  in  Poland,  sent  on, 
October  29,  1766,  a  despatch  to  his  Government,  in  which 
we  read  : 

I  had  another  long  conversation  with  the  King,  who 
represented  to  me  in  the  most  touching  colours  the  situation 
of  his  affairs  and  the  manner  in  which  he  thinks  himself 
and  the  nation  treated.  He  saw  himself,  he  said,  upon  the 
brink  of  the  most  serious  danger  ;  that  he  was  determined 
to  suffer  all  rather  than  betray  his  country,  or  act  like  a 
dishonest  man  ;  that  Her  Imperial  Majesty  had  never  pre- 
tended to  more  than  procuring  the  Protestants  the  full 
exercise  of  their  religion,  and  that  he  had  laboured  for  many 


158  The  Problem  of  Poland 

months  past  on  that  plan  ;  that  this  sudden  and  violent 
resolution  of  the  Empress  to  put  them  on  a  level  with  his 
other  subjects  convinced  him  that  religion  was  only  a 
pretext,  and  that  she  and  the  King  of  Prussia,  repenting 
of  having  placed  a  man  on  the  throne  that  worked  for  the 
elevation  of  his  country,  were  taking  measures  to  overset 
what  they  themselves  had  done  ;  that  he  awaited  the  event 
with  the  utmost  tranquillity,  conscious  of  having  ever  acted 
on  the  principles  of  Justice  and  Patriotism. 

The  British  Ambassador  in  Berlin,  Sir  Andrew  Mitchell, 
confirmed  in  his  despatches  the  views  of  his  colleagues 
in  Petersburg  and  Warsaw  as  to  the  ultimate  aims  of  Eussia 
and  Prussia  in  Poland.  He  wrote,  for  instance,  on 
November  22,  1766  : 

Neither  the  Empress  of  Eussia  nor  the  King  of  Prussia 
would  wish  to  see  such  an  alteration  in  the  constitution  of 
Poland  as  could  not  fail  to  render  the  Eepublick  more 
independent,  more  powerful,  and  of  more  weight  and 
importance  than  it  has  hitherto  been  in  Europe. 

Before  the  first  partition  of  Poland  the  Province  of 
Bast  Prussia  was  separated  from  the  rest  of  the  Kingdom 
of  Prussia  by  Polish  territory.  The  present  Province  of 
West  Prussia,  with  Thorn,  Dantzig,  and  the  mighty  Eiver 
Vistula,  formed  then  part  of  Poland.  Frederick  strove 
to  acquire  that  province,  and  with  this  object  in  view  he 
had  advocated  the  partition  of  Poland  with  Eussia.  How- 
ever, an  event  occurred  which  seriously  affected  the  King's 
plans.  In  1768  war  broke  out  between  Eussia  and  Turkey. 
It  was  long  drawn  out  and,  to  Frederick's  dismay,  Eussia 
proved  victorious.  The  King  strongly  desired  the  existence 
of  a  powerful  Turkey  friendly  to  Prussia,  which,  in  case 
of  need,  might  afford  valuable  support  to  Prussia  by 
attacking  Eussia  in  the  flank  or  Austria  in  the  rear.  The 
King  wrote  in  his  '  Memoirs  '  : 

It  was  in  no  way  in  Prussia's  interest  to  see  the  Ottoman 
Power  altogether  destroyed.     In  case  of  need  excellent  use 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     159 

could  be  made  of  it  for  causing  a  diversion  either  in  Hungary 
or  in  Eussia  in  the  event  that  Prussia  was  at  war  either  with 
Austria  or  with  the  Muscovite  Power. 

Germany's  traditional  philo-Turkish  policy  was  originated 
not  by  Bismarck  and  William  the  Second,  but  by  Frederick 
the  Great. 

During  a  long  time  Frederick  strove  to  bring  about  a 
war  between  Eussia  and  Austria  by  telling  the  Austrians 
that  if  Eussia  should  conquer  large  portions  of  Turkey 
she  would  become  too  powerful,  and  would  become 
dangerous  to  Austria  herself,  that  Austria  should  not 
tolerate  the  Eussians  crossing  the  Danube.  As  his  attempts 
at  involving  these  two  States  in  war  proved  unsuccessful, 
he  resolved  to  divert  Eussia's  attention  from  the  Balkan 
Peninsula  to  Poland,  and  for  greater  security  he  wished 
to  make  use  of  Austria  as  a  tool  and  a  partner  in  his  designs. 
As  Maria  Theresa,  the  Austrian  Empress,  refused  to  take 
a  hand  in  the  partition  of  Poland,  he  began  to  work  upon 
her  son  and  successor.  Joseph  the  Second,  born  in  1741, 
was  at  the  time  young,  enthusiastic,  inexperienced,  hasty, 
vain,  and  he  thirsted  for  glory.  He  envied  Frederick's 
successes.  Playing  upon  his  vanity  and  upon  that  of 
Prince  Kaunitz,  the  leading  Austrian  statesman,  Frederick 
the  Great  obtained  their  support  for  partitioning  Poland. 
After  a  long  but  fruitless  resistance  against  her  son  and 
her  principal  adviser,  Maria  Theresa  signed,  it  is  said  with 
tears  in  her  eyes,  on  March  4,  1772,  the  Partition  Treaty. 
However,  in  signing  it,  she  expressed  her  dissent  and  dis- 
approval in  the  following  prophetic  phrase  : 

Placet,  puisque  tant  et  de  savants  personnages  veulent 
qu'il  en  soit  ainsi ;  mais,  longtemps  apres  ma  mort,  on  verra 
ce  qui  resulte  d'avoir  ainsi  foule  aux  pieds  tout  ce  que 
jusqu'^  present  on  a  toujours  tenu  pour  juste  et  pour 
sacre. 

To  preserve  the  appearance  of  legitimacy  the  partitioning 
Powers  wished  to  receive  the  consent  of  the  Polish  Diet  to 


160  The  Problem  of  Poland 

their  act  of  spoliation.  Frederick  the  Great  describes  how 
that  consent  was  obtained.  After  mentioning  that  each 
of  the  partitioning  Powers  sent  an  army  to  Poland  to  over- 
awe the  people,  and  that  Warsaw  was  occupied  by  troops, 
he  wrote  in  his  '  Memoirs  ' : 

At  first  the  Poles  were  obstinate  and  rejected  all  proposals. 
The  representatives  did  not  come  to  Warsaw.  Having  grown 
tired  of  the  long  delay,  the  Court  of  Vienna  proposed  to 
appoint  a  day  for  the  opening  of  the  Diet,  threatening  that 
in  case  of  the  non-appearance  of  the  delegates,  the  three 
Powers  would  partition  not  merely  part  but  the  whole  of 
the  country.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  cession  of  the  out- 
lying districts  was  effected  by  voluntary  agreement,  the 
foreign  troops  would  be  withdrawn  from  Poland.  That 
declaration  overcame  all  difficulties.  The  Treaty  of  Cession 
was  signed  with  Prussia  on  the  18th  of  September,  and 
Poland  was  guaranteed  the  integrity  of  her  remaining 
provinces.  .  .  .  The  Poles,  who  are  the  most  easy-going 
and  most  foolish  nation  in  Europe,  thought  at  first  that 
they  could  safely  consent  because  they  would  be  able  to 
destroy  the  work  of  the  three  Powers  within  a  short  time. 
They  argued  thus  in  the  hope  that  Eussia  might  be  defeated 
by  Turkey. 

At  the  first  partition  Prussia,  Austria,  and  Eussia  were, 
according  to  their  treaty  concluded  with  Poland,  to  take 
certain  vast  but  clearly  defined  territories  from  that  unhappy 
State.  However,  by  fraud  and  violence  they  greatly 
exceeded  the  stipulated  limits.  Frederick  the  Great  tells 
us  with  his  habitual  cynical  candour  : 

The  Poles  complained  loudly  that  the  Austrians  and 
Prussians  increased  their  shares  without  limit.  There  was 
some  reason  for  these  complaints.  The  Austrians  used  a 
very  wrong  map  of  Poland  on  which  the  names  of  the  rivers 
Sbruze  and  Podhorze  had  been  exchanged,  and  making  use 
of  this  pretext  enlarged  their  portion  very  greatly  beyond 
the  limits  agreed  upon  by  the  Treaty  of  Partition.  The 
basis  of  the  Treaty  had  been  that  the  shares  of  the  three 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     161 

Powers  should  be  equal.  As  the  Austrians  had  increased 
their  share,  King  Frederick  considered  himself  justified  in 
doing  hkewise,  and  included  in  Prussia  the  districts  of  the 
old  and  the  new  Netze. 

Careful  study  of  the  '  Memoirs  '  and  of  the  diplomatic  and 
private  correspondence  of  the  time  shows  convincingly  that 
Frederick  the  Great  was  the  moving  spirit,  and  that  he 
was  responsible  for  the  first  partition  of  Poland,  that  Russia 
and  Austria  were  merely  his  tools  and  his  dupes.  He  has 
told  us  in  his  '  Memoirs  '  that  he  sent  the  original  plan  of 
partition  to  Petersburg,  attributing  it  to  the  fertile  brain  of 
a  visionary  statesman.  Count  Lynar.  The  late  Lord 
Salisbury  wrote  in  his  valuable  essay  '  Poland,'  published 
in  the  Quarterly  Beview  in  1863,  in  which,  by  the  by,  he 
treated  the  claims  of  the  Poles  with  little  justice  : 

By  a  bold  inversion  of  the  real  degrees  of  guilt  the  chief 
blame  is  laid  on  Russia.  Prussia  is  looked  upon  as  a  pitiful 
and  subordinate  accomphce,  while  Austria  is  almost  absolved 
as  an  unwilling  accessory.  .  .  . 

To  Frederick  the  Great  of  Prussia  belongs  the  credit  of 
having  initiated  the  scheme  which  was  actually  carried  into 
execution.  It  is  now  admitted,  even  by  German  historians, 
that  the  first  partition  was  proposed  to  Catharine  by  Prince 
Henry  of  Prussia  on  behalf  of  his  brother  Frederick,  and 
with  the  full  acquiescence  of  Joseph,  Emperor  of  Germany. 
Frederick  had  never  been  troubled  with  scruples  upon  the 
subject  of  territorial  acquisition,  and  he  was  not  likely  to 
commence  them  in  the  case  of  Poland.  Spoliation  was  the 
hereditary  tradition  of  his  race.  The  whole  history  of  the 
kingdom  over  which  he  ruled  was  a  history  of  lawless 
annexation.  It  was  formed  of  territory  filched  from  other 
races  and  other  Powers,  and  from  no  Power  so  hberally  as 
from  Poland. 

The  fact  that  Frederick  the  Great  was  responsible  for 
the  first  partition  of  Poland  is  acknowledged  not  only  by 
leading  German  historians,  but  even  by  the  German  school- 
books.     As   an  excuse,  it  is  usually  stated  that  necessity 


162  The  Problem  of  Poland 

compelled  Frederick  to  propose  that  step  because  the  anarchy 
prevailing  m  Poland  made  impossible  its  continued  existence 
as  an  independent  State.  However,  German  writers  never 
mention  that  the  Poles  themselves  earnestly  wished  to 
reform  the  State,  and  that  Frederick  not  only  opposed 
that  reform  but  greatly  increased  disorder  by  putting  his 
own  nominee  on  the  Polish  throne,  by  causing  civil  war  to 
break  out  in  the  country,  by  raising  the  Polish  Dissenters 
against  the  Government,  by  occupying  Poland  in  con- 
junction with  Kussia,  by  interfering  with  its  elections  and 
Government,  and  by  bribing  and  overawing  its  Legislature 
by  armed  force. 

The  second  partition  of  Poland  in  1793  is  perhaps  even 
more  disgraceful  to  Prussia  than  was  the  first,  because  it 
involved  that  country  and  her  King  in  an  act  of  incredible 
treachery.  Frederick  the  Great  died  in  1786.  His  successor, 
Frederick  William  the  Second,  was  a  worthless  individual, 
and  he  brought  about  the  second  partition  by  means  which 
his  uncle  would  have  disdained.  Mr.  M.  S.  F.  Scholl,  a 
German  diplomat  of  standing,  described  in  Koch's  classical 
*  Tableau  des  Eevolutions  de  I'Europe,'  which  is  still  much 
used  by  students  of  history,  and  especially  by  diplomats, 
the  infamous  way  in  which  Prussia  betrayed  Poland  at  the 
time  of  the  second  partition  in  the  following  words  : 

While  in  France,  during  the  Eevolution,  the  nation  was 
seized  by  a  sudden  rage  and  abohshed  all  institutions  and 
all  law  and  order,  giving  itself  up  to  excesses  which  one  would 
have  thought  to  be  impossible,  another  nation  in  the  North 
of  Europe,  which  was  plunged  in  anarchy  and  oppressed 
by  its  neighbours,  made  a  noble  effort  to  establish  good  order 
and  to  throw  off  its  foreign  yoke. 

The  Poles  had  persuaded  themselves  that  they  might 
be  able  to  change  their  vicious  Constitution  and  to  give 
renewed  strength  to  the  Government  of  the  Pohsh  Republic 
during  a  time  when  Eussia  was  occupied  with  wars  against 
Sweden  and  Turkey.  An  Extraordinary  Diet  was  convoked 
at  Warsaw,  and  in  order  to  abolish  the  inconvenience  of 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     163 

the  liberum  veto,  which  required  unanimity  of  votes,  it 
adopted  the  form  of  a  Confederation.  The  Empress, 
Catharine  the  Second  of  Eussia,  approached  the  PoHsh  Diet 
and  endeavoured  to  conclude  with  it  an  alhance  against 
the  Turks.  Her  plan  was  spoiled  by  the  King  of  Prussia, 
who,  in  consequence  of  arrangements  made  with  England, 
did  all  in  his  power  to  rouse  the  Poles  against  the  Eussians. 
He  encouraged  them  by  offering  them  his  alliance  to  under- 
take the  reformation  of  their  Government  which  Prussia 
had  recently  guaranteed.  A  Committee  of  the  Polish  Diet 
was  instructed  to  drav/  up  a  plan  of  a  Constitution  designed 
to  regenerate  the  Eepublic. 

The  resolution  taken  by  the  Diet  was  likely  to  displease 
the  Empress  of  Eussia,  who  considered  that  step  as  a  formal 
breach  of  the  Treaty  between  Eussia  and  Poland  concluded 
in  1775.  As  the  Poles  could  foresee  that  the  changes  which 
they  desired  to  effect  were  likely  to  involve  them  in  differences 
with  the  Empress  of  Eussia,  they  ought  before  all  to  have 
thought  of  preparing  their  defence.  However,  instead  of 
improving  their  finances  and  strengthening  their  army,  the 
Diet  lost  much  in  discussing  the  projected  new  Constitution. 
Prussia's  protection,  of  which  they  had  officially  been  as- 
sured, made  the  Poles  too  confident.  The  alliance  which  the 
King  of  Prussia  actually  concluded  with  the  Eepublic  on 
March  27,  1790,  gave  them  a  feehng  of  absolute  security. 
King  Stanislaus  Augustus  hesitated  a  long  time  as  to  the 
attitude  which  he  should  adopt.  At  last  he  joined  that 
party  of  the  Diet  which  desired  to  draw  Poland  out  of  the 
humiliating  position  in  which  she  had  fallen.  The  new 
Constitution  was  proclaimed  on  May  3,  1791. 

Although  that  Constitution  was  not  perfect,  it  was  in 
accordance  with  Poland's  conditions.  It  corrected  the  vices 
of  her  ancient  laws,  and  although  it  was  truly  Eepublican 
in  spirit,  it  avoided  the  exaggerated  ideas  to  which  the 
French  Eevolution  had  given  rise.  The  throne  was  made 
hereditary.  The  absurd  liherum  veto  was  abolished.  The 
Diet  was  declared  permanent  and  the  legislative  body  was 
divided  into  two  chambers.  The  lower  one  was  to  discuss 
laws.  The  upper  one,  the  Senate,  presided  over  by  the 
King,  was  to  sanction  them  and  to  exercise  the  veto.     The 


164  The  Prohleyn  of  Poland 

executive  power  was  entrusted  to  the  King  and  a  Council 
of  Supervision  composed  of  seven  responsible  Ministers.  .  .  . 

The  exertions  made  by  the  Poles  for  ensuring  their 
independence  aroused  Russia's  anger.  As  soon  as  the 
Empress  of  Russia  had  concluded  peace  with  Turkey,  she 
induced  her  supporters  in  Poland  to  form  a  separate  con- 
federation which  aimed  at  revoking  the  innovations  which 
the  Diet  of  Warsaw  had  introduced.  It  strove  to  bring  the 
old  Polish  constitution  once  more  into  force.  That  con- 
federation was  concluded  on  the  14th  of  May  1792,  at 
Targowice,  and  the  Counts  Felix  Potocki,  Rzewuski,  and 
Branicki  were  its  leaders. 

The  Empress  of  Russia  sent  an  army  into  Poland  in 
support  of  the  new  Confederation,  and  made  war  against 
those  Poles  who  were  in  favour  of  the  new  constitution. 
Only  then  did  the  Poles  seriously  think  of  vigorous  counter 
measures.  The  Diet  decreed  that  the  Polish  Army  should 
be  placed  on  a  war  footing,  and  a  loan  of  33,000,000  florins 
was  arranged  for.  However,  when  the  Prussian  Ambassador 
was  asked  to  state  what  assistance  the  King,  his  master, 
would  give  in  accordance  with  his  pledges  contained  in  the 
Treaty  of  Alliance  of  1790 — according  to  Articles  3  and  4 
he  was  to  furnish  the  Repubhc  with  18,000  men,  and  in  case 
of  need  with  30,000  men — he  gave  an  evasive  answer  which 
threw  the  patriotic  party  into  despair. 

The  refusal  of  the  Pohsh  Diet  to  sanction  a  commercial 
proposal  by  which  Poland  would  have  abandoned  the  towns 
of  Danzig  and  Thorn  to  Prussia  had  angered  that  monarch 
against  the  Poles,  and  the  Empress  of  Russia  did  not  find  it 
difficult  to  obtain  the  Prussian  King's  consent  to  another 
partition  of  the  country.  The  aversion  which  the  sovereigns 
felt  against  everything  which  resembled  the  French  Revolu- 
tion, with  which,  however,  the  events  in  Poland,  where 
King  and  nation  acted  in  harmony,  had  nothing  in  common 
except  appearances,  strongly  inliuenced  the  BerUn  Court 
and  caused  it  to  break  the  engagements  which  it  had  con- 
tracted with  the  Republic. 

The  Poles  understood  the  danger  of  their  position. 
Their  enthusiasm  cooled,  and  the  whole  Diet  was  seized 
with  a  feeling  of  consternation.     Having  to  rely  on  their 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanshijj     165 

own  strength,  and  being  torn  by  dissensions,  the  Poles  were 
unable  to  face  their  Kussian  opponents  with  success.  The 
patriotic  party  was  unfortunate  in  the  campaign  of  1792. 
After  several  victories  the  Kussians  advanced  upon  Warsaw 
and  King  Stanislaus,  who  was  easily  discouraged,  joined  the 
Confederation  of  Targowice,  denounced  the  Constitution  of 
the  3rd  of  May,  and  subscribed  on  the  25th  of  August  1792 
to  all  the  conditions  which  the  Empress  of  Kussia  prescribed. 
An  armistice  was  declared,  and  in  consequence  of  its  stipula- 
tions the  Polish  Army  was  reduced.  In  virtue  of  the  Con- 
vention of  Petersburg  of  the  23rd  of  January  1793,  concluded 
between  Prussia  and  Eussia,  the  Prussian  troops  entered 
Poland  and  spread  throughout  the  country,  following 
Russia's  example.  Proclamations  of  the  Courts  of  Berlin 
and  St.  Petersburg  were  published,  by  which  these  States 
took  possession  of  those  districts  of  the  country  which  their 
troops  had  occupied.  The  adoption  by  Poland  of  the 
principles  of  1789  and  the  propagation  of  the  democratic 
principles  of  the  French  by  the  Poles  were  given  as  reasons 
for  the  second  partition  of  Poland.  .  .  . 

The  partitioning  Powers  renounced  once  more  all  rights 
and  claims  to  the  territories  of  the  Republic,  and  bound 
themselves  to  recognise,  and  even  to  guarantee,  if  desired, 
the  Constitution  which  the  Polish  Diet  would  draw  up  with 
the  free  consent  of  the  Polish  nation. 

Notwithstanding  the  reiterated  promises  of  respecting 
the  integrity  of  the  much-reduced  country,  the  third  partition 
took  place  in  1795. 

From  the  very  beginning  Prussia,  Austria,  and  Russia 
treated  Poland  as  a  corj)us  vile,  and  cut  it  up  like  a  cake, 
without  any  regard  to  the  claims,  the  rights,  and  the  pro- 
tests of  the  Poles  themselves.  Although  history  only 
mentions  three  partitions,  there  were  in  reality  seven. 
There  were  those  of  1772,  1793,  and  1795,  already  referred 
to  ;  and  these  were  followed  by  arbitrary  redistributions 
of  the  Polish  territories  in  1807,  1809,  and  1815.  In  none 
of  these  were  the  inhabitants  consulted  or  even  considered. 
The  Congress  of  Vienna  established  the  independence  of 


166  The  Problem  of  Poland 

Cracow,  but  Austria-Hungary,  asserting  that  she  considered 
herself  '  threatened  '  by  the  existence  of  that  tiny  State, 
seized  it  in  1846. 

While  Prussia,  Austria,  and  Eussia,  considering  that 
might  was  right,  had  divided  Poland  amongst  themselves, 
regardless  of  the  passionate  protests  of  the  inhabitants, 
England  had  remained  a  spectator,  but  not  a  passive  one, 
of  the  tragedy.  She  viewed  the  action  of  the  AlHes  with 
strong  disapproval,  but  although  she  gave  frank  expression 
to  her  sentiments,  she  did  not  actively  interfere.  After 
all,  no  English  interests  were  involved  in  the  partition. 
It  was  not  her  business  to  intervene.  Besides,  she  could 
not  successfully  have  opposed  single-handed  the  joint  action 
of  the  three  powerful  partner  States,  especially  as  France, 
under  the  weak  Louis  the  Fifteenth,  held  aloof.  How- 
ever, English  statesmen  refused  to  consider  as  valid  the 
five  partitions  which  took  place  before  and  during  the 
Napoleonic  era. 

The  Treaty  of  Chaumont  of  1814  created  the  Concert 
of  Europe.  At  the  Congress  of  Vienna  of  1815  the  frontiers 
of  Europe  were  fixed  by  general  consent.  As  Prussia,  Austria, 
and  Eussia  refused  to  recreate  an  independent  Poland, 
England's  opposition  would  have  broken  up  the  Concert, 
and  might  have  led  to  fm'ther  wars.  Unable  to  prevent 
the  injustice  done  to  Poland  by  her  opposition,  and  anxious 
to  maintain  the  unity  of  the  Powers  and  the  peace  of  the 
world,  England  consented  at  last  to  consider  the  partition 
of  Poland  as  a  fait  accompli,  and  formally  recognised  it, 
especially  as  the  Treaty  of  Vienna  assured  the  Poles  of 
just  and  fair  treatment  under  representative  institutions. 
Article  1  of  the  Treaty  of  Vienna  stated  expressly  : 

Les  Polonais,  sujets  respectifs  de  la  Eussie,  de  I'Autriche 
et  de  la  Prusse,  obtiendront  une  representation  et  des  institu- 
tions nationales  reglees  d'apres  le  mode  d'existence  politique 
que  chacun  des  gouvernements  auxquels  ils  appartiennent 
jugera  utile  et  convenable  de  leur  accorder. 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     167 

By  signing  the  Treaty  of  Vienna,  England  recognised 
not  explicitly,  but  merely  implicitly,  the  partition  of  Poland, 
and  she  did  so  unwillingly  and  under  protest.  Lord  Castle- 
reagh  stated  in  a  Circular  Note  addressed  to  Eussia,  Prussia, 
and  Austria  that  it  had  always  been  England's  desire  that 
an  independent  Poland,  possessing  a  dynasty  of  its  own, 
should  be  established,  which,  separating  Austria,  Eussia, 
and  Prussia,  should  act  as  a  buffer  State  between  them  ; 
that,  failing  its  creation,  the  Poles  should  be  reconciled 
to  being  dominated  by  foreigners,  by  just  and  hberal  treat- 
ment which  alone  would  make  them  satisfied.  His  Note, 
which  is  most  remarkable  for  its  far-sightedness,  wisdom, 
force,  and  restraint,  was  worded  as  follows  : 

The  Undersigned,  His  Britannic  Majesty's  Principal 
Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs  and  Plenipotentiary 
to  the  Congress  of  Vienna,  in  desiring  the  present  Note 
concerning  the  affairs  of  Poland  may  be  entered  on  the  Proto- 
col, has  no  intention  to  revive  controversy  or  to  impede 
the  progress  of  the  arrangements  now  in  contemplation. 
His  only  object  is  to  avail  himself  of  this  occasion  of  tempe- 
rately recording,  by  the  express  orders  of  his  Court,  the 
sentiments  of  the  British  Government  upon  a  European 
question  of  the  utmost  magnitude  and  influence. 

The  Undersigned  has  had  occasion  in  the  course  of  the 
discussions  at  Vienna,  for  reasons  that  need  not  now  be  gone 
into,  repeatedly  and  earnestly  to  oppose  himself,  on  the 
part  of  his  Court,  to  the  erection  of  a  Pohsh  kingdom  in 
union  with  and  making  a  part  of  the  Imperial  Crown  of 
Eussia. 

The  desire  of  his  Court  to  see  an  independent  Power, 
more  or  less  considerable  in  extent,  established  in  Poland 
under  a  distinct  Dynasty,  and  as  an  intermediate  State 
between  the  three  great  Monarchies,  has  uniformly  been 
avowed,  and  if  the  Undersigned  has  not  been  directed  to 
press  such  a  measure,  it  has  only  arisen  from  a  disinclination 
to  excite,  under  all  the  apparent  obstacles  to  such  an  arrange- 
ment, expectations  which  might  prove  an  unavailing  source 
of  discontent  among  the  Poles. 


168  The  Problem  of  Poland 

The  Emperor  of  Eussia  continuing,  as  it  is  declared,  still 
to  adhere  to  his  purpose  of  erecting  that  part  of  the  Duchy 
of  Warsaw  which  is  to  fall  under  His  Imperial  Majesty's 
dominion,  together  with  his  other  Polish  provinces,  either 
in  whole  or  in  part,  into  a  kingdom  under  the  Eussian 
sceptre  ;  and  their  Austrian  and  Prussian  Majesties,  the 
Sovereigns  most  immediately  interested,  having  ceased  to 
oppose  themselves  to  such  an  arrangement — the  Under- 
signed adhering,  nevertheless,  to  all  his  former  representa- 
tions on  this  subject  has  only  sincerely  to  hope  that  none  of 
those  evils  may  result  from  this  measure  to  the  tranquillity 
of  the  North,  and  to  the  general  equilibrium  of  Europe, 
which  it  has  been  his  painful  duty  to  anticipate.  But  in 
order  to  obviate  as  far  as  possible  such  consequences,  it  is  of 
essential  importance  to  establish  the  public  tranquillity 
throughout  the  territories  which  formerly  constituted  the 
kingdom  of  Poland,  upon  some  solid  and  liberal  basis  of 
common  interest,  by  applying  to  all,  however  various  may 
be  their  political  institutions,  a  congenial  and  conciliatory 
system  of  administration. 

Experience  has  proved  that  it  is  not  by  counteracting  all 
their  habits  and  usages  as  a  people  that  either  the  happiness 
of  the  Poles,  or  the  peace  of  that  important  portion  of 
Europe,  can  be  preserved.  A  fruitless  attempt,  too  long 
persevered  in,  by  institutions  foreign  to  their  manner  and 
sentiments  to  make  them  forget  their  existence,  and  even 
language,  as  a  people,  has  been  sufficiently  tried  and  failed. 
It  has  only  tended  to  excite  a  sentiment  of  discontent  and 
self-degradation,  and  can  never  operate  otherwise  than  to 
provoke  commotion  and  to  awaken  them  to  a  recollection  of 
past  misfortunes. 

The  Undersigned,  for  these  reasons,  and  in  cordial 
concurrence  with  the  general  sentiments  which  he  has  had 
the  satisfaction  to  observe  the  respective  Cabinets  enter- 
tained on  this  subject,  ardently  desires  that  the  illustrious 
Monarchs  to  whom  the  destinies  of  the  Polish  nation  are 
confided,  may  be  induced,  before  they  depart  from  Vienna, 
to  take  an  engagement  with  each  other  to  treat  as  Poles, 
under  whatever  form  of  political  institution  they  may  think 
fit  to  govern  them,  the  portions  of  that  nation  that  may  be 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     169 

placed  under  their  respective  sovereignties.  The  knowledge 
of  such  a  determination  will  best  tend  to  concihate  the 
general  sentiment  to  their  rule,  and  to  do  honour  to  the 
several  Sovereigns  in  the  eyes  of  their  Polish  subjects.  This 
course  will  consequently  afford  the  surest  prospect  of  their 
living  peaceably  and  contentedly  under  their  respective 
Governments.  .  .  . 

This  despatch  was  sent  on  January  12,  1815,  a  century 
ago.  The  warnings  were  not  heeded  and  the  past  century 
has  been  filled  with  sorrow  for  the  Poles  and  with  risings 
and  revolutions,  as  Lord  Castlereagh  clearly  foretold. 

In  their  reply,  the  Kussian,  Prussian,  and  Austrian  repre- 
sentatives promised  to  act  in  accordance  with  England's 
views.  However,  soon  after  the  overthrow  of  Napoleon, 
reaction  set  in.  The  promises  made  to  the  peoples  at  the 
Congress  of  Vienna,  and  the  claims  of  the  nationahties, 
were  disregarded,  Eepresentative  government  was  either 
not  established,  or,  where  estabhshed,  was  destroyed. 
Under  the  guidance  of  Prince  Metternich,  the  evil  genius 
of  Austria,  an  era  of  petty  tyranny  and  of  persecution  began. 
An  example  vnll  show  how  the  Poles  were  treated.  On 
May  15,  1815,  Kmg  Frederick  William  the  Third  of  Prussia, 
on  taking  possession  of  the  Pohsh  territories  which  fell  to 
him  under  the  Treaty  of  Vienna,  addressed  the  following 
proclamation  to  the  inhabitants  : 

Inhabitants  of  the  Kingdom  of  Poland  !  In  again  taking 
possession  of  the  district  of  the  former  dukedom  of  Warsaw, 
which  originally  belonged  to  Prussia,  I  wish  to  define  your 
position.  You  also  have  a  Fatherland,  and  you  receive 
proof  of  my  appreciation  for  your  attachment  to  me.  You 
will  be  incorporated  in  the  Prussian  Monarchy,  but  you 
need  not  abandon  your  nationality.  You  will  take  part 
in  the  constitution  which  I  intend  granting  to  my  faithful 
subjects,  and  you  will  receive  a  provincial  constitution 
similar  to  that  which  the  other  provinces  of  my  State  will 
receive.     Your  religion  shall  be  respected,  and  the  clergy 


170  The  Problem  of  Poland 

will  receive  an  income  suitable  to  its  position.  Your 
personal  rights  and  property  will  be  protected  by  the  laws 
which  will  be  made  with  your  collaboration.  The  Polish 
language  shall  be  used  side  by  side  with  the  German  language 
in  all  public  transactions  and  affairs,  and  every  one  of  you 
shall  be  able  to  obtain  official  positions,  honours,  and 
dignities  according  to  his  ability. 

In  1813,  at  the  beginning  of  the  War  of  Liberation 
against  Napoleon,  Frederick  William  the  Third  had  solemnly 
promised  a  constitution  to  the  Prussian  people.  At  that 
moment  he  needed  their  help.  That  promise,  which  was 
received  with  the  greatest  enthusiasm,  was  renewed  in  the 
document  given  above  and  in  many  others,  but  it  was  not 
kept,  although  the  King  lived  till  1840.  He  and  his  suc- 
cessors treated  the  Poles  with  absolute  faithlessness.  Not 
a  single  one  of  the  promises  made  to  them  in  the  Proclama- 
tion quoted  was  observed.  During  a  century  Prussia  has 
disregarded  her  pledges  of  fair  and  equal  treatment.  Instead 
the  Poles  were  persecuted  and  oppressed  in  Prussia,  and 
their  persecution  in  Austria,  and  especially  in  Eussia,  was 
largely,  if  not  chiefly,  due  to  Prussia's  instigation. 

Since  the  time  of  Frederick  the  Great,  and  in  accordance 
with  his  advice  given  in  the  beginning  of  this  chapter, 
Prussian  statesmen,  distrusting  and  fearing  Eussia,  aimed 
at  maintaining  the  most  intimate  relations  with  that  country, 
for  Eussia's  support  was  most  valuable,  while  her  hostility 
was  dangerous.  Fearing  and  distrusting  Eussia,  they 
strove  to  keep  that  country  weak.  Animated  by  fear  and 
distrust,  they  aimed  at  possessing  themselves  of  a  powerful 
weapon  which  could  be  used  against  the  Northern  Power 
in  case  of  need. 

These  three  purposes  of  Prussian  statesmanship  could 
best  be  served  by  inducing  Eussia  to  pursue  in  her  Pohsh 
districts  a  policy  which  exasperated  the  Poles,  which  created 
disaffection  on  her  most  vulnerable  frontier.  Eussia  was 
an  autocracy,  and  the  Poles,  remembering  their  ancient 
Eepublic,  have  always  been  democratically  inclined.    An 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     171 

autocrat  is  naturally  afraid  of  revolution  and  conspiracy. 
Taking  advantage  of  these  feelings,  Prussia  succeeded 
during  more  than  a  century  in  influencing  and  guiding 
Eussia's  pohcy  to  her  advantage.  She  unceasingly  pointed 
out  to  the  Czar  that  the  three  States  which  brought 
about  the  partition  of  Poland  were  equally  interested  in 
combating  democracy  and  revolution.  The  Poles  were 
depicted  to  the  Eussians  as  born  revolutionaries  and 
anarchists. 

Eussia  had  good  reason  to  fear  a  Polish  rising  on  her 
western,  her  most  vulnerable,  frontier,  on  which  dwell 
nearly  12,000,000  Poles.  The  Poles  are  exceedingly  warlike, 
and  Eussia  has  in  the  past  found  it  extremely  difficult  to 
suppress  their  risings.  Besides,  an  invader  could  always 
hope  to  raise  the  Poles  against  the  Czar  by  promising  them 
liberty,  as  was  done  by  Napoleon  the  First  in  1812.  Prussian 
statesmen  never  tired  of  pointing  out  to  the  Czar  that  the 
danger  of  a  Pohsh  revolution  could  be  overcome  only  by 
severe  repressive  measures  taken  jointly  with  Prussia. 
Thus  Prussia  and  Eussia  were  to  remain  partners,  being 
jointly  interested  in  the  persecution  of  Poland.  Poland's 
unhappiness  was  to  be  the  cement  of  the  two  States. 
For  the  same  reason  for  which  Frederick  the  Great  de- 
sired to  preserve  disorder  in  Poland,  his  successors  desired 
to  see  chronic  dissatisfaction  prevail  in  Eussia's  Western 
Provinces. 

Prussia  contemplated  with  fear  the  possibility  of  Poland 
receiving  her  independence.  It  is  clear  that  the  re-creation 
of  an  independent  Poland  within  the  Hmits  of  1772  would 
affect  Eussia  only  slightly,  but  would  damage  Prussia  very 
severely.  The  Prussian  Poles  dwell  in  dense  masses  in 
Southern  Silesia,  one  of  the  wealthiest  coal  and  industrial 
centres  of  Germany,  and  in  the  provinces  of  Posen  and 
Western  Prussia.  If  the  province  of  Posen  should  once 
more  become  Polish,  the  distance  which  separates  Berlin 
from  the  eastern  frontier  of  Germany  would  be  reduced 
to  about  one  half.     The  capital  would  be  in  danger.     If 


172  The  Problem  of  Poland 

the  province  of  West  Prussia,  with  the  mouth  of  the 
Mstula  and  the  port  of  Danzig,  should  once  more  become 
PoHsh,  Prussia's  position  in  the  province  of  East  Prussia 
would  be  jeopardised,  for  Polish  territory  would  once  more 
separate  it  from  the  rest  of  the  Monarchy.  Russia,  on  the 
other  hand,  with  her  boundless  territories,  could  easily 
bear  the  loss  of  her  Polish  provinces,  especially  as  her  capitals 
lie  far  from  the  frontier.  Prince  Biilow  stated,  not  without 
cause,  in  the  Prussian  Diet  on  January  19,  1903  :  '  The 
Polish  question  is,  as  it  has  ever  been,  one  of  the  most 
important,  nay,  the  most  important,  question  of  Prussia's 
policy.' 

In  modern  Russia  there  have  always  been  absolutist  and 
liberal-minded  Czars  and  a  reactionary  and  a  progressive 
party.  Those  who  depicted  Russia  as  a  land  of  pure  and 
undiluted  absolutism,  and  her  Czars  as  a  race  of  cruel  and 
unenlightened  despots,  were  not  acquainted  with  Russian 
history.  While  the  reactionary  party  in  Russia  favoured 
the  policy  of  oppressing  the  nationalities,  the  liberal-minded 
were  in  favour  of  a  wisely  limited  constitutionalism.  They 
desired  to  give  representative  institutions  to  the  people  and 
some  suitable  form  of  self-government  to  the  Poles. 

In  1859  Bismarck  became  the  Prussian  Ambassador 
in  Petrograd.  At  that  time  Russia  was  recovering  from 
the  effects  of  the  Crimean  War,  and  many  of  the  most 
enlightened  Russians  had  become  convinced  that  her  defeat 
was  largely  due  to  her  backwardness,  that  her  backwardness 
was  caused  by  her  unprogressive  institutions,  that  a  more 
liberal  policy  in  the  widest  sense  of  the  word  was  needed. 
The  Czar  himself  and  his  principal  adviser.  Prince 
Gortchakoff,  were  in  favour  of  Liberalism  and  of  Constitu- 
tionalism. Both  desired  to  give  greater  freedom  to  the  Poles. 
However,  Bismarck,  following  the  policy  of  Frederick 
the  Great,  resolutely  opposed  their  policy  in  Prussia's  interest. 
Owing  to  his  persuasiveness  and  personal  magnetism, 
that  great  statesman  obtained  the  ascendant  over  the  Czar 
and  induced  him  to  pursue  a  reactionary  policy  towards 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     173 

the  Poles.    Lord  Cowley,  the  British  Ambassador  in  Paris, 
reported  to  Earl  Eussell  on  March  26,  1863  : 

I  have  had  a  curious  conversation  with  the  Prussian 
Ambassador,  and  not  altogether  without  importance,  as 
showing  that  the  Prussian  Government  has,  if  possible, 
greater  repugnance  to  the  restoration  of  Polish  independence 
than  the  Cabinet  of  St.  Petersburg  itself.  Adverting  to  the 
well-known  desire  of  the  Emperor  to  accomplish  this  event, 
Count  Goltz  said  that  it  was  a  question  of  life  and  death 
to  Prussia.  ...  In  the  course  of  this  conversation  Count 
Goltz  said  that  M.  de  Bismarck,  while  Prussian  Minister  at 
St.  Petersburg,  had  strenuously  and  successfully  opposed 
the  few  concessions  made  to  Poland  by  the  present  Emperor. 

In  his  '  Memoirs  '  Prince  Bismarck  candidly  described  his 
anti-Polish  policy  in  Russia  as  follows  : 

In  the  higher  circles  of  Russian  society  the  influences 
which  made  for  Poland  were  connected  with  the  now  out- 
spoken demand  for  a  constitution.  It  was  felt  as  a  degrada- 
tion that  a  cultivated  people  like  the  Russians  should  be 
denied  institutions  which  existed  in  all  European  nations, 
and  should  have  no  voice  in  the  management  of  their  own 
affairs.  The  division  of  opinion  on  the  Polish  question 
penetrated  the  highest  mihtary  circles.  Those  Russians 
who  demanded  a  constitution  for  themselves  pleaded  at 
times  in  excuse  for  the  Poles  that  they  were  not  governable 
by  Russians,  and  that  as  they  grew  more  civihsed  they 
became  entitled  to  a  share  in  the  administration  of  their 
country.  This  view  was  also  represented  by  Prince 
Gortchakoff. 

The  conflict  of  opinion  was  very  lively  in  St.  Petersburg 
when  I  left  that  capital  in  April,  1862,  and  it  so  continued 
throughout  my  first  year  of  office.  I  took  charge  of  the 
Foreign  Office  under  the  impression  that  the  insurrection 
which  had  broken  out  on  January  1st,  1863,  brought  up 
the  questionnot  only  of  the  interests  of  our  Eastern  provinces, 
but  also  that  wider  one,  whether  the  Russian  Cabinet  were 
dominated  by  Pohsh  or  anti-Polish  proclivities,  by  an  effort 
after  Russo-Polish  fraternisation  in  the  anti-German  Pan- 


174  Tlie  Problem  of  Poland 

slavist  interest   or   by   one   for   mutual  reliance   between 
Eussia  and  Prussia. 

For  the  German  future  of  Prussia  the  attitude  of  Eussia 
was  a  question  of  great  importance.  A  philo-Polish  Eussian 
policy  was  calculated  to  vivify  that  Eusso-French  sympathy 
against  which  Prussia's  effort  had  been  directed  since  the 
peace  of  Paris,  and  indeed  on  occasion  earlier,  and  an  alliance 
(friendly  to  Poland)  between  Eussia  and  France,  such  as  was 
in  the  air  before  the  Eevolution  of  July,  would  have  placed 
the  Prussia  of  that  day  in  a  difficult  position.  It  was  our 
interest  to  oppose  the  party  in  the  Eussian  Cabinet  which 
had  Polish  proclivities,  even  when  they  were  the  proclivities 
of  Alexander  II. 

That  Eussia  herself  afforded  no  security  against  fraterni- 
sation with  Poland  I  was  able  to  gather  from  confidential 
intercourse  with  Gortchakoff  and  the  Czar  himself.  Czar 
Alexander  was  at  that  time  not  indisposed  to  withdraw 
from  part  of  Poland,  the  left  bank  of  the  Vistula  at  any  rate — 
so  he  told  me  in  so  many  words — while  he  made  unemphatic 
exception  of  Warsaw,  which  would  always  be  desirable  as  a 
garrison  town,  and  belonged  strategically  to  the  Vistula 
fortress  triangle.  Poland,  he  said,  was  for  Eussia  a  source 
of  unrest  and  dangerous  European  complications  ;  its  Eussi- 
fication  was  forbidden  by  the  difference  of  religion  and  the 
insufficient  capacity  for  administration  among  Eussian 
officials. 

.  .  .  Our  geographical  position  and  the  intermixture  of 
both  nationalities  in  the  Eastern  provinces,  including  Silesia, 
compel  us  to  retard,  as  far  as  possible,  the  opening  of  the 
Polish  question,  and  even  in  1863  made  it  appear  advisable 
to  do  our  best  not  to  facilitate,  but  to  obviate,  the  opening 
of  this  question  by  Eussia.  It  was  assumed  that  liberal 
concessions,  if  granted  to  the  Poles,  could  not  be  withheld 
from  the  Eussians  ;  Eussian  constitutionalists  were  therefore 
philo-Polish. 

Eussia's  history  has  often  been  most  unfavourably 
affected,  and  the  clearly  expressed  will  of  the  Czar  himself 
been  totally  deflected,  by  the  incompetence  of  a  single 
powerful  individual.     The  Czar  Alexander  was  a   kindly, 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     175 

liberal-minded,  and  broad-minded  man,  and  he  was,  as 
we  have  learned  from  the  testimony  of  Bismarck  and  Lord 
Cowley,  very  favourable  to  the  Poles  and  to  their  aspirations. 
He  intended  to  give  the  Poles  a  full  measure  of  self-govern- 
ment, and  he  entrusted  an  eminent  Pole,  Count  Wielopolski, 
an  old  revolutionary  of  1830,  with  that  difficult  task. 
Wielopolski,  though  probably  well  meaning,  was  tactless, 
rash,  and  inclined  to  violence.  Some  of  his  measures  had 
caused  dissatisfaction  among  the  Poles  and  had  led  to  riots. 
Wielopolski  resolved  to  rid  himself  of  his  opponents,  who 
were  chiefly  young  hot-headed  enthusiasts,  by  enrolling 
them  in  the  army,  and  sending  them  for  a  long  number  of 
years  to  Siberia  and  the  Caucasus.  By  his  orders  numerous 
young  men,  belonging  to  good  families,  were  to  be  arrested 
in  their  beds  by  soldiers  during  the  night  of  January  1, 
1863.  In  the  words  of  Lord  Napier,  the  British  Ambassador 
in  Petrograd,  '  the  opposition  was  to  be  kidnapped.'  That 
foolish  and  arbitrary  step  led  to  a  widespread  revolt  and 
a  prolonged  but  hopeless  struggle  between  Polish  guerillas 
and  Russian  soldiers.  Bismarck,  who  had  unceasingly  re- 
commended a  policy  of  reaction  while  he  was  in  Petrograd, 
made  the  best  use  of  his  opportunity,  and  he  did  so  all 
the  more  readily  as  Prince  Gortchakoff  was  a  friend  not  only 
of  Poland  but  also  of  France.  Foreseeing  a  struggle  between 
Prussia  and  France,  Bismarck  desired  to  obtain  Russia's 
goodwill,  to  create  differences  between  that  country  and 
France,  and  to  discredit  the  Francophile  Prince  Gortchakoff 
with  the  Czar.  Sir  A.  Buchanan,  the  British  Ambassador 
in  Berlin,  informed  Lord  Russell  on  March  21,  1863  : 

Prince  HohenzoUern,  in  speaking  to  me  some  days  ago 
with  regret  of  the  foreign  policy  of  the  Prussian  Government, 
said  that  one  of  its  principal  objects  has  been  the  overthrow 
of  Prince  Gortchakoff,  whose  wish  to  promote  an  aUiance 
between  France  and  Russia  is,  they  believe,  the  only  obstacle 
in  the  way  of  re-establishing  the  relations  which  existed  be- 
tween the  three  Northern  Courts  previously  to  the  Crimean 
War. 


176  The  Problem  of  Poland 

Bismarck  exaggerated  to  the  Czar  the  scope,  character, 
and  consequences  of  the  Pohsh  revolt  to  the  utmost,  and 
while  France  and  England  expressed  their  sympathy  with 
the  Poles,  and  reproached  AVielopolski  for  his  blundering, 
Bismarck  hastened  to  demonstrate  his  attachment  to 
Eussia  and  his  devotion  to  the  Czar  by  offering  Prussia's 
assistance  in  combating  the  revolutionists.  On  January 
22,  1863,  the  first  sanguinary  encounter  took  place.  Ten 
days  later,  on  February  1,  General  Gustav  von  Alvensleben 
was  despatched  by  Prussia  to  the  Czar  with  proposals  for 
joint  action  against  the  Poles.  Sir  A.  Buchanan,  the  British 
Ambassador  in  Berhn,  telegraphed  on  February  12  to 
Earl  Kussell : 

Insurrection  in  Poland  extending,  and  numbers  of  Eus- 
sian  troops  said  to  be  insufficient  for  its  suppression.  .  .  . 
Two  corps  of  observation  are  forming  on  the  frontier,  and 
assistance,  if  required,  will  be  afforded  by  Prussia.  Bis- 
marck says  Prussia  will  never  permit  the  establishment  of 
an  independent  kingdom  of  Poland. 

Two  days  later  the  British  Ambassador  telegraphed  : 

.  .  .  General  Alvensleben,  who  is  now  in  Warsaw, 
having  arrived  there  two  days  ago  from  St.  Petersburg,  has 
concluded  a  military  convention  with  the  Eussian  Govern- 
ment, according  to  which  the  two  Governments  will  recipro- 
cally afford  facihties  to  each  other  for  the  suppression  of 
the  insurrectionary  movements  which  have  lately  taken 
place  in  Poland.  .  .  . 

The  Prussian  railways  are  also  to  be  placed  at  the  disposal 
of  the  Eussian  military  authorities  for  the  transport  of 
troops  through  Prussian  territory  from  one  part  of  the 
kingdom  of  Poland  to  another.  The  Government  further 
contemplate,  in  case  of  necessity,  to  give  military  assistance 
to  the  Eussian  Government  for  the  suppression  of  the 
insurrection  in  the  kingdom  ;  but  I  am  told  that  no  engage- 
ment has  yet  been  entered  into  with  respect  to  the  nature  or 
extent  of  such  assistance.  In  the  meanwhile,  however, 
four  corps  of  the  Prussian  Army  are  concentrating  on  the 


Great  Prohlems  of  British  Statesmanship     177 

frontiers  under  the  command  of  General  Waldersee,  whose 
headquarters  are  at  Posen. 

To  demonstrate  Prussia's  zeal  for  Eussia,  one  third  of 
the  Prussian  Army  was  placed  at  Eussia's  service  on  the 
Polish  frontier,  to  help  in  suppressing  the  rising  of  a  number 
of  men  armed  chiefly  with  scythes  and  pistols. 

For  reasons  given  in  these  pages,  Bismarck  was  alarmed 
by  the  possibility  that  the  Czar  might  establish  an  inde- 
pendent Poland  on  Prussia's  border.  Sir  A.  Buchanan,  the 
British  Ambassador  in  Berlin,  informed  Earl  Eussell  on 
February  14,  1863  : 

M.  de  Bismarck,  in  acquainting  me  a  few  days  ago  with 
his  intention  to  take  measures  in  concert  with  the  Eussian 
Government  to  prevent  the  extension  of  the  insurrectionary 
movements  which  have  lately  taken  place  in  Poland,  said 
the  question  was  of  vital  importance  to  Prussia,  as  her 
own  existence  would  be  seriously  compromised  by  the 
establishment  of  an  independent  kingdom  of  Poland.  I 
asked  whether  he  meant  to  say  that  if  Eussia  found  any 
difficulty  in  suppressing  the  insurrection,  the  Prussian 
Government  intended  to  afford  them  military  assistance  ; 
and  he  not  only  replied  in  the  affirmative,  but  added  that 
if  Eussia  got  tired  of  the  contest  and  were  disposed  to  with- 
draw from  the  kingdom — a  course  which  some  Eussians  were 
supposed  to  think  advantageous  to  her  interests — the 
Prussian  Government  would  carry  on  the  war  on  their  own 
account.  .  .  . 

The  Emperor  WilHam  the  First,  who  at  the  time  was 
only  King  of  Prussia,  frankly  said  to  the  British  Ambassador, 
according  to  his  telegram  on  February  22,  1863  : 

It  was  equally  the  duty  and  the  interest  of  Prussia 
to  do  everything  in  her  power  to  prevent  the  estab- 
lishment of  an  independent  Polish  kingdom,  for  if  the 
Polish  nation  could  reconstitute  themselves  as  an  indepen- 
dent State,  the  existence  of  Prussia  would  be  seriously 
menaced,  as  the  first  efforts  of  the  new  State  would  be  to 


178  The  Problem  of  Poland 

recover  Dantzig,  and  if  that  attempt  succeeded,  the  fata] 
consequences  to  Prussia  were  too  evident  to  require  him 
to  point  them  out. 

While  Prussia,  for  purely  selfish  reasons,  advocated  a 
policy  of  persecution  and  repression  towards  the  Poles, 
which  would  only  increase  their  resentment  to  the  advantage 
of  Eussia's  enemies,  Great  Britain,  following  her  traditional 
policy  of  disinterested  detachment  and  wise  humanity, 
recommended  once  more  the  adoption  of  a  liberal  policy 
towards  the  Poles  in  accordance  with  the  stipulations  of 
the  Treaty  of  Vienna.  Earl  Kussell  sent  to  the  British 
Ambassador  in  Petrograd  on  March  2,  1863,  the  following 
most  remarkable  despatch : 

My  Lord, — Her  Majesty's  Government  view  with  the 
deepest  concern  the  state  of  things  now  existing  in  the 
kingdom  of  Poland.  They  see  there,  on  the  one  side,  a 
large  mass  of  the  population  in  open  insurrection  against 
the  Government,  and,  on  the  other,  a  vast  military  force 
employed  in  putting  that  insurrection  down.  The  natural 
and  probable  result  of  such  a  contest  must  be  expected  to 
be  the  success  of  the  military  forces.  But  that  success,  if 
it  is  to  be  achieved  by  a  series  of  bloody  conflicts,  must  be 
attended  by  a  lamentable  effusion  of  blood,  by  a  deplorable 
sacrifice  of  life,  by  widespread  desolation,  and  by  impoverish- 
ment and  ruin,  which  it  would  take  a  long  course  of  years 
to  repair. 

Moreover,  the  acts  of  violence  and  destruction  on  both 
sides,  which  are  sure  to  accompany  such  a  struggle,  must 
engender  mutual  hatreds  and  resentments  which  will  em- 
bitter, for  generations  to  come,  the  relations  between  the 
Russian  Government  and  the  Polish  race.  Yet,  however 
much  Her  Majesty's  Government  might  lament  the  existence 
of  such  a  miserable  state  of  things  in  a  foreign  country, 
they  would  not,  perhaps,  deem  it  expedient  to  give  formal 
expression  of  their  sentiments  were  it  not  that  there  are 
peculiarities  in  the  present  state  of  things  in  Poland  which 
take  them  out  of  the  usual  and  ordinary  condition  of  such 
affairs. 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     179 

The  kingdom  of  Poland  was  constituted  and  placed  in 
connection  with  the  Kussian  Empire  by  the  Treaty  of  1815, 
to  which  Great  Britain  was  a  contracting  party.  The  present 
disastrous  state  of  things  is  to  be  traced  to  the  fact  that 
Poland  is  not  in  the  condition  in  which  the  stipulations  of 
that  Treaty  require  that  it  should  be  placed.  Neither  is 
Poland  in  the  condition  in  which  it  was  placed  by  the  Emperor 
Alexander  I,  by  whom  that  Treaty  was  made.  During 
his  reign  a  National  Diet  sat  at  Warsaw  and  the  Poles  of 
the  kingdom  of  Poland  enjoyed  privileges  fitted  to  secure 
their  political  welfare.  Since  1832,  however,  a  state  of 
uneasiness  and  discontent  has  been  succeeded  from  time 
to  time  by  violent  commotion  and  a  useless  effusion  of  blood. 
Her  Majesty's  Government  are  aware  that  the  immediate 
cause  of  the  present  insurrection  was  the  conscription  lately 
enforced  upon  the  Polish  population  ;  but  that  measure 
itself  is  understood  to  have  been  levelled  at  the  deeply- 
rooted  discontent  prevailing  among  the  Poles  in  consequence 
of  the  political  condition  of  the  kingdom  of  Poland. 

The  proprietors  of  land  and  the  middle  classes  in  the 
towns  bore  that  condition  with  impatience,  and  if  the 
peasantry  were  not  equally  disaffected  they  gave  little 
support  or  strength  to  the  Eussian  Government.  Great 
Britain,  therefore,  as  a  party  to  the  Treaty  of  1815,  and  as  a 
Power  deeply  interested  in  the  tranquillity  of  Europe,  deems 
itself  entitled  to  express  its  opinion  upon  the  events  now 
taking  place,  and  is  anxious  to  do  so  in  the  most  friendly 
spirit  towards  Kussia,  and  with  a  sincere  desire  to  promote 
the  interest  of  all  the  parties  concerned.  Why  should  not 
His  Imperial  Majesty,  whose  benevolence  is  generally  and 
cheerfully  acknowledged,  put  an  end  at  once  to  this  bloody 
conflict  by  proclaiming  mercifully  an  immediate  and  un-' 
conditional  amnesty  to  his  revolted  Polish  subjects,  and 
at  the  same  time  announce  his  intention  to  replace  without 
delay  his  kingdom  of  Poland  in  possession  of  the  political 
and  civil  privileges  which  were  granted  to  it  by  the  Emperor 
Alexander  I  in  execution  of  the  stipulations  of  the  Treaty 
of  1815  ?  If  this  were  done  a  National  Diet  and  a  National 
Administration  would  in  all  probability  content  the  Poles 
and  satisfy  European  opinion. 


180  The  Problem  of  Poland 

You  will  read  this  despatch  to  Prince  Gortchakoff  and 
give  him  a  copy  of  it. 

Earl  Eussell's  wise  suggestions  were  sympathetically 
received  at  Petrograd,  and  on  March  31,  Czar  Alexander 
published  in  the  Journal  de  St.  Petershourg  a  manifesto 
in  which  he  stated  that  he  did  not  desire  to  hold  the  Polish 
nation  responsible  for  the  rebellion,  and  promised  to  intro- 
due  a  systejn  of  local  self-government  in  Poland,  admonishing 
the  rebels  to  lay  down  their  arms.  Unfortunately,  they  did 
not  do  so.  A  prolonged  campaign  was  necessary  to 
re-establish  order  in  Poland,  and  meanwhile  the  Czar  had 
been  so  much  embittered  through  the  agitation  of  the 
Eussian  reactionaries  and  their  Prussian  friends,  and  by 
the  foUies  of  some  of  the  Polish  leaders,  that  he  deprived 
Poland  of  her  constitution.  Urged  on  by  the  statesmen  at 
Berlin,  another  period  of  repression  began.  On  February 
23,  1868,  Poland  was  absolutely  incorporated  with  Eussia, 
and  the  use  of  the  Polish  language  in  public  places  and  for 
public  purposes  was  prohibited. 

Ever  since,  Bismarck  and  his  successors  have  endeavoured 
to  create  bad  blood  between  Eussia  and  her  Polish  citizens, 
being  desirous  of  retaining  Eussia's  support  at  a  time  when 
she  was  drifting  towards  France.  Solely  with  the  object 
of  demonstrating  to  Eussia  the  danger  of  the  Polish  agitation 
Bismarck  introduced  in  1886  his  Polish  Settlement  Bill, 
by  which,  to  the  exasperation  of  the  Prussian  Poles,  vast 
territories  were  bought  from  Polish  landowners  and  German 
peasants  settled  on  them.  When  the  Conservative  party 
wished  to  oppose  that  policy  in  the  Prussian  Parliament 
as  being  unpractical,  its  leader  was,  according  to  Professor 
Delbriick's  testimony,  expressed  in  his  book  '  Eegierung 
und  Volkswille,'  urged  by  the  Chancellor  to  vote  for  the  Bill 
because  its  passage  was  necessary  '  for  reasons  of  foreign 
policy.' 

During  a  century  and  a  half  Eussia's  Polish  policy  has 
been  made  in  Germany.     During  150  years  Eussia  has  perse- 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     181 

cuted  and  outraged  the  Poles  at  Prussia's  bidding  and  for 
Prussia's  benefit.  The  confidential  diplomatic  evidence 
given  in  these  pages  makes  that  point  absolutely  clear. 

Until  recent  times  Kussia  was  a  very  backward  nation, 
and,  not  urmaturally,  she  endeavoured  to  learn  the  arts  of 
government  and  of  civilisation  from  Germany,  her  nearest 
neighbour.  Unfortunately,  Germany  did  not  prove  a 
fair  and  unselfish  friend  to  Eussia.  Germany  aimed  not 
so  much  at  advancing  Eussia  as  at  benefiting  herself. 
German  rulers  and  statesmen  saw  in  the  Eussians  good- 
natured  savages  to  be  exploited.  Impecunious  German 
princes  and  noblemen  went  to  Eussia  to  make  a  fortune, 
and  poor  German  princesses  married  Eussian  princes. 
Thus  German  influence  became  supreme  not  only  in  the 
Eussian  Army  and  Administration,  but  even  within  the 
Imperial  Family. 

During  150  years  German  influence  was  supreme  in 
Eussian  society.  While,  during  this  period,  Prussia,  and 
afterwards  Germany,  unceasingly  urged  Eussia  to  oppress 
and  ill-treat  her  Poles,  England  consistently  recommended 
Eussia  to  adopt  liberal  treatment  as  being  in  Eussia's 
interest. 

One  of  the  first  British  diplomatic  despatches  dealing 
with  the  partition  of  Poland  is  that  of  Mr.  Thomas  Wroughton, 
dated  June  15,  1763,  and  given  in  these  pages.  In  that 
remarkable  document  the  forecast  was  made  that  Eussia 
would  scarcely  consent  to  a  partition  of  Poland,  partly 
because  such  a  partition  would  strengthen  Prussia  too 
much,  partly  because  an  independent  Poland  would  form 
an  efficient  buffer  State  between  herself  and  the  Western 
Powers.  He  wrote  :  '  Eussia  is  inattackable  on  that  side 
at  present,  which  she  would  not  be  if  she  appropriated  to 
herself  that  barrier.'  Since  then  Eussia  has  more  than 
once  had  occasion  to  regret  that  she  was  the  direct  neighbour 
of  Prussia,  and  that  she  had  given  large  Polish  districts 
to  that  country. 

Soon  after  the  beginning  of  the  present  War  the  Grand 


182  The  Problem  of  Poland 

Duke   Nicholas,   the   Commander-in-Chief  of  the   Eussian 
forces,  addressed  an  appeal  to  the  Poles  of  Kussia,  Germany, 
and    Austria-Hungary    in   which    he    promised    them    the 
re-creation  of  a  kingdom  of  Poland,  comprising  all  Poles 
dwelling    within    Eussia,    Austria,    and    Germany,    under 
Eussia's    protection.     The    full    text    of    that    remarkable 
manifesto  will  be  found  in  the  chapter  '  The  Problem  of 
Austria-Hungary.'     The  enemies  of  Eussia  have  sneeringly 
described  that  document  as  a  death-bed  repentance,  and 
have  complained  that  it  was  not  issued  by  the  Czar  himself. 
Of  course,  the  Grand  Duke  acted  in  the  name  and  on  behalf 
of  the  Czar.     That  needs  no  explanation.     If  the  Czar  was 
not  of  the  Grand  Duke's  mind  he  would  of  course  have 
disavowed    him.     Besides,    Eussia's    resolve    to    give    full 
liberty  to  the  Poles  was  not  born  from  the  stress  of  the  War. 
It  was  formed  long  ago.     However,  it  was  obviously  imprac- 
ticable to  give  full  self-government  to  the  Eussian  Poles 
without  laying  the  foundation  of  a  Greater  Poland.     Hence 
such  a  step  on  Eussia's  part  would  have  met  with  the  most 
determined  opposition  and  hostility  in  Germany  and  Austria- 
Hungary,  and  it  would  most  probably  have  been  treated 
as  casus  belli.     Lord  Cowley,  the  British  Ambassador  in 
Paris,  informed    Earl  Eussell,  on  March  26,   1863,    '  The 
Eussian  Government  could  make  no  concessions  of  any 
value  to  the  Polish  Provinces  which  would  not  lay  the 
foundation    of    the   re-establishment   of    the   kingdom    of 
Poland.'     Lord  Napier,  the  British  Ambassador  in  Petro- 
grad,  informed  his  Government  on  April  6,  1863,  that  '  The 
restoration  of  the  Polish  State  on  the  basis  of  nationaUty 
will  assuredly  not  be  effected  while  the  strength  of  Eussia 
and    Germany    remains    unbroken.     During   the    struggle, 
whatever  may  be  the  fate  of  Poland,  the  frontier  of  France 
would  be  pushed  to  the  Ehine.'     That  remarkable  prophecy 
seems  likely  to  come  true. 

Formerly  there  was  no  Polish  nation.  The  Poles  consisted 
of  150,000  nobles  and  of  many  millions  of  ill-treated  serfs. 
Hard  times  and  misfortune  have  welded  the  Poles  into  a 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     183 

nation.  The  property-less  serfs  have  become  prosperous 
farmers,  and  the  people  of  the  middle  and  of  the  upper 
class  have  become  earnest  workers.  Between  1900  and 
1912  the  deposits  in  the  Polish  Co-operative  Societies  have 
increased  from  £12,420,057  to  £46,970,354.  In  every 
walk  of  life  Poles  have  achieved  most  remarkable  successes. 
Although  education  among  the  Poles,  especially  among 
those  in  Eussia  and  Austria-Hungary,  is  still  extremely 
backward — there  are  only  two  Polish  universities — the 
Poles  have  created  a  most  wonderful  literature.  The  Polish 
hterature  is  the  richest  among  the  Slavonic  Hteratures,  and  it 
need  not  fear  comparison  with  any  of  the  Western  literatures. 
In  music  and  in  science  also  Poles  have  accomplished  great 
things.  Among  the  leading  modern  writers  is  Sienkiewicz, 
among  the  greatest  living  musicians  is  Paderewski,  among 
the  leading  living  scientists  is  Madame  Curie-Sklodowska. 
Formerly,  the  Poles  were  thriftless  and  incompetent  in 
business  and  agriculture.  How  wonderfully  they  have 
changed  may  be  seen  from  the  fact  that  in  the  Eastern 
Provinces  of  Germany  they  are  rapidly  ousting  the  Germans, 
although  these  receive  most  powerful  support  from  the 
State.  Notwithstanding  the  enormous  purchases  of  land 
made  under  the  Settlement  Acts,  by  which  £35,000,000 
have  been  devoted  to  the  purchase  of  Polish  land  for  German 
farmers,  the  Germans  have  on  balance  since  the  year  1896 
lost  250,000  acres  of  land  to  the  Poles  in  the  PoHsh  districts. 

The  Poles  are  to  a  certain  extent  to  blame  for  their 
misfortunes.  In  the  past  they  have  lacked  self-command 
and  a  sense  of  proportion.  It  is  noteworthy  that  during 
the  revolution  of  1863  Polish  leaders  published  in  Paris 
maps  of  an  independent  Poland,  which  comprised  large 
and  purely  Kussian  districts  with  towns  such  as  Kieff,  on 
the  ground  of  historical  right.  Yet  Kieff  was  the  cradle  of  the 
Kussian  Orthodox  faith. 

In  Western  Eussia,  in  Eastern  Prussia,  and  in  Galicia, 
there  dwell  about  20,000,000  Poles.  If  the  War  should 
end,  as  it  is  Hkely  to  end,  in  a  complete  victory  of  the 


184  The  Problem  oj  Poland 

Allies,  a  powerful  independent  State  of  Poland  will  arise. 
The  united  Poles  will  receive  full  self-government  under  the 
protection  of  Kussia.  They  will  be  enabled  to  develop 
their  nationahty,  but  it  seems  scarcely  hkely  that  they 
will  separate  themselves  entirely  from  Kussia.  Their 
position  will  probably  resemble  that  of  Quebec  in  Canada, 
and  if  the  Eussians  and  Poles  act  wisely  they  will  live  as 
harmoniously  together  as  do  the  French-speaking  '  habit- 
ants '  of  Quebec,  and  the  English-speaking  men  of  the 
other  provinces  of  Canada.  Federation  should  prove  a  guar- 
antee of  freedom  and  a  bond  between  the  two  peoples. 

Kussia  need  not  fear  that  Poland  will  make  herself 
entirely  independent,  and  only  the  most  hot-headed  and 
short-sighted  Poles  can  wish  for  complete  independence. 
Poland,  having  developed  extremely  important  manufac- 
turing industries,  requires  large  free  markets  for  their  output. 
Her  natural  market  is  Kussia,  for  Germany  has  industrial 
centres  of  her  own.  She  can  expect  to  have  the  free  use 
of  the  precious  Kussian  markets  only  as  long  as  she  forms 
part  of  that  great  State.  At  present,  a  spirit  of  the  heartiest 
goodwill  prevails  between  Kussians  and  Poles.  The  old 
quarrels  and  grievances  have  been  forgotten  in  the  common 
struggle.  The  moment  is  most  auspicious  for  the  resur- 
rection of  Poland. 

While  Prussia  has  been  guilty  of  the  partition  of  Poland, 
Kussia  is  largely  to  blame  for  the  repeated  revolts  and 
insurrection  of  her  Polish  citizens.  The  late  Lord  Salisbury, 
who  as  a  staunch  Conservative  could  scarcely  be  described 
as  an  admirer  of  the  Poles,  and  who  in  his  essay  '  Poland,' 
printed  in  1863,  treated  their  claims  rather  with  contempt 
than  with  sympathy,  wrote  in  its  concluding  pages  : 

Since  1815  the  misgovernment  of  Poland  has  not  only 
been  constant  but  growing.  And  with  the  misgovernment 
the  discontent  has  been  growing  in  at  least  an  equal  ratio. 
Yet  they  ought  not  to  have  been  a  difficult  race  to  rule. 
The  very  abuses  to  which  they  had  been  for  centuries  exposed 
should  have  made  the  task  of  satisfying  them  easy. 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     185 

Kussian  statesmen  might  well  bear  in  mind  the  recom- 
mendations of  that  great  statesman  as  to  the  way  by  which 
Eussia  might  satisfy  her  Poles.     Lord  Salisbury  wrote  : 

The  best  that  can  be  hoped  for  Poland  is  an  improved 
condition  under  Eussian  rule.  The  conditions  which  are 
needed  to  reconcile  the  Poles  to  a  Eussian  Sovereign  are 
manifest  enough  and  do  not  seem  very  hard  to  be  observed. 
The  Poles  have  not  only  been  oppressed  but  insulted,  and  in 
their  condition  insult  is  harder  to  put  up  with  than  oppres- 
sion. A  nation  which  is  under  a  foreign  yoke  is  sensitive 
upon  the  subject  of  nationality.  ...  If  Eussia  would  rule 
the  Poles  in  peace  she  must  defer  to  a  sensibility  which 
neither  coaxing  nor  severity  will  cure.  All  the  substance  of 
power  may  be  exercised  as  well  through  Polish  administra- 
tors as  through  Eussian.  The  union  between  the  two 
countries  may  for  practical  purposes  be  complete,  though 
every  legal  act  and  every  kind  of  scholastic  instruction  be 
couched  in  the  Polish  language. 

It  would  be  hazardous,  and  it  would  probably  be  foolish, 
to  separate  Poland  completely  from  Eussia.  Poland  has 
grown  into  Eussia  and  Eussia  into  Poland.  After  all,  it  can- 
not be  expected  that  Eussia  will  abandon  her  principal  and 
most  promising  industrial  district  with  two  of  her  largest 
towns.  In  politics  one  should  endeavour  to  achieve  only 
the  practical.  The  question  therefore  arises  :  How  much 
self-government  will  Eussia  grant  to  Poland  ?  Will  she 
give  her  a  separate  legislation,  taxation,  post  office,  coinage, 
finances,  army  ?  The  arrangement  of  these  details  may 
prove  somewhat  difficult.  It  is  to  be  hoped  that  during 
the  negotiations  between  Poles  and  Eussians  regarding 
a  settlement  the  Poles  will  endeavour  to  be  cool  and 
reasonable,  and  that  the  Eussians  will  be  trusting  and 
generous.  Happily,  a  spirit  of  hearty  goodwill  is  abroad 
in  Eussia. 

The  greatest  grievance  of  the  Polish  nation  is  not  that 
it  lives  under  foreign  rule,  but  that  it  lives  under  oppression, 
iand  that  it  has  been  parcelled  out  among  several  States. 


186  The  Problem  of  Poland 

Owing  to  the  partition  of  Poland,  Poles  have  been  taught 
to  consider  as  enemies  men  of  their  own  nationality  living 
across  the  border,  and  they  have  been  compelled  by  their 
rulers  to  slaughter  each  other. 

In  the  Great  War  more  than  a  million  Polish  soldiers 
have  been  engaged  against  their  will  in  a  fratricidal  war. 
That  terrible  fact  alone  constitutes  a  most  powerful  claim 
upon  all  men's  sympathy  and  generosity. 

Although  Kussia  has  in  times  past  treated  the  Poles 
far  more  harshly  than  has  Prussia,  and  although  the  Ger- 
man Poles  are  far  more  prosperous  than  are  the  Eussian,  the 
Poles  see  their  principal  enemy  not  in  Eussia  but  in  Prussia. 
After  all,  the  Eussian  is  their  brother  Slav,  and  they  are 
proud  of  their  big  brother.  Besides,  they  recognise  that 
Eussia  has  been  misguided  by  Prussia,  and  that  Prussia 
was  largely  responsible  for  Poland's  partition  and  for 
Eussia's  anti-Polish  policy.  The  bitterness  with  which 
the  Prussian  Poles  hate  Prussia  may  be  seen  from  the 
Polish  newspapers  published  in  Germany,  which,  during 
many  years,  have  successfully  advocated  the  policy  of  boy- 
cotting Germans  and  everything  German,  both  in  business 
and  in  society.  The  Dziennik  Kujawski  of  Hohensalza 
wrote  on  January  18,  1901  : 

To-morrow  the  kingdom  of  Prussia  celebrates  the  second 
century  of  its  existence.  We  cannot  manifest  our  joy, 
because  Prussia's  power  has  been  erected  chiefly  upon  the 
ruins  of  ancient  Poland.  Prussia's  history  consists  of  a 
number  of  conquests  made  by  force  and  in  accordance  with 
the  old  Prussian  principle  revived  by  Bismarck,  '  Might  is 
better  than  right.'  Prussia's  glory  has  been  bought  with 
much  blood  and  tears,  and  she  owes  her  existence  chiefly 
to  Poland's  destruction. 

In  the  Gazeta  Gdanska  of  November  24,  1906,  published 
in  Dantzig,  we  read  : 

The  Prussian  and  the  Eussian. — If  one  asks  a  Pole 
whether  he   would   rather  live   under   German  or  under 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     187 

Russian  rule,  his  reply  will  be  '  I  would  a  hundred  times 
rather  have  to  do  with  Russians  than  with  Germans,  and 
the  Prussians  are  the  worst  of  Germans.'  Many  Poles  will 
scarcely  be  able  to  tell  why  they  hate  the  Prussians.  Many 
will  find  their  preference  illogical.  Still  it  is  there.  From 
the  fullness  of  the  heart  speaketh  the  mouth.  After  all,  the 
worst  Russian  is  a  better  fellow  than  the  very  best  German. 
That  feeling  lies  in  our  blood.  The  Russian  is  our  Slavonic 
brother,  and  in  his  heart  of  hearts  every  Pole  is  glad  if  his 
brother  is  prospering  and  when  he  can  tell  the  world  '  There 
you  see  our  common  Slavonic  blood.'  The  more  we  hate 
the  Prussians,  the  more  we  love  the  Russians. 

The  Gazeta  Grudzionska,  of  Graudenz,  wrote  in  March 
1899: 

Take  heed,  you  PoHsh  women  and  Polish  girls  !  Polish 
women  and  Polish  girls  are  the  strongest  protectors  of  our 
nationality.  The  Poles  can  be  Germanised  only  when 
Germanism  crosses  our  Polish  doorstep,  but  that  will  never 
happen,  if  God  so  wills  it,  as  long  as  Polish  mothers,  Polish 
wives,  and  Polish  maids  are  found  in  our  houses.  They  will 
not  allow  Poland's  enemies  to  enter.  For  a  Pohsh  woman 
it  is  a  disgrace  to  marry  a  German  or  to  visit  German  places 
of  amusement  or  German  festivals.  As  long  as  the  Polish 
wife  watches  over  her  husband  and  takes  care  that  he  bears 
himself  always  and  everywhere  as  a  Pole,  as  long  as  she 
watches  over  his  home  and  preserves  it  as  a  stronghold  of 
Polonism,  as  long  as  a  Polish  Cathohc  newspaper  is  kept  in 
it,  and  as  long  as  the  Polish  mother  teaches  her  children  to 
pray  to  God  for  our  beloved  Poland  in  the  Polish  language, 
so  long  Poland's  enemies  will  labour  in  vain. 

Innumerable  similar  extracts  might  easily  be  given. 

When  the  peace  conditions  come  up  for  discussion  at 
the  Congress  which  will  bring  the  present  War  to  an  end, 
the  problem  of  Poland  will  be  one  of  the  greatest  difficulty 
and  importance.  Austria-Hungary  has  comparatively  little 
interest  in  retaining  her  Poles.  The  Austrian  Poles  dwell 
in  Galicia  outside  the  great  rampart  of  the   Carpathian 


188  The  Problem  of  Poland 

mountains,  which  form  the  natural  frontier  of  the  Dual 
Monarchy  towards  the  north-east.  The  loss  of  Galicia, 
with  its  oilfields  and  mines  may  be  regrettable  to  Austria- 
Hungary,  but  it  will  not  affect  her  very  seriously.  To 
Germany,  on  the  other  hand,  the  loss  of  the  Polish  districts 
will  be  a  fearful  blow.  The  supreme  importance  which 
Germany  attaches  to  the  Polish  problem  may  be  seen 
from  this,  that  Bismarck  thought  it  the  only  question 
which  could  lead  to  an  open  breach  between  Germany 
and  Austria-Hungary.  According  to  Crispi's  Memoirs, 
Bismarck  said  to  the  Italian  statesman  on  September  17, 
1877: 

There  could  be  but  one  cause  for  a  breach  in  the  friend- 
ship that  unites  Austria  and  Germany,  and  that  would  be 
a  disagreement  between  the  two  Governments  concerning 
Polish  policy.  ...  If  a  Polish  rebellion  should  break  out 
and  Austria  should  lend  it  her  support,  we  should  be  obliged 
to  assert  ourselves.  We  cannot  permit  the  reconstruction 
of  a  Catholic  kingdom  so  near  at  hand.  It  would  be  a 
northern  France.  We  have  one  France  to  look  to  already, 
and  a  second  would  become  the  natural  ally  of  the  first, 
and  we  should  find  ourselves  entrapped  between  two 
enemies. 

The  resurrection  of  Poland  would  injure  us  in  other 
ways  as  well.  It  could  not  come  about  without  the  loss  of  a 
part  of  our  territory.  We  cannot  possibly  relinquish  either 
Posen  or  Dantzig,  because  the  German  Empire  would  remain 
exposed  on  the  Russian  frontier,  and  we  should  lose  an  outlet 
on  the  Baltic. 

In  the  event  of  Germany's  defeat  a  large  slice  of  Poland, 
including  the  wealthiest  parts  of  Silesia,  with  gigantic  coal 
mines,  ironworks,  &c.,  might  be  taken  away  from  her; 
and  if  the  Poles  should  recover  their  ancient  province  of 
West  Prussia,  with  Dantzig,  Prussia's  hold  upon  East 
Prussia,  with  Koenigsberg,  would  be  threatened.  The 
loss  of  her  Polish  districts  would  obviously  greatly  reduce 
Germany's    military    strength    and    economic    power.    It 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     189 

may  therefore  be  expected  that  Germany  will  move  heaven 
and  earth  against  the  re-creation  of  the  kingdom  of  Poland, 
and  that  she  will  strenuously  endeavour  to  create  differences 
between  Kussia  and  her  Allies.  The  statesmen  of  Europe 
should  therefore,  in  good  time,  firmly  make  up  their  minds 
as  to  the  future  of  Poland. 


CHAPTEK  VI 

THE    GERMAN    EMPEROR's    POSITION 

While  many  people  have  discussed  whether  Germany  was 
responsible  for  the  War,  nobody  has  inquired  whether  the 
German  Emperor,  in  declaring  war  upon  Eussia  and  France, 
acted  in  accordance  with  the  German  Constitution,  or 
whether  he  exceeded  his  powers. 

It  is  fairly  generally  assumed  that  the  Emperor  was 
entitled  to  make  war  upon  the  two  countries — that  the 
question  of  war  and  peace  lay  within  his  discretion.  In 
the  following  pages  it  will  be  shown  that  the  Emperor 
exceeded  his  carefully  limited  powers — that  he  acted  un- 
constitutionally. 

The  question  whether  the  Emperor  acted  constitutionally 
or  unconstitutionally  is  not  merely  a  professorial  but  a 
very  practical  one.  British  statesmen  and  rulers  enjoy 
a  very  great  latitude  because  the  British  Constitution  is 
unwritten.  They  can  either  find  for  their  action  some 
precedent  in  the  past  or  construct  a  precedent  from  the 
past.  In  case  of  need  they  can  create  a  new  precedent, 
and  the  question  whether  their  action  was  constitutional 
or  not  is  one  which  may  be  discussed  by  experts  in  con- 
stitutional law,  but  is  incomprehensible  for  the  broad  masses 
of  the  people.  In  Germany  matters  are  different.  All 
citizens  are  familiar  with  the  written  Constitution,  with 
which  they  are  made  acquainted  in  the  schools.  Popular 
editions  with  explanations  can  be  bought  in  every  book- 
shop for  a  few  pence,  while  the  educated  are  acquainted 
with  the  commentaries  on  the  Constitution  by  Laband, 

190 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     191 

Arndt,  and  many  other  writers.  The  question  whether 
the  Emperor,  in  making  war  upon  Eussia  and  France,  acted 
constitutionally  or  unconstitutionally  may  in  due  course 
become  a  very  urgent  one.  The  German  people  do  not 
object  to  unconstitutional  action  on  the  part  of  their  rulers 
if  the  measures  taken  prove  successful  and  beneficial. 
That  may  be  seen  by  the  ease  with  which  the  Prussian 
Diet  passed  an  Act  of  Indemnity  with  regard  to  Bismarck's 
Government  in  opposition  to  the  will  of  Parliament,  when 
the  victory  of  1866  over  Austria  had  proved  that  the  Prussian 
Government  had  been  right  in  increasing  the  army  very 
considerably  against  the  will  of  Parliament.  Nothing  is  as 
successful  as  success.  If,  however,  the  present  War  should 
end  in  Germany's  defeat  the  German  people  will  not  only 
ask  whether  Germany  commenced  the  War,  but  whether 
the  German  Emperor,  in  declaring  war,  acted  lawfully  or 
unlawfully,  and  he  may  be  held  to  account. 

The  widely  held  belief  that  Germany  is  a  highly  cen- 
tralised State,  that  William  the  Second  is  the  sovereign  and 
the  practically  unlimited  ruler  of  the  country  is  erroneous. 
Germany  is  a  federation  of  independent  States.  The  sov- 
ereignty of  the  empire  reposes  not  in  the  King  of  Prussia, 
but  in  the  allied  States  themselves.  The  King  of  Prussia, 
being  the  most  powerful  of  the  German  monarchs,  is  merely 
the  hereditary  president  of  the  Federation.  The  best  defi- 
nition of  the  German  Empire  has,  perhaps,  been  given  by 
President  Wilson  in  his  book  '  The  State,'  in  which  we  read  : 

The  German  Empire  is  a  Federal  State  composed  of 
four  kingdoms,  seven  grand-duchies,  four  duchies,  seven 
principalities,  three  free  cities,  and  the  Imperial  domain  of 
Alsace-Lorraine,  these  lands  being  united  in  a  great '  corpora- 
tion of  public  law  '  under  the  hereditary  Presidency  of  the 
King  of  Prussia.  Its  Emperor  is  its  President,  not  its 
Monarch.  .  .  .  The  new  Empire  bears  still,  in  its  constitu- 
tion, distinctest  traces  of  its  derivation.  It  is  still  a  dis- 
tinctly Federal  rather  than  unitary  State,  and  the  Emperor 
is  still  only  its  constitutional  President.    As  Emperor  he 


192  The  German  Emperor^ s  Position 

occupies  not  an  hereditary  throne,  but  only  an  hereditary 
office.  Sovereignty  does  not  reside  in  him,  but  '  in  the 
union  of  German  Federal  Princes  and  the  free  cities.'  He  is 
the  chief  officer  of  a  great  political  corporation.  .  .  .  It  is  a 
fundamental  conception  of  the  German  constitution  that 
'  the  body  of  German  sovereigns,  together  with  the  Senates 
of  the  three  free  cities,  considered  as  a  unit — tanquam  unum 
corfus — is  the  repository  of  Imperial  sovereignty.' 

The  fact  that  the  German  Emperor  is  not  the  sovereign 
of  the  Empire  but  merely  its  hereditary  President,  that 
the  Imperial  power  is  possessed  by  the  allied  States  them- 
selves, is  known  to  almost  every  German.  In  the  last 
issue  of  '  Meyer's  Encyclopedia  '  we  read  : 

According  to  the  Imperial 'Constitution  of  the  16th  April, 
1871,  the  German  Empire  is  '  an  everlasting  confederation  ' 
which  the  German  Princes  and  free  towns  have  concluded 
'  for  the  protection  of  the  territory  of  the  confederation  and 
the  rights  thereof  as  well  as  for  the  promotion  of  the  welfare 
of  the  German  people.'  The  Imperial  power  is  possessed 
by  the  Allied  States.  Their  organ  is  the  Federal  Council. 
The  Presidency  of  the  Confederation  belongs  to  the  Prussian 
Crown.  The  Presidential  rights  are  a  Prussian  privilege, 
and  they  are  enumerated  in  the  German  Constitution.  With 
the  Presidency  of  the  Confederation  is  connected  the  title 
German  Emperor,  not  Emperor  of  Germany,  for  the  Emperor 
is  not  sovereign  of  the  Empire.  He  exercises  his  powers 
'  in  the  name  of  the  Empire  '  or  '  in  the  name  of  the  Allied 
Governments.' 

If  we  wish  to  discover  whether  the  Emperor,  in  making 
war  upon  Eussia  and  France,  acted  constitutionally  or 
unconstitutionally,  we  should  study  the  text  of  the  German 
Constitution  and  the  commentaries  upon  that  document 
by  the  most  authorised  statesmen  and  professors,  and 
especially  by  the  alHed  sovereigns  themselves.  The  preamble 
of  the  Constitution  states  : 

His  Majesty  the  King  of  Prussia  in  the  name  of  the  North 
German  Confederation,  His  Majesty  the  King  of  Bavaria, 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     193 

His  Majesty  the  King  of  Wiirtemberg,  His  Eoyal  Highness 
the  Grand  Duke  of  Baden,  and  His  Eoyal  Highness  the 
Grand  Duke  of  Hesse  and  by  Ehine,  for  those  parts  of 
the  Grand  Duchy  of  Hesse  which  are  south  of  the  river 
Maine,  conclude  an  everlasting  Confederation  for  the  pro- 
tection of  the  Territory  of  the  Confederation  and  the  rights 
thereof,  as  well  as  for  the  promotion  of  the  welfare  of  the 
German  people.  This  Confederation  will  bear  the  name 
'  German  Empire.' 

It  should  carefully  be  noted  that  in  the  short  preamble 
it  is  expUcitly  stated  that  the  German  Empire  was  formed 
for  the  purpose  of  defence. 

The  fourth  chapter  of  the  Constitution,  which  is  super- 
scribed '  The  Presidency,'  consists  of  articles  eleven  to 
nineteen.    The  first  portion  of  article  eleven  reads  as  follows  : 

The  Presidency  of  the  Confederation  belongs  to  the 
King  of  Prussia,  who  bears  the  name  of  German  Emperor. 
The  Emperor  has  to  represent  the  Empire  internationally, 
to  declare  war,  and  to  conclude  peace  in  the  name  of  the 
Empire,  to  enter  into  alhances  and  other  treaties  with  Foreign 
Powers,  to  accredit  and  to  receive  Ambassadors. 

The  consent  of  the  Federal  Council  is  necessary  for  the 
declaration  of  war  in  the  name  of  the  Empire,  unless  an 
attack  on  the  territory  or  the  coast  of  the  Confederation 
has  taken  place. 

The  purely  defensive  character  of  the  German  Empire 
is  expressed  not  only  in  the  short  preamble  of  the  con- 
stitution, but  also  in  this  most  important  article  eleven,  from 
which  we  learn  that  the  German  Emperor  may  not  declare 
war  in  the  name  of  the  Empire  '  unless  an  attack  on  the 
territory  or  the  coast  of  the  Confederation  has  taken  jplace,' 
that  for  the  declaration  of  a  war  of  aggression,  *  the  consent 
of  the  Federal  Council  is  necessary.'  The  Federal  Council 
is  not  a  popular  representative  body,  but  a  body  which 
represents  all  the  individual  States  themselves.  In  other 
words,  the  Constitution  stipulates  that  the  German  Emperor 


194         The  German  Emperor'' s  Position 

may  make  war  only  if  Germany  has  actually  been  attacked, 
that  a  war  of  aggression  on  Germany's  part  can  be  effected 
only  by  the  will  of  the  individual  States  united  in  the  Federal 
Council. 

The  German  Empire  is  the  successor  of  the  North 
German  Confederation,  which  was  formed  by  Prussia, 
Saxony,  and  various  other  States  after  the  Prusso-Austrian 
war  of  1866.  The  German  Constitution  of  1871  is  almost 
word  for  word  the  same  Constitution  as  that  of  the  North 
German  Confederation  of  1867.  There  is  only  one  material 
and  important  difference  between  the  two  Constitutions. 
It  consists  in  the  alteration  which  was  made  in  the  most 
important  article  eleven.  That  article  was  worded  as 
follows  in  the  Constitution  of  the  North  German  Con- 
federation of  1867  : 

The  Presidency  of  the  Confederation  appertains  to  the 
Crown  of  Prussia,  which,  in  the  exercise  thereof,  has  the  right 
of  representing  the  Confederation  internationally,  of  declar- 
ing war  and  concluding  peace,  of  entering  into  Alliances  and 
other  Treaties  with  Foreign  States,  of  accrediting  and  receiv- 
ing Ambassadors  in  the  name  of  the  Confederation. 

The  King  of  Prussia,  as  President  of  the  North  German 
Confederation,  had  the  right  of  '  declaring  war  and  con- 
cluding peace.'  As  no  condition  was  attached,  he  could 
in  the  name  of  the  Confederation  declare  not  only  a  war 
of  defence  but  also  a  war  of  attack.  That  right  was  Umited 
four  years  later,  when  the  Prussian  King  and  German 
Emperor  was  restricted  to  declaring  war  only  if '  an  attack 
on  the  territory  or  the  coast  of  the  Confederation  has  taken 
place.'  The  war-making  power  of  the  King  of  Prussia 
was  thus  limited  by  the  express  wish  of  the  South  German 
sovereigns,  who  did  not  desire  to  be  dragged  into  a  war 
against  their  will,  who  had  seen  Prussia  victorious  in  three 
consecutive  wars,  and  possibly  feared  that  she  might  rashly 
embark  upon  another  war  which  might  have  a  less  fortunate 
result  than  the  previous  ones.     Besides,  the  South  German- 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     195 

sovereigns,  and  especially  the  King  of  Bavaria,  did  not 
wish  to  subordinate  themselves  to  the  King  of  Prussia. 
They  desired  that  the  King  of  Prussia  as  Emperor  should 
merely  be  "primus  inter  fares  and  that  the  fact  that  he  was 
not  Emperor  of  Germany  should  be  expressed  even  in  his 
title.  He  was  merely  to  be  German  Emperor.  Prince 
Bismarck  has  told  us  in  his  Memoirs  that  William  the 
First  objected  to  that  title.     He  wrote  : 

His  Majesty  raised  a  fresh  difficulty  when  we  were  fixing 
the  form  of  the  Imperial  title,  it  being  his  wish  to  be  called 
Emperor  of  Germany  if  Emperor  it  had  to  be.  .  .  .  In  the 
final  Conference  of  January  17,  1871,  he  declined  the 
designation  of  German  Emperor,  and  declared  that  he  would 
be  Emperor  of  Germany  or  no  Emperor  at  all.  ...  I 
urged  that  the  title  Emperor  of  Germany  involved  a  sovereign 
claim  to  the  non-Prussian  dominions  which  the  Princes  were 
not  inclined  to  allow  ;  that  it  was  suggested  in  the  letter 
from  the  King  of  Bavaria  that  '  the  exercise  of  the  Presiden- 
tial rights  should  be  associated  with  the  assumption  of  the 
title  of  German  Emperor.' 

The  Sovereigns  of  the  south,  and  especially  the  Bavarian 
King,  feared  that  they  might  become  mere  cyphers  under 
Prussia's  leadership,  that  their  independence  would  be 
lost,  that  their  individuality  would  be  entirely  merged  in 
the  German  Empire.  They  wished  to  have  their  position 
guaranteed  not  only  by  the  Constitution  but  also  by  binding- 
promises  made  by  Prince  Bismarck  on  behalf  of  Prussia. 
On  November  27,  1870,  Prince  Bismarck  wrote  to  King 
Ludwig  of  Bavaria  with  regard  to  the  proposed  creation 
of  a  German  Empire  : 

The  title  Gorman  Emperor  signifies  that  his  rights  have 
originated  from  the  voluntary  concession  of  the  German 
sovereigns  and  tribes.  History  teaches  that  the  great 
princely  houses  of  Germany  never  regarded  the  existence  of 
an  Emperor  elected  by  them  as  derogatory  to  their  high 
position  in  Europe. 


196  The  German  Emperor^ s  Position 

In  his  reply,  dated  December  2,  1870,  King  Ludwig 
wrote  to  Prince  Bismarck  : 

I  hope,  and  hope  with  assurance,  that  Bavaria  will  in 
the  future  preserve  her  independent  position,  for  it  is  surely- 
consistent  with  a  loyal  unreserved  Federal  policy,  and  it  will 
be  safest  to  obviate  a  pernicious  centralisation. 

Prince  Bismarck  wrote  in  answer  to  the  King : 

Your  Majesty  rightly  presumes  that  I  expect  no  salva- 
tion from  centrahsation,  that  I  perceive  in  that  very  main- 
tenance of  the  rights  which  the  Federal  Constitution  secures 
to  individual  members  of  the  Federation  the  form  of  develop- 
ment best  suited  to  the  German  spirit,  and,  at  the  same  time, 
the  surest  guarantee  against  the  dangers  to  which  law  and 
order  might  be  exposed  in  the  free  movement  of  the  poli- 
tical life  of  to-day.  The  hostile  position  taken  up  by  the 
Republican  party  throughout  Germany  in  regard  to  the 
re-establishment  of  the  Imperial  dignity,  through  the  ini- 
tiative of  your  Majesty  and  of  the  Federal  princes,  proves 
that  it  is  conducive  to  promoting  the  Conservative  and 
Monarchical  interests. 

The  King  of  Bavaria's  fears  and  doubts  regarding  the 
position  of  Prussia  were  not  entirely  dispelled  by  the  wording 
of  the  Constitution  and  by  Bismarck's  assurances.  Hence 
he  wrote  to  the  Imperial  Chancellor  on  July  31,  1874, 
regarding  the  Federal  principle,  and  in  reply  Bismarck 
wrote  on  August  10  : 

Apart  from  personal  guarantees,  your  Majesty  may 
securely  reckon  on  those  comprised  in  the  very  Constitu- 
tion of  the  Empire.  That  Constitution  rests  on  the  federal 
basis  accorded  in  the  treaties  of  federation,  and  it  cannot 
be  violated  without  breach  of  treaty.  Therein  the  Constitu- 
tion of  the  Empire  differs  from  every  national  Constitution. 
Your  Majesty's  rights  form  an  indissoluble  part  of  the 
Constitution  of  the  Empire.  They  rest  on  the  same  secure 
basis  of  law  as  all  the  institutions  of  the  Empire.  Germany, 
in  the  institution  of  its  Federal  Council,  and  Bavaria,  in  its 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     197 

dignified  and  intelligent  representation  on  that  Council, 
have  a  firm  guarantee  against  any  deterioration  or  exaggera- 
tion of  efforts  in  the  direction  of  unitarian  aspirations.  Your 
Majesty  will  be  able  to  place  the  fullest  confidence  in  the 
security  of  the  treaty-guarded  law  of  the  Constitution,  even 
when  I  no  longer  have  the  honour  of  serving  the  Empire  as 
Chancellor. 

Not  only  the  King  of  Bavaria  but  other  sovereigns  also 
wished  to  assert  their  independence  and  to  guard  them- 
selves against  being  dragged  into  a  war  against  their  will 
by  the  King  of  Prussia.  They  asserted  their  constitutional 
rights  on  suitable  occasions.  For  instance  on  June  7,  1875, 
at  the  time  when  it  was  believed  that  Bismarck  contem- 
plated an  attack  upon  France,  von  Mittnacht,  the  Wiirtem- 
berg  Prime  Minister,  wrote  to  Prince  Bismarck  : 

Germany  places  the  greatest  confidence  in  the  diplomatic 
representation  of  the  Empire  by  the  Emperor  and  in  the 
direction  of  Germany's  policy  by  your  Serene  Highness.  At 
the  same  time  it  should  be  pointed  out  that  for  a  declaration 
of  war  in  the  name  of  the  Empire  the  consent  of  the  Federal 
Council  is  required  unless  the  Federal  territory  is  threatened 
with  an  attack. 

Bismarck  essayed  to  define  the  position  of  the  Emperor 
and  that  of  the  other  sovereigns  of  Germany  not  only  in 
the  written  Constitution  and  in  confidential  letters  which 
he  exchanged  with  the  sovereigns  and  statesmen  of  the 
Southern  States,  but  also  in  public  speeches  on  the  Con- 
stitution. For  instance,  in  his  speech  in  the  Keichstag 
on  April  9,  1871,  he  expressly  stated  that  the  sovereignty 
of  the  Empire  was  not  in  the  hands  of  the  Emperor,  but 
in  those  of  the  Allied  Governments.    He  said  : 

I  believe  that  the  Federal  Council  has  a  great  future 
because  for  the  first  time  an  attempt  has  been  made  by  its 
creation  to  concentrate  power  in  a  federal  board  which 
exercises  the  sovereignty  of  the  whole  Empire  although  it 
does  not  deprive  the  individual  States  of  the  benefits  of 


198  The  Germcni  Emperor\s  Position 

the  Monarchical  Power  or  of  their  ancient  republican 
government.  The  sovereignty  of  the  German  Empire  does 
not  lie  in  the  hands  of  the  Emperor,  but  in  those  of  the 
allied  Governments  as  a  whole.  At  the  same  time  it  is 
useful  if  the  wisdom,  or,  if  you  like,  the  unwisdom,  of  twenty- 
five  individual  governments  is  brought  into  the  delibera- 
tions of  the  Federal  Council,  for  thus  we  obtain  a  variety 
of  views  which  we  have  never  had  within  the  Government 
of  any  single  State.  Prussia  is  great,  but  she  has  been  able 
to  learn  from  the  small  and  from  the  smallest  States,  and 
these  have  learned  from  us.  .  .  ,  My  experience  has 
taught  me  to  believe  that  I  have  made  considerable  progress 
in  my  political  education  by  participating  in  the  delibera- 
tions of  the  Federal  Council  owing  to  the  stimulating  friction 
provided  by  twenty-five  German  Governments,  and  thus 
I  have  learned  a  great  deal  in  addition.  Therefore  I  would 
ask  you  :  Do  not  touch  the  Federal  Council !  I  see  in  it 
a  kind  of  Palladium  of  our  future.  I  see  in  it  a  great  guar- 
antee for  Germany's  future. 

The  Chancellor  laid  particular  stress  upon  the  fact  that 
the  German  Empire  was  created  for  defence,  that  the 
existence  of  article  eleven,  quoted  in  the  beginning  of  this 
chapter,  guaranteed  Germany  against  a  wanton  war  of 
aggression.  In  his  speech  delivered  in  the  Eeichstag  on 
November  4,  1871,  he  stated  : 

A  strong  guarantee  for  the  peacefulness  of  the  new  Empire 
lies  in  this,  that  the  Emperor  has  renounced  the  unlimited 
right  to  declare  war  which  he  possessed  in  his  former  position 
as  King  of  Prussia.  In  this  renunciation  lies  a  strong  guar- 
antee against  a  wanton  war  of  aggression.  .  .  .  The  guaran- 
tee lies  in  this,  that  according  to  the  constitution  the  Federal 
Council  must  consent  to  a  war  of  aggression.  By  the  right 
given  to  it  by  the  Constitution  the  Federal  Council  cannot 
prevent  mobilisation,  but  it  can  prevent  a  declaration  of  war. 
It  cannot  prevent  preparation  for  war  which  the  Emperor 
has  recognised  to  be  necessary,  for  the  co-operation  of  the 
Federal  Council  is  only  required  in  the  action  of  declaring 
war  unless  the  war  is  purely  a  war  of  defence  which  has 
been  forced  upon  Germany  by  an  attack  upon  its  territories. 


Great  Problems  of  British  StatesmanshijJ     199 

In  this  respect  the  Federal  Council  may  be  compared  to  an 
enlarged  Cabinet. 

It  is  only  fair  to  add  that  Bismarck  did  not  disregard 
the  possibility  of  Germany  having  to  act  on  the  aggressive. 
Hence  he  added  : 

As  regards  the  theory  of  a  war  of  aggression  conducted 
by  Germany  for  the  purpose  of  defence  which  was  mentioned 
by  a  previous  speaker,  I  believe  that  the  attack  is  often  the 
most  efficient  form  of  defence.  It  has  been  a  frequent 
occurrence,  and  it  is  very  useful  for  a  country,  such  as 
Germany,  which  is  situated  in  the  centre  of  Europe  and 
which  can  be  attacked  from  three  or  four  directions.  It  may 
be  necessary  to  follow  the  example  set  by  Frederick  the  Great, 
who,  before  the  Seven  Years'  War,  did  not  wait  until  the 
net  in  which  he  was  to  be  caught  had  been  thrown  over 
his  head,  but  tore  it  to  pieces.  I  believe  that  those  are  in 
error  who  imagine  that  the  German  Empire  will  quietly  wait 
until  a  powerful  opponent  or  mighty  coalition  consider 
the  moment  favourable  for  an  attack.  Only  an  unskilful 
diplomacy  could  act  thus.  In  such  a  case  it  is  the  duty  of 
the  Government  to  select  a  moment  for  making  war  when 
the  danger  is  smallest  and  when  the  struggle  can  be  fought 
at  the  lowest  cost  to  the  nation  and  at  the  least  danger, 
provided,  of  course,  that  war  is  really  unavoidable.  The 
nation  can  expect  that  in  such  a  case  the  Government  will 
take  the  initiative. 

The  fact  that  Bismarck  disapproved  of  a  war  of  aggression 
such  as  the  present  one  may  be  clearly  seen  from  numerous 
important  statements  of  his,  some  of  which  I  quoted  in 
my  book,  '  The  Foundations  of  Germany  '  (Smith,  Elder 
&  Co.,  1916). 

Naturally  the  professors  of  Constitutional  Law  who 
commented  upon  the  Constitution  expounded  it  in  accord- 
ance with  its  plain  meaning  and  with  the  teachings  of  Prince 
Bismarck.  They  taught,  up  to  the  outbreak  of  the  present 
War,  that  the  sovereignty  of  the  country  was  not  in  the 
hands  of  the  Emperor,  but  in  those  of  the  Allied  States, 


200         The  German  Emperor'' s  Position 

that  the  Emperor  was  not  the  monarch  of  Germany,  but 
merely  the  President  of  the  Confederation,  and  that  he  was 
not  entitled  to  declare  a  war  of  offence  except  with  the 
consent  of  the  non-Prussian  States.  For  instance,  Professor 
Laband  wrote  in  his  most  important  standard  work,  '  Das 
Staatsrecht  des  Deutschen  Eeiches '  in  four  huge  volumes, 
of  which  the  fifth  edition  appeared  shortly  before  the  "War  : 

The  foundation  of  the  North  German  Federation  and  of 
the  German  Empire  was  effected  not  by  the  German  people 
but  by  the  German  States.  All  actions  which  brought 
about  the  creation  of  the  Confederation  were  actions  of 
these  States.  By  entering  into  the  Confederation  they 
divested  themselves  of  their  sovereignty,  but  not  of  their 
individuality,  as  States.  Their  individuality  continued 
unbroken  and  became  the  foundation  of  the  Federal  State. 
It  follows  that  not  the  individual  citizens  are  the  members 
of  the  Empire,  nor  that  the  citizens  in  the  aggregate  possess 
the  power  of  the  Empire.  The  members  of  the  Empire  are 
the  individual  States.  The  German  Empire  is  not  an  or- 
ganisation composed  of  millions  of  members  who  constantly 
increase  in  numbers,  but  is  an  association  of  twenty-five 
members.  .  .  . 

It  must  be  observed  that  no  new  legal  institution  has 
been  created  by  re-estabhshing  the  Imperial  dignity.  The 
idea  of  the  presidency  of  the  Confederation  has  not  been 
altered  by  connecting  with  it  the  title  Emperor.  The 
historical  events  which  led  to  the  resuscitation  of  the  Imperial 
title,  the  reasons  and  motives  with  which  the  Constitution 
was  submitted,  the  discussion  accompanying  it,  and  espe- 
cially Article  XI  of  the  Imperial  Constitution  itself,  show  with 
indubitable  certainty  that  the  Emperor's  position  is  com- 
pletely identical  with  that  of  the  presidency  in  the  North 
German  Federation,  and  that  the  Emperor,  apart  from  his 
title  and  insignia,  has  no  rights  except  the  right  of  President. 
.  .  .  The  Emperor  is  not  sovereign  of  the  Empire.  The 
sovereign  power  rests  not  with  him,  but  with  the  German 
allied  sovereigns  and  free  towns  as  a  whole.  If  he  acts  in 
the  name  of  the  Empire,  he  acts  not  in  his  own  name  but  in 
the  name  of  the  Empire. 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanshijj     201 

The  facts  given  in  these  pages  prove  conclusively  that, 
according  to  the  German  Constitution,  the  Emperor  was 
not  entitled  to  declare  a  war  of  aggression,  that  he  acted 
unconstitutionally  in  attacking  Eussia  and  France.  The 
question  has  now  to  be  considered  whether,  in  case  the 
War  should  have  an  unfortunate  end  for  Germany,  the 
Emperor  can  justify  his  action  by  referring  to  the  stipu- 
lations of  the  Austro- German  Treaty  of  Alhance  of  1879. 
It  is  almost  universally  believed,  even  in  the  best-informed 
diplomatic  quarters,  that  the  celebrated  Dual  Alliance 
Treaty  is  a  defensive  and  offensive  Treaty.  That  is  a  grave 
error.  The  Austro-German  Treaty  was  meant  to  be,  and 
is,  a  purely  defensive  instrument.  This  will  be  seen  from 
its  text  and  from  the  official  note  introducing  it.  Both 
the  Prefatory  Note  and  the  Treaty  itself  were  first  pubUshed 
in  the  Berlin  Official  Gazette  of  February  3,  1888,  and  I 
herewith  give  the  full  text  of  both.  The  translation  was 
made  by  the  Foreign  Office  and  it  was  published  in  vol. 
73  of  the  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers  : 

The  Governments  of  Germany  and  of  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian  Monarchy  have  determined  upon  the  publication  of 
the  Treaty  concluded  between  them  on  the  7th  of  October 
1879,  in  order  to  put  an  end  to  doubts  which  have  been 
entertained  in  various  quarters  of  its  purely  defensive 
character,  and  have  been  turned  to  account  for  various 
ends.  The  two  allied  Governments  are  guided  in  their 
policy  by  the  endeavour  to  maintain  peace  and  to  guard,  as 
far  as  possible,  against  its  disturbance  ;  they  are  convinced 
that  by  making  the  contents  of  their  Treaty  of  Alhance 
generally  known  they  will  exclude  all  possibility  of  doubt  on 
this  point,  and  have  therefore  resolved  to  publish  it. 

Treaty  of  Defensive  Alliance  between  Austria-Hungary  and 
Germany.    Signed  at  Vienna,  October  7,  1879. 

Inasmuch  as  their  Majesties  the  German  Emperor,  King 
of  Prussia,  and  the  Emperor  of  Austria,  King  of  Hungary, 
must  consider  it  their  inalienable  duty  to  provide  for  the 


202  The  German  Emperor's  Position 

security  of  their  Empires  and  the  peace  of    their  subjects 
under  all  circumstances  ; 

Inasmuch  as  the  two  Sovereigns,  as  was  the  case  under 
the  former  existing  Treaty,  will  be  enabled  by  the  close 
union  of  the  two  Empires  to  fulfil  this  duty  more  easily  and 
more  efficaciously  ; 

Inasmuch  as,  finally,  an  intimate  co-operation  of  Germany 
and  Austria-Hungary  can  menace  no  one,  but  is  rather 
calculated  to  consolidate  the  peace  of  Europe  on  the  terms 
established  by  the  stipulation  of  Berlin  ; 

Their  Majesties  the  German  Emperor  and  the  Emperor 
of  Austria,  King  of  Hungary,  while  most  solemnly  promising 
never  to  allow  their  purely  defensive  Agreement  to  develop 
an  aggressive  tendency  in  any  direction,  have  determined 
to  conclude  an  alliance  of  peace  and  mutual  defence. 

With  this  object  their  Majesties  have  named  as  their 
Plenipotentiaries  : 

His  Majesty  the  German  Emperor,  His  Majesty's  Am- 
bassador Extraordinary  and  Plenipotentiary,  Lieutenant- 
General  Prince  Henry  the  Seventh  of  Keuss,  &c.  ; 

His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Austria,  King  of  Hungary, 
His  Majesty's  Privy  Councillor,  Minister  of  the  Imperial 
House  and  for  Foreign  Affairs,  Lieutenant  Field-Marshal 
Julius  Count  Andrassy  of  Csik-Szeut-Kiraly  and  Kraszna- 
Haka,  &c.  ; 

Who  have  this  day  at  Vienna,  after  the  exchange  and 
mutual  verification  of  one  another's  full  powers,  agreed  as 
follows  : 

Art.  I.— Should,  contrary  to  their  hope,  and  against  the 
loyal  desire  of  the  two  High  Contracting  Parties,  one  of  the 
two  Empires  be  attacked  by  Eussia,  the  High  Contracting 
Parties  are  bound  to  come  to  the  assistance  one  of  the  other 
with  the  whole  war  strength  of  their  Empires,  and  accord- 
ingly only  to  conclude  peace  together  and  upon  mutual 
agreement. 

IL— Should  one  of  the  High  Contracting  Parties  be  at- 
tacked by  another  Power,  the  other  High  Contracting  Party 
binds  itself  hereby,  not  only  not  to  support  the  aggressor 
against  its  high  ally,  but  to  observe  at  least  a  benevolent 
neutral  attitude  towards  its  fellow  Contracting  Party. 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     203 

Should,  however,  in  such  a  case  the  attacking  Power  be 
supported  by  Russia,  either  by  an  active  co-operation  or  by 
miUtary  measures  which  constitute  a  menace  to  the  Party 
attacked,  then  the  obhgation  stipulated  in  Article  I  of  this 
Treaty,  for  mutual  assistance  with  the  whole  fighting  force, 
becomes  equally  operative,  and  the  conduct  of  the  war  by 
the  two  High  Contracting  Parties  shall  in  this  case  also  be 
in  common  until  the  conclusion  of  a  common  peace. 

III. — This  Treaty  shall,  in  conformity  with  its  peaceful 
character,  and  to  avoid  any  misinterpretations,  be  kept 
secret  by  the  two  High  Contracting  Parties,  and  only  be 
communicated  to  a  third  Power  upon  a  joint  understanding 
between  the  two  Parties,  and  according  to  the  terms  of  a 
special  Agreement. 

The  two  High  Contracting  Parties  venture  to  hope,  after 
the  sentiments  expressed  by  the  Emperor  Alexander  at  the 
meeting  at  Alexandrowo,  that  the  armaments  of  Eussia 
will  not  in  reality  prove  to  be  menacing  to  them,  and  have 
on  that  account  no  reason  for  making  a  communication  ; 
should,  however,  this  hope,  contrary  to  their  expectation, 
prove  to  be  erroneous,  the  two  High  Contracting  Parties 
would  consider  it  their  loyal  obligation  to  let  the  Emperor 
Alexander  know,  at  least  confidentially,  that  they  must 
consider  an  attack  on  either  of  them  as  directed  against 
both. 

In  virtue  of  which  the  Plenipotentiaries  have  signed 
this  Treaty  and  affixed  their  seals. 

Vienna,  October  7,  1879. 

(L.S.)  H.  VII,  P.  Reuss. 
(L.S.)  Andrassy. 

It  will  be  noticed  that  indeed  the  Austro- German  Alliance 
bears  a  purely  pacific  and  defensive  character.  The  Official 
Note  inserted  in  the  Government  Gazette,  introducing 
it,  refers  to  '  its  purely  defensive  character.'  If  we  read 
the  Treaty  itself  we  find  it  stated  in  its  preamble  that  it 
has  been  concluded  '  to  consolidate  the  peace  of  Europe,' 
that  it  is  a  *  purely  defensive  Agreement,'  that  it  is  '  an 
alliance  of  peace  and  mutual  defence.'     The  purely  defensive 


204         The  German  Emperor^s  Position 

character  of  the  Austro- German  Treaty  of  AlHance  cannot 
be  denied,  nor  can  it  be  explahied  away.  Germany  was 
under  no  obhgation  to  come  to  Austria's  aid  in  a  war  in 
which  that  country  was  the  aggressor.  It  follows  that  the 
German  Emperor  cannot  justify  his  attack  upon  Kussia 
and  France  by  explaining  that  he  was  bound  by  treaty 
to  come  to  Austria's  aid.  The  fact  that  the  Austro-German 
Treaty  was  a  purely  defensive  one  appears  not  only  from 
the  Treaty  itself  but  from  Prince  Bismarck's  commentaries 
upon  the  Alliance.  Eef  erence  to  my  book,  *  The  Foundations 
of  Germany,'  will  furnish  numerous  most  emphatic  state- 
ments of  the  Chancellor  according  to  which  Germany  was 
under  no  obligation  to  help  Austria,  should  the  latter  be 
involved  in  war  with  Eussia  in  consequence  of  Austrian 
aggressive  action  in  the  Balkan  Peninsula. 

On  June  15,  1888,  the  Emperor  Frederick  died  and 
William  the  Second  ascended  the  throne.  A  few  days 
later,  on  June  25  and  27,  he  addressed  the  German  Imperial 
and  the  Prussian  State  Parliament  in  person,  reading  to 
these  assemblies  his  speech  from  the  throne.  In  these 
addresses,  which  opened  his  reign,  he  solemnly  promised 
to  observe  the  Constitution  and,  in  accordance  with  the 
Constitution,  not  to  declare  war  unless  the  Empire  or  its 
Allies  should  actually  be  attacked.  The  Emperor  stated  in 
his  speech  to  the  Keichstag  on  June  25  : 

The  most  important  tasks  of  the  German  Emperors 
consist  in  securing  the  Empire  politically  and  militarily 
against  attacks  from  without  and  in  watching  the  execution 
of  the  Imperial  laws  within.  The  foremost  Imperial  law  is 
the  German  Constitution.  It  is  one  of  the  foremost  rights 
and  duties  of  the  Emperor  to  observe  and  to  protect  the 
Constitution  and  the  rights  granted  by  it  to  the  two  legisla- 
tive bodies  of  the  nation  and  to  every  German,  and  also  to 
the  sovereign.  .  .  . 

In  the  domain  of  foreign  policy  I  am  resolved  to  keep 
peace  with  all  nations  to  the  best  of  my  endeavour.  My 
love  for  the  German  army  and  my  position  towards  the 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     205 

military  forces  will  never  lead  me  into  temptation  to  deprive 
the  country  of  the  benefits  of  peace  unless  war  should  become 
a  necessity,  having  been  forced  upon  us  by  an  attack  upon 
the  Empire  or  upon  its  Allies.  The  German  Army  is  in- 
tended to  protect  our  peace,  and  if  peace  is  broken  the 
Army  must  be  able  to  regain  it  with  honour.  It  will  be 
able  to  do  this  with  God's  help  owing  to  the  strength  which 
it  has  received  in  accordance  with  the  recent  military  law 
which  was  unanimously  passed.  It  is  far  from  my  heart 
to  use  the  armed  strength  of  the  country  for  wars  of  aggres- 
sion. Germany  neither  requires  further  military  glory 
nor  conquests,  having  estabhshed  by  war  her  justification  to 
exist  as  a  united  and  independent  nation. 

Our  alhance  with  Austria-Hungary  is  generally  known. 
I  adhere  to  it  with  German  fidelity  not  merely  because  it  has 
been  concluded  but  also  because  I  recognise  in  this  defensive 
alliance  the  foundation  of  the  European  Balance  of  Power. 

Two  days  later,  on  June  27,  WilHam  the  Second,  as 
King  of  Prussia,  opened  the  two  Prussian  Houses  of  Parlia- 
ment and  addressed  them  in  person  as  follows  : 

.  .  .  Since,  owing  to  my  father's  death,  the  throne  of 
my  ancestors  has  come  to  me,  I  have  felt  the  need  at  the 
beginning  of  my  reign  to  assemble  you  around  me  without 
delay  and  to  give  before  you  a  solemn  vow  and  to  swear  the 
oath  prescribed  by  the  Prussian  Constitution  : 

I  vow  that  I  will  observe  the  Constitution  of  the  hingdom 
firmly  and  inviolally,  and  that  I  will  rule  in  accordance  with 
the  Constitution  and  the  Law.     So  help  me  God ! 

.  .  .  Like  King  William  the  First,  I  will,  in  accordance 
with  my  solemn  vow,  faithfully  and  conscientiously  observe 
the  laws  and  the  rights  of  the  popular  representation,  and 
with  equal  conscientiousness  I  will  preserve  and  exercise. 
the  rights  of  the  crown,  as  established  by  the  Constitution, 
in  order  to  hand  them  on  in  due  course  to  my  successor  on 
the  throne.  It  is  far  from  me  to  disturb  the  confidence  of 
the  people  in  the  solidity  of  our  legal  conditions  by  striving 
to  increase  the  rights  of  the  crown.  The  legal  extent  of  my 
rights,  as  long  as  these  are  not  questioned,  suffices  to  secure 


206         The  German  Emjjeror^s  Position 

to  the  State  that  measure  of  monarchical  influence  which 
Prussia  requires  owing  to  her  historical  development,  her 
present  position  and  her  place  in  the  Empire,  and  the  feelings 
and  habits  of  the  people.  I  am  of  opinion  that  our  Constitu- 
tion contains  a  just  and  useful  distribution  of  powers  among 
the  various  governing  factors,  and  for  this  reason,  not  only 
on  account  of  my  vow,  I  shall  observe  and  protect  it. 

In  the  two  most  important  speeches  quoted,  the  Emperor 
solemnly  promised  to  the  nation  on  his  ascent  to  the  throne 
'  to  observe  and  to  protect  the  Constitution,'  not  to  increase 
his  powers  '  by  striving  to  increase  the  rights  of  the  crown,' 
and  not  to  declare  war '  unless  war  should  become  a  necessity, 
having  been  forced  upon  us  by  an  attack  upon  the  Empire 
or  upon  its  Alhes.'  It  is  also  worth  noting  that  the  Emperor 
described  the  Austro- German  AlUance  as  '  this  defensive 
alhance,  the  foundation  of  the  European  Balance  of  Power.' 
Nothing  could  be  more  explicit  than  the  assurances  and 
undertakings  given  in  these  words.  The  two  speeches, 
though  read  by  the  Emperor,  embody  of  course  not  merely 
the  Emperor's  views  but  also  those  of  Prince  Bismarck, 
who  apparently  drafted  them  in  collaboration  with  the 
Emperor.  Bismarck  was  an  excellent  judge  of  character. 
Apparently  he  hoped  to  bridle  the  Emperor's  impetuous- 
ness  by  causing  him  to  declare  in  the  most  solemn  manner 
that  he  would  observe  the  Constitution  and  not  make  war 
unless  Germany  should  actually  be  attacked.  His  hopes 
that  the  solemn  promises  of  the  Emperor  would  restrain  him 
during  his  reign  have  been  disappointed. 

According  to  the  Constitution,  every  Imperial  Act  has 
to  be  countersigned  by  the  Imperial  Chancellor  who,  by 
countersigning,  assumes  responsibility  for  it.  Of  course 
the  responsibihty  of  the  Imperial  Chancellor  becomes  a 
mere  formality  without  meaning  if  the  Emperor  appoints 
to  the  Chancellorship  a  man  without  strength  of  character 
who  readily  countersigns  the  Imperial  orders  as  they  are 
given.  Soon  after  his  accession  to  the  throne  William 
the  Second  showed  that  he  meant  to  be  his  own  Chancellor, 


Great  Problems  of  British  StatesmanshijJ     207 

that  he  had  no  use  for  a  Chancellor  who  possessed  ability 
and  independence  of  niind.  He  dismissed  Bismarck 
and  has  since  then  appointed  phable  men  in  his  stead. 
Bismarck's  four  successors  were  without  exception  men 
of  great  phabiHty.  Probably  Herr  von  Bethmann-HoUweg 
is  the  most  pliable  of  them  all.  To  the  alarm  and  concern 
of  the  old  Chancellor,  the  young  Emperor  endeavoured  to 
govern  Germany  and  to  direct  the  foreign  and  domestic 
pohcy  of  the  country  in  accordance  with  his  personal  views 
and  moods,  violating  the  spirit,  if  not  the  wording,  of  the 
Constitution.  Considering  himself  the  Trustee  of  the 
Empire,  Bismarck  endeavoured  during  the  years  of  his  retire- 
ment from  o£&ce  to  create  a  counterpoise  to  the  dangerous 
impetuousness  of  the  Emperor,  who  wished  to  grasp  all 
power,  by  recommending,  on  numerous  occasions,  the 
jealous  preservation  and  defence  of  the  Constitution.  For 
instance,  on  August  10,  1891,  a  year  after  his  dismissal, 
addressing  representatives  of  the  University  Students  of 
Germany,  Prince  Bismarck  stated : 

In  order  to  unite  Germany  the  individual  dynasties  and 
governments  of  Germany  had  to  co-operate.  All  former 
attempts  at  carrying  out  the  idea  of  unifying  Germany  were 
bound  to  fail  because  the  dynastic  forces  were  under- 
estimated. ...  I  see  the  task  of  the  future,  mainly,  in 
preserving  the  existing.  If  I  recommend  preserving  the 
existing,  I  mean  of  course  that  the  Imperial  edifice  should 
be  improved  and  completed.  What,  then,  should  be  pre- 
served ?  I  would  most  urgently  recommend  you  for  the 
future  to  preserve  the  Imperial  Constitution.  Lay  that  to 
your  heart.  The  Constitution  is  imperfect,  but  it  was  the 
best  Constitution  that  could  be  obtained.  Cultivate,  then, 
the  Constitution.  Watch  jealously  over  the  Constitution, 
and  see  that  the  rights  established  by  the  Constitution  are 
not  diminished.  I  am  not  a  friend  of  centralisation.  I  say 
again  :  Watch  over  the  Imperial  Constitution  even  if,  later 
on  in  life,  it  should  not  please  you.  Do  not  advise  any 
alteration  unless  all  the  States  agree  to  it.  That  is  the  first 
condition  for  the  political  welfare  of  the  Empire. 


208         The  German  Emjyeror's  Position 

In  July  1892  Prince  Bismarck  made  a  speech  at  Kissingen, 
in  which  he  particularly  dwelt  on  the  danger  to  the  nation 
of  appointing  to  the  Chancellorship  an  obedient  official,  a 
mere  Imperial  Secretary,  and,  foreseeing  the  danger  of  an 
Imperial  absolutism  exercised  through  a  pliable  Chancellor, 
demanded  the  creation  of  a  counterpoise  to  the  Emperor. 
He  said  in  the  course  of  that  remarkable  speech  : 

I  should  have  liked  to  continue  the  work,  but  our  young 
Emperor  will  do  everything  himself.  .  .  . 

The  German  Eeichstag  does  not  fulfil  my  expectations 
that  it  would  be  the  centre  of  national  life  as  I  had  hoped 
at  the  time  of  its  creation.  If  one  wishes  to  strengthen 
the  Eeichstag  one  must  increase  the  responsibility  of  the 
Ministers.  The  Constitution  of  Prussia  promises  a  law  which 
will  make  Ministers  responsible  for  their  actions.  Such  a 
law  has,  however,  not  been  promulgated,  and  ministerial 
responsibility  does  not  apply  to  the  Empire.  Hence  anyone 
can  become  Imperial  Chancellor  even  if  he  is  not  qualified 
for  that  position.  Consequently  the  office  of  Imperial 
Chancellor  may  be  lowered  so  that  the  Chancellor  will  become 
merely  a  private  secretary,  whose  responsibility  is  limited 
to  doing  what  he  is  told  without  selecting  what  is  useful  or 
examining  proposals.  ...  If  responsibility  was  enforced 
by  law  no  one  would  become  Imperial  Chancellor  unless  he 
possessed  the  necessary  qualifications.  .  .  . 

When  I  became  Minister,  the  Crown  was  in  difficulties. 
The  King  was  discouraged.  His  Ministers  refused  to  sup- 
port him.  He  wished  to  abdicate.  When  I  saw  this  I 
strove  to  strengthen  the  Crown  against  Parliament.  Per- 
haps I  have  gone  too  far  in  this  direction.  We  require 
a  counterpoise.  I  believe  that  frank  criticism  is  indispens- 
able for  a  monarchical  government.  Otherwise  it  degene- 
rates into  an  official  absolutism.  We  require  the  fresh 
air  of  public  criticism.  Germany's  constitutional  life  is 
founded  on  it.  When  Parliament  becomes  powerless, 
becomes  merely  an  instrument  of  a  higher  will,  we  shall 
come  back  again  in  due  course  to  the  enlightened  abso- 
lutism of  the  past.  Theoretically  that  may  be  the  most 
perfect  form  of  government,  a  divine  form  of  government. 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     209 

However,    it  is  practically  unacceptable  because  of  human 
inadequacy. 

In  a  speech  delivered  August  20,  1893,  Prince  Bismarck 
stated  : 

In  our  attempts  at  unification  we  must  not  go  beyond 
the  Constitution.  The  German  Constitution  has  not  only 
demanded  vast  sacrifices  in  human  lives  and  in  blood.  It 
was  an  exceedingly  difficult  work  to  combine  the  opposing 
interests  which  had  been  at  variance  for  centuries.  It  was 
exceedingly  difficult  to  unite  them  in  such  a  manner  that  at 
last  all  were  satisfied  or  at  least  contented.  The  fact  that 
the  Constitution  is  touched  and  shaken  fills  me  with  grave 
cares  in  my  old  age. 

On  June  12,  1890,  only  a  few  months  after  liis  dismissal, 
Prince  Bismarck  said,  addressing  a  deputation  of  Stuttgart 
citizens  : 

The  dynasties  have  appeared  to  me  a  guarantee  of 
Germany's  unity.  With  their  assistance  the  work  of  unifying 
Germany,  which  had  been  begun  in  battle,  was  completed. 
...  I  have  never  been  an  advocate  of  Imperial  centralisa- 
tion, and  I  have  made  it  my  task  as  Imperial  Chancellor 
to  protect  the  rights  of  the  individual  States  against  illegiti- 
mate encroachments. 

During  the  eight  years  which  Bismarck  spent  in  retire- 
ment he  frequently  urged  his  countrymen  in  speech  and 
in  writing  to  preserve  the  German  Constitution  inviolate, 
not  to  diminish  the  rights  of  the  individual  States,  to  create 
a  counterpoise  to  the  Emperor's  impetuousness  and  to  his 
attempts  at  governing  Germany  as  if  it  were  a  Greater 
Prussia,  and  not  to  embark  upon  an  aggressive  war,  nor 
to  support  Austria  should  she  come  into  colhsion  with 
Russia  by  an  attack  in  the  Balkans,  because  in  that  case 
Germany  was  under  no  obligation  to  help  Austria  and  had 
no  interest  in  being  involved  in  a  great  war  over  Balkan 
questions. 

In  attacking  Russia  and  France  the  German  Emperor 


210         The  German  Emperor's  Position 

not  only  violated  the  Imperial  Constitution  but  he  acted 
with  an  absolute  disregard  of  the  maxims  of  State  which 
the  creator  of  Modern  Germany  had  laid  down,  and  he 
cannot  even  pload  that  he  was  compelled  to  go  into  war 
because  of  the  Austro-German  AHiance.  His  contravention 
of  the  German  Constitution  may  possibly  in  course  of  time 
assume  an  exceedingly  serious  aspect. 

Prince  Bismarck  stated  in  his  posthumous  *  Memoirs  ' : 
'  The  Federal  Council  represents  the  governing  power  of 
the  joint  sovereignty  of  Germany.'  According  to  the 
German  Constitution,  '  the  consent  of  the  Federal  Council 
is  necessary  for  the  declaration  of  war  in  the  name  of  the 
Empire,  unless  an  attack  on  the  territory  or  the  coast  of 
the  Confederation  has  taken  place.'  The  Emperor  could 
constitutionally  and  legitimately  attack  Eussia  and  France 
only  after  an  attack  on  German  territory  had  actually 
occurred.  In  order  to  make  an  aggression  legitimate,  a 
foreign  attack  upon  Germany  had  either  to  be  brought 
about  or  to  be  invented.  Germany  went  to  war  because, 
according  to  the  official  version,  '  war  was  forced  upon  her,' 
because  German  territory  was  attacked  both  by  Eussia 
and  France.  On  August  4  the  German  Chancellor,  von 
Bethmann-Hollweg,  stated  in  the  Eeichstag  : 

The  Emperor  gave  orders  that  the  French  frontier  should 
be  respected  under  all  conditions.  With  one  single  excep- 
tion that  order  was  strictly  obeyed.  France,  which  mobihsed 
at  the  same  hour  as  Germany,  declared  to  us  that  she  would 
withdraw  her  troops  to  a  distance  of  10  kilometres  from  the 
frontier.  But  what  happened  in  reality  ?  Flying  machines 
throwing  bombs,  cavalry  patrols  and  companies  of  French 
infantry  breaking  into  Alsace-Lorraine  !  By  acting  thus 
France  has  broken  the  peace  and  has  actually  attacked 
Germany  although  a  state  of  war  had  not  yet  been  declared. 

As  regards  the  exception  mentioned  I  have  received  the 
following  report  from  the  Chief  of  the  General  Staff : 

'  Of  the  French  complaints  regarding  the  violation  of 
the  frontier  only  a  single  one  must  be  admitted.  Against 
express  orders  a  patrol  of  the  XIV.  Army  Corps  crossed  the 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     211 

frontier  on  the  2ncl  of  August.  Apparently  it  was  com- 
manded by  an  officer.  It  seems  that  they  were  shot,  for 
only  one  man  has  returned.  However,  long  before  this 
single  crossing  of  the  frontier  took  place  French  flying 
machines  have  thrown  bombs  upon  the  German  railway  luies 
as  far  as  the  South  of  Germany,  and  French  troops  have 
attacked  German  troops  protecting  the  frontier  at  the 
Schlucht  Pass.  In  accordance  with  orders  given  the  German 
troops  have  limited  themselves  entirely  to  the  defensive.' 

This  is  the  report  of  the  General  Staff. 

Gentlemen,  we  are  now  in  a  state  of  necessity,  and  neces- 
sity knows  no  law  !  Our  troops  have  occupied  Luxemburg 
and  perhaps  have  entered  upon  Belgian  territory. 

According  to  the  Pieport  of  the  Chief  of  the  General 
Staff,  von  Moltke,  the  French  began  the  war  by  attacking 
by  means  of  flying  machines,  &c.  Since  August  4, 
when  that  mendacious  statement  was  read  in  the  German 
Reichstag,  it  has  been  repeated  innumerable  times  by 
German  officialdom  and  by  leading  private  men.  In  the 
German  "White  Book,  which  was  pubHshed  in  Enghsh  for 
the  benefit  of  Americans,  we  read  : 

A  few  hours  later,  at  5  p.m.,  the  mobihsation  of  the 
entire  French  army  and  navy  was  ordered.  On  the  morning 
of  the  next  day  France  opened  hostihties. 

In  the  book  '  Truth  about  Germany — Facts  about  the 
War,'  which  was  Hkewise  issued  for  the  benefit  of  Americans 
under  the  joint  supervision  of  Prince  Biilow  and  many 
other  of  the  best-informed  Germans,  it  is  stated  : 

Before  one  German  soldier  had  crossed  the  German 
frontier  a  large  number  of  French  aeroplanes  came  flying 
into  our  country  across  the  neutral  territory  of  Belgium 
and  Luxemburg  without  a  word  of  warning  on  the  part  of 
the  Belgian  Government.  At  the  same  time  the  German 
Government  learned  that  the  French  were  about  to  enter 
Belgium.  Then  our  Government  with  great  reluctance 
had  to  decide  upon  requesting  the  Belgian  Government 
to  allow  our  troops  to  march  through  its  territory. 


212  The  German  Emperoi^^s  Position 

According  to  the  celebrated  legal  authority,  Professor 
Josef  Kohler,  France  attacked  Germany  not  from  the  air  but 
by  invasion  across  the  frontier.  He  wrote  in  the  book  '  Die 
Vernichtung  der  englischen  Weltmacht,'  published  in  1915: 

You  know  that  when  we  offered  France  neutrality  the 
French  replied  to  our  offer  by  sending  troops  across  the 
frontier,  violating  thus  the  Law  of  Nations  established  by 
the  Hague  Convention. 

The  German  Declaration  of  War  upon  France  stated  : 

M.  le  President,  the  German  administrative  and  military 
authorities  have  established  a  certain  number  of  flagrantly 
hostile  acts  committed  on  German  territory  by  French  mili- 
tary aviators.  Several  of  these  have  openly  violated  the 
neutrality  of  Belgium  by  flying  over  the  territory  of  that 
country ;  one  has  attempted  to  destroy  buildings  near 
Wesel  ;  others  have  been  seen  in  the  district  of  the  Eifel ; 
one  has  thrown  bombs  on  the  railway  near  Carlsruhe  and 
Nuremberg. 

I  am  instructed,  and  I  have  the  honour,  to  inform  your 
Excellency,  that  in  the  presence  of  these  acts  of  aggression 
the  German  Empire  considers  itself  in  a  state  of  war  with 
France  in  consequence  of  the  acts  of  this  latter  Power.  .  .  . 

SCHOEN. 

According  to  Herr  von  Below  Saleske,  the  German 
Minister  in  Brussels,  Germany  was  attacked  by  France, 
neither  by  aeroplanes,  nor  by  an  ordinary  attack  across 
the  frontier,  but  by  an  attack  from  airships.  In  an  inter- 
view which  he  asked  for  at  1.30  a.m.  on  August  3,  1914, 
Herr  von  Below  Saleske  made  that  statement,  according 
to  a  Memorandum  published  in  the  Diplomatic  Correspon- 
dence issued  by  the  Belgian  Government.  The  Memorandum 
runs  as  follows  : 

A  I'heure  et  demie  de  la  nuit,  le  Ministre  d'Allemagne  a 
demande  a  voir  le  Baron  van  der  Elst.  II  lui  a  dit  qu'il 
etait  charge  par  son  Gouvernement  de  nous  informer  que 
des  dirigeables  frangais  avaient  jete  des  bombes  et  qu'une 
patrouille  de  cavalerie  fran5aise,  violant  le  droit  des  gens, 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     213 

attendu  que  la  guerre  n'etait  pas  declaree,  avait  traverse 
la  frontiere. 

Lately  the  assertion  that  France  began  the  war  upon 
Germany,  by  an  attack  either  by  land  or  from  the  air,  has 
been  less  frequently  heard.  The  insistent  inquiries  made 
by  German  politicians  at  the  military  headquarters  in 
Berlin  and  in  South  German  towns  have  failed  to  discover 
the  place  where,  according  to  the  statement  of  the  Chief 
of  the  General  Staff  which  was  read  by  the  German  Chan- 
cellor in  the  Eeichstag,  '  French  flying  machines  have  thrown 
bombs  upon  the  German  railway  lines  as  far  as  the  South 
of  Germany.'  When  the  question  of  responsibility  for 
the  War  is  judicially  investigated,  it  will,  perhaps,  appear 
who  it  was  that  created  a  colourable  pretext  for  Germany's 
aggression  by  pretending  that  France  had  been  the  first 
to  strike  at  Germany.  It  will  then  appear  whether  the 
untrue  statement  of  the  General  Staff  was  made  by  order 
of  the  Emperor,  or  whether  it  originated  in  the  General 
Staff  itself ;  whether  the  Emperor  demanded  that  a  pretext 
should  be  created,  or  whether  the  military  leaders,  especially 
von  Moltke,  who  were  notoriously  anxious  for  war,  invented 
the  French  attack  in  order  to  force  the  Emperor's  hands. 
My  impression  has  been  for  a  long  time  that  the  latter  was 
the  case,  as  I  endeavoured  to  show  in  an  article  pubHshed 
in  The  Nineteenth  Century  and  After?-  Very  hkely  Herr 
von  Jagow  and  the  Imperial  Chancellor  acted  perfectly 
bond  fide  when  they  explained  at  the  critical  moment  that 
they  had  been  unacquainted  with  the  text  of  the  Austrian 
ultimatum  to  Serbia.  The  surmise  that  the  military  leaders 
first  brought  about  the  diplomatic  crisis,  and  then  forced 
the  hands  of  the  Emperor  and  of  the  Imperial  Chancellor 
by  inventing  a  French  attack  upon  Germany,  is  strengthened 
by  the  admission  of  the  Secretary  of  State,  von  Jagow,  and 
of  his  Under-Secretary,  Herr  Zimmermann,  in  their  conversa- 
tion with  the  French  Ambassador  and  the  Belgian  Minister 

1  '  How  the  Army  has  ruined  Germany,'  The  Nineteenth  Century  and 
After,  April  1916. 


214  The  German  Empero)''s  Position 

in  Berlin,  that  they  were  powerless,  that  the  control  of  the 
diplomatic  situation  was  in  the  hands  of  the  miUtary  leaders. 
Future  investigation  will  probably  show  that  the  military 
party,  by  a  false  report,  engineered  a  deliberate  and  carefully 
planned  violation  of  the  German  Constitution,  that  they 
made  the  Emperor  their  tool.  However,  if  the  war  was 
brought  about  by  the  pressure  of  the  military  firebrands, 
and  by  the  deliberate  concoction  of  a  French  attack,  the 
Emperor  cannot  plead  irresponsibility  for  his  action.  Qui 
facit  'per  alium  facit  per  se.  The  principal  is  responsible  for 
the  actions  of  his  agents.  A  surgeon  cannot  plead  that  he 
is  not  responsible  for  a  fatal  operation,  that  he  acted  against 
his  conviction,  that  he  was  forced  into  it  by  the  demands  of 
his  dresser.  A  lawyer  cannot  plead  immunity  because  he 
acted  against  his  conviction,  owing  to  the  urgent  advice 
of  his  clerk.  If  the  War  should  end  in  Germany's  defeat, 
the  German  Emperor  may  be  held  responsible  by  the  German 
people  and  he  cannot  then  shift  his  responsibility  on  to  the 
military  leaders,  nor  will  it  suffice  if  he  should  explain 
that  he  had  punished  the  late  von  Moltke  for  his  intrigue 
by  dismissing  him  at  the  earliest  opportunity. 

The  German  Constitution  is  on  the  one  hand  a  charter 
of  popular  liberties  which  grants  to  the  German  nation 
certain  rights,  such  as  Parliamentary  representation  with 
a  democratic  franchise.     It  is,  on  the  other  hand,  a  pact 
concluded  between  Prussia  and  the  German  States  whereby 
their  relations  are  regulated,  and  whereby  Prussia's  authority 
and  competence  as  the  presiding  State  of  the  Confederation 
are  carefully  determined  and  limited.     The  German  Con- 
stitution delimits  punctiliously  the  functions  and  powers 
of    the    Emperor-President.     In    accepting    the    Imperial 
Crown  and  in  promising  to  observe  the  Constitution,  the 
King  of  Prussia,  as  German  Emperor,  bound  himself  to 
observe  the  fundamental  regulations  of  the  Empire,  which 
were  devised  not   only  in  the  interest  of  the  dynasties 
or  of  the  individual  States,  apart  from  Prussia,  but  in  the 
interest  of  the  German  nation  as  a  whole. 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     215 

The  minor  States  were,  according  to  the  Constitution, 
to  act  as  a  brake  upon  a  rash  and  impulsive  Prussian  King. 
Hence,  not  only  the  South  Germans  but  the  Prussians  also 
are  strongly  interested  in  the  careful  observance  of  the 
Constitution  on  the  part  of  the  King-Emperor.  The 
sovereigns  of  the  minor  States  are  not  merely  ornamental 
Lords-Lieutenant  but  are,  according  to  the  Constitution, 
partners  in  the  Imperial  concern,  in  which  they  possess 
a  controlling  interest  if  a  war  of  aggression  is  planned  by 
the  Emperor. 

The  sovereigns  of  the  minor  States  insisted  upon  the 
limitation  of  the  Emperor's  power,  not  merely  in  their 
personal  interest  or  in  that  of  their  States,  but  in  that 
of  all  Germany,  of  the  German  nation.  Hence,  the  limita- 
tions demanded  by  them,  restricting  the  Emperor's  powers 
with  regard  to  the  declaration  of  war,  were  considered 
reasonable  by  Bismarck  and  by  the  old  Emperor  and  by 
his  advisers,  and  they  were  readily  assented  to  as  being  in 
the  best  interest  of  the  nation  and  of  the  Emperor  himself. 

Eightly  considered,  the  German  Constitution  is  a  deed 
of  partnership  concluded  between  the  King  of  Prussia 
and  the  German  sovereigns  and  free  towns  on  the  one  hand, 
and  between  the  Emperor  and  the  German  people  on  the 
other  hand.  The  Imperial  dignity  was  in  1871,  and  again 
in  1888,  bestowed  upon  the  King  of  Prussia  on  conditions. 
William  the  Second  has  broken  the  formal  pact  between 
himself  and  his  brother  sovereigns  and  between  himself 
and  the  nation,  notwithstanding  his  solemn  declarations 
made  at  the  time  of  his  accession,  either  owing  to  his  wilful- 
ness or  owing  to  his  weakness,  either  because  he  wished  to 
embark  upon  a  war  of  aggression,  or  because  he  allowed 
himself  to  be  forced  into  such  a  war,  which  violates  the 
Constitution,  by  the  intrigues  of  the  military  party.  It 
seems  by  no  means  improbable  that  the  German  sovereigns 
and  people  will  hold  the  German  Emperor  accountable 
should  the  War  end  disastrously  for  Germany. 


CHAPTER  VII 

Britain's  war  finance  and  economic  future 

A  forecast  and  a  warning  1 

Late  in  1915,  Mr.  Montagu  stated  in  the  House  of  Commons 
that  the  British  War  expenditure  came  to  £5,000,000  a  day, 
that  the  War  was  swallowing  up  half  the  national  income. 
This  was  evidently  a  very  serious  understatement.  Five 
million  pounds  a  day  is  equal  to  £1,825,000,000  a  year. 
According  to  the  '  British  Census  of  Production,'  published 
in  December,  1912,  and  relating  to  the  year  1907,  the  national 
income  of  that  year  amounted  to  £2,000,000,000.  Even 
the  most  optimistic  statisticians  have  not  seen  in  that  figure 
a  very  great  understatement.  It  therefore  appears  that 
the  British  War  expenditure  per  day  was  at  that  time 
approximately  equal  to  the  entire  national  income  per  day 
in  normal  times.  It  need,  however,  scarcely  be  pointed  out 
that  the  War,  which  has  taken  millions  of  able-bodied  British 
men  from  the  productive  occupations,  and  which  has 
diverted  the  industries  from  the  production  of  useful 
commodities  to  that  of  war  material,  has  very  seriously 
diminished  the  true  national  income.  Besides,  with  the  con- 
stantly increasing  numbers  of  the  British  Army,  and  the 
steadily  growing  financial  requirements  of  the  Allies  for 
British  loans  and  subsidies,  the  daily  War  expenditure  of 
this  country  has  continually  kept  on  increasing.  Hence, 
the  daily  cost  of  the  War  may  now  greatly  exceed  the  whole 
of  the  national  income. 

1  The  Nineteenth  Century  and  After,  December,  1915. 
216 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     217 

The  vastness  of  Great  Britain's  War  expenditure  staggers 
the  imagination  not  only  of  people  in  general  but  even  that 
of  financiers  and  statisticians.  It  can  be  visualised  only  by 
comparison.  The  Franco-German  War  of  1870-71,  which 
lasted  nine  months,  cost  Germany  £60,000,000  ;  the  Panama 
Canal,  the  greatest  and  the  most  expensive  engineering  under- 
taking the  world  has  seen,  cost  the  United  States  in  ten 
years  £80,000,000  ;  the  Boer  War,  which  lasted  three  years, 
cost  this  country  £250,000,000.  It  follows  that  Great 
Britain  has  spent  on  the  War,  at  the  comparatively  moderate 
rate  of  £5,000,000  per  day,  every  two  weeks  almost  as  much 
as  the  total  cost  of  the  Panama  Canal,  and  that  she  has  spent 
every  two  months  considerably  more  than  she  did  during  the 
whole  of  the  protracted  campaign  against  the  Boers. 

The  War  has  so  far  cost  about  £3,000,000,000.  The 
national  capital  of  Great  Britain  is  usually  estimated  to 
amount  to  about  £15,000,000,000.  As  the  struggle  seems 
likely  to  continue,  it  may  eventually  swallow  a  sum  equal  to 
one-third  of  the  British  national  capital,  if  not  more.  Interest 
will  have  to  be  paid  on  the  gigantic  War  debt.  Its  capital 
must,  by  purchase,  gradually  be  reduced  to  manageable 
proportions,  and  in  addition  untold  millions  will  be  required 
every  year  for  the  support  of  the  crippled  and  incapacitated 
veterans,  and  for  the  widows  and  orphans.  Before  the  War, 
Budgets  of  £200,000,000  per  year  seemed  monstrous.  After 
the  War,  Budgets  of  £500,000,000  may  seem  modest.  If  we 
now  remember  that  years  of  hard  times  followed  the  rela- 
tively cheap  Boer  War  we  can  well  understand  that  statesmen 
and  business  men  look  with  grave  anxiety  and  alarm  into 
the  future,  and  at  the  mountainous  debt  which  Great  Britain 
is  rapidly  piling  up,  and  that  they  are  asking  themselves  : 
Can  this  over-taxed  country  stand  the  additional  financial 
burdens  ?  Will  not  the  War  destroy  the  British  industries 
and  trade,  drive  the  country  into  bankruptcy  and  ruin,  or 
at  least  permanently  impoverish  Great  Britain  ?  In  the 
following  pages  an  attempt  will  be  made  to  answer  these 
questions. 


218    Britain's  War  Finance  and  Economic  Future 

In  endeavouring  to  solve  the  great  problems  confronting 
them  the  most  eminent  statesmen  and  soldiers  of  all  times 
have  tm-ned  for  their  information  and  guidance  to  the 
experience  of  the  past,  to  the  teachings  of  history.  A  hun- 
dred years  ago  Great  Britain  concluded  her  twenty  years' 
struggle  with  Kevolutionary  and  Napoleonic  France,  in 
the  course  of  which  she  spent  about  £1,100,000,000,  a  sum 
which  greatly  exceeded  one-third  of  the  national  capital  of 
the  time.  What,  then,  can  we  learn  from  Great  Britain's 
experience  ?  How  was  the  Napoleonic  War  financed  ?  What 
were  the  consequences  of  that  gigantic  expenditure  upon  the 
British  industries,  British  trade,  and  the  British  finances  ? 
Unfortunately,  scientific  history  has  been  greatly  neglected 
in  this  country.  The  existing  accounts  of  the  Napo- 
leonic struggle  are  exceedingly  unsatisfactory.  They  con- 
sist partly  of  pleasantly  written  popular  books  designed  to 
while  away  the  idle  hours  of  the  leisured  and  the  uninformed, 
partly  of  books  written  by  Party  men  for  Party- political 
purposes  in  which  are  exposed  the  wickedness  of  the  Tories 
or  the  stupidity  of  the  Whigs,  the  narrow-mindedness  of  the 
Protectionists  or  the  recklessness  of  the  Free  Traders.  It  is 
humihating  that  an  impartial  documentary  history  of  the 
Great  War  and  of  its  economic  aspects  remains  still  to  be 
written.  The  past  should  be  a  guide  to  the  present.  I 
propose  in  these  pages  to  summarise  the  economic  teachings 
of  the  Great  War  by  means  of  most  valuable  evidence  which 
will  not  be  found  in  any  of  the  histories  of  that  struggle, 
and,  fortified  by  the  necessary  data,  an  attempt  will  be  made 
to  apply  their  lesson  to  the  present  and  to  make  a  forecast 
of  Britain's  economic  future. 

The  Great  War  between  France  and  Great  Britain 
began  in  1793  and  lasted,  with  two  interruptions  (1802-03 
and  1814-15)  until  1815.  It  cost  this  country  about 
£1,100,000,000,  but  as  that  figure  is  not  in  accordance  with 
tradition  it  may  be  challenged.  I  will  therefore  give  my 
reasons  for  using  it. 

It  is  not  easy,  in  analysing  national  expenditure  during  a 


Gi'eat  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     219 

time  of  war,  to  state  exactly  what  part  of  it  is  peace  ex- 
penditure and  what  is  war  expenditure.  Most  writers  on 
pubhc  finance  have  stated  that  the  War  with  France  cost 
this  nation  about  £800,000,000.  That  seems  to  me  to  be 
far  too  low  a  figure.  If  we  wish  to  ascertain  the  cost  of  a 
war  we  cannot  do  so  by  mechanically  adding  up  all  expendi- 
ture which  is  labelled  '  War  Expenditure,'  for  much  of  it 
will  appear  under  civil  heads.  Therefore,  we  must  endeavour 
to  find  out,  firstly,  how  much  debt  was  incurred  for  the  war, 
and,  secondly,  by  how  much  the  current  national  expenditure, 
which  is  raised  by  taxation,  was  increased  during  the  war 
and  presumably  owing  to  the  war.  Let  us  make  this  test, 
for  it  will  furnish  us  with  some  exceedingly  interesting  data 
which  will  be  of  great  value  in  the  course  of  this  investigation. 
Before  and  during  the  Great  War  the  British  National 
Debt  increased,  according  to  McCuUoch's  '  Account  of  the 
British  Empire,'  as  foUow^s  : 


The  British 
National  Debt 

Annual  Charge 

National  Debt  in  1775 
Debt   incurred    diiring   American    War, 
1775-84  

Total      

Repaid  during  peace,  1784-93 

D^'bt  at  commencement  of  Great  War  in 
1793 

Debt  contracted  during  the  Great  War, 
1793-1815        

National  Debt  on  1st  February,  1817    . 

128,583,635 
121,267,993 

£ 
4,471,571 

5,089,336 

249,851,628 
10,501,480 

9,560,907 
249,277 

239,350,148 
601,500,343 

9,311,630 
22,704,311 

840,850,491 

32,015,941 

It  will  be  noticed  that  the  British  National  Debt  grew 
by  £601,500,000  during  the  Great  War. 

Between  1792  and  1815  the  national  expenditure,  the  Tax 
Revenue,  and  the  interest  paid  on  the  National  Debt  in- 
creased, according  to  the  following  interesting  table,  which 
is  taken  from  Porter's  '  Progress  of  the  Nation,'  as  follows. 


220    Britain's  War  Finance  and  Economic  Future 

It  deserves  to  be  studied  with  care,  especially  as  we  shall 
have  to  revert  to  it  in  the  course  of  this  chapter. 


National  Revenue  and  Expenditure. 


- 

National  Expenditure 

Tax  Revenue 

Interest  paid  on 
National  Debt 

£ 

£ 

£ 

1792 

19,589,123 

19,258,814 

9,767,333 

1793 

24,197,070 

19,845,705 

9,437,862 

1794 

27,742,117 

20,193,074 

9,890,904 

1795 

48,414,177 

19,883,520 

10,810,728 

1796 

42,175,291 

21,454,728 

11,841,204 

1797 

50,740,609 

23,126,940 

14,270,616 

1798 

51,127,245 

31,035,363 

17,585,518 

1799 

55,624,404 

35,602,444 

17,220,983 

1800 

56,821,267 

34,145,584 

17,381,561 

1801 

61,329,179 

34,113,146 

19,945,624 

1802 

49,549,207 

36,368,149 

19,855,558 

1803 

48,998,230 

38,609,392 

20,699,864 

1804 

59,376,208 

46,176,492 

20,726,772 

1805 

67,169,318 

50,897,706 

22,141,426 

1806 

68,941,211 

55,796,086 

23,000,006 

1807 

67,613,042 

59,339,321 

23,362,685 

1808 

73,143,087 

62.998,191 

23,158,982 

1809 

76,566,013 

63,719,400 

24,213,867 

1810 

76,865,548 

67,144,542 

24,246,946 

1811 

83,735,223 

65,173,545 

24,977,915 

1812 

88,757,324 

65,037,850 

25,546,508 

1813 

105,943,727 

68,748,303 

28,030,239 

1814 

116,832,260 

71,134,503 

30,051,365 

1815 

92,280,180 

72,210,512 

31,576,074 

1816 

65,169,771 

02,264,546 

32,938,751 

T( 

jtal  Tax  Revenue, 

1792-1815:  £1,082,( 

)13,370. 

In  looking  over  this  table  it  will  be  noticed  that  the 
revenue  derived  from  taxes  increased  from  £19,258,814  in 
1792  to  £72,210,512  in  1815.  Nobody  can  say  with  absolute 
certainty  how  much  of  this  increase  was  due  to  the  automatic 
expansion  of  the  ordinary  peace  expenditure,  and  how  much 
to  the  War.  Therefore,  we  must  make  an  estimate.  We 
shall  probably  be  fairly  correct  if  we  assume  that  the  national 
expenditure,  and  with  it  the  tax  revenue  which  should 
provide  for  it,  would,  from  1792  to  1816,  have  gradually 
increased  by,  let  us  say,  60  per  cent.,  that  is,  from  £19,000,000 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     221 

in  round  figures  to  £31,000,000,  had  there  been  peace.  That 
gradual  increase  over  the  whole  period  under  review  would 
give  us  an  average  yearly  expenditure  of  £25,000,000  per 
year,  and  an  equally  large  tax  revenue  to  balance  it.  During 
the  twenty-four  years  from  1792  to  1915  the  total 
British  Tax  Eevenue  should  therefore  have  amounted  to 
£600,000,000,  had  peace  been  maintained.  As,  however, 
the  British  Tax  Eevenue  from  1792  to  1815  amounted  in 
the  aggregate  to  no  less  than  £1,082,000,000,  we  may  assume 
that  of  the  revenue  raised  by  taxes  between  1792  and  1815, 
£482,000,000  were  raised  owing  to  the  war.  Hence,  the 
true  cost  of  the  Great  War  should  consist  of  £601,500,000 
raised  by  loan,  and  of  £482,000,000  raised  by  taxation,  or 
£1,083,500,000  in  all.  My  estimate  that  the  British  War 
expenditure  in  the  Great  War  came  to  about  £1,100,000,000 
should  err,  if  at  all,  on  the  side  of  moderation.  Let  us  now 
endeavour  to  gauge  the  significance  of  the  gigantic  financial 
effort  made  by  this  country  by  looking  at  it  from  the  con- 
temporary point  of  view. 

In  1814  Mr.  P.  Colquhoun,  an  eminent  writer  on  eco- 
nomics and  statistics,  pubHshed  his  excellent '  Treatise  on  the 
Wealth,  Power,  and  Eesources  of  the  British  Empire.'  It 
was  based  on  the  Treasury  statistics.  According  to  him  the 
whole  private  and  pubHc  property  of  the  nation  represented 
a  money  value  of  £2,736,640,000.  It  is  noteworthy  that 
of  that  sum  £1,200,640,000  was  in  respect  of  agricultural 
land  alone.  Manufacturing,  commerce,  and  trade,  which 
now  are  the  principal  wealth-creating  resources  of  the 
country,  were  evidently  of  relatively  small  importance  at 
the  time.  According  to  his  painstaking  and  conscientious 
investigations,  the  national  income  amounted  then  to 
£430,521,372  per  year.  Its  composition  is  shown  in  the 
table  on  page  222. 

If  we  accept  as  correct  my  estimate  that  Great  Britain's 
expenditure  on  the  war  with  France  amounted  to  about 
£1,100,000,000,  it  follows  that  a  century  ago  Great  Britain 
spent  on  the  war  a  sum  about  equivalent  to  the  national 


222    Britain'' s  War  Finance  and  Economic  Future 

income  of  two  and  a  half  years,  and  considerably  larger  than 
one -third  of  the  entire  national  capital.  If,  a  century  ago, 
Great  Britain  was  able  to  spend  on  war  more  than  one-third 
of  the  national  capital,  she  should  certainly  be  able  to  make 
proportionately  as  great  a  financial  sacrifice  at  the  present 
time,  when  rapidly  producing  machinery  has  taken  the  place 
of  slowly  producing  agriculture,  when  capital  lost  or  diverted 
by  the  War  can  more  quickly  be  replaced.  As  the  national 
capital  amounts  at  least  to  £15,000,000,000,  Great  Britain 
should  now  be  able  to  spend  again  more  than  one-third,  or 
from  £5,000,000,000  to  £6,000,000,000,  on  war.  If  the 
Empire  as  a  whole  should  finance  the  War,  that  amount 

National  Income.  £ 


From  agriculture   .... 

From  mines  and  minerals 

From  manufactures 

From  inland  trade 

From  foreign  commerce  and  shipping 

From  the  coasting  trade 

From  fisheries,  excluding  Newfoundland 

From  banks  .... 

Foreign  income      .... 


216,817,624 

9,000,000 

114,230,000 

31,500,000 

46,373,748 

2,000,000 

2,100,000 

3,500,000 

5,000,000 


Total 430,521,372 

could  easily  be  doubled.  Of  course  some  allowance 
must  be  made  for  the  fact  that  whereas  a  hundred  years 
ago  British  war  expenditure  was  spread  over  twenty  years, 
it  will  now  be  spread  over  a  much  shorter  period.  Hence, 
the  necessary  economic  measures,  similar  to  those  which 
were  taken  a  century  ago,  must  not  be  taken  dilatorily 
but  speedily. 

Before  considering  the  consequences  of  the  nation's 
gigantic  expenditure  upon  its  economic  position  and  future, 
let  us  briefly  study  the  means  by  which,  a  century  ago,  Great 
Britain  raised  the  colossal  funds  required  for  the  war  against 
France,  for  such  an  investigation  will  supply  us  with  some 
very  valuable  precedents. 

A  hundred  years  ago,  as  now,  the  war  was  paid  for 
partly  with  the  proceeds  of  loans,  partly  with  funds  pro- 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     223 

vided  by  taxation.  If,  as  I  have  endeavoured  to  show, 
the  war  cost  this  country  £1,100,000,000,  it  appears  that 
£600,000,000,  or  three-fifths,  were  raised  by  loans  and 
£500,000,000,  or  two-fifths,  by  taxation.  If  we  now  turn 
back  to  the  interesting  table  of  national  revenue  and  expendi- 
ture previously  given,  it  will  be  seen  that  taxation  was 
enormously  increased  during  the  Napoleonic  era.  Between 
1792  and  1815  it  increased  from  £19,258,814  to  £72,210,512, 
or  was  almost  quadrupled,  and  as  the  substantial  increase 
of  taxation  only  began  in  1796,  it  was  almost  quadrupled 
in  the  small  space  of  twenty  years  !  How  great  was  the 
financial  sacrifice  made  by  the  nation  during  the  Napoleonic 
wars  may  be  seen  by  the  fact  that  British  taxation  was 
generally  considered  to  be  '  intolerably  high '  before  the 
war  began.  It  was  indeed  very  high.  If  we  look  at  the 
table  of  British  National  Debt  given  in  the  beginning  of 
this  chapter,  it  appears  that  the  National  Debt  had  been 
almost  exactly  doubled  by  the  costly  war  with  the  American 
Colonies,  France,  Spain,  and  Holland  from  1775  to  1784, 
that  this  country  entered  the  Napoleonic  War  with  the  dead 
weight  of  an  enormous  war  debt  pressing  on  it.  From 
the  table  of  National  Eevenue  and  Expenditure  it  appears 
furthermore  that  in  1792  no  less  than  practically  one-half 
of  the  entire  national  expenditure  consisted  of  interest 
paid  on  the  National  Debt,  that  one-half  of  the  Budgetary 
expenditure  in  time  of  peace  was,  in  fact,  expenditure  caused 
by  the  previous  wars. 

During  the  Napoleonic  War  the  public  burdens  were 
vastly  increased.  Keference  to  the  table  of  National  Ee- 
venue and  Expenditure  shows  that  the  interest  paid  per 
year  on  the  National  Debt  increased  from  £9,767,333  in 
1792  to  no  less  than  £32,938,751  in  1816,  growing  no  less 
than  three  and  a  half  fold.  The  British  national  expendi- 
ture of  1792  was  at  the  time  rightly  considered  to  be  a  very 
heavy  one.  It  was  exactly  twice  as  large  as  in  1775. 
Yet,  between  1813  and  1816  Great  Britain  spent  on  an 
average  per  year  on  interest  on  the  National  Debt  alone 


224<    BritairCs  War  Finance  and  Economic  Future 

50  per  cent,  more  than  the  total  amount  of  the  British 
national  expenditure  of  1792,  and  three  times  as  much  as 
the  whole  national  expenditure  of  1775. 

We  have  no  reason  to  complain  of  the  present  war  taxes. 
Compared  with  those  established  during  the  Napoleonic 
time  they  are  very  light  indeed. 

Now  let  us  study  the  way  by  which  Great  Britain  raised 
her  war  taxes  during  the  Great  War. 

As  the  Budgets  of  a  century  ago  form  in  their  bulky 
original  a  maze  in  which  the  uninitiated  are  lost,  I  would 
give  a  useful  analytical  digest  of  the  Budget  revenue  for  the 
year  1815,  taken  from  the  second  volume  of  Mr.  Stephen 
Dowell's  valuable  '  History  of  Taxation  and  Taxes  in 
England.'  Details  of  the  revenue  of  Great  Britain,  exclusive 
of  Ireland,  are  shown  in  the  table  on  page  225. 

The  revenue  from  taxes  in  Ireland  for  the  year  1815, 
ending  January  5,  1816,  was,  in  British  currency,  equal  to 
£6,258,723. 

It  will  be  noticed  that  a  century  ago,  as  now,  the  direct 
taxes  on  capital  and  income  and  the  taxes  on  luxuries 
such  as  beer,  wine,  spirits,  sugar,  tea,  coffee,  tobacco,  houses, 
coaches,  &c.,  provided  the  bulk  of  the  revenue.  However, 
not  only  these  but  everything  taxable  was  taxed.  Exports, 
imports,  and  internal  trade,  coal  and  timber,  raw  materials 
used  in  the  industries  and  manufactured  articles  produced 
in  Great  Britain,  all  had  to  pay  their  share.  Sydney  Smith, 
the  witty  Canon  of  St.  Paul's,  wrote  in  an  article  in  The 
Edinburgh  Review  in  1820  : 

We  can  inform  Brother  Jonathan  what  are  the  inevitable 
consequences  of  being  too  fond  of  glory.  Taxes  upon  every 
article  which  enters  into  the  mouth,  or  covers  the  back,  or 
is  placed  under  the  foot.  Taxes  upon  anything  that  is 
pleasant  to  see,  hear,  feel,  smell,  or  taste.  Taxes  upon 
warmth,  light,  and  locomotion.  Taxes  upon  everything  on 
earth,  or  under  the  earth,  on  everything  that  comes  from 
abroad,  or  is  grown  at  home.  Taxes  on  the  raw  material, 
taxes  on  every  fresh  value  that  is  added  to  it  by  the  industry 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     225 


DiEEOT  Taxes 

£ 

£ 

The  land  tax 

1,196,000 

Taxes  on  houses  and  establishments 

.     6,500,000 

Income  tax     .... 

14,000,000 

Tax  on  succession  to  property 

11,297,000 

Property  insured      . 

918,000 

Property  sold  at  auction 

284,000 

Coaches  and  cabs    • 

471,608 

Tonnagf-  on  shipping 

171,651 

25,435,259 

Taxes  on  Astioles  of  Consumption. 

Food,  Drink,  and  Tobacco  : 

£ 

£ 

Salt 

1,616,671 

Sugar     . 

. 

2,957,403 

Currants,  raisins,  pepper, 

and  vinegar 

541,589 

Beer 

3,330,044 

Malt       . 

6,044,276 

Hops 

222,026 

Drink  Licenses 

200,000 

Wine 

1,900,772 

Spirits    . 

6,700,000 

Tea 

3,591,350 

Coffee     . 

276,700 

Tobacco 

2,025,663 

on  ArtR  AnA 

*/j  _Vi^j-X»./1 

Raw  Materials  and  Customs  Duties : 

Coal  and  slate          .... 

915,797 

Timber 

1,802,000 

Cotton  wool    ..... 

760,000 

Raw  and  thrown  silk 

450,000 

Barilla,  indigo,  potashes,  bar  iron,  and  fur. 

3        297,000 

285,000 

Export  duties           .... 

364,417 

Various  import  duties 

1,188,000 

3,062,214 

Taxes  on  Manufactures : 

Leather           ..... 

698,342 

Soap 

747,759 

Bricks  and  tiles 

269,121 

Glass 

424,787 

Candles 

354,350 

Paper     . 

476,019 

Printed  goods 

388,076 

Newspapers    . 

383,000 

Advertisements 

125,000 

Plate      . 

82,151 

Various 

132,116 

4,080,721 

Stamp  Duties. 

Bills  and  notes        .... 

841,000 

Receipts         ..... 

210,000 

Other  instruments  .... 

.     1,692,000 

2,743,000 

£ 

Grand  total      .... 

67,730,688 
Q 

226    Britain's  War  Finance  and  Economic  Future 


of  man.  Taxes  on  the  sauce  which  pampers  man's  appetite, 
and  the  drug  which  restores  him  to  health  ;  on  the  ermine 
which  decorates  the  judge,  and  the  rope  which  hangs  the 
criminal ;  on  the  poor  man's  salt  and  the  rich  man's  spice  ; 
on  the  brass  nails  of  the  coffin  and  the  ribbons  of  the  bride  ; 
at  bed  or  board,  couchant  or  levant,  we  must  pay.  The 
schoolboy  wdiips  his  taxed  top,  the  beardless  youth  manages 
his  taxed  horse  with  a  taxed  bridle  on  a  taxed  road  ;  and 
the  dying  Englishman,  pouring  his  medicine,  which  has 
paid  seven  per  cent.,  into  a  spoon  that  has  paid  fifteen  per 
cent.,  flings  himself  back  upon  his  chintz  bed  which  has 
paid  twenty-two  per  cent,  and  expires  in  the  arms  of  an 
apothecary  who  has  paid  a  licence  of  One  hundred  pounds 
for  the  privilege  of  putting  him  to  death.  His  whole 
property  is  then  immediately  taxed  from  two  to  ten  per 
cent.  Besides  the  Probate  large  fees  are  demanded  for 
burying  him  in  the  chancel.  His  virtues  are  handed  down 
to  posterity  on  taxed  marble  and  he  will  then  be  gathered 
to  his  fathers  to  be  taxed  no  more. 

The  manner  by  which  British  taxation  was  increased  in 
the  course  of  the  Great  War  may  be  gauged  by  comparing 
the  peace  Budget  of  1792  with  that  of  1815.  The  following 
figures  give  a  summary  comparison  : 


In  1792 

In  1815 

£ 

£ 

Direct  taxes   ...... 

3,837,000 

25,438,259 

Taxes  on  food,  drink  and  tobacco     . 

9,035,783 

29,406,494 

Taxes    on    raw    materials    and    customs 

duties          ...... 

1,467,000 

6,062,214 

Taxes  on  manufactures    .... 

1,656,000 

4,080,721 

Stamp  duties  ...... 

752,000 

2,743,000 

It  will  be  noticed  that  the  taxes  on  food,  drink,  tobacco; 
raw  materials,  imports,  and  on  manufactures  increased 
between  1792  and  1815  from  three  to  four-fold,  and  that 
the  stamp  duties  were  raised  at  a  similar  ratio,  while  the 
direct  taxes,  that  is,  the  taxes  on  the  income  and  the  pro- 
perty of  the  well-to-do,  and  on  their  establishments,  increased 


Gi'eat  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     Til 

almost  sevenfold.  If  we  bear  in  mind  that  a  century  ago 
British  foreign  trade  was  carried  on  chiefly  with  the  Con- 
tinent of  Europe  and  the  United  States,  that  during  many 
years  practically  the  whole  Continent  was  closed  by 
Napoleon  to  British  trade,  that  from  1812  to  1815  Great 
Britain  was  at  war  with  the  United  States,  that  the  British 
Colonies  were  quite  unimportant,  that  in  1800  Canada  had 
240,000  and  AustraHa  only  6500  inhabitants,  that  the  only 
valuable  British  Colonies  were  the  West  Indies,  that  in 
consequence  of  the  closmg  of  the  principal  British  markets 
business  was  extremely  bad,  that  commercial  failures  were 
very  numerous,  that  several  harvests  had  failed,  that  bread 
was  scarce  and  very  dear,  that  gold  had  disappeared,  that 
the  forced  paper  currency  had  rapidly  depreciated,  so  that 
a  guinea  at  one  time  was  worth  twenty-seven  shillings  in 
paper,  we  can  appreciate  the  economic  sufferuigs  of  the 
British  people  and  their  determination  and  staying  power, 
then:  civic  heroism  and  their  moral  fibre.  They  paid  during 
those  hard  times  three  and  four  times  as  much  in  taxes  as  they 
had  done  during  the  years  preceding  the  war.  As,  therefore, 
a  hundred  years  ago,  and  under  far  more  difficult  economic 
circumstances  than  those  which  obtain  at  present,  the  British 
people  were  able  to  bear  a  burden  of  taxation  from  three  to 
four  times  as  heavy  as  that  to  wliich  they  had  been 
accustomed,  the  British  people  of  to-day  will  also  be  able  to 
pay  far  more  in  taxes  than  they  have  done  hitherto,  although 
there  will,  of  course,  be  grumbling  and  suffering.  Nations, 
and  especially  nations  which  hve  luxuriously  and  wastefully, 
have  almost  an  infinite  capacity  of  paying  taxes.  That 
is  one  of  the  lessons  of  the  Great  War  with  France. 

Great  Britain  habitually  makes  war  lavishly  and  waste- 
fully.  That  lies  in  the  national  character.  Out  of  the 
forty  years  from  1775  to  1815  nine  years  were  spent  in  an 
enormous  war  with  the  American  Colonies,  France,  Spain, 
and  Holland,  and  twenty  years  n  a  still  greater  war  with 
Eepubhcan  and  Napoleonic  France,  and  her  alhes  and 
vassals.    During  these  forty  years,  as  we  may  see  by  referring 


228    Britam''s  War  Finance  and  Economic  Future 

to  the  little  table  given  in  the  beginning  of  this  chapter, 
the  National  Debt  and  the  yearly  interest  paid  on  it  increased 
about  sevenfold.  Frederick  the  Great,  Napoleon  the 
First,  and  many  other  men  of  eminence,  both  in  England 
and  abroad,  beheved  that  the  enormous  British  National 
Debt,  and  the  ever-increasing  burden  of  taxation,  would 
impoverish  and  ruin  England.  Yet,  at  the  end  of  the 
forty  years'  war  period,  England  was  undoubtedly  far 
wealthier  than  she  had  been  at  its  beginning. 

After  the  conclusion  of  that  terrible  war  period  the 
expected  collapse  of  the  British  industries  and  of  British 
commerce  did  not  take  place.  On  the  contrary,  all  the 
British  industries  and  British  commerce  expanded  in  an 
unprecedented  manner.  It  has  so  frequently  been  asserted 
by  economic  and  general  historians  who  write  history  in 
order  to  prove  a  case,  or  to  establish  a  doctrine,  who  write 
party  pamphlets  in  book  form,  that  England's  economic 
expansion  was  consequent  upon,  and  due  to,  the  introduction 
of  Free  Trade,  that  that  fallacy  has  been  very  widely 
accepted  as  truth.  The  abolition  of  many  of  the 
innumerable  taxes  imposed  during  the  Great  War  no  doubt 
proved  a  powerful  stimulus  to  certain  industries.  Still, 
Great  Britain's  most  wonderful  progress  in  trade  and 
industry,  in  banking  and  shipping,  in  agriculture  and 
mining,  took  place  before  Free  Trade  was  introduced. 
It  was  effected  during  and  shortly  after  the  forty  years 
of  almost  incessant  warfare,  and  was,  as  I  shall  endeavour 
to  show,  chiefly  due  to  these  wars  and  to  the  burdens  which 
they  imposed  upon  the  nation.  Before  endeavouring  to 
prove  this,  it  is  necessary  to  show  that  the  greatest  economic 
advance  of  this  country  took  place  before  1846,  the  year 
when  Free  Trade  was  introduced. 

The  supply  of  men,  as  Adam  Smith  wisely  remarked, 
is  regulated  by  the  demand  for  men.  In  prosperous  times, 
when  work  is  plentiful,  the  people  increase  rapidly.  Between 
1801  and  1841  the  British  population  almost  doubled, 
growing  from  10,942,646  to   18,720,394.    Agriculture   and 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     229 

the  manufacturing  industries  flourished.  As  in  1841,  ac- 
cording to  Porter's  '  Progress  of  the  Nation,'  only  about 
3,000,000  British  people  lived  on  imported  wheat,  it 
obviously  follows,  as  that  distinguished  statistician  pointed 
out,  that  British  agricultural  production  must  have  increased 
by  50  per  cent,  in  the  meantime.  The  expansion  of  British 
agriculture  may  be  seen  not  only  by  the  large  increase 
of  the  population,  which  relied  almost  exclusively  on  home- 
grown food,  but  also  by  the  increasing  yield  of  agricultural 
rent,  which,  according  to  McCulloch's  '  Statistical  Account 
of  the  British  Empire,'  grew  as  follows  : 

Agricultural  Rent 

1800 £22,500,000 

1806 25,908,207 

1810 29,503,074 

1815 34,230,462 

1843 40,167,089 

Now  let  us  look  at  the  progress  of  the  British  manu- 
facturing industries.  The  following  tables  are  extracted 
from  Porter's  book,  'The  Progress  of  the  Nation,'  1851. 
I  would  add  that  Mr.  Porter  was  the  chief  of  the  Statistical 
Department  of  the  Board  of  Trade,  and  the  founder  of 
the  Statistical  Society,  and  he  was  later  on  Secretary  to 
the  Board  of  Trade. 

As  the  statistics  relating  to  British  industrial  produc- 
tion during  the  first  half  of  the  last  century  are  somewhat 
defective,  the  progress  of  the  British  manufacturing 
industries,  as  a  whole,  and  of  British  trade,  can  best  be 
gauged  from  the  increase  in  the  populations  of  the  principal 
manufacturing  and  trading  towns.  These  increased  rapidly 
as  is  shown  in  a  table  on  page  230. 

It  will  be  noticed  that  between  1801  and  1841  the 
population  of  Manchester,  Liverpool,  and  indeed  most  of 
the  towns  given,  grew  threefold  and  more  than  three- 
fold. Thes9  figures  suffice  to  show  that  the  British  manu- 
facturing industries  and  British  trade  expanded  at  an 
incredible  rate  of  speed  before  1846. 


230    Britain's  War  Finance  and  Economic  Future 


The  textile  industry,  in  its  various  branches,  is  the 
greatest  British  manufacturing  industry,  and  its  rise  is 
frequently,  although  erroneously,  attributed  by  many  to 


Population 

of  British  Towns. 

1801 

1811 

1821 

1831 

1841 

Manchester  and  Salford 

94,876 

115,874 

163,635 

237,832 

311,009 

Liverpool     . 

82,295 

104,104 

138,354 

201,751 

286,487 

Birmingham 

70,670 

82,753 

101,722 

143,986 

182,922 

Leeds . 

53,162 

62,534 

83,796 

123,393 

152,074 

Sheffield      . 

45,755 

53,231 

65,275 

91,692 

111,091 

Wolverhampton 

30,584 

43,190 

53,011 

67,514 

93,245 

Bradford 

13,264 

16,012 

26,307 

43,527 

66,715 

Oldham 

21,677 

29,479 

38,201 

50,513 

60,451 

Preston 

12,174 

17,360 

24,859 

33,871 

50,887 

Bolton 

17,966 

24,799 

32,045 

42,245 

51,029 

Leicester 

17,005 

23,453 

31,036 

40,639  !    50,806  | 

Nottingham 

28,861 

34,253 

40,415 

50,680 

53,091 

Macclesfield 

13,255 

17,143 

23,154 

30,911 

32,629 

Coventry     . 

16,034 

17,923 

21,448 

27,298  1    31,032 

Hudders  field 

7,268 

9,671 

13,284 

19,035      25,068 

Rochdale     . 

8,040 

10,392 

12,998 

18,351 

24,272 

Northampton 

7,020 

8,427 

10,793 

15,351 

21,242 

Free  Trade.  Measured  by  the  quantity  of  raw  material 
imported — the  best  test  available — the  British  textile  in- 
dustries, according  to  Porter,  developed  as  follows  : 

Imports  of 


- 

Eaw  Cotton 

Baw  Silk 

Raw  Wool 

Lbs. 

Lbs. 

Lbs. 

Lbs. 

1801 

54,203,433 

960,0001 

7,371,774 

1805 

58,878,163 

— 

8,069,793 

1815 

92,525,951 

1,475,389 

13,640,375 

1825 

202,546,869 

3,604,058 

43,816,966 

1835 

333,043,464 

5,788,458 

42,604,656 

1845 

721,979,953 

6,328,159 

76,813,865 

Between  1801  and  1845  the  importation  of  raw  silk 
increased  about  sevenfold,  that  of  raw  wool  more  than 
tenfold,  and  that  of  raw  cotton  more  than  thirteen-fold. 

1  Ten  years  average. 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     281 

The  British  iron  production  increased,  according  to 
Porter,  as  follows  : 

British  Iron  Production, 

1806 258,000  tons. 

1825 581,000  tons. 

1835 1,000,000  tons. 

1840 1,500,000  tons, 

1845 1,700,000  tons. 

Between  1806  and  1845  the  British  iron  production 
increased  nearly  sevenfold. 

The  expansion  of  all  the  British  manufacturing  indus- 
tries was  so  rapid  after  1815  that  they  speedily  acquired 
practically  a  world  monopoly.  In  1845  Great  Britain  was 
indeed,  to  use  Cobden's  words,  the  workshop  of  the  world. 

Modern  manufacturing  is  based  on  coal.  The  command- 
ing position  which  the  British  industries  had  obtained 
during  and  after  the  Great  War  can  best  be  gauged  by 
Great  Britain's  production  of  coal.  According  to  E.  C. 
Taylor's  valuable  '  Statistics  of  Coal,'  a  bulky  handbook 
pubhshed  in  1848,  the  world's  production  of  coal  in  1845 
was  as  follows  : 


— 

Production  of 
Coal  in  1845 

Percentage  of 
World's  Production 

Great  Britain     ..... 

Belgium    ...... 

United  States    .         .          .          .         • 

France       ...... 

Russia       ...... 

Austria     ...... 

Total 

Tons 
31,500,000 
4,960,077 
4,400,000 
4,141,617 
3,500,000 
659,340 

Per  Cent. 
64-2 
101 
8-9 
8-4 
7-0 
1-4 

100  0 

49,161.034 

In  1845  Great  Britain  not  only  produced  two-thirds 
of  the  world's  coal  and  two-thirds  of  the  world's  iron,  but 
also  worked  up  two-thirds  of  the  world's  raw  cotton. 

During  the  war,  and  during  the  three  decades  of  peace 
which  followed  the  Congress  of  Vienna,  Great  Britain  became 
the  workshop  of  the  world.  The  predictions  of  Napoleon 
and  of  many  statesmen,  financiers,  and  economists,  that 


♦232    Britain's  War  Finance  and  Economic  Future 

the  enormous  National  Debt  and  the  huge  burden  of  taxation 
would  utterly  impoverish  Great  Britain,  were  triumphantly 
refuted.  In  no  other  period  of  the  nation's  history  did  its 
wealth  progress  at  a  more  rapid  rate.  The  principal  cause 
which  led  to  this  marvellous  economic  development  was, 
in  my  opinion,  illogical  as  it  may  sound,  the  great  burden 
which  forty  years  of  almost  incessant  warfare  had  laid  upon 
the  British  people.  Men  do  not  love  exertion,  do  not  love 
work.  They  are  born  idlers  who  endeavour  to  enjoy  life 
without  exertion.  They  will  not  work  hard — there  are, 
of  course,  exceptions — unless  compelled.  Men,  being  born 
idle  and  improvident,  hve  without  labour  in  all  chmes  where 
a  kindly  Nature  has  provided  for  their  wants.  Necessity 
is  not  only  the  mother  of  invention,  but  also  the  mother  of 
labour,  of  productivity,  of  thrift,  of  wealth,  of  power,  and 
of  progress,  and  the  greatest  civihsing  influence  of  all  is  the 
tax-collector.  The  tax-collector  converted  the  backward 
and  happy-go-lucky  British  nation  into  a  nation  of  strenuous 
and  intelhgent  industrial  workers. 

Men  hke  their  comforts  and  their  amusements,  and 
they  are  apt  to  spend  very  nearly  all  they  earn.  If  their 
taxes  are  suddenly  very  greatly  increased,  their  first  impulse 
is  to  stint  themselves,  but  as  this  is  a  painful  process,  they 
soon  endeavour  to  provide  the  money  required  by  the  tax- 
collector  by  harder  work,  or  by  more  intelligent  exertion. 
During  the  forty  years  period  of  almost  incessant  war,  and 
during  the  three  decades  which  followed  the  Peace  of  Vienna, 
taxes  were  increased  enormously,  and  as  the  increased  taxes 
could  scarcely  be  provided  for  by  the  unpleasant  virtue  of 
thrift,  the  people  began  to  exert  their  ingenuity  and  strove 
to  increase  their  income  by  increasing  production.  At  the 
end  of  the  eighteenth  and  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth 
century,  two  periods  of  greatly  increased  taxation,  British 
genius  was  applied  to  money-making,  to  industry,  and  to 
invention  in  an  unparalleled  manner.  Not  chance,  but  the 
constantly  and  colossally  growing  demands  of  the  tax-col- 
lector led  to  the  introduction  of  the  steam-engine,  of  labour- 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     233 

saving  machinery  of  every  kind,  of  modern  manufacturing, 
of  modern  commerce  and  banking,  of  railways,  and  of 
steamships. 

The  time  when  taxation  was  trebled  and  quadrupled  saw 
the  rise  of  inventive  geniuses  such  as  Watt,  Boulton,  Brindley, 
Trevethick,  Telford,  Brunei,  Maudesley,  Bramah,  Nasmyth, 
George  Stephenson,  Hargreaves,  Arkwright,  Crompton, 
Cartwright,  Horrocks,  Smeaton,  Priestly,  Dalton,  Faraday, 
Davy,  Wedgwood,  and  many  others.  The  resources  of  the 
country  were  carefully  studied  and  energetically  developed. 
Excellent  roads  were  built  to  facihtate  traffic.  The  activity 
of  the  Duke  of  Bridgewater,  and  of  other  men,  gave  to 
England  the  then  best  system  of  inland  waterways.  The 
Duke  of  Bedford,  Kay,  and  Coke  of  Norfolk  gave  a  tre- 
mendous impetus  to  scientific  agriculture.  Eowland  Hill 
introduced  the  penny  postage.  By  the  perfection  of  the 
organisation  of  joint-stock  undertakings,  the  building  of 
costly  railways,  of  factories  on  the  largest  scale,  and  the 
evolution  of  modern  banking,  were  made  possible. 

During  the  end  of  the  eighteenth  and  the  first  half  of  the 
nineteenth  century,  Enghshmen  were  the  most  enterprising 
men  in  the  world.  They  not  only  made  the  principal 
inventions  of  modern  industry,  but  they  were  invariably 
the  first  to  exploit  the  industrial  inventions  made  by  other 
nations.  Since  then,  Enghsh  enterprise  and  Enghsh  in- 
ventiveness have  sadly  dechned.  Most  industrial  inven- 
tions and  improvements  are  made  nowadays  in  Germany 
and  in  the  United  States,  and  the  most  valuable  industrial 
inventions  and  discoveries  made  by  Englishmen  are  ex- 
ploited not  in  England,  but  in  Germany  and  America.  The 
British  discovery  of  making  dyes  from  coal-tar  led  to  the 
estabhshment  of  an  enormous  coal-tar  dye  industry  in 
Germany.  Although  an  Englishman  invented  the  valuable 
automatic  loom,  only  a  few  automatic  looms  are  to  be 
found  in  this  country,  while  hundreds  of  thousands  are 
employed  in  the  United  States.  Many  similar  instances 
might  be  given. 


234    Britain^s  War  Finance  and  Economic  Future 

During  the  last  fifty  years,  England  has  undoubtedly 
grown  slack.  Many  British  industries  have  remained 
stagnant  or  have  declined,  while  those  in  the  United  States 
and  in  Germany  have  mightily  expanded.  Great  Britain 
was  the  workshop  of  the  world  in  1845,  but  she  occupies  no 
longer  that  proud  position.  What  is  the  cause,  or  what  are 
the  causes,  of  this  extraordinary  change  ?  There  are  many 
causes,  but  the  principal  cause  is  undoubtedly  this,  that 
when  England  had  become  industrially  supreme  and  very 
wealthy,  the  people  were  no  longer  compelled  to  work  hard. 
Having  established  their  position  in  the  world  of  industry  and 
commerce,  Englishmen  began  to  take  their  ease.  Self- 
indulgence  took  the  place  of  industry.  Both  the  employers 
and  their  workers  began  to  neglect  their  business  at  a  time 
when  necessity  compelled  the  German  and  American  peoples 
to  concentrate  their  entire  energy  upon  the  development  of 
their  commerce  and  their  industries. 

I  have  endeavoured  to  show  in  these  pages  that  the 
wonderful  development  of  the  British  industries  during 
the  end  of  the  eighteenth  and  during  the  first  half  of  the 
nineteenth  century  was  due  not  to  chance,  but  to  high 
taxation — that  not  chance,  but  the  pressure  of  high  taxation 
produced  the  invention  of  the  steam-engine  and  of  labour- 
saving  machinery  of  every  kind.  It  is  to  be  hoped  that  the 
vastly  increased  demands  of  the  tax-collector  will  once  more 
stimulate  inventiveness  and  industry  in  this  country  to 
the  utmost,  that  necessity  will  cause  Englishmen  to  discover 
new  avenues  which  lead  to  prosperity,  that  the  gigantic  cost 
of  the  present  War  will  be  as  easily  borne  as  that  of  the  Great 
War  a  century  ago.  However,  we  need  not  reckon  upon  the 
discovery  of  new  processes  and  the  invention  of  new  machines. 
Great  Britain  can  easily  provide  for  her  financial  require- 
ments, however  long  the  War  may  last,  by  the  simple 
process  of  Americanising  her  industries.  Great  Britain  is 
blessed  with  an  excellent  climate  and  a  most  favourable 
geographical  position.  She  is  the  only  country  in  the 
world  which,  owing  to  the  situation  of  its  coalfields,  can 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     235 

manufacture  practically  on  the  sea-shore,  whereas  other 
nations  are  greatly  hampered  by  being  compelled  to  manu- 
facture far  inland.  Besides,  Great  Britain  possesses  a 
gigantic  and  invaluable  undeveloped  estate  in  her  vast 
Dominions  and  Colonies.  Great  Britain  and  the  British 
Empire  have  absolutely  unlimited  resources  which  are  partly 
not  exploited  at  all,  and  partly  quite  insufficiently  utihsed. 
The  greatest  resource  of  every  nation  is,  in  Colbert's 
words,  the  labour  of  the  people.  Unfortunately,  the  labour 
of  the  British  people  is  very  largely  wasted.  If  we  compare 
the  productivity  of  labour  in  this  country  and  in  the  United 
States,  we  find,  incredible  as  it  may  sound,  that  American 
labour  is  about  three  times  as  efficient  as  is  British  labour, 
that  one  American  worker  produces  approximately  as  much 
as  do  three  British  workers.  This  assertion  can  be  proved 
by  means  of  the  British  and  the  United  States  censuses 
of  production.  The  British  census  of  production  refers  to 
the  year  1907  and  the  American  census  to  the  year  1909. 
The  two  years  lie  so  near  together  that  one  may  fairly 
compare  the  results  given.  There  is,  of  course,  a  difficulty 
in  comparing  the  efficiency  of  British  and  American  labour. 
In  the  first  place  the  industries  in  the  two  countries  have  not 
always  been  officially  classified  in  the  same  manner.  There- 
fore many  industries,  such  as  the  iron  industry,  cannot  be 
compared  by  means  of  the  census  figures.  In  the  second 
place  the  qualities  of  American  and  British  produce  fre- 
quently differ  widely.  These  considerations  have  necessarily 
narrowed  the  range  of  comparable  figures.  The  following 
table  contains  statistics  relating  to  some  British  and 
American  industries  which  may  fairly  be  compared.  They 
will  show  conclusively  that  in  many  of  the  comparable 
industries  the  American  workers  produce  approximately 
three  times  as  large  a  quantity  of  goods  as  do  their  English 
colleagues,  and  that  they  succeed  in  producing  three  times 
as  much,  not  because  they  work  three  times  as  hard,  but 
because,  as  is  also  shown  in  the  table,  the  United  States 
use  in  the  identical  industries  approximately  three   times 


236    Britain'' s  War  Finance  and  Economic  Future 

as  much  horse-power  per  thousand  men  as  does  Great 
Britam.  The  followmg  figures  are  extracted  from  a  fuller 
table  which  appeared  in  an  article  of  mine  published  in 
The  Fortnightly  Beview  for  August  1913,  to  which  I  would 
refer  those  who  desire  further  details.  They  were  much 
discussed  at  the  time,  but  they  have  hitherto  not  been 
successfully  challenged. 


— 

Production 
per  year 

Number  of 
Wage- 
earners 

Hori5e-power 
Employed 

Horse- 
power per 
Thousand 

Wage- 
earners 

Value  of 
Produc- 
tion per 
Wage- 
earner 
per  Year 

Boots  and  Shoes  : 

£ 

£ 

United  Kingdom 

20,095,000 

117,565 

20,171 

172 

171 

United  States 

102,359,000 

198,297 

96,302 

486 

516 

Cardboard  Boxes  : 

United  Kingdom 

2,067,000 

19,844 

2,288 

114 

106 

United  States 

10,970,000 

39,514 

23,323 

590 

275 

Cement : 

United  Kingdom 

3,621,000 

18,860 

60,079 

3,195 

192 

United  States 

12,641,000 

26,775 

371,799 

13,873 

472 

Clothing  : 

United  Kingdom 

62,169,000 

392,084 

17,837 

45 

158 

United  States 

190,560,000 

393,439 

65,019 

165 

484 

Cocoa,  Chocolate,  and 

Confectionary : 

United  Kingdom 

16,171,000 

54,629 

19,898 

346 

296 

United  States 

31,437,000 

47,464 

46,463 

980 

662 

Cotton  Goods : 

United  Kingdom 

132,000,000 

659,573 

1,239,212 

2,214 

236 

United  States 

125,678,400 

378,880 

1,296,517 

3,423 

332 

Clocks  and  Watches : 

United  Kingdom 

613,000 

4,448 

550 

125 

137 

United  States 

7,039,400 

23,857 

14,957 

628 

296 

Cutlery  and  Tools : 

United  Kingdom 

2,047,000 

12,485 

5,248 

420 

164 

United  States 

10,653,200 

32,996 

68,294 

2,069 

323 

Firearms    and    Am- 

munition : 

United  Kingdom 

677,000 

4,444 

2,619 

595 

152 

United  States 

6,822,400 

14,715 

17,840 

1,214 

464 

Gloves : 

United  Kingdom 

1,056,000 

4,532 

509 

113 

233 

United  States 

4,726,200 

11,354 

2,889 

256 

416 

Hats  and  Caps : 

United  Kingdom 

5,256,000 

28,420 

5,142 

181 

149 

United  States 

16,598,000 

40,079 

23,524 

588 

414 

Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     237 


— 

Production 
per  Year 

Number  of 
Wage- 
earners 

Horse-power 
Employed 

Horse- 
power per 
Thousand 
Wage- 
earners 

Value  of 
Produc- 
tion per 
Wage- 
earner 
per  Year 

Hosiery : 

£ 

£ 

United  Kingdom 

8,792,000 

47,687 

7,784 

163 

184 

United  States 

40,028,600 

129,275 

103,709 

804 

309 

Leather  Tanning  and 

Dressing  : 

United  Kingdom 

18,289,000 

26,668 

22,609 

847 

686 

United  States 

65,574,800 

62,202 

148,140 

2,389 

1,054 

Matches : 

United  Ejngdom 

862,000 

3,865 

1,591 

408 

223 

United  States 

2,270,600 

3,631 

6,224 

1,729 

625 

Paint  Colours  and 

Varnish  : 

United  Kingdom 

9,127,000 

10,574 

14,575 

1,375 

863 

United  States 
Paper : 

United  Kingdom 

24,977,800 

14,240 

66,162 

4,012 

1,754 

13,621,000 

40,955 

172,224 

4,201 

330 

United  States 

53,531,000 

75,978 

1,304,265 

15,846 

705 

Pens  and  Pencils : 

United  Kingdom 

791,000 

6,025 

1,450 

241 

131 

United  States 

2,539,000 

6,058 

4,261 

710 

419 

Printing  and  Pub- 

lishing : 

United  Kingdom 

13,548,000 

34,210 

38,611 

1,133 

396 

United  States 

147,757,200 

258,434 

297,763 

1,154 

572 

Silk : 

United  Kingdom 

5,345,000 

30,710 

18,867 

608 

142 

United  States 

39,382,400 

99,037 

97,947 

989 

398 

The  figures  given,  which  have  not  been  selected  for  the 
purpose  of  '  making  a  case,'  show  irrefutably  that  the 
British  manufacturing  industries  as  a  whole  are  almost 
incredibly  inefficient.  Wherever  we  look  we  find  that  the 
American  worker  produces  per  year  approximately  three 
times  as  much  as  does  his  British  colleague.  Even  the 
British  cotton  industry,  the  premier  industry  of  the  country, 
is,  both  on  the  spinning  and  on  the  weaving  side,  not  pro- 
vided with  the  best  labour-saving  machinery,  as  I  pointed 
out  very  fully  in  an  article  in  The  Nineteenth  Century  review 
some  years  ago.^ 

1  '  Will  a  Tariff  Harm  Lancashire  ? — A  Lesson   from   America,'    The 
Nineteenth  Century  and  After,  August,  1912. 


238    Britain's  War  Finance  and  Economic  Future 

The  comparison  of  production  per  wage-earner  per  year 
in  England  and  the  United  States  is  based  upon  wholesale 
prices.  It  is  true  that  the  shop  prices  of  many  commodities 
are  higher  in  the  United  States  than  in  England.  However, 
this  difference  is  due  very  largely  to  the  fact  that  the 
American  retailers  require  a  larger  profit  because  they  have 
larger  expenses,  and  because  the  business  of  distribution 
is  more  costly  in  the  United  States  than  here  because  dis- 
tances are  greater.  In  most  cases  the  wholesale  prices  of 
comparable  commodities  are  nearly  identical  in  both 
countries.  The  fact  that  the  American  workers  produce 
on  an  average  approximately  three  times  as  much  as  their 
British  colleagues  employed  in  the  same  industries  can 
therefore  not  be  gainsaid. 

It  is,  of  course,  generally  known  that  in  many  cases 
American  workers  employ  far  more  perfect  machinery 
than  do  their  British  colleagues,  but  it  is  not  generally 
known,  and  it  seems  almost  unbelievable,  that  the  American 
workers  employ,  besides  better  machinery,  about  three 
times  as  much  power  as  do  the  British  workers  engaged  in 
the  same  trades.  If  we  allow  for  the  fact  that  the  American 
industries  possess  not  only  better  machines,  but  in  addition 
three  times  as  much  power  with  which  to  drive  them,  it 
is  obvious  that  the  mechanical  efficiency  of  the  American 
industries  is  considerably  more  than  three  times  as  great 
as  that  of  the  corresponding  British  industries. 

At  the  time  when  Great  Britain  was  the  workshop  of  the 
world,  McCulloch  wrote  in  his  'Account  of  the  British 
Empire ' :  'A  given  number  of  hands  in  Great  Britain 
perform  much  more  work  than  is  executed  by  the  same 
number  of  hands  almost  anywhere  else.'  That  statement, 
which  was  true  in  the  middle  of  the  last  century,  is  true 
no  longer.  Unfortunately  the  British  industries  have  become 
lamentably  inefficient,  not  only  in  comparison  with  those 
of  the  United  States,  but  of  Germany  and  of  other  countries 
as  well.  The  greatest  asset  of  a  State  is  its  man-power. 
Much  of  the  British  man-power  is  wasted.    By  Americanising 


G7'eat  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     239 

the  British  manufacturing  industries  we  can  obviously 
double  and  treble  the  national  output,  and  can  thus  double 
and  treble  the  national  income.  That  has  been  made 
abundantly  clear  by  my  analytical  comparison. 

The  lamentable  inefficiency  of  British  production  is 
apparent  not  only  in  manufacturing,  but  in  agriculture 
and  mining  as  well.  The  Coal  Tables  of  1912,  published 
by  the  British  Board  of  Trade  in  March,  1914,  contain  many 
interesting  figures  relating  to  coal  production  in  England 
and  abroad.  Coal  is  the  bread  of  the  manufacturing  indus- 
tries. Its  importance  to  the  nation  can  scarcely  be  exag- 
gerated. Let  us  see  how  British  coal  production  compares 
with  coal  production  elsewhere. 

Tons  of  Coal  Produced  per  Annum  per  Person  Employed. 


- 

United 
Kingdom 

United  States 

Australia 

New  Zealand 

Canada 

1886-90 

312 

400 

333 

359 

341 

1891-95 

271 

444 

358 

388 

375 

189&-1900 

298 

494 

426 

441 

457 

1901-5 

281 

543 

437 

474 

495 

1906-10 

275 

596 

462 

470 

439 

1908 

271 

538 

500 

478 

422 

1909 

266 

617 

388 

456 

400 

1910 

257 

618 

449 

478 

453 

1911 

260 

613 

485 

487 

395 

1912 

2441 

660 

542 

503 

472 

It  will  be  noticed  that  the  coal  production  per  man  per 
year  is  almost  twice  as  large  in  Australia,  New  Zealand, 
and  Canada  as  it  is  in  the  United  Kingdom,  and  that  it  is 
almost  three  times  as  large  in  the  United  States  as  it  is  in 
this  country.  This  startling  difference  can  only  partly 
be  explained  by  the  fact  that  in  many  cases  the  coal  seams 
are  thicker  in  the  United  States  than  in  Great  Britain, 
and  are  to  be  found  at  a  lesser  depth.  This  startling  dis- 
crepancy in  output  is  largely,  if  not  chiefly,  ascribable  to 
this,  that  the  British  miner,  as  the  British  industrial  worker, 

^  Strike  year. 


240    Britain's  War  Finance  and  Economic  Future 

is  hostile  to  improved  machinery,  and  is  determinedly 
bent  upon  Umiting  output.  It  is  ominous  that,  whereas 
British  coal  production  per  man  has  steadily  been  decreasing 
during  the  last  thirty  years,  American,  Austrahan,  New 
Zealand,  and  Canadian  coal  production  per  man  has  been 
steadily  increasing.  The  British  miner  has  unfortunately 
succeeded  in  more  than  nullifying  the  technical  improve- 
ments made  in  coal  production  which  in  other  countries 
have  greatly  increased  production  per  man. 

While  an  increasing  coal  production  per  man  in  America, 
Augtraha,  and  New  Zealand  has  brought  about  the  cheapen- 
ing of  coal,  or  has  at  least  prevented  it  becoming  dearer, 
greatly  increased  wages  notwithstanding,  the  reduction  in 
the  British  output  per  man,  combined  with  increased  wages, 
has  fatally  increased  the  price  of  British  coal.  This  will 
appear  from  the  figures  given  in  the  table  on  page  241. 

The  figures  given  show  that  the  British  coal-miners 
have  succeeded  in  reducing  the  output  of  coal  per  man 
and  creating  an  artificial  scarcity.  In  former  years  British 
coal  was  approximately  as  cheap  as  American  coal,  and  in 
some  years  it  was  cheaper.  Of  that  advantage  the  manu- 
facturing industries  have  now  been  deprived.  Of  late  years, 
owing  to  increased  wages  and  reduced  output,  Enghsh 
coal  prices  have  been  50  per  cent,  higher  than  American 
coal  prices.  Hence  the  British  manufacturing  industries 
suffer  not  only  from  insufficient  output  due  to  inefficient 
machinery  and  insufficient  power  to  drive  it,  but  also  from 
unnecessarily  high  coal  prices.  McCuUoch  wrote  in  his 
'Account  of  the  British  Empire  ' : 

Our  coal  mines  have  been  sometimes  called  the  Black 
Indies,  and  it  is  certain  that  they  have  conferred  a  thousand 
times  more  real  advantage  on  us  than  we  have  derived  from 
the  conquest  of  the  Mogul  Empire,  or  than  we  should  have 
reaped  from  the  Dominion  of  Mexico  and  Peru.  .  .  .  Our 
coal  mines  may  be  regarded  as  vast  magazines  of  hoarded 
or  warehoused  power  ;  and  unless  some  such  radical  change 
should  be  made  on  the  steam  engine  as  should  very  decidedly 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     241 

lessen  the  quantity  of  fuel  required  to  keep  it  in  motion, 
or  some  equally  serviceable  machine,  but  moved  by  different 
means,  be  introduced,  it  is  not  at  all  likely  that  any  nation 
should  come  into  successful  competition  with  us  in  those 
departments  in  which  steam  engines,  or  machinery  moved 
by  steam,  may  be  advantageously  employed. 

Average  Value  of  Coal  per  Ton  at  the  Pit's  Mouth. 


- 

United  Kingdom 

United  States 

Australia 

New  Zealand 

s.     d. 

s.     d. 

s.    d. 

s.  (Z. 

1886 

4  10 

6  4i 

— 

— 

1887 

4  9f 

6  6i 

9  2 

10  10 

1888 

5  0| 

6  0 

9  0 

10  11 

1889 

6  4i 

5  3^ 

8  11 

11  3 

1890 

8  3 

5  2| 

8  6 

11  0 

1891 

8  0 

5  3^ 

8  9 

11  4 

1892 

7  H 

5  4| 

7  11 

11  3 

1893 

6  9^ 

5  4 

7  5 

11  1 

1894 

6  8 

5  1 

6  8 

11  0 

1895 

6  0^ 

4  9i 

6  4 

11  1 

1896 

6  lOJ 

4  9J 

6  2 

10  10 

1897 

6  11 

4  n 

6  11 

10  0 

1898 

6  4J 

4  5 

5  9 

10  0 

1899 

7  7 

4  8^ 

6  1 

10  0 

1900 

10  9i 

5  3| 

6  0 

10  9 

1901 

9  4i 

6  6^ 

7  7 

10  0 

1902 

8  2J 

5  8i 

7  9 

10  11 

1903 

7  8 

6  7 

7  4 

10  9 

1904 

7  2i 

5  lOJ 

6  10 

10  9 

1905 

6  ll| 

5  8 

6  2 

10  7 

1906 

7  3^ 

5  9^ 

6  3 

10  7 

1907 

9  0 

5  11^ 

6  10 

10  7 

1908 

8  11 

5  llf 

7  4* 

10  4^ 

1909 

8  Of 

5  7^ 

7  6| 

10  10^ 

1910 

8  2i 

5  lOi 

7  6i 

11  li 

1911 

8  1| 

5  lOJ 

7  5^ 

10  lOJ 

1912 

9  Of 

6  1 

7  6* 

10  Hi 

McCulloch,  as  his  contemporary  Mr.  Cobden,  believed 
that  England  was,  and  always  would  remain,  the  workshop 
of  the  world  because  this  country  had  then  virtually  a 
monopoly  in  the  production  of  coal.  It  has  been  shown 
on  another  page  that  this  country  produced  in  1845  twice 
as  much  coal  as  did  all  the  other  countries  of  the  world 
combined.    By   making  coal  artificially  scarce   and   dear. 


242    Britain's  War  Finance  and  Economic  Future 

the  British  miners,  who  in  their  fatal  pohcy  have  been 
supported  by  short-sighted  Governments  of  either  party, 
have  taken  away  from  the  British  industries  one  of  the 
greatest  advantages  which  they  possessed  and  threaten 
to  ruin  them  altogether. 

The  masters,  the  men,  and  the  politicians  have  probably 
been  equally  responsible  for  the  inefficiency  of  the  British 
manufacturing  industries  and  of  British  mining.  British 
employers  have  come  to  consider  business  to  be  a  bore,  if 
not  a  nuisance.  During  the  last  few  decades  they  were 
quite  satisfied  with  the  condition  of  their  business  as  long 
as  they  made  an  income  with  little  exertion,  and  they 
were  ready  to  leave  the  supervision  and  direction  of  their 
affairs  to  a  manager.  They  took  little  note  of  the  scientific 
and  technical  progress  made  in  other  countries.  They 
looked  upon  new  methods,  upon  improved  organisation, 
upon  scientific  processes  of  production,  and  upon  improved 
machinery  with  indifference,  if  not  with  dislike.  That 
indifference  to  progress  was  particularly  noticeable  in  the 
case  of  limited  liabihty  companies,  especially  when  they 
were  controlled  by  amateur  directors,  or  by  men  who  had 
only  a  very  small  stake  in  the  business.  Compared  with 
the  United  States,  British  transport  by  railway  also  is 
lamentably  behindhand  and  inefficient,  and  the  result  is 
that  American  railway  freights  are  far  lower  than  British, 
although  American  railway  wages  are  three  times  as  high 
as  are  British  wages. 

While  British  masters  were  opposed  to  industrial  progress 
and  to  all  innovations  from  conservatism,  from  indifference, 
or  from  sheer  laziness,  their  men  looked  upon  improved 
organisation  and  machinery  with  positive  and  undis- 
guised hostility,  for  they  had  been  taught  by  their  leaders 
that  their  greatest  interest  lay  in  a  high  wage  and  in  a  low 
output,  that  every  increase  in  output  injured  the  other 
workers  and  themselves.  It  seems  incredible  that  such  a 
foolish  fallacy  should  have  been  allowed  to  restrict  and 
stifle  the  development  of  the  British  industries.     Unfor- 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     243 

tunately  the  British  workers  as  a  whole  have  been  ahnost  as 
hostile  to  the  introduction  of  modern  methods  and  improved 
machinery  as  they  were  in  the  machine-smashing  era  a 
century  ago.  The  world  is  a  great  co-operative  society. 
Men  are  paid  money  wages,  but  as  they  spend  them  in 
purchasing  goods  they  are  in  reahty  paid  in  goods,  in  food, 
clothes,  &c.  A  man  who  produces  food  is  paid  in  clothes, 
and  a  man  who  makes  clothes  has  to  buy  food.  If  both 
produce  '  scientifically  '  as  little  as  possible  they  will  lack 
food  and  clothes,  whatever  their  money  wages  may  be. 
If,  on  the  other  hand,  both  produce  much  there  will  be 
abundance  and  prosperity.  Production  determines  wages. 
Small  production  and  high  wages  are  incompatible.  High 
production  and  high  wages  go  hand  in  hand.  In  the  United 
States  wages  are  from  two  to  three  times  as  high  as  in  this 
country  because  production  per  man  is  from  two  to  three 
times  as  great ;  and  as  production  is  from  two  to  three 
times  as  great,  goods  are  very  little  dearer  in  the  United 
States  than  in  England,  high  wages  notwithstanding.  The 
result  is  that  the  very  highly  paid  American  workmen 
can  purchase  with  their  large  wages  an  abundance  of  food, 
clothes,  &c.,  and  can  save  large  amounts  in  addition. 

In  the  lengthy  table  summarising  British  and  American 
production  per  worker  per  year  printed  on  pages  236-237, 
the  gross  value  of  the  goods  produced  is  given.  Of  course, 
a  worker  who  converts  in  a  day  a  piece  of  leather  into  a  pair 
of  boots  worth  fifteen  shillings  does  not  really  produce 
fifteen  shillings'  worth  of  goods.  To  arrive  at  the  real  value 
of  his  day's  work  we  must  deduct  from  the  value  of  the 
goods  made  by  him  the  cost  of  the  raw  material  and  the 
general  factory  expenses.  By  deducting  these  we  arrive  at 
the  net  production  per  worker  per  week.  Details  will  be 
found  in  the  table  on  page  244.  The  figures  given  are 
based  on  the  Censuses  of  Production. 

It  will  be  noticed  that  in  the  trades  enumerated  the 
American  workers  produce  per  week  as  a  rule  from  two  to 
three  times  as  much,  net,  as  their  British  colleagues.    As 


244    Britain's  War  Finance  and  Economic  Future 

no  worker  can  possibly  obtain  for  his  work  more  than  the 
entire  value  of  his  work,  it  is  clear  that  the  British  worker 
in  cardboard  boxes,  for  instance,  cannot  obtain  more 
than  £1  per  week  unless  he  produces  more.  This  table 
explains  why  wages  were  high  in  America  and  relatively  low 


Net  Produce  jjer  Worker  per  Week. 


In  the  United 
Kingdom 


In  the  United 
States 


Boots  and  shoes 

Cardboard  boxes 

Butter  and  cheese     . 

Cement    .... 

Clothing  .... 

Cocoa,  chocolate  and  confectionery 

Cotton  goods    . 

Clocks  and  watches  . 

Cutlery  and  tools 

Dyeing  and  finishing  textiles 

Gasworks 

Firearms  and  ammunition 

Gloves      .... 

Hats  and  caps 

Hosiery  .... 

Leather  tanning  and  dressing 

Lime         .... 

Brewing  and  malting 

Matches   .... 

Paint  and  varnish     . 

Paper       .... 

Pens  and  pencils 

Printing  and  publishing     . 

Railway  carriages,  &c. 

Silk  .... 

Soap  and  candles 


£  s.    d. 

1  7  4 
10    0 

2  8  1 
2  10  10 
1  3  11 
1  12  3 
1  10  5 
1  7  9 
1     8     1 

1  18  11 
4     1     1 

2  2  8 
1  11  2 
1     5  10 

1  3     5 

2  5  0 
1  13  5 
6     7     3 

1  13    0 

3  16     2 

2  2  8 
19     8 

3  13  1 
2     7     4 

1  1     2 

2  19     8 


£   5.    d. 

3  10  0 
2  15  10 
8     3     1 

4  17  8 
4  7  4 
4  18     5 

2  13  9 
4  3  0 
4  1 
4    4 

11  16 
4    9 

3  10 

4  1  10 

2  2     8 

4  13     1 

3  2 
19  10 

7     3 

12  9 

5  3 

4  5 
7  16  11 
4  0  5 
3     9     3 

11     7     8 


in  this  country,  up  to  the  outbreak  of  the  present  War,  in  the 
course  of  which  British  wages  have  materially  increased. 

Unfortunately,  the  politicians  of  both  parties  have  very 
largely  contributed  to  the  backwardness  and  stagnation 
which  is  noticeable  in  British  business.  Desiring  to  obtain 
votes,  they  have  unceasingly  flattered  both  masters  and 
men.     They  have  told  the  employers  that  Great  Britain 


Great  Prohlems  of  British  Statesmanship     245 

was  the  richest  country  in  the  world,  and  that  she  was 
industrially  far  ahead  of  all  countries.  They  have  not 
only  not  prevented  the  workers  reducing  their  output  to 
the  utmost,  but  they  have  actually  encouraged  them  in 
that  suicidal  policy  by  their  legislation.  Striving  after 
popularity,  after  votes,  the  politicians  have  thus  encouraged 
idling  on  the  part  of  both  employers  and  employees,  and 
have  opposed  modern  organisation  and  modern  improve- 
ments. While  encouraging  labour  to  combine  and  to  restrict 
production,  they  have  opposed  the  combination  of  employers 
to  increase  efficiency.  For  decades  both  parties  advocated 
Free  Trade  chiefly  because  that  policy  furnished  an  excellent 
party  cry,  furnished  votes. 

If  we  wish  to  ascertain  the  causes  of  British  industrial 
stagnation  and  relative  decline,  it  is  well  to  listen  to  the 
opinion  of  foreign  experts.  Let  us  in  this  manner  consider 
the  causes  of  the  relative  dechne  of  the  British  iron  industry. 
In  1845  two-thu:ds  of  the  world's  iron  was  produced  by 
Great  Britain.  German  iron  production  was  then  quite 
unimportant.  At  present  German  iron  production  is  far 
ahead  of  iron  production  in  this  country.  According  to  a 
valuable  German  technical  handbook,  '  Gemeinfassliche 
Darstellung  des  Eisenhiittenwesens,'  Diisseldorf,  1912,  the 
production  of  iron  and  steel  in  Great  Britain  and  Germany 
has  developed  as  follows  : 


Iron  Production. 

Steel  Production. 

In  Germany 

In  Great  Britain 

In  Germany 

In  Great  Britain 

Tons 

Tons 

Tons 

Tons 

1865 

975,000 

4,896,000 

100,000 

225,000 

1870 

1,391,000 

6,060,000 

170,000 

287,000 

1875 

2,029,000 

6,432,000 

347,000 

724,000 

1880 

2,729,000 

7,802,000 

624,000 

1,321,000 

1885 

3,687,000 

7,369,000 

894,000 

2,020,000 

1890 

4,658,000 

8,033,000 

1,614,000 

3,637,000 

1895 

5,465,000 

7,827,000 

2,830,000 

3,312,000 

1900 

8,521,000 

9,052,000 

6,646,000 

5,130,000 

1905 

10,988,000 

9,746,000 

10,067,000 

5,984,000 

1910 

14,793,000 

10,380,000 

13,699,000 

6,107,000 

246    Britain's  War  Finance  and  Economic  Future 

Why  has  Germany,  whose  production  of  iron  and  steel 
was  formerly  insignificant,  so  rapidly  and  so  completely 
outstripped  Great  Britain,  which  possesses  the  greatest 
natural  facilities  for  producing  iron  and  steel  ?  The  German 
handbook  mentioned  is  published  by  the  Union  of  German 
Iron  Masters,  a  purely  professional  association.  It  considers 
this  question  exclusively  from  a  business  point  of  view.  It 
significantly  states  : 

No  land  on  earth  is  as  favourably  situated  for  iron  produc- 
tion as  is  England.  Extensive  deposits  of  coal  and  iron, 
easy  and  cheap  purchase  of  foreign  raw  materials,  a  favour- 
able geographical  position  for  selling  its  manufactures, 
reinforced  by  the  great  economic  power  of  the  State,  made 
at  one  time  the  island  kingdom  industrially  omnipotent 
throughout  the  world.  Now  complaints  about  constantly 
increasing  foreign  competition  become  from  day  to  day 
more  urgent.  These  are  particularly  loud  'with  regard  to 
the  growing  power  of  the  German  iron  industry.  It  is  under- 
standable that  Great  Britain  finds  it  unpleasant  that  Ger- 
many's iron  industry  should  have  become  so  strong.  How- 
ever, Germany's  success  has  been  achieved  by  unceasing 
hard  work.  .  .  . 

The  unexampled  growth  of  the  German  industry  began 
when,  on  July,  15,  1879,  a  moderate  Protective  Tariff  was 
introduced.  Until  then  it  was  impossible  for  the  German 
iron  industries  to  flourish.  Foreign  competition  was  too 
strong.  .  .  . 

The  German  Trade  Unions,  with  their  Socialist  ideas,  are 
opposed  to  progress.  If  their  aspirations  should  succeed, 
the  German  iron  industry  would  be  ruined.  An  attempt 
on  the  part  of  the  German  Trade  Unions  to  increase  the 
earnings  of  the  skilled  workers  by  limiting  the  number  of 
apprentices,  the  imitation  of  the  policy  which  has  been 
followed  by  the  British  Trade  Unions,  would  produce  a 
scarcity  of  skilled  workers  in  Germany  as  it  has  done  in 
England.  The  British  iron  industry  should  be  to  us  Germans 
a  warning  example.  The  English  Trade  Unions  with  their 
short-sighted  championship  of  labour,  with  their  notorious 
policy  of  '  ca'  canny  '  (the  limitation  of  output),  and  with 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     247 

their  hostility  to  technical   improvements   have   seriously 
shaken  the  powerful  position  of  the  British  iron  trade. 

Most  people  see  in  Trade  Unions  an  organisation  which 
may  become  dangerous  to  the  national  industries  by  pro- 
moting strikes.  Strikes,  however,  are  of  comparatively 
little  danger.  They  are  like  a  virulent,  but  intermittent, 
fever.  The  most  pernicious  feature  of  the  British  Trade 
Unions  is  their  policy  of  limiting  output,  and  their  hostihty 
to  improvements  in  organisation  and  machinery.  Their 
activity  has  upon  the  body  economic  an  influence  similar  to 
a  slow  fever  which  leads,  almost  imperceptibty,  to  atrophy, 
to  marasmus,  and  to  death. 

The  War  will  be  long  drawn  out.  It  may  cost 
£4,000,000,000,  £5,000,000,000,  and  perhaps  more.  It  may 
swallow  up  one-third,  and  perhaps  one-half  of  the  national 
capital.  It  may  permanently  double,  or  even  more  than 
double,  taxation.  I  have  endeavoured  to  show  by  irre- 
futable evidence  that  the  British  manufacturing  industries 
and  British  mining  are  inefficient,  that,  by  introducing  the 
best  modern  methods,  British  production  and  British  income 
can  be  doubled  and  trebled.  Unfortunately,  British  agri- 
culture is  as  inefficient  as  are  the  manufacturing  industries 
and  mining.  Space  does  not  permit  to  show  in  detail  how 
greatly  British  agricultural  production  might  be  increased. 
I  have  shown  in  various  articles  published  in  The  Nineteenth 
Century  review  ^  and  elsewhere  that,  on  an  agricultural 
area  which  is  only  sixty  per  cent,  larger  than  that  of  this 
country,  Germany  produces  approximately  three  times  as 
much  food  of  every  kind  as  does  this  country.  British  and 
German  agriculture  are  summarily  compared  in  the  tables  on 
page  248.     They  are  based  upon  the  official  statistics. 

As  the  German  area  under  woods  and  forests  is  eleven 
times  as  large  as  the  British,  and  as  the  German  woods 
produce  far  more  timber  per  acre  than  do  the  British,  the 

*  See  The  Nineteenth  Century  and  Alter,  September,  October,  and 
December,  1909. 


248    Britain's  War  Finance  and  Economic  Future 

German  timber  production  is  probably  about  twenty  times 
as  large  as  the  British. 

The  cultivated  area  of  Germany  is  60  per  cent,  larger 
than  the  British  cultivated  area.  If  agriculture  were 
equally  productive  in  both  countries,  Germany  should 
produce  only  60  per  cent,  more  than  does  the  United 
Kingdom.  However,  we  find  that  Germany  produced 
in  1912  about  ten  times  as  much  bread-corn  as  the  United 


United  Kingdom 

Germany 

Total  area  ..... 
Cultivated  area    .... 
Woods  and  forests 

Acres 

77,721,256 

46,931,637 

3,069,070 

Acres 

133,585,000 

78,632,139 

34,272,841 

Production  in  1912. 


United  Kingdom 

Germany 

Tons 

Tons 

Wheat  and  rye    .... 

1,568,700 

15,958,900 

Barley 

1,320,400 

3,482,000 

Oats  . 

2,915,900 

8,520,200 

Potatoes     . 

5,726,342 

50,209,500 

Hay  . 

14,024,222 

36,524,915 

Cattle 

11,914,635 

20,182,021 

Cows 

4,400,816 

10,944,283 

Horses 

Not  ascertainable 

4,523,059 

Pigs  . 

3,992,549 

21,923,707 

Sheep 



28,967,495 

5,803,445 

Kingdom,  about  two-and-a-half  times  as  much  barley, 
about  three  times  as  much  oats,  about  nine  times  as  much 
potatoes,  and  about  two-and-a-half  times  as  much  hay. 
In  addition  to  these  comparable  crops  Germany  produced 
about  2,000,000  tons  of  sugar  from  nearly  20,000,000  tons 
of  beet,  and  vast  quantities  of  tobacco. 

According  to  the  latest  comparable  statistics,  Germany 
has  about  twice  as  much  cattle  as  this  country,  about  two- 
and-a-half  times  as  many  milch  cows,  and  about  five-and-a- 
half  times  as  many  pigs.    The  United  Kingdom  is  superior 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     249 

to  Germany  only  in  sheep,  which  live  largely  on  derehct 
grass  land,  and  which  are  of  comparatively  little  value, 
five  sheep  being  reckoned  equal  in  value  to  two  pigs. 

Comparison  of  the  figures  given  shows  that  on  an  agri- 
cultural area  which  is  only  60  per  cent,  larger  than  that 
of  this  country,   Germany  produces  approximately  three 
times  as  large  a  quantity  of  animal  and  vegetable  food. 
The  inferior  productiveness  of  British  agriculture  is  probably 
ascribable  to  the  form  of  its  organisation.     German  agri- 
culture is  based  on  freehold  ownership,  British  agriculture 
on  rent.    The  sense  of  property  induces  German,  French, 
and   other   agriculturists   to    do   their   best.     Competition 
for  freehold  farms  drives  up  their  price,  and  the  high  price 
of  land  compels  German  and  other  agriculturists  working 
under  the  freehold  system  to  increase  agricultural  production 
to  the  utmost.    In  Great  Britain  farmers  rent  their  farms 
at  so  much  a  year.    The  tied-up  farms  are  apt  to  remain 
unchanged  from  century  to  century.    Fields  remain  un- 
altered, and  so  does  cultivation.    British  farmers  follow 
the  old  routine,  and  as  landowners  would  make  themselves 
unpopular  by  raising  the  rent,  necessity  does  not  provide 
the  stimulus  of  agricultural  progress  which  the  freehold 
system   creates  in   other   countries.    Largely  for   psycho- 
logical   reasons    British    agriculture    is    conservative    and 
stagnant.    A   century   ago   Arthur   Young  wrote :     '  The 
best  manure  for  a  field  is  a  high  rent.'    British  landlordism 
is  largely  responsible  for  British  agricultural  stagnation. 
The  introduction   of   the  freehold  system  would  raise  the 
price  of  agricultural  land  and  would  compel  agriculturists 
to  double  and  treble  their  output. 

If  the  facts  and  figures  given  in  these  pages  are  correct — 
I  do  not  think  that  they  can  be  successfully  challenged — • 
it  follows  that  Great  Britain  can  easily  pay  for  the  War 
by  introducing,  in  all  her  industries,  the  best  and  most 
scientific  methods  which  have  been  so  extraordinarily  suc- 
cessful elsewhere. 

The  tax-collector  is,  as  I  have  stated  before,  perhaps 


250    Britain's  War  Finance  and  Economic  Future 

the  most  powerful  factor  of  industrial  progress.  His 
greatly  increased  demands  will  compel  the  employers  of 
labour  to  increase  production  to  the  utmost,  to  replace 
labour-wasting  with  the  best  labour-saving  machinery,  to 
Americanise  industry.  However,  the  exertions  of  the 
employers  will  prove  a  failure  unless  the  workers  can  be 
convinced  that  they  are  ruining  not  only  the  national 
industries  but  also  themselves  by  their  insane  policy  of 
antagonising  all  mechanical  improvements  and  of  restricting 
output.  The  pohticians  in  power  can  do  much  to  enable 
employers  of  all  kinds  to  double  and  treble  production  by 
pursuing  in  economic  matters  no  longer  a  vote-gaining 
pohcy,  but  a  business  poHcy  recommended  by  the  ablest 
business  men.  The  expert  should  replace  the  amateur 
in  shaping  and  directing  national  economic  policy.  The 
War  might,  and  ought  to,  lead  not  to  Great  Britain's 
bankruptcy,  but  to  its  industrial  regeneration.  It  should 
be  followed  by  a  revival  of  industry  similar  to  that  which 
took  place  after  the  Great  War  a  century  ago. 

The  natural  resources  of  the  British  Empire  are  un- 
limited. They  are  far  greater  than  those  of  the  United 
States.  Owing  to  the  War  and  to  the  stimulus  which  high 
taxation  will  provide,  a  tremendous  economic  expansion 
should  take  place  both  in  Great  Britain  and  in  the 
Dominions  which  might  place  the  British  Empire 
permanently  far  ahead  of  the  American  Commonwealth. 
However,  individual  unco-ordinated  effort  will  not  bring 
about  such  a  revival.  A  united  national  and  imperial 
effort  under  the  control  of  a  business  Government  which 
leads  and  inspires  is  needed.  If  pohticians  continue  their 
shiftless  hand-to-mouth  pohcy,  if  they  continue  thinking 
mainly  of  votes  and  neglecting  the  permanent  interests 
of  nation  and  Empire,  the  efforts  of  individuals  to  recreate 
the  British  industries  and  to  give  to  the  British  Empire 
and  to  this  country  a  modern  economic  organisation  are 
bound  to  fail. 

In  view  of  the  colossal  war  expenditure  thrift  is  urgently 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     251 

needed.  Unfortunately,  the  British  nation  is  a  very- 
improvident  nation.  This  may  be  seen  from  the  following 
figures : 

Savings  Banks  Deposits. 


In  the  United  States 

In  Germany 

In  the  United  Kingdom 

1880 
1890 
1900 
1907 
1912 

£ 
163,821,000 
310,005,000 
477,944,000 
699,082,000 
945,481,000 

£ 
130,090,000 
256,865,000 
441,929,000 
694,455,000 
933,990,000 

£ 
77,721,000 
111,285,000 
186,006,000 
209,654,000 
235,916,000 

Between  1880  and  1912  the  Savings  Banks  Deposits 
increased  in  round  figures  in  the  United  States  and  in 
Germany  by  £800,000,000,  and  in  the  United  Kingdom  by 
only  £160,000,000,  increasing  about  sixfold  in  the  United 
States,  about  sevenfold  in  Germany,  and  only  threefold 
in  this  country.  During  the  five  years  from  1907  to  1912 
they  increased  in  round  figures  in  the  United  States  by 
£245,000,000,  or  35  per  cent.  ;  in  Germany  by  £240,000,000, 
or  35  per  cent.  ;  and  in  the  United  Kingdom  by  a  paltry 
£25,000,000,  or  12  per  cent.  The  record  of  the  Savings 
Banks  Deposits  is  particularly  humiliating  for  this  country 
if  we  remember  that  the  German  and  American  workers 
have  thousands  of  millions  in  freehold  land  and  houses, 
co-operative  societies,  &c. 

Of  the  enormous  sums  spent  upon  the  War  the  bulk  is 
expended  in  Great  Britain,  and  goes,  with  comparatively 
unimportant  deductions — the  profits  made  by  employers 
and  middlemen — from  the  coffers  of  the  well-to-do  into 
the  pockets  of  the  working  masses  in  the  form  of  wages. 
The  Government  has  exhorted  the  people  repeatedly  to 
be  thrifty,  and  it  has  enforced  thrift  upon  the  moneyed 
by  very  greatly  increasing  direct  taxation.  The  well-to- 
do  are  no  doubt  living  more  thriftily  than  they  did  before 
the  War.     The  working  masses  are  far  more  prosperous 


252    Britain's  War  Finance  and  Economic  Future 

than  they  have  ever  been.  Wages  have  risen  enormously  ; 
but  unfortunately  the  masses  save  little.  They  spend 
their  vastly  increased  earnings  largely  on  worthless  amuse- 
ments and  foolish  luxuries.  Owing  to  the  wholesale  trans- 
ference of  capital  from  the  rich  to  the  workers  taxation 
should  be  remodelled.^  It  is  true  that  a  century  ago,  in 
the  war  against  France,  practically  the  whole  of  the  increased 
taxation  was  placed  on  the  shoulders  of  the  opulent.  How- 
ever, at  that  time  wages  remained  low  during  the  war. 
Hence  the  workers  could  not  contribute  much  to  its  costs. 
Now  the  position  is  different.  Millions  which  are  urgently 
required  for  defence  are  wasted  recklessly  by  the  masses. 
Universal  thrift  is  needed.  The  Government  should,  with- 
out delay,  increase  thrift  among  the  masses  partly  by  taxing 
worthless  amusements,  and  partly  by  organising  thrift 
among  the  workers.  Here,  also,  individual  attempts 
can  achieve  little.  The  workers  must  be  taught  that  they 
should  now  put  by  a  competence  upon  which  they  will 
receive  unprecedentedly  high  interest,  especially  as  great 
and  widespread  distress  may  follow  the  War.  Employers 
throughout  the  country  should  be  prevailed  upon  by  the 
Government  to  give  on  the  Government's  behalf  premiums 
for  savings.  All  employers  should  be  requested  to  induce 
their  workers  to  put  as  large  as  possible  a  portion  of  their 
increased  wages  into  War  stock.  Through  the  employers 
the  Government  should  search  out  the  workers  in  the 
factories  and  induce  them  to  put  by  money  week  by  week 
to  their  benefit  and  to  that  of  the  nation  as  a  whole. 

On  November  2,  1915,  Mr.  Asquith  stated  in  the  House' 
of  Commons  : 

The  financial  position  to-day  is  serious.  The  extent  to 
which  we  here  in  this  country  are  buying  goods  abroad  in 
excess  of  our  exports  is  more  than  £30,000,000  per  month, 
against  an  average  of  about  £11,000,000  per  month  before 
the  War  ;  and  at  the  same  time  we  are  making  advances  to 

^  Many  of  the  reforms  advocated  in  the  following  pages  were  introduced 
since  their  publication  in  The  Nineteenth  Century  review. 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     253 

our  Allies  and  to  others,  which  were  estimated  by  my  right 
hon.  friend  the  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer  in  his  Budget 
speech  to  amount  to  a  total  during  the  current  financial 
year,  to  say  no  more  of  what  is  to  come,  to  £423,000,000.  .  .  . 
This  is  a  burden  which,  rich  as  we  are,  resourceful  as  we 
are,  we  cannot  go  on  discharging  unless  there  is  on  the  part 
of  the  Government,  as  well  as  on  the  part  of  individuals, 
the  most  strict  and  stringent  rule  of  economy,  the  avoid- 
ance of  unnecessary  expenditure,  the  curtailment  of  charges 
which  under  normal  conditions  we  should  think  right  and 
necessary,  and,  if  I  may  use  a  homely  expression,  cutting 
our  coat  according  to  the  cloth  with  which  we  have  to  make 
it.  .  .  .  I  would  once  more  say  with  all  the  emphasis  of 
which  I  am  capable,  that  we  cannot  sustain  the  burden 
which  this  great  War  has  laid  upon  us  unless  as  indi- 
viduals, as  classes,  as  a  community,  and  as  a  Government, 
we  make  and  are  prepared  to  make  far  greater  sacrifices 
than  we  have  hitherto  done  in  the  direction  of  retrenchment 
and  economy. 

Mr.  Asquith  thus  recommended  on  November  2,  1915, 
retrenchment  and  economy  in  the  most  emphatic  language. 
He  informed  the  nation  that  thrift  and  the  avoidance  of 
unnecessary  expenditure  was  most  necessary  on  the  part 
of  individuals  and  the  nation  as  a  whole.  Yet  the  nation 
lives  approximately  as  luxuriously  as  ever.  The  well- 
to-do,  whose  income  has  been  greatly  reduced  by  the  War 
and  by  additional  taxation,  have  curtailed  their  expenditure, 
to  some  extent,  but  scarcely  sufficiently,  while  the  masses 
of  the  people  spend  far  more  on  luxuries  than  they  ever 
did  before.  Theatres,  restaurants,  music-halls,  picture 
theatres,  and  public-houses  are  nightly  crowded,  and 
working  men  who  are  reaping  a  golden  harvest  purchase 
for  their  family  gramophones,  silk  dresses  and  furs,  pianos 
which  are  often  only  used  for  show,  &c.  Most  people 
undoubtedly  wish  to  save,  but  they  spend  very  freely, 
perhaps  not  so  much  from  self-indulgence  as  from  mis- 
placed kindness  of  heart.  Men  and  women  hesitate  to 
reduce  their  expenditure  on  luxuries  because  such  reduction 


254    Britain's  War  Finance  and  Economic  Future 


would  inflict  injury  on  the  providers  of  luxuries.  The 
thousands  of  millions  which  will  bo  required  for  the  conduct 
of  the  War  cannot  be  provided  by  saving  the  odd  pence.' 
They  can  be  found  only  by  the  wholesale  reduction  of 
expenditure  on  luxuries,  by  putting  the  providers  of  the 
luxuries  out  of  business.  An  able  worker  or  business  man 
can  always  adjust  himself  to  changed  circumstances. 
Dismissed  servants  will  be  able  to  find  more  useful  work 
in  shops  and  factories.  Dismissed  gardeners  can  use 
their  experience  in  agriculture  to  better  advantage  to  the 
nation.  Manufacturers  of  luxuries  and  their  workers, 
and  shopkeepers  who  deal  in  luxuries,  can  change  the 
character  of  their  trade.  It  is  impossible  to  carry  on 
'  business  as  usual '  and  to  provide  the  untold  millions 
needed  for  the  War. 

If  we  compare  Great  Britain's  imports  of  luxuries 
during  the  first  seven  months  of  1914  when  there  was  peace, 
with  the  first  seven  months  of  1915  when  she  was  at  war, 
we  find  the  following  : 

Imports  during  Seven  Months  up  to  July  31. 


— 

1914 

1915 

£ 

£ 

Poultry  and  game     .... 

797,492 

477,683 

Tinned  sardines 

455,041 

608,231 

Grapes     . 

109,336 

40,103 

Almonds  . 

298,101 

308,934 

Oranges   . 

1,693,206 

1,982,823 

Cocoa  manufactures 

937,785 

1,385,162 

Currants 

331,114 

543,895 

Raisins    . 

181,495 

417,417 

Fruit  preserved  in  sugar 

579,776 

835,527 

Confectionery  . 

82,817 

81,670 

Ornamental  feathers . 

1,043,126 

452,082 

Fresh  flowers    . 

206,837 

163,306 

Ivory 

78,178 

42,246 

Cinema  films,  &c. 

1,490,636 

985,087 

Watches  and  parts    . 

871,611 

673,221 

Silk  manufactures 

9,824,057 

8j637,989 

Glace  kid 

921,648 

876,193 

Gloves 

962,892 

434.149 

Motor  cars,  and  parts 

5,240,819 

4,249,975 

Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     255 

The  few  items  in  this  Hst  are  representative.  Space 
does  not  permit  to  analyse  the  imports  of  hixuries  in  greater 
detail.  Production  has  been  thrown  out  of  gear  throughout 
the  world.  Hence  the  imports  of  Great  Britain  have 
been  reduced  largely  because  the  exporting  nations  could 
not  export  as  usual.  Many  of  the  luxuries  imported  into 
Great  Britain  come  from  France,  Germany,  Austria-Hungary, 
Italy,  and  Turkey.  A  glance  at  this  list  shows  that  in 
some  instances  the  imports  of  luxuries  have  fallen  severely, 
perhaps  because  the  exporting  countries  could  not  send 
the  goods.  In  other  cases  the  imports  of  luxuries  are  as 
large  as  usual  or  even  larger  than  usual.  The  importation 
of  almonds,  oranges,  chocolates,  currants,  raisins,  fruit 
preserved  in  sugar,  greatly  increased  notwithstanding  the 
War,  while  the  imports  of  manufactured  silks,  confectionery, 
flowers,  watches,  and  motor  cars  and  parts  diminished  only 
slightly.  If  the  consumption  of  imported  luxuries  was 
very  much  as  usual,  we  may  safely  estimate  that  the  con- 
sumption of  home-made  luxuries  was  also  very  much  as 
usual. 

Luxurious  expenditure  cannot  easily  be  checked  by 
voluntary  effort,  but  it  can  easily  be  diminished  by  legisla- 
tion. Amusements,  especially  those  of  the  worthless  kind, 
might  be  taxed,  and  the  importation  of  foreign  luxuries 
can  be  stopped  completely,  or  almost  completely,  by 
prohibitive  enactments.  A  short  while  ago  the  Govern- 
ment explained  in  the  House  of  Commons  that  in  blockading 
Germany  foreign  luxuries  were  not  stopped  because  their 
importation,  while  not  increasing  Germany's  military 
strength,  weakened  and  damaged  her  financial  position. 
One  of  the  greatest  financial  problems  for  England  consists 
in  paying  for  her  enormous  imports.  The  most  obvious 
step  for  improving  Great  Britain's  financial  position  consists 
in  ruthlessly  cutting  off  the  importation  of  all  imported 
luxuries.  The  import  duties  put  on  motor  cars,  cine- 
matograph films,  &c.,  are  a  small  step  in  the  right  direction. 
Import  duties  should  without  delay  be  put  on  all  imported 


256    Britain's  War  Finance  and  Economic  Future 

luxuries,  and  even  on  those  manufactured  necessities 
which  can  be  produced  in  this  country.  The  question  of 
fiscal  purism,  the  question  of  Free  Trade  and  Tariff  Eeform, 
questions  of  party  politics  and  of  vote-catching,  should 
not  be  allowed  to  undermine  the  financial  position  of  this 
country  at  a  time  when  it  fights  for  its  very  life. 

The  War  is  costing  Great  Britain  about  £2,000,000,000 
a  year.  It  will  probably  before  long  cost  considerably 
more.  This  country  will,  as  I  have  endeavoured  to  show, 
be  able  to  make  up,  and  more  than  make  up,  for  her  War 
expenditure,  however  large  it  may  be,  by  vastly  increasing 
production,  by  reorganising,  by  Americanising,  her  industries. 
But  the  victory  of  the  Entente  Powers  obviously  depends 
very  largely  on  Britain's  financial  strength.  The  immediate 
need  of  the  country  is  therefore  labour  and  thrift.  Strenuous 
labour  and  careful  thrift  are  required  to  tide  this  nation 
over  the  anxious  months  of  war  which  will  determine 
whether  the  world  will  become  German  or  Anglo-Saxon, 
subject  or'free. 


CHAPTEE  VIII 

Britain's  coming  industrial  supremacy  ^ 

It  seems  likely  that  the  War  will  swallow  approximately  one- 
half  of  Great  Britain's  national  wealth.  So  far  it  has  cost 
this  country  more  than  £3,000,000,000.  Before  it  is  over 
the  British  war  expenditure  may  be  increased  to 
£5,000,000,000  or  £6,000,000,000.  To  that  gigantic  sum 
will  have  to  be  added  pensions  for  incapacitated  soldiers, 
war  widows,  and  orphans,  and  compensation  for  losses 
caused  by  the  War,  which  together  may  require  another 
£1,000,000,000.  If,  finally,  we  make  due  allowance  for  the 
financial  value  of  the  precious  lives  lost  it  will  appear  that 
the  War  will  absorb  about  £7,500,000,000,  a  sum  which  is 
approximately  equal  to  one-half  of  Great  Britain's  national 
wealth. 

Opinions  as  to  the  economic  consequences  of  the  War  are 
divided.  Some  assert  that  the  gigantic  losses  incurred  will 
industrially  cripple  Great  Britain  and  all  Europe  and  that, 
they  will  greatly  strengthen  the  industrial  and  financial' 
predominance  of  the  United  States.  They  tell  us  that 
Great  Britain  will  decline  economically  and  politically, 
and  become  another  Belgium  ;  that  the  United  States  will 
become  the  leading  Anglo-Saxon  nation  for  the  same  reason 
for  which  Carthage  became  the  heir  to  the  world  empire 
created  by  Phoenicia,  her  mother  State  ;  that  Washington 
will  eventually  become  the  capital  of  a  great  Empire  ;  that 
war-ruined  and  pauperised  Europe  will  become  practically 
an  American   dependency  ;    that   the  world   will   become 

^  The  Nineteenth  Century  and  After,  October,  1916. 

257  s 


258     Britain's  Coming  Industrial  Supremacy 

American.  That  view  is  widely  held  on  the  other  side  of 
the  Atlantic,  where  it  is  causing  lively  satisfaction.  Other 
people  vaguely  beheve  that  Great  Britain  is  '  the  richest 
country  in  the  world,'  and  that  the  United  Kingdom  can 
easily  bear  the  gigantic  financial  burden  which  the  World 
War  has  laid  upon  its  shoulders.  In  considering  a  great 
economic  problem  the  doctrinaire  turns  to  theory  while  the 
practical  statesman  apphes  to  experience  for  guidance. 
Experience  is  no  doubt  the  safer  guide.  Let  us  then  con- 
sider the  problem  of  the  economic  future  from  the  practical, 
and  particularly  from  the  British,  point  of  view. 

The  widely  held  opinion  that  Great  Britain  is  '  the  richest 
country  in  the  world '  is  erroneous.  According  to  the 
'  World  Almanac  and  Encyclopedia '  of  1916,  the  American 
equivalent  of  '  Whitaker's  Almanack,'  the  national  wealth 
of  the  British  Isles,  the  British  Empire,  and  the  United  States 
is  as  follows  : 

United  Kingdom 17,000.000,000 

British  Empire 26,000,000,000 

United  States 37,547.800,000 

From  the  same  source  we  learn  that  the  insurances  in 
force  came  to  £6,231,120,800  in  the  United  States  and  only 
to  £1,174,042,400  in  Great  Britain. 

According  to  the  American  estimate  the  wealth  of  the 
United  States  is  considerably  more  than  twice  as  great  as 
that  of  the  United  Kingdom,  and  is  nearly  50  per  cent,  larger 
than  that  of  the  British  Empire  as  a  whole.  As,  during 
recent  years,  American  wealth  has  been  growing  about 
three  times  as  fast  as  British  wealth,  there  is  apparently 
much  reason  for  beheving  that,  owing  to  the  heavy  handicap 
imposed  upon  the  United  Kingdom  by  the  War,  the  United 
States  will  in  future  outpace  economic  Great  Britain  at  a 
faster  and  more  furious  rate  than  ever. 

Let  us  glance  at  the  foundations  of  America's  vast 
wealth. 

The   United    States    are   infinitely   richer   than   Great 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     259 

Britain  because  they  possess  a  greater  population  and  far 
greater  developed  natural  resources.  While  Great  Britain  has 
47,000,000  inhabitants  the  United  States  have  105,000,000 
people.  In  man-power  the  United  States  are  more  than 
twice  as  strong  as  the  United  Kingdom.  Only  6  per  cent, 
of  the  inhabitants  of  the  world  are  Americans,  yet  among 
the  nations  of  the  earth  the  United  States  are  the  largest 
producers  of  wheat,  maize,  oats,  tobacco,  cotton,  timber, 
cattle,  pigs,  coal,  petroleum,  iron  and  steel,  copper,  silver, 
zinc,  lead,  aluminium,  woollen  and  cotton  goods,  leather, 
silk,  &c.  The  relatively  small  number  of  Americans  produce 
one-fifth  of  the  world's  wheat,  gold  and  silver,  one-fourth  of 
the  world's  zinc,  one-third  of  the  world's  oats,  iron  ore,  pig 
iron,  and  lead,  two-fifths  of  the  world's  steel,  coal,  and 
tobacco,  one-half  of  the  world's  aluminium,  three-fifths  of 
the  world's  copper,  two-thirds  of  the  world's  cotton,  pe- 
troleum, and  maize.  '  God's  own  country,'  as  the  Americans 
call  it,  has  indeed  been  blessed. 

The  United  States  are  far  ahead  of  all  other  nations  not 
only  in  developed  and  exploited  natural  resources  but  also  in 
mechanical  outfit.  The  engine-power  of  the  United  States 
is  vastly  superior  to  that  of  Great  Britain  and  of  the  British 
Empire.  According  to  the  last  British  and  American 
Censuses  of  Production  the  manufacturing  industries  of 
the  United  States  employ  18,675,376  horse-powers,  while 
the  British  industries  employ  only  8,083,341.  I  have  shown 
in  the  previous  chapter  that  per  thousand  workers  the 
American  industries  employ  from  two  to  three  times  as 
many  horse-powers  as  do  the  identical  British  industries. 
An  even  greater  superiority  in  the  employment  of  labour- 
saving  machinery  will  be  found  in  mining,  agriculture, 
inland  transport,  &c.  Besides,  the  United  States  have  avail- 
able in  their  water-falls  at  least  40,000,000  horse-powers, 
of  which,  in  1908,  5,356,680  horse-powers  were  developed, 
while  the  water-powers  possessed  by  the  United  Kingdom 
are  quite  insignificant.    America's  superiority  in  mechanical 


260    Britain's  Coming  Industrial  Sujyremacy 

outfit  may  perhaps   best  be  gauged   from  the  following 
remarkable  figures  : 

Miles  of  Railway. 

Miles 

United  Kingdom 23,441 

British  Empire 134,131 

All  Europe 207,432 

United  Stcates 254,732 

The  World 665,964 

It  is  noteworthy  that  the  105,000,000  Americans  have 
more  miles  of  railway  than  the  440,000,000  citizens  of  the 
British  Empire  and  the  500,000,000  inhabitants  of  all 
Europe.  Several  private  railway  systems,  such  as  the 
Pennsylvania  System,  the  Harriman  System,  the  Gould 
System,  and  the  Moore-Eeid  System,  have  about  as  many 
miles  of  railway  as  has  the  whole  of  the  United  Kingdom, 
while  the  mileage  of  the  Vanderbilt  System  is  actually  10 
per  cent,  larger  than  that  of  the  United  Kingdom.  Great 
Britain  has  780,512  telephones,  while  the  United  States 
have  no  less  than  9,552,107  telephones. 

National  wealth  is  either  developed  or  undeveloped, 
either  exploited  or  latent.  The  statistics  as  to  the  wealth 
of  nations  given  refer,  of  course,  only  to  the  former,  not  to 
the  latter,  for  the  latent  wealth  is  not  susceptible  to  statistical 
measurement.  America  owes  her  vast  wealth  not  to  the 
fact  that  she  has  exceptionally  great  natural  resources, 
but  to  the  fact  that  her  natural  resources  have  been  exploited 
with  the  utmost  energy.  That  may  be  gauged  from  the 
figures  of  American  engine  and  water  power  and  from  the 
railway  and  telephone  statistics  given.  Measured  by 
undevelo'ped  and  unex'ploited  resources,  by  latent  wealth, 
the  British  Empire,  Eussia,  and  perhaps  China  also,  are 
far  richer  than  the  United  States.  The  United  States, 
including  Alaska,  Hawaii,  and  Porto  Eico,  have  an  area 
of  3,574,658  square  miles,  while  the  British  Empire,  not 
including  the  Colonies  conquered  from  Germany,  com- 
prises no  less  than  12,808,994  square  miles.  Providence  has 
distributed  its  favours  fairly  evenly.     There  is  no  reason 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     261 

for  believing  that  the  United  States  have  been  given  an 
unduly  great  share  of  the  good  things  of  this  world.  We 
may  therefore  conclude  that  the  British  Empire,  though 
actually  much  poorer,  is  potentially  much  richer  than  the 
United.  States. 

In  develo'ped  and  ex'ploited  resources  the  United  States 
are  undoubtedly  far  ahead  of  the  British  Empire,  but  in 
undevelo'ped  and  unexyloited  resources  the  British  Empire 
is  undoubtedly  far  ahead  of  the  United  States.  It  is  wrong 
to  say  that  Great  Britain  is  the  richest  country  in  the  world, 
but  it  may  safely  be  asserted  that,  by  its  extent  and  natural 
resources,  the  British  Empire,  which  spreads  through  all 
climes,  possesses  the  greatest  potential  national  wealth  in 
the  world.  It  is  therefore  obvious  that  the  incomparable 
latent  riches  of  the  Empire  may  be  converted  into  actual 
wealth  and  power,  provided  they  are  vigorously  and  wisely 
exploited. 

Wealth  depends  after  all  not  so  much  on  the  possession 
of  great  natural  resources  as  on  the  action  of  men.  Two 
centuries  ago  wealthy  North  America  nourished  only  a 
few  thousand  roving  Indians  and  a  small  number  of  white 
settlers  and  traders.  An  Indian,  a  Chinaman,  or  a  Kaffir 
who,  engaged  at  his  home  in  agriculture  or  in  manufacturing 
in  the  literal  meaning  of  the  word,  produces  perhaps  a 
shillingsworth  of  wealth  per  day,  will  learn  in  a  few  weeks 
to  produce  thirty  or  forty  shillingsworth  of  wealth  per  day 
if  transferred  to  Great  Britain  or  the  United  States.  Land 
and  natural  resources  are  limited,  but  wealth  production  by 
the  employment  of  the  most  modern  methods  is  absolutely 
unlimited.  In  certain  industries  a  single  man  can  produce 
now  more  wealth  than  could  a  thousand  men  a  century 
ago.  Yet  fifty  years  hence  men  may  look  with  the  same 
surprise  at  the  automatic  loom  or  the  steam-hammer  with 
which  we  look  now  at  the  hand-loom  and  the  hand-forge. 

The  British  Empire  resembles  the  United  States  in 
many  respects.  Both  extend  tlirough  all  climes.  Both 
possess    vast  and    thinly    populated   areas   endowed    with 


262    BritairCs  Coming  Industrial  Sujwemacy 

the  greatest  agricultural,  sylvan,  mineral,  industrial,  and 
commercial  possibilities.  In  both  only  a  few  small  patches 
are  reserved  to  the  manufacturing  industries.  In  view  of 
the  resemblance  of  the  United  States  and  the  British  Empire 
it  is  clear  that  Britain  may  learn  much  from  the  example 
set  by  the  Great  Eepublic  in  the  development  of  its  natural 
resources.  Moreover,  half  a  century  ago  the  United  States 
passed  through  an  experience  similar  to  that  through  which 
Great  Britain  and  the  Empire  are  passing  at  present.  The 
Civil  War  of  1861-1865,  as  I  have  shown  in  the  chapter 
entitled  *  How  America  became  a  Nation  in  Arms,'  de- 
stroyed about  a  million  lives  at  a  time  when  the  United 
States  had  less  than  35,000,000  white  and  coloured  in- 
habitants, and  cost  altogether  about  £2,000,000,000.  In 
1860  the  national  wealth  of  the  United  States  amounted, 
according  to  the  Census,  to  only  £3,231,923,214.  It 
follows  that  the  Civil  War  cost  a  sum  equivalent  to  two- 
thirds  of  America's  national  wealth.  Yet  the  war  did  not 
impoverish  the  country,  but,  incredible,  as  it  may  sound, 
greatly  enriched  it.  I  shall  endeavour  to  show  that  the 
Civil  War  created  the  impetus  which  made  the  United 
States  the  richest  nation  in  the  world,  and  that  the  present 
War  will  vastly  benefit  the  allied  nations,  and  especially 
the  British  Empire,  provided  they  will  profit  by  the  great 
and  invaluable  lesson  furnished  by  the  United  States. 

In  the  tenth  volume  of  the  excellent  '  Life  of  Abraham 
Lincoln,'  written  by  Messrs.  Nicolay  and  Hay,  we  read  : 
'  The  expense  of  the  war  to  the  Union  (the  Northern  States) 
over  and  above  the  ordinary  expenditure  was  about 
$3,250,000,000  ;  to  the  Confederacy  (the  Southern  States) 
less  than  half  that  amount,  about  $1,500,000,000.'  Accord- 
ing to  the  latest  accounts  the  Civil  War  pensions,  which 
required  $164,387,941  in  1915,  have  hitherto  absorbed 
$4,614,643,266,  or  nearly  £1,000,000,000,  and  the  pay- 
ments will  go  on  for  many  years  to  come.  If  we  add  to 
these  gigantic  figures  the  increased  local  expenditure  in 
the  United  States  during  the  war,  the  valuable  property 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     263 

destroyed  in  the  fighting,  and  the  financial  value  of  almost 
a  milhon  lives  lost,  it  will  be  seen  that  the  war  has  cost 
the  United  States  vastly  more  than  £2,000,000,000.  The 
war  absolutely  ruined  the  wealthy  cotton,  sugar,  and  tobacco 
industries  of  the  South,  pauperised  the  Southern  States, 
led  to  the  destruction  of  innumerable  farms  and  buildings 
in  the  war  zone,  destroyed  America's  shipping,  closed  the 
Southern  markets  to  the  commerce  of  the  North  and 
seriously  hampered  agriculture  throughout  the  Union 
because  miUions  of  able-bodied  men  were  drafted  into  the 
Army.  How  disastrously  American  agriculture  was  affected 
by  the  Civil  War  can  best  be  seen  from  the  Livestock 
Statistics,  which  give  the  following  picture  : 

Farm  Animals. 


- 

Cattle 

Horses 

Mules 

Pigs 

Sheep 

1860  . 
1867  . 

25,616,019 
20,079,729 

6,249,174 
5,401,263 

1,151,148 
822,386 

33,512,867 
24,693,534 

22,471,275 
39,385,386 

Owing  to  the  necessity  of  war  agriculture  in  general 
had  to  be  largely  neglected.  Discrimination  was  necessary 
between  the  essential  and  non-essential.  The  vast  demand 
for  wool  for  uniforms  made  necessary  an  increase  in  sheep. 
Their  number  grew  during  the  war  by  17,000,000.  Other 
animals  had  to  be  neglected.  Hence  the  number  of  cattle 
decHned  by  5,500,000,  horses  dechned  by  850,000,  mules 
by  350,000,  and  pigs  by  9,000,000.  While  production  and 
trade  suffered  in  many  directions,  national  expenditure  and 
taxation  increased  at  an  unprecedented  and  almost  incredible 
rate.  The  financial  burden  caused  by  the  war  may  be 
summarised  in  the  fewest  possible  figures  as  follows  : 


National  Expenditure 

Cost  o£  Army 

Cost  of  Navy 

I860 
1865 

Dols. 
63,200,876 
1,295,099,290 

Dols. 
16,472,203 
1,030,690,400 

Dols. 

11,514,650 

122,617,434 

264    Britain's  Coining  Industrial  Supremacy 


LSfiO 
1865 


Public  Debt 


Dols. 
59,964,402.01 
2,674,815,856.76 


Annual  Interest  on  Debt 


Dols. 
3,443,687 
137,742,617 


In  five  short  years  the  national  expenditure  of  the 
United  States  increased  a  little  more  than  twenty-fold, 
chiefly  owing  to  the  cost  of  the  army,  which  increased  more 
than  sixty-fold.  During  the  same  period  the  pubhc  debt 
and  the  interest  payable  on  it  grew  more  than  forty-fold. 
To  provide  for  this  colossal  financial  burden  the  American 
national  revenue  was  increased  from  $41,476,299  in  1861 
to  $112,094,946  in  1863,  to  $322,031,158  in  1865,  and  to 
$519,949,564  in  1866.  In  five  years  it  grew  almost  thirteen- 
fold.  However,  notwithstanding  the  total  ruin  of  the  South, 
and  the  hampering  influence  of  the  war  in  the  North, 
the  national  wealth  of  the  United  States  grew  at  a  pro- 
digious rate  between  1860  and  1870,  the  Census  years. 
According  to  the  Censuses  the  real  and  personal  estate  of 
the  Americans  compared  in  the  two  years  as  follows  : 


National  "Wealth 

Population 

Wealth  per  Head 

1800       . 
1870 

Dols. 
16,159,616,068 
30,068,518,507 

31,443,321 

38,558,371 

Dols. 
513.92 
779.83 

Of  the  ten  years  under  consideration  four  years,  except 
a  few  days,  were  occupied  by  the  devastating  war.  Yet  the 
national  wealth  of  the  United  States  almost  doubled  during 
the  decade,  and  the  wealth  per  head  of  population  increased 
by  almost  60  per  cent.  This  is  particularly  marvellous  in 
view  of  the  fact  that  large  districts  of  the  United  States 
were  far  poorer  in  1870  than  in  1860,  for  the  enormous 
ravages  caused  in  the  South  could  not  quickly  be  repaired. 
By  '  great  divisions  '  the  wealth  per  head  was  changed. 
This  change  is  shown  in  the  tables  on  page  265. 

It  will  be  noticed  that  wealth  per  head  increased  at  a 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     265 

moderate  rate  in  the  North-Central  and  Western  States, 
which  are  chiefly  devoted  to  agriculture,  while  it  increased 
at  an  enormous  rate  in  the  North  Atlantic  Division,  the 
principal  seat  of  the  manufacturing  industries  and  com- 
merce.    On  the  other  hand  wealth  per  head  decHned  disas- 


— 

United  States 

N.  Atlantic 

States 

N.  Central 
States 

S.  Atlantic 

States 

1860    .... 
1870    .... 

Dols. 
514 
780 

Dols. 
528 
1243 

Dols. 
436 
735 

Dols. 
537 
384 

South  Central  States 

Western  States 

1860 

1870 

Dols. 
598 
334 

Dols. 
434 
843 

trously  in  the  South  Atlantic  and  the  South-Central  Divisions, 
the  home  of  the  defeated  slave-holding  States. 

As  the  comparisons  given  are  perhaps  a  little  too  summary 
it  will  be  worth  while  to  compare  the  wealth  of  some  of  the 
more  important  States  in  1860  and  1870.  According  to  the 
United  States  Censuses  their  wealth  has  changed  very 
unequally.     Statistics  will  be  found  on  page  266. 

While  during  the  decade  the  wealth  of  the  Southern 
States  shrunk  to  one -half  and  even  to  one -third  notwith- 
standing six  years  of  peace,  the  wealth  of  the  Northern 
States  increased  prodigiously.  That  of  Illinois,  Massa- 
chusetts, and  Pennsylvania  grew  two-and-a-half-fold, 
that  of  New  York  increased  three-and-a-half-fold,  and 
the  wealth  of  the  '  new  '  agricultural  States  in  the  West 
grew  even  more  quickly.  The  wealth  of  Kansas  increased 
sixfold,  and  that  of  Nebraska  nearly  eightfold.  During 
the  decade  1860-1870  the  wealth  of  the  manufacturing 
States  and  of  the  wheat-growing  States  of  the  Far  West 
grew  at  an  unprecedented  rate.  The  simultaneous  develop- 
ment of  industry  and  agriculture  during  the  decade  1860- 


266    Britain's  Coming  Industrial  Supremacy 

1870  coincided  with,  and  was  chiefly  due  to,  the  American 
Civil  War.  That  is  recognised  by  many  scientists  and  writers 
who  have  studied  that  period.  Mr.  E.  L.  Bogart,  in  his 
•  Economic  History  of  the  United  States,'  wrote  : 

The  Civil  War,  by  practically  cutting  off  foreign  inter- 
course, immensely  hastened  the  growth  of  domestic  indus- 


Southern  States. 


I860 

1870 

Dols. 

Dols. 

Alabama    ..... 

495,237,078 

201,855,871 

Georgia      ..... 

645,895,237 

268,167,207 

Louisiana  ..... 

602,118,586 

323,125,666 

IVIississippi .         .... 

607,324,911 

209,197,345 

South  Carolina   .... 

548,138,754 

208,146,989 

Texas         ..... 

365,200,614 

159,052,542 

Northern  States. 


— 

I860 

1870 

Dols. 

Dols. 

Connecticut       .... 

444,274,114 

774,631,524 

Elinois     . 

871,860,282 

2,121,680,579 

Indiana    . 

528,835,371 

1,268,180,543 

Iowa 

247,338,265 

717,644,750 

Kansas     . 

31,327,895 

188,892,014 

Massachusetts 

815,237,413 

2,132,148,741 

Minnesota 

52,294,413 

228,907,590 

Missouri  . 

501,214,398 

1,284,922,877 

Nebraska . 

9,131,398 

69,277,483 

New  York 

1,843,338,517 

0,500,841,264 

Ohio 

1,173,898,422 

2,235,430,300 

Pennsylvania 

1,416,501,848 

3,803,340,112 

Wisconsin 

273,671,668 

702,307,329 

tries.  The  industrial  revolution  thus  inaugurated  has  been 
compared  with  that  in  England  one  hundred  years  before. 
It  certainly  marks  a  turning-point  in  the  economic  develop- 
ment of  the  country  as  distinct  as  that  in  political  life  and 
more  significant  in  its  effects  than  the  earlier  industrial 
revolution,  introduced  in  this  country  fifty  years  before  by 
the  restrictive  period. 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     267 

Another  American  writer,  Katharine  Coman,  stated  in 
her  '  Industrial  History  of  the  United  States  ' : 

The  war  demands,  coupled  with  the  protective  tariff, 
induced  an  extraordinary  activity  in  every  department  of 
business  enterprise.  Universal  buoyancy  and  unbounded 
confidence  in  the  future  rendered  it  easy  to  borrow  money 
at  home  and  abroad.  European  capitaUsts  invested  readily 
in  the  United  States  securities,  railroad  bonds  and  mining 
stock,  and  the  resources  of  the  country  were  exploited  as 
never  before. 

Theodor  Vogelstein  wrote  in  his  book  '  Organisations- 
formen  der  Eisenindustrie  und  TextiHndustrie  in  England 
und  Amerika  '  (Leipzig,  1910) : 

The  manufacturing  industries  of  the  North  came  out 
of  the  war  in  a  splendid  condition.  The  enormous  exertions 
made  during  the  struggle,  by  which  more  than  a  million  of 
the  best  workers  were  withdrawn  from  economic  life,  pro- 
moted the  replacing  of  human  labour  by  machine  labour 
to  an  unusual  extent.  The  necessity  of  paying  interest 
on  the  large  loans  raised  abroad  naturally  stimulated  very 
greatly  the  export  trade.  On  the  other  hand,  imports, 
except  of  such  goods  as  were  required  for  the  army,  suffered. 
Lastly,  the  war  brought  with  it  a  system  of  rigid  protection, 
of  a  protection  more  severe  than  any  American  manufacturer 
would  have  thought  possible  in  his  wildest  dreams.  One  of 
the  greatest  errors  which  one  may  encounter  over  and  over 
again,  even  in  scientific  publications,  is  the  idea  that  rigid 
American  protectionism  was  created  in  1890.  ...  It  is 
no  mere  coincidence  that  1866,  when  Congress  began  to 
abolish  internal  war  taxes,  and  left  unaltered  the  corre- 
sponding import  duties,  saw  the  rise  of  the  first  American 
Trust. 

When  hostihties  began  between  the  North  and  the  South, 
the  United  States  had  only  a  few  thousand  troops,  and  were 
utterly  unprepared  for  the  gigantic  struggle.  The  vastness 
of  the  conflict,  the  employment  of  millions  of  soldiers, 
naturally  created  an   enormous  demand  for  weapons,  and 


268    Britain's  Coming  Industrial  Supremacy 

munitions,  vehicles,  railways,  telegraphs,  and  manufactures 
of  every  kind.  As  the  American  foreign  trade  was  very 
seriously  restricted  through  reasons  which  will  be  discussed 
further  on,  and  as  the  majority  of  the  able-bodied  men  were 
withdrawn  from  the  economic  activities  and  enrolled  in 
the  army,  a  greatly  reduced  number  of  workers  in  field  and 
factory  had  suddenly  to  provide  an  immensely  increased 
output.  The  necessity  of  vastly  increasing  individual 
production  compelled  employers  to  introduce  the  most 
perfect  and  the  most  powerful  labour-saving  machinery 
available  both  in  agriculture  and  in  industry.  Professor 
E.  D.  Fite  wrote  in  his  excellent  book  '  Social  and  Industrial 
Conditions  in  the  North  during  the  Civil  War  '  ; 

Three  things  saved  the  harvest :  the  increased  use  of 
labour-saving  machinery,  the  work  of  women  in  the  fields, 
and  the  continued  influx  of  new  population. 

Up  to  this  time  the  use  of  reaping  machines  had  been 
confined  almost  entirely  to  some  of  the  large  farms  of  the 
West.  .  .  .  Grain  was  generally  sown  by  hand.  These 
processes  required  the  work  of  many  men,  so  that  when  the 
able-bodied  began  to  go  to  war,  with  large  harvests  left  to 
garner,  new  methods  and  new  implements  were  absolutely 
necessary  if  the  crops  were  to  be  saved. 

Immediately  interest  in  labour-saving  machinery  and 
in  the  relative  merits  of  the  different  machines  became 
widespread,  and  next  to  enthusiasm  over  abounding  crops 
in  time  of  war  was  the  most  striking  characteristic  of  the 
world  of  agriculture.  .  .  .  The  old  apathy  was  gone.  The 
war  suddenly  had  popularised  methods  of  cultivation  in 
which  the  agricultural  papers  had  striven  in  vain  for  a  decade 
to  arouse  interest. 

The  Scientific  American  of  February  12, 1864,  stated  : 

The  total  number  of  mowers  manufactured  increased 
from  35,000  in  1862  and  40,000  in  1863  to  70,000  in  1864  ; 
estimating  the  number  for  1861  at  20,000,  this  would  make 
the  number  for  the  four  years  165,000,  compared  with  85,000 
the  number  made  in  the  preceding  ten  or  twelve  years. 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     269 

Owing  to  the  great  improvements  in  agricultural 
machinery,  agricultural  production  increased  rapidly,  and 
the  losses  caused  by  the  war  were  soon  made  good.  I  have 
shown  in  the  beginning  of  this  chapter  that  between  1860 
and  1867  the  number  of  cattle,  horses,  mules,  and  pigs  de- 
creased very  severely  owing  to  the  war.  Between  1867 
and  1877  the  number  of  farm  animals  increased  rapidly,  as 
follows : 

Farm  Animals. 


- 

Cattle 

Horses 

Mules 

Pigs 

Sheep 

1867 
1877 

20,079,725 
29,216,900 

5,401,263 
10,155,400 

822,386 
1,443,500 

24,693,534 
28,077,100 

39,385,386 
35,804,200 

The  great  improvement  in  agricultural  appHances  and 
machinery  enabled  a  few  men  to  do  the  work  of  many. 
The  steam  plough,  the  seed-casting  machine,  the  reaper, 
the  self-binder,  and  the  railway  made  possible  the  opening 
and  the  vigorous  exploitation  of  the  rich  agricultural  plains 
of  the  West,  notwithstanding  the  scarcity  and  the  dearness 
of  labour  and  the  inaccessibility  of  the  far-away  interior. 
But  for  these  machines  the  enormous  agricultural  wealth  of 
the  North  American  prairies  would  still  be  unutilised. 

The  Civil  War  gave  a  powerful  stimulus  to  the  develop- 
ment of  the  American  railway  system,  especially  as  transport 
by  the  ]\Iississippi  was  interrupted  by  the  war,  for  the 
mouth  of  that  mighty  river  was  in  the  hands  of  the  rebels. 
Professor  Fite  has  told  us  : 

The  Mississippi  formerly  had  been  the  outlet,  carrying  the 
grain  and  other  produce  to  New  Orleans,  whence  it  was 
distributed  in  all  directions.  After  the  war  closed  the  river, 
if  the  railroads  had  not  been  in  existence,  the  West  would 
have  been  isolated  without  a  market ;  and  it  was  believed 
by  some  that,  rather  than  lose  this,  the  section  would  have 
followed  its  market  into  secession.  .  .  . 

The  new  routes  of  trade  to   the  Atlantic  coast  were 


270    Britain's  Coming  Industrial  Supremacy 

developed  rapidly  indeed,  thanks  to  the  wonderful  increase  of 
the  crops  even  more  than  to  the  closing  of  the  river.  .  .  . 
The  receipts  and  shipments  of  the  port  of  Chicago  grew 
apace,  and  were  typical  of  the  growth  of  the  new  routes 
eastward.  Starting  in  1838  with  a  shipment  of  78  bushels 
of  wheat,  and  gradually  thereafter  increasing  her  shipments, 
but  never  before  1860  sending  out  over  10,000,000  bushels 
of  wheat  and  wheat  flour,  this  new  city  in  each  year  of  the 
war  shipped  on  the  average  20,000,000  bushels  of  wheat 
and  wheat  flour  ;  her  yearly  corn  exports,  in  the  past  never 
above  11,000,000  bushels,  now  averaged  25,000,000  bushels. 

The  closing  of  the  Mississippi  route,  the  abundance  of  the 
harvests  and  the  vast  transport  requirements  of  the  Army 
very  greatly  increased  the  pressure  of  railway  traffic.  It 
could  be  handled  only  by  greatly  increasing  the  efficiency 
of  the  railroads.  Necessity  thus  led  to  the  introduction  of 
scientific  railway  management.  Hitherto  railways  had 
been  built  haphazard  by  enterprising  capitalists.  Unre- 
stricted individualism  and  the  desire  to  hamper  competitors 
had  led  to  the  introduction  of  at  least  eight  different  gauges, 
which  varied  from  4  feet  8|  inches  to  6  feet.  The  war 
forced  the  railways  to  combine  and  to  adopt  a  single  gauge. 

The  standardisation  of  railways  was  gradually  evolved. 
An  Imperial  railway  system  was  created  which  found  its 
highest  expression  in  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission 
of  1887.  The  United  States  have  private  railways,  but  an 
Imperial  railway  system  owing  to  the  supervision  and  control 
exercised  by  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  through- 
out the  Union.  During  the  war  the  weak  iron  rails,  which 
rapidly  wore  out,  were  replaced  by  heavier  iron  and  especially 
by  steel  rails.  Stations,  goods  yards,  and  sidings  were 
enlarged.  Military  and  economic  pressure  made  the  rapid 
extension  of  the  railway  system  indispensable.  Notwith- 
standing the  war  the  length  of  the  American  railways  was 
increased  from  30,626  miles  in  1860  to  36,801  miles  in  1866, 
or  by  20  per  cent.  In  consequence  of  the  vast  increase  in 
jq.ilway   business   and   of   the  improvements   in  handling 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     271 

the  traffic  which  were  introduced  the  American  railways 
flourished  greatly  during  the  war.  The  American  Bailway 
Becord  of  January  8,  1863,  wrote,  in  reviewing  the  year 
1862: 

The  year  1862  will  ever  be  remembered  in  railroading 
as  one  of  the  most  prosperous  that  has  ever  been  known. 
The  railroads  never  earned  so  much  in  the  whole  course 
of  their  existence  as  they  have  during  this  much-dreaded 
year. 

The  American  Railroad  Journal  of  January  2,  1864, 
declared  in  reviewing  the  business  of  the  year  1863  : 

The  railway  system  has  greatly  flourished  the  past  year. 
The  Companies  have  got  out  of  debt  or  largely  diminished 
their  indebtedness,  their  earnings  are  increasing,  their 
dividends  have  become  regular  and  inviting.  The  past 
year  has  been,  therefore,  the  most  prosperous  ever  known 
to  American  railways. 

Modern  war  is  carried  on  by  weapons  and  by  machines. 
It  is  fought  quite  as  much  in  the  factory  as  in  the  field.  The 
Civil  War,  while  greatly  promoting  the  development  of 
America's  agriculture  and  of  the  American  railways,  had 
not  unnaturally  the  most  far-reaching  and  the  most  strik- 
ing effects  upon  the  American  manufacturing  industries. 
Without  their  help  the  North  could  not  possibly  have  won 
the  war.  Before  1861  the  United  States  manufactured 
little.  They  imported  vast  quantities  of  manufactured 
goods  of  every  kind  from  Europe,  chiefly  from  Great  Britain. 
Therefore,  when  the  war  broke  out  the  Americans  found  that 
they  lacked  not  only  weapons  and  ammunition  but  wool 
and  cloth  for  uniforms,  boots,  &c.,  as  well. 

The  heavy  cost  of  imported  goods,  the  unfavourable 
position  of  the  American  exchange,  and  the  disinclination 
to  buy  the  commodities  needed  at  an  extortionate  price 
and  a  ruinous  exchange  in  Europe  made  necessary  not  only 
the  rapid  creation  of  war  industries  but  that  of  general 


272    Britain's  Coming  Industrial  Supremacy 


manufacturing  industries  as  well.  The  war  had  totally- 
disorganised  America's  foreign  trade.  It  had  stopped  the 
exports  of  cotton,  tobacco,  and  sugar  which  were  produced 
in  the  revolted  South,  with  which  foreign  imports  were  very 
largely  paid  for.  How  seriously  America's  foreign  trade 
had  been  affected  thereby  may  be  seen  by  the  fact  that 
American  exports  shrank  from  $333,576,057  in  1860  to  only 
$166,029,303  in  1865.  They  declined  to  one-half.  During 
the  same  period  imports  were  reduced  from  $353,616,119 
to  $238,745,580.  However,  soon  after  the  war  the  American 
export  trade  expanded  rapidly. 

In  view  of  the  total  disorganisation  of  the  foreign  trade 
and  of  the  foreign  exchange  the  United  States  were  no  longer 
able  to  buy  manufactured  goods  in  Europe  and  to  pay  for 
them  chiefly  with  cotton,  sugar,  and  tobacco.  Necessity 
forced  them  to  become  self-supporting  as  far  as  possible. 
To  encourage  the  American  industries  to  produce  those 
goods  which  hitherto  were  imported  from  abroad  the 
American  Government  took  a  step  comparable  to  that 
which  the  British  Government  took  during  the  present  War. 
With  the  intention  of  discouraging  imports  heavy  taxes  were 
imposed  upon  imported  goods.  The  change  effected  in 
America's  Fiscal  PoHcy,  owing  to  the  stress  of  war,  may  be 
seen  at  a  glance  by  the  following  table  : 


Customs  Eeceipts 

Duties  per  cent, 
ad  valorem 

1861  . 

1862  . 

1863  . 

1864  . 

1865  . 

1866  . 

1867  . 

1868  . 

1869  . 
1912   . 

39,582,126 

49,056,398 

69,059,642 

102,316,153 

84,928,261 

179,046,652 

176,417,811 

164,464,600 

180,048,427 

304,899,360 

18-84 
36-19 
32-62 
36-69 
47-56 
48-33 
46-67 
48-63 
47-22 
40-12 

It  will  be  noticed  that  the  ad  valorem  duties  were  twice 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     273 

as  high  in  1862  as  in  1861,  and  that  they  were  considerably 
increased  in  1865.  Since  then  import  duties  have  on  an 
average  been  only  little  below  50  per  cent,  ad  valorem  on 
dutiable  articles.  Only  during  the  last  few  years  has  the 
duty  declined  to  an  average  of  about  40  per  cent. 

Before  the  Civil  War  iron  and  iron  ware  had  been  one  of 
the  principal  American  imports.  The  Civil  War  laid  the 
foundations  of  the  gigantic  iron  and  steel  industry  of  the 
United  States  which  is  at  present  by  far  the  largest  in  the 
world.     Professor  Fite  wrote  : 

The  progress  of  manufactures  involving  the  raw  materials 
of  the  mines  was  marked.  Iron  was  used  in  all  branches  of 
manufacturing,  and  its  growing  consumption  was  an  indica- 
tion of  general  industrial  progress.  ...  Of  all  the  flourish- 
ing centres  of  iron  manufacturing  Pittsburg  was  the  largest ; 
here  in  one  year  six  extensive  iron  mills  were  erected,  and  in 
the  last  year  and  a  half  of  the  war  $26,000,000  worth  of 
iron  and  steel  were  manufactured. 

The  report  of  the  American  Iron  and  Steel  Association 
of  1871  stated  : 

In  1860  205,000  tons  of  iron  rails  were  made  in  the 
United  States,  the  largest  amount  ever  made  in  any  one 
year  up  to  that  time  ;  187,000  tons  were  made  in  1861, 
213,000  tons  in  1862,  275,000  tons  in  1863,  335,000  tons 
in  1864,  and  356,000  tons  in  1865.  In  1853  importations, 
reached  358,000  tons,  the  highest  figure  reached  in  the 
'fifties  ;  146,000  tons  were  imported  in  1860,  89,000  tons  in 
1861,  10,000  tons  in  1862,  20,000  tons  in  1863,  146,000  tons 
in  1864,  and  63,000  tons  in  1865. 

The  Civil  War  was  instrumental  in  creating  the  gigantic 
American  clothing  and  boot  and  shoe  industries.  Professor 
Fite  tells  us  : 

At  first  uniforms  were  very  scarce ;  in  the  various 
United  States  garrisons,  when  the  war  came,  there  were 
only  enough  on  hand  to  accommodate  the  regular  army  of 
13,000  men,  and  but  few  factories  were  fitted  for  making 


274    Britain's  Coming  Industrial  Supremacy 

cloth  for  military  purposes,  .  .  .  When  the  War  Depart- 
ment made  heavy  purchases  of  army  cloth  in  England  and 
France  in  order  to  meet  the  crisis,  the  almost  savage  cry  arose 
in  some  quarters  :  *  Patronise  home  industries.'  .  .  . 

In  the  succeeding  years  the  woollen  factories  were  able 
to  cope  with  the  situation,  and  no  more  complaints  were 
heard  ;  the  millions  of  soldiers  were  clad  in  products  of  the 
country's  own  mills.  The  annual  military  consumption 
of  wool  in  the  height  of  the  war  was  75,000,000  pounds,  for 
domestic  purposes  138,000,000  pounds  more,  a  total  con- 
sumption for  all  purposes  of  over  200,000,000  pounds,  against 
85,000,000  pounds  in  times  of  peace. 

The  progress  of  the  woollen  factories,  most  of  them 
located  in  New  York  and  New  England,  was  enormous  ; 
every  mill  was  worked  to  its  fullest  capacity,  many  working 
night  and  day,  Sunday  included.  In  all  2000  sets  of  new 
cards  were  erected,  representing  many  new  mills.  As  the 
report  of  the  New  York  Chamber  of  Commerce  said,  the 
progress  seemed  scarcely  credible.  .  .  . 

The  ready-made  clothing  industry  was  as  necessary  for 
clothing  the  army  as  were  the  sheep  farms  and  the  woollen 
mills.  .  .  .  The  trade  thus  created  did  supplant  importa- 
tions from  the  East  side  of  London.  By  the  middle  of  the 
war  the  importations  ceased,  and  then  the  country  succeeded 
in  clothing  its  army  of  over  a  million  men  almost  entirely 
by  native  industry,  not  only  furnishing  a  large  percentage 
of  the  wool  for  manufacturing  all  the  cloth,  but  making  the 
uniforms. 

Much  of  this  success  was  doubtless  due  to  the  sewing 
machine  then  but  recently  invented.  .  .  .  The  manufacture 
of  clothing  was  greatly  stimulated.  Men's  shirts,  which 
required  fourteen  hours  and  twenty  minutes  for  making 
by  hand,  by  the  machine  could  be  made  in  one  hour  and 
sixteen  minutes.  .  .  . 

The  shoe  industry  likewise  benefited  by  the  sewing 
machine  ;  in  fact,  was  converted  by  it  from  a  system 
of  household  manufacture  to  the  modern  factory  system. 

During  the  Civil  War  British  cotton  thread,  which 
hitherto  had  had  practically  a  monopoly  in  the  United  States; 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     275 

was  replaced  by  American  cotton  thread.     In  the  words  of 
Professor  Fite  : 

Cotton  thread  continued  to  be  used,  with  the  more  or 
less  complete  substitution  of  American-made  for  the  English- 
made  product,  which  had  been  almost  the  only  thread  sold 
before  the  war.  Through  the  influence  of  the  heavy  war 
tariff  three-fourths  of  the  market  came  to  be  supplied 
from  home.  The  advance  in  the  price  of  '  Coats,'  which 
finally  reached  four  times  its  old  value,  created  a  chance 
for  American  manufacturers,  which  was  readily  seized  upon, 
and  a  vast  new  industry  sprang  up  ;  the  Willimantic 
Company,  with  a  new  plant  worth  $1,000,000,  Green 
&  Daniels,  and  other  firms  appeared.  At  Newark,  New 
Jersey,  an  English  firm  built  a  very  large  plant  to  manu- 
facture their  product  on  this  side  of  the  tariff  wall  and  thus 
reap  its  advantages. 

The  huge  modern  meat-packing  industry  of  Chicago  also 
was  greatly  stimulated,  if  not  created,  by  the  war.  Professor 
Fite  wrote  : 

Progress  in  hog-packing  was  centred  chiefly  in  Chicago. 
The  industry  here  had  been  progressing  slowly  for  almost 
thirty  years,  when  suddenly,  as  the  result  of  the  unusual 
transportation  conditions  arising  out  of  the  closing  of  the 
Mississippi  Kiver,  the  yearly  output  rose  from  270,000  hogs 
in  1860,  the  largest  number  packed  in  any  one  year  before 
the  war,  to  900,000. 

Many  other  industries,  too  numerous  to  mention,  owed 
their  creation,  or  their  powerful  expansion,  to  the  war. 

Industrial  efficiency  and  productiveness  are  increased 
not  only  by  improved  labour-saving  machinery  but  by  an 
improved  organisation  as  well.  Industrial  co-operation 
and  the  division  of  labour  can  be  carried  to  the  greatest 
perfection  only  by  a  concentration  of  energy  and  direction, 
by  manufacturing  on  a  large  scale,  by  eliminating  unnecessary 
and  therefore  wasteful  competition.     Owing  to  the  pressure 


276    Britain's  Coming  Industrial  Supremacy 

of   the  war   a  powerful  tendency  towards  industrial  con- 
solidation arose.     Professor  Fite  has  told  us  : 

As  soon  as  expansion  set  in  it  was  evident  that  the 
existing  industrial  machinery  was  inadequate  to  the  tasks 
imposed  upon  it.  Industrial  enterprises  in  the  past  under  a 
system  of  free  competition  had  been  very  numerous,  and 
each  had  been  conducted  on  a  small  scale  ;  there  was  no 
unity  of  effort  in  allied  lines  and  over  large  areas  of  territory, 
while  in  some  cases  unwise  laws  had  created  inequalities. 
This  lack  of  unity  needed  to  be  corrected,  more  harmony 
among  common  interests  introduced,  and  unequal  privileges 
swept  away,  if  business  was  to  be  transacted  on  an  increased 
scale.  This  was  the  fundamental  reason  for  the  sudden  and 
pronounced  tendency  towards  consolidation  that  charac- 
terised the  world  of  capital  as  soon  as  the  war  began,  although 
other  factors  doubtless  contributed  to  the  same  end,  such 
as  internal  taxes,  large  fortunes,  the  progress  of  inventions, 
pecuhar  transportation  conditions,  the  tariff,  high  prices,  and 
the  assaults  of  the  labouring  classes.  ... 

When  once  started,  concentration  of  manufacturing 
went  on  swiftly.  Soon  after  the  war  was  over  the  special 
commissioner  of  the  revenue  noted  a  rapid  concentration 
of  the  business  of  manufacturing  into  single  vast  estab- 
hshments  and  an  utter  annihilation  of  thousands  of  little 
separate  industries,  the  existence  of  which  was  formerly  a 
characteristic  of  the  older  sections  of  the  country.  .  .  . 

Never  in  the  history  of  the  country  up  to  that  time  had 
there  been  such  a  strong  tendency  towards  united  and  har- 
monious action  on  the  part  of  the  employing  classes,  whether 
this  resulted  in  a  complete  merging  of  one  company  into 
another  or  looser  and  more  temporary  organisations  to 
consider  the  subject  of  prices,  internal  taxes,  the  tariff, 
or  wages  ;  never  had  there  been  such  an  incentive  to 
consolidation  and  union.  Combination  in  every  hne  was 
the  tendency  of  the  hour.  A  determination  was  growing 
to  merge  small,  isolated  units,  often  hostile  to  each  other, 
into  larger  and  more  harmonious  groups  ;  big  corporations 
supplanted  smaller  ones  ;  things  were  done  on  a  more  exten- 
sive scale  than  had  ever  before  been  attempted.     Although 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     277 

the  new  spirit  appeared  suddenly,  it  did  its  work  thoroughly, 
and  while  it  was  not  carried  as  far  as  at  the  present  time, 
it  must  still  be  recognised  that  its  advent  created  a  new 
epoch  in  industrial  and  commercial  life,  the  foundation  for 
all  that  has  come  later.  There  was  a  definite  turning  away 
from  the  independent  self-reliant  locahsm  and  small  units 
of  the  past,  a  decided  right-about  toward  centralisation.  .  .  . 

Another  element  entering  into  the  situation  was  the 
peculiar  effects  of  internal  taxes.  There  was  a  tax  on  the 
sales  of  most  industrial  products,  placed  finally  at  6  per  cent. 
ad  valorem,  which  bore  heavily  on  manufacturers,  inas- 
much as  most  products  represented  more  than  one  process  of 
manufacture.  .  .  . 

The  manufacturer  with  little  capital,  who  could  afford 
only  a  small  establishment,  was  discriminated  against  in 
favour  of  the  rich  man  ;  if  the  cotton  manufacturer  could 
afford  not  only  to  spin  but  also  to  weave,  he  escaped  one 
tax  ;  if  he  could  have  his  own  dyeworks,  he  escaped  another 
tax.  Such  a  man,  after  enlarging  his  plant,  could  undersell 
his  poor  neighbour.  Concentration  in  manufacturing,  there- 
fore, came  to  be  the  rule,  for  the  more  nearly  complete  and 
comprehensive  the  plant,  the  less  was  the  tax. 

During  the  Civil  War  the  American  manufacturing  in- 
dustries expanded  with  almost  incredible  vigour.  Professor 
Fife  briefly  summed  up  the  principal  causes  of  their  expansion 
in  the  following  words  : 

For  this  progress  of  manufacturing  there  were  many 
reasons.  First,  the  ordinary  needs  of  the  country  were 
greater  than  usual.  .  .  . 

Then  the  paper  money  regime  was  in  full  swing,  and 
money  was  plenty  and  prices  soaring.  There  was,  too,  the 
incentive  of  the  tariff,  not  a  session  of  Congress  passing 
without  some  raising  of  these  bars  to  foreigners.  Every 
manufacturer,  great  and  small,  was  conscious  of  more 
buoyancy  and  freedom  as  he  realised  that  under  the  cloak 
of  the  supposed  needs  of  revenue  with  which  to  wage  the 
war  he  was  rapidly  dispensing  with  foreign  competition 
with  all  its  attendant  risks  ;  examples  of  industries  benefited 
in  this  way  were  sugar,  thread,  iron,  steel  rail,  and  woollen 


278    Britain's  Coming  Industrial  Supremacy 

manufacturing.  But  greatest  of  all  incentives  were  Govern- 
ment contracts,  which  generally  have  a  way  of  bringing 
higher  prices  than  ordinary  sales,  and  which  at  this  time 
became  more  and  more  lucrative  as  foreigners  were  effectually 
barred  from  competition.  Fortunate  the  manufacturer  who 
had  such  contracts,  and  small  the  number  who  did  not 
have  them.  Contemporary  opinion  plainly  inclined  to  the 
view  that  a  Government  contract  was  the  manufacturer's 
greatest  opportunity. 

The  best  and  the  most  imposing  picture  of  the  pro- 
gress of  the  American  manufacturing  industries  during  the 
decade  in  which  the  Civil  War  occurred  is  furnished  by 
the  dry  statistics  of  the  American  Censuses  of  1860  and 
1870.  While  Professor  Fite  in  his  excellent  account  describes 
to  us  the  causes,  the  Censuses  merely  give  the  facts.  They 
confirm  the  views  expressed  by  Professor  Fite  and  they 
show  the  following  remarkable  and  almost  unbelievable 
progress  during  a  period  of  war  : 


I860 

1870 

Mamifacturing  establishments 

Capital  employed 

Hands  employed 

Wages  paid         .... 

Value  of  products 

140,433 

$1,009,855,715 

1,311,246 

$378,878,966 
$1,885,861,676 

252,148 

$2,118,208,769 

2,053,996 

$775,584,343 

$4,232,325,442 

Between  1860  and  1870  the  number  of  manufacturing 
establishments  increased  by  80  per  cent,  and  their  capital 
was  more  than  doubled.  The  number  of  hands  employed 
increased  by  55  per  cent.,  and  the  wages  paid  to  them  and 
the  value  of  products  turned  out  increased  each  by  more 
than  100  per  cent.  That  is  truly  a  wonderful  record.  The 
figures  given  prove  conclusively  that  the  Civil  War,  not- 
withstanding its  destructiveness  and  huge  cost,  did  not 
ruin  the  American  industries  but  caused  their  rise  and 
prosperity. 

As   the   table   given    treats    summarily    the   American 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     279 

industries  as  a  whole,  their  progress  can  perhaps  more 
correctly  be  gauged  by  a  more  detailed  comparison  of  their 
output  according  to  the  Censuses : 


Value  of  Industrial  Production. 

In  18G0 

III  1870 

Dols. 

Dols. 

Agricultviral  implements 

17,487,960 

52,066,875 

Bricks  and  tiles    . 

11,263,147 

29,302,016 

Hosiery 

7,280,606 

18,411,564 

Cotton  goods 

115,681,774 

177,489,739 

Indiarubber  good 

5,768,450 

14,566,374 

Pig  iron 

20,870,120 

69,640,498 

Rolled  iron  . 

31,888,705 

120,311,158 

Cast  iron 

36,132,033 

99,843,218 

Forged  iron. 

2,030,718 

8,385,669 

Lumber 

96,715,854 

210,159,327 

Slachinery    . 

51,887,266 

138,519.246 

Nails  and  tacks 

9,857,223 

23,101,082 

Sewing  machines 

4,255,820 

13,638,706 

Silk  manufactures 

6,607,771 

12,210,662 

Steel  . 

1,778,240 

9,609,986 

Tobacco  and  snuff 

21,820,535 

38,388,359 

Tobacco  and  cigars 

9,068,778 

33,373,685 

Woollen  goods 

61,894,986 

155,405,358 

Worsted  goods     . 

3,701.378 

22,090,381 

Comparison  of  the  figures  given  shows  that  between 
1860  and  1870  the  production  of  agricultural  implements, 
bricks  and  tiles,  indiarubber  goods,  pig  iron,  cast  iron, 
machinery,  sewing  machines,  cigars  and  woollen  goods 
increased  threefold,  that  the  production  of  rolled  iron  and 
forged  iron  increased  fourfold,  and  that  the  output  of 
steel  and  worsted  goods  increased  no  less  than  sixfold. 
These  figures,  which  have  not  been  picked  in  order  to  make 
a  case,  but  which  are  all  those  given  in  the  American  Censuses, 
prove  that  the  war  enormously  benefited  the  American 
manufacturing  industries,  that  the  great  struggle  between 
the  North  and  the  South  brought  about  the  rapid  expansion 
of  American  manufacturing  which  carried  the  United 
States  to  the  first  rank  among  industrial  nations. 

Nations  are  born  in  war  and  die  in  peace.     Peace  creates 


280    Britain's  Coming  Industrial  Supremacy 

sloth,  neglect,  intrigue,  and  dissension.  A  keen  sense  of 
danger,  on  the  other  hand,  is  the  most  powerful  unifying 
factor  known  to  history.  The  hostility  of  Austria  united 
Switzerland,  Hungary,  and  Italy  and  is  uniting  the  Southern 
Slavs.  The  hostility  of  France  united  Germany.  The 
hostility  of  England  united  the  quarrelling  American 
Colonies  and  creaeed  the  United  States.  The  hostility 
of  Germany  is  welding  the  British  Empire  iato  an  indis- 
soluble whole. 

Wars,  though  disastrous  to  individuals,  often  prove  a 
blessing  to  nations.  They  unite  and  toughen  men.  They 
prepare  them  for  the  struggle  of  life  both  in  the  military 
and  in  the  economic  sphere. 

Success  in  trade  and  industry,  as  in  war,  depends  after 
all  not  so  much  on  the  possession  of  dead  resources  as  on 
the  intelligence,  ability,  energy,  and  industry  of  men. 
Most  men  are  born  idlers.  They  prefer  ease  and  comfort 
to  physical  and  mental  exertion.  Hence  they  dislike  and 
oppose  change  and  progress.  Necessity  is  the  mother 
not  only  of  ingenuity  and  of  invention  but  of  labour  and  of 
thrift,  and  therefore  of  economic  progress  and  of  wealth. 
Herein  lies  the  reason  that  the  countries  most  blessed  by 
Nature  are  often  the  poorest  and  the  least  progressive. 
Great  Britain's  former  industrial  predominance  was  founded 
not  in  peace  but  in  war.  It  was  created,  as  I  have  shown 
in  the  previous  chapter,  during  the  period  1775-1815,  Of 
these  forty  years  thirty  were  spent  in  colossal  wars,  the 
war  with  the  American  Colonies  and  their  European  allies, 
and  the  gigantic  war  with  Eepublican  and  Napoleonic 
France.  •  These  wars  gave  to  Great  Britain  her  late  pre- 
eminence in  commerce  and  industry.  Necessity,  especially 
the  enormous  increase  in  taxation,  made  vastly  increased 
production  indispensable.  It  led  to  the  introduction  of 
the  steam  engine,  of  modern  industry,  of  modern  commerce, 
of  modern  agriculture,  of  modern  transport,  and  of  modern 
capitalism.     It  brought  about  the  industrial  revolution. 

Peace  and  ease  have  almost  unnoticed  deprived  Great 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     281 

Britain  of  the  foremost  industrial  position  which  she  had 
obtained  during  the  Great  War,  and  which  now  is  possessed 
by  the  United  States.  The  present  War  should  not  only- 
unite  the  British  Empire  but  should  once  more  give  to  the 
British  people  the  foremost  position  in  the  economic  world, 
provided  they  make  wise  and  energetic  use  of  their 
opportunities.  On  the  other  hand,  the  United  States,  far 
from  enriching  themselves  at  the  cost  of  the  fighting 
nations,  far  from  coining  the  sweat  and  blood  of  the  Allies 
into  dollars,  may,  through  peace  and  ease,  fall  a  prey  to 
that  fatal  self-complacency  and  stagnation  from  which 
political  and  industrial  Britain  has  suffered  for  decades  and 
from  which  she  has  been  saved  by  the  War.  Before  long 
the  Great  Eepublic  may  begin  to  stagnate  and  decline 
and  become  a  victim  of  her  undisturbed  material  prosperity. 
It  seems  not  impossible  that,  owing  to  the  War,  the  United 
States  will  henceforth  decline,  not  only  politically  but 
economically  as  well,  while  Great  Britain  will  once  more 
become  economically  the  leading  Anglo-Saxon  nation. 

Let  us  now  consider  the  economic  effects  of  the  War 
upon  Great  Britain  and  upon  the  Empire  as  a  whole. 

In  the  chapter  on  '  Britain's  War  Finance  and  Economic 
Future,'  I  showed  by  means  of  irrefutable  figures,  which 
have  attracted  the  attention  of  the  principal  technical 
papers  and  of  many  eminent  industrialists,  that  the  American 
workers  in  factories,  mines,  &c.,  produce  per  head  from- 
two  to  three  times  as  much  as  their  British  colleagues 
engaged  in  the  same  callings  ;  that  the  vastly  greater 
output  of  the  American  workers  is  due  to  the  employment 
of  far  more  powerful  and  far  more  efficient  machinery,  better 
organisation,  a  greater  desire  for  progress  on  the  part  of 
the  manufacturers,  and  a  comparative  absence  of  a  delibe- 
rate limitation  of  output  on  the  part  of  the  workers.  I 
showed  that  Great  Britain  could  double  and  treble  her 
income  and  wealth  by  doubling  and  trebling  her  engine- 
power  upon  the  American  plan  and  by  improving  her 
organisation.     I  showed   that   she   could   easily   pay,   and 


282    Britain's  Coming  Industrial  Supremacy 

more  than  pay,  for  the  War  by  Americanising  her  industries. 
Since  the  time  when  those  words  were  printed  ^  the  American- 
isation  of  British  industry  has  begun.  The  pressure  of 
necessity  has  brought  about  many  of  the  necessary  changes. 
The  British  employers  have  been  awakened  to  the  need 
of  progress  and  reform,  and  the  British  Trade  Unions 
have  abandoned  in  part  their  fatal  policy  of  restricting 
output  and  antagonising  improved  machinery. 

Before  the  War  the  United  Kingdom  had,  in  round 
numbers,  18,000,000  male  and  female  workers  employed 
in  agriculture,  industry,  commerce,  domestic  service,  &c. 
Since  then  about  6,000,000  men  have  joined  the  Army  and 
Navy,  while,  according  to  Mr.  Montagu's  statement  made 
in  the  House  of  Commons  on  August  15,  1916,  2,250,000 
men  and  women  are  engaged  in  making  munitions  under 
the  Ministry  of  Munitions.  If  we  estimate  that,  in  addition 
to  these,  750,000  men  and  women  not  under  the  Ministry 
of  Munitions  are  engaged  on  war  work,  it  appears  that  the 
War  has  reduced  the  number  of  British  workers  by  exactly 
one-half.  However,  the  loss  in  man-power  is  probably 
not  50  per  cent,  but  about  60  per  cent.,  because  the  youngest, 
the  strongest,  and  the  most  efficient  workers  are  either 
in  the  Army  and  Navy  or  engaged  on  war  work.  The 
consumption  of  the  country  is  about  as  great  as  it  was  in 
peace  time,  for,  while  private  demand  for  goods  is  smaller 
here  and  there,  the  reduction  effected  by  the  economy  of 
some  is  probably  counter-balanced  by  the  increased  spending 
on  the  part  of  the  workers,  and  especially  by  the  enormous 
demands  for  ordinary  goods  for  the  use  of  the  Army  and 
Navy.  The  British  exports  for  the  first  seven  months  of 
1916  were,  but  for  £10,000,000,  as  large  as  those  during 
the  corresponding  seven  peace  months  of  1914,  although, 
allowing  for  the  rise  in  prices,  they  were  considerably 
smaller. 

It  therefore  appears  that  with  only  one-half  of  her 
workers    Great    Britain    produces    now    approximately   as 

1  September,  1915. 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmmiship     283 

large  a  quantity  of  ordinary  goods  as  she  did  with  all  her 
workers  before  the  War.  In  other  words,  the  output  per 
worker  has  approximately  doubled.  Necessity  has  led 
to  more  intensive  and  more  scientific  production,  to  better 
organisation,  to  the  introduction  of  the  most  modern  methods 
and  of  the  most  perfect  machinery,  not  only  in  the  manu- 
facture of  munitions  of  war,  but  in  ordinary  manufacturing 
as  well.  It  has  been  stated  that  during  the  War  the  United 
Kingdom  has  imported  £200,000,000  worth  of  American 
machinery.  The  vast  advance  made  in  manufacturing 
will  no  doubt  be  of  permanent  benefit  to  the  nation.  The 
new  and  efficient  processes  will  not  be  abandoned  for  the 
old  and  wasteful  ones.  Mr.  Montagu  stated  in  the  House 
of  Commons  on  August  15,  when  describing  the  activity  of 
the  Ministry  of  Munitions,  according  to  the  verbatim  report : 

Old-fashioned  machinery  and  slip-shod  methods  are 
disappearing  rapidly  under  the  stress  of  war,  and  whatever 
there  may  have  been  of  contempt  for  science  in  this  country, 
it  does  not  exist  now.  There  is  a  new  spirit  in  every  depart- 
ment of  industry  which  I  feel  certain  is  not  destined  to  dis- 
appear when  we  are  at  liberty  to  divert  it  from  its  present 
supreme  purpose  of  beating  the  Central  Powers.  When  that 
is  done,  can  we  not  apply  to  peaceful  uses,  the  form  of 
organisation  represented  by  the  Ministry  of  Munitions  ?  I 
am  not  thinking  so  much  of  the  great  buildings  which  con- 
stitute new  centres  of  industry,  planned  with  the  utmost 
ingenuity  so  as  to  economise  effort,  filled  with  machines  of 
incredible  efficiency  and  exactitude.  I  wish  rather  to 
emphasise  the  extent  to  which  all  concerned — and  each 
section  is  vital  to  our  objects — are  co-operating  to  obtain 
the  best  results  from  the  material  in  our  hands.  We  have 
the  leaders  of  all  the  essential  industries  now  working  for  us 
or  co-operating  with  us  in  the  Ministry.  The  great  unions 
render  us  constant  assistance  in  the  discussion  and  solution 
of  difficulties,  whether  with  our  officers  or  within  their  own 
body.  On  technical  questions  of  the  most  varied  character 
we  have  the  advantage  of  the  best  expert  advice  in  the 
country. 


284    Britain'' s  Coming  Industrial  Supremacy 

We  have  in  being,  now  that  British  industry  is  organised 
for  war,  the  general  staff  of  British  industry.  I  am  sure 
that  we  should  sacrifice  much  if  we  did  not  avail  ourselves 
of  that  staff  to  consider  how  far  all  this  moral  and  material 
energy  can  be  turned  to  peaceful  account. 

Sir  W.  Essex,  a  great  industrialist,  said  at  the  same 
sitting  : 

I  think  the  products  of  this  Armageddon  are  going  to 
be  real  and  substantial.  I  know  the  price  we  shall  pay  for 
it  will  be  enormous,  but  we  shall  not  begrudge  it,  or  a  tithe 
or  a  hundredth  of  it,  but  a  great  by-product  will  be  that  our 
mechanical  industry  and  our  chemical  industry,  and  all  the 
industries  which  are  touched— and  hardly  an  industry  is  not 
touched  more  or  less  intimately — will  have  been  revivified, 
modernised,  and  invigorated  to  an  incredible  degree,  and 
that  must  of  necessity  react  on  the  whole  industrial  work  of 
our  Empire,  and  will  not  only  maintain,  but  enormously 
enhance  all  the  advantages  which  as  a  manufacturing  nation 
we  have  hitherto  enjoyed.  .  .  . 

These  men  [the  leaders  of  industry  who  are  co-operating 
with  the  Ministry  of  Munitions]  are  going  up  and  down,  week 
in  and  week  out,  month  in  and  month  out,  energising  the 
thousands  of  factories  which  are  under  the  control  of  the 
Ministry  of  Munitions,  bringing  them  up  to  date  in  their 
workshop  methods,  making  them  acquainted  in  many  cases 
I  know  with  tools,  the  like  of  which  they  had  no  previous 
knowledge  of  save  by  hearsay,  bringing  them  up  also  to 
new  methods,  new  systems,  and  organisation  until — this 
is  the  common  testimony  of  many  of  the  proprietors  of 
these  factories — '  We  did  not  know  our  business  until  we 
got  linked  up  with  the  Minister  of  Munitions.'  You  are 
able  by  this  aggregation  of  the  manufacturing  industries  of 
the  country  here  employed  to  level  up  the  whole,  and  that, 
I  take  it,  would  be  a  by-product  of  incalculable  value  to 
the  industry  of  this  country,  and  must  enormously  affect 
it  for  good  and  make  for  our  advantage  in  the  future  com- 
petition with  other  races  of  the  world. 

The  necessity  of  war  has  not  only  vastly  increased  the 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     285 

efficiency  of  the  existing  industries,  but  has  caused  power- 
ful new  industries  to  arise.  Vast  quantities  of  chemicals, 
electrical  apparatus,  glass,  optical-ware,  machinery,  tools, 
&c.,  which  formerly  were  imported  from  abroad,  are  now 
manufactured  in  this  country,  especially  as  import  pro- 
hibitions have  provided  a  powerful  stimulus.  The  War 
has  greatly  promoted  technical  education  and  increased 
technical  ability,  for  skilled  workers  in  enormous  numbers 
were  wanted.  Hence  hundreds  of  schools  had  to  be  created 
in  which  unskilled  workers  were  converted  into  highly 
skilled  ones.  Inventiveness  was  stimulated  by  the  neces- 
sity to  manufacture  numerous  articles  which  hitherto  were 
made  abroad  by  secret  processes.  Last,  but  not  least, 
the  War  has  led  to  the  creation  of  huge  model  factories 
for  making  munitions,  compared  with  which  the  great  Wool- 
wich establishment  is  small  and  out  of  date.  These  giant 
factories  will  not  be  pulled  down  after  the  conclusion  of 
peace,  but  will,  of  course,  be  adapted  to  the  production 
of  ordinary  goods.  Great  Britain  will  undoubtedly  follow 
in  this  the  example  set  by  the  United  States  after  the  Civil 
War. 

The  War  has  doubled  the  manufacturing  efficiency  not 
only  of  Great  Britain,  but  of  France,  Kussia,  Italy,  and 
Japan  as  well.  When  the  struggle  is  over,  the  United  States 
will  no  longer  compete  with  industrial  nations  possessed  of 
an  antiquated  outfit  whose  output  per  man  is  exceedingly 
low  owing  to  the  use  of  inefficient  and  labour-wasting 
machinery  and  methods.  During  the  War  the  most  impor- 
tant industries  of  the  whole  world  have  become  Americanised. 
The  United  States  will  henceforth  have  to  compete  on  equal 
terms  in  an  Americanised  world.  They  may  discover  that 
the  War  has  destroyed  their  industrial  paramountcy. 

The  change  effected  by  the  War  will  be  particularly 
striking  in  the  iron  and  steel  industry,  the  most  important 
of  all  manufacturing  industries.  Before  the  struggle  the 
United  States  and  Germany  dominated  the  world's  iron  and 
steel  trade,  and  Britain's  position  had  sunk  very  low  indeed, 


286    Britain's  Coming  Industrial  Supremacy 

as  the  following  figures  show,  which  are  taken  from  the 
'  Statesman's  Year  Book  ' : 


— 

Production  of  Iron 
in  1912 

Production  of  Steel 
in  1912 

United  States         .... 
Germany       ..... 
United  Kingdom    .... 

Tons 

29,727,000 

17,582,000 

8,751,000 

Tods 

31,251,000 

17,024,000 

6,903,000 

In  1912  the  United  Kingdom  produced  only  about  one- 
half  as  much  iron  as  Germany,  and  one-third  as  much  iron 
as  the  United  States.  In  the  same  year  the  United  Kingdom 
produced  only  about  one-third  as  much  steel  as  Germany 
and  one-fifth  as  much  steel  as  the  United  States. 

Germany's  defeat  will  no  doubt  lead  to  the  decline  of  her 
mightiest  industry.  The  bulk  of  the  iron  ore  employed  by 
the  German  iron  industry  came  before  the  War  from  German 
Lorraine,  Luxemburg,  and  the  French  districts  close  to  the 
German  frontier.  The  principal  iron  deposits  on  the  Con- 
tinent are  dominated  by  the  guns  of  Metz  and  Diedenhofen 
on  the  one  hand,  and  of  Verdun  and  Nancy  on  the  other. 
Germany's  desperate  attack  upon  Verdun  was  probably 
largely  due  to  the  wish  to  deprive  France  of  her  steel. 
France's  acquisition  of  Alsace-Lorraine  will  deprive  Ger- 
many of  the  bulk  of  her  iron  ore  and  make  France  the 
proprietor  of  the  largest  iron  deposits  in  Europe.  The  iron 
ore  in  sight  in  the  small  Lorraine-Luxemburg  district  is 
approximately  as  plentiful  and  as  rich  in  metal  as  the  iron 
ore  of  the  United  States. 

Iron-smelting  requires  of  course  vast  quantities  of  coal. 
About  a  ton  and  a  half  of  coal  is  needed  for  every  ton  of 
iron  ore.  Unfortunately  France  has  little  coal,  and  has  to 
import  vast  quantities  of  coal,  although  her  iron  industry  is 
at  present  of  comparatively  little  importance.  The  output 
of  the  French  coal-mines  can  apparently  not  be  greatly 
increased.  Near  the  German  frontier,  but  outside  Alsace- 
Lorraine,  on  the  Saar  River,  there  are  German  coal-mines 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     287 

which  France  might  acquire,  but  these  do  not  yield  a  satis- 
factory coke  for  iron- smelting.  Hence  Germany  uses  West- 
phaUan  coal  for  smelting  the  iron  of  Lorraine.  Possessing 
the  Lorraine  ore  beds,  France  would  lack  coal  wherewith  to 
smelt  it.  She  would  therefore  either  have  to  import  coal 
from  Westphalia  or  England  for  exploiting  that  vast  resource, 
or  she  would  have  to  send  a  large  part  of  the  Lorraine  ore 
to  Germany  or  England  for  smelting.  Great  Britain  and 
France  have  been  partners  in  war  and  should  be  partners 
in  peace.  They  might  jointly  exploit  the  vast  ore  deposits 
mentioned.  By  co-operating,  England  and  France  might 
dominate  not  only  the  iron  trade  of  Europe,  but  perhaps 
that  of  the  world.  They  might  leave  far  behind  them  the 
iron  industry  of  the  United  States 

In  consequence  of  the  War  the  industrial  output  of  the 
United  Kingdom,  as  that  of  the  United  States  after  the  Civil 
War,  may  be  doubled  and  trebled.  The  United  Kingdom, 
like  the  small  industrial  area  of  the  United  States,  will  find 
its  best  and  safest  market  for  a  vastly  increased  industrial 
output  in  the  Dominions  and  Colonies,  in  its  Far  West. 
After  the  Civil  War  the  United  States  developed  their  great 
estate  with  the  same  energy  with  which  they^had  conducted 
the  war.  I  have  shown  in  the  beginning  of  this  chapter 
that  the  United  States,  with  their  comparatively  small 
territory;  have  almost  exactly  twice  as  many  miles  of  rail- 
way as  has  the  whole  of  the]British  Empire]with  its  immense 
territory.  Hundreds  of  thousands  of  miles  of  railway  are 
required  throughout  the  British  Empu:e.  The  opening  of 
the  Dominions  and  Colonies  by  means  of  railways  alone 
will  give  full  employment  to  the  vastly  enlarged  iron  and 
steel  industries  of  Great  Britain  and  the  Dominions  for 
decades  to  come.  The  British  Dominions  have  room  for 
hundreds  of  millions  of  white  settlers.  After  the  end  of  the 
Civil  War  money  had  to  be  made  to  pay  off  the  war  debt. 
To  make  money,  the  Far  West  had  to  be  opened  up  by  means 
of  railways  and  immigrants,  for  railways  and  settlement  must 
go  hand  in  hand.    The  numerous  immigrants  kept  fully 


288    Britain's  Coming  Industrial  Supremacy 

employed  not  only  the  American  iron  and  steel  industry 
which  the  war  had  created,  but  all  the  American  industries 
which  had  been  immensely  enlarged  during  the  struggle. 

In  territory  and  in  latent  resources  the  British  Empire  is 
far  superior  to  the  United  States,  but  in  developed  and 
exploited  resources,  in  industrial  power,  wealth,  and  white 
population,  the  Empire  is  very  inferior  to  the  Great  Eepublic. 
Between  1871  and  1911  the  population  of  the  United  States 
increased  by  53,500,000,  that  of  Germany  increased  by 
25,400,000,  while  the  white  population  of  the  British  Empire 
grew  by  only  21,500,000.  That  comparison  is  humiliating 
for  the  British  Empire.  If  the  same  rate  of  progress  or  a 
similar  rate  should  continue  to  prevail,  the  British  Empire 
would  in  course  of  time  become  a  second-rate  or  a  third-rate 
Power. 

Wealth  is  power.  The  British  Empire  should  endeavour 
to  be  the  leading  Anglo-Saxon  nation,  not  only  in  territory, 
but  in  white  population  and  wealth  as  well.  Hitherto 
the  development  of  the  Empire  has  been  restricted  by  a 
small-minded  parochial  policy  of  the  component  parts,  by 
lack  of  Imperial  organisation  and  co-operation.  The  great 
Imperial  domain  can  be  adequately  protected  and  exploited 
only  by  the  Empire  as  a  whole,  by  a  truly  Imperial  Govern- 
ment, by  Empire-wide  co-operation.  Immigration  and 
emigration,  transportation  by  land  and  water,  the  planful 
opening  and  settlement  of  the  vast  empty  spaces  of  the 
Empire,  and  the  question  of  inter-Imperial  trade  must  be 
settled  imperially,  not  parochially.  If  that  is  done,  there 
is  every  reason  to  believe  that  in  a  few  decades  the  British 
Empire  will  be  far  ahead  of  the  United  States  both  in  white 
population  and  in  wealth. 

It  may  be  argued  that  the  British  Dominions  and  Colonies 
cannot  be  developed  as  rapidly  as  the  United  States,  although 
the  resources  of  the  former  are  greater  than  those  of  the 
latter,  because  the  United  States  are  a  single  country  which 
nature  has  opened  up  by  a  number  of  magnificent  rivers. 
That  argument  is  erroneous.     The  United  States  are  not 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     289 

a  State,  but  a  number  of  States,  which  jealously  defend  their 
State  rights  and  which  do  not  readily  co-operate.  Besides, 
the  seas  are  the  Mississippi,  the  Missouri,  and  the  Hudson 
of  the  British  Empire.  They  do  not  separate,  but  connect 
the  different  parts. 

In  consequence  of  the  Civil  War,  the  United  States  stan- 
dardised their  chaotic  railway  system,  as  has  been  shown. 
They  placed  it  under  imperial  control,  and  gradually  evolved 
a  unified  and  national  system  by  means  of  the  Inter-State 
Commerce  Commission.  Cheap  transport  and  freight  and 
equitable  rates  are  the  best  means  for  opening  up  the  Empire 
rapidly.  The  Governments  of  the  Empire  should  learn 
from  America's  lesson  and  control  transport  by  land  and 
water  throughout  the  Empire.  At  present  private  railway 
companies  and  shipping  companies  direct,  divert,  stimulate, 
or  restrict  the  imperial  trade  according  to  their  convenience, 
or  even  penalise  British  and  facilitate  foreign  trade  for  their 
own  benefit.  The  transport  companies  by  land  and  sea 
must  be  taught  that  the  interests  of  the  Empire  are  more 
important  than  those  of  their  shareholders. 

An  Imperial  Government  in  the  full  sense  of  the  term 
should  investigate  and  take  stock  of  the  Imperial  resources, 
for  they  are  unknown.  It  is  nobody's  business  to  study 
and  describe  the  resources  of  the  Empire.  No  official  survey 
has  even  been  made  of  England's  coal  beds.  The  resources 
of  the  Empire  are  exploited,  or  wasted,  at  will  by  private 
individuals.  The  mineral  resources  of  the  United  States 
have  been  explored  and  described  by  the  American  Geo- 
logical Survey,  which  has  rendered  invaluable  service,  and  of 
recent  years  the  Americans  have  embarked  upon  the  policy 
of  preserving  their  natural  resources  under  the  guidance 
of  their  national  Conservation  Commission.  An  Imperial 
stocktaking  is  necessary.  The  Empire  belongs  to  the  race, 
not  to  a  few  capitalists.  Its  exploitation  should  be  guided 
by  national  and  Imperial  interests.  Yet  such  guidance 
need  not  restrict  very  much  the  activities  of  enterprising 
capitalists. 


290    Britain's  Coming  Industrial  Supremacy 

The  British  race  will  scarcely  suffice  to  fill  up  the  vacant 
lands  of  the  Empire.  The  Dominions  will  become  keen 
competitors  with  the  United  States  for  desirable  immigrants. 
Hitherto  the  bulk  of  European  emigrants  have  gone  to  the 
United  States,  but  the  British  Empire  may  be  able  to  divert 
the  stream.  For  decades  men  have  gone  to  the  United 
States  not  only  because  it  was  easy  to  make  money  in  that 
country,  but  also  because  the  United  States  were  considered 
a  home  of  freedom,  the  champion  of  liberty.  America's 
prestige  as  a  defender  of  freedom  and  liberty  has  probably 
suffered  owing  to  her  attitude  during  the  first  two  years  of 
the  War.  Men  wishing  for  liberty  may  henceforth  rather 
go  to  the  British  Empire  than  to  the  United  States.  The 
planful  development  of  the  Imperial  domain  by  the  building 
of  railways  and  the  cheapening  of  transport  will  bring 
hundreds  of  thousands  of  desirable  emigrants  to  the  British 
Empire. 

The  tariff  policy  of  Great  Britain  and  the  Dominions 
will  have  the  most  far-reaching  influence  upon  the  economic 
development  of  the  Empire.  A  common-sense  tariff  policy 
will  further  the  settlement  and  exploitation  of  the  Imperial 
estate,  while  a.  doctrinaire,  a  vote-catching,  or  sectional 
policy  will  condemn  the  Empire  to  stagnation  and  decline. 
The  development  of  the  United  States  has  been  helped  im- 
mensely by  the  fact  that  they  form  a  single  market.  The 
British  Empire,  like  the  United  States,  is  so  vast  that  there 
need  be  no  jealousy  among  the  component  States.  British 
industry,  like  the  industry  of  Pennsylvania  or  Illinois, 
cannot  provide  all  the  manufactured  goods  wanted  by  the 
Empire.  There  is  room  for  manufacturing  centres  in  all 
parts  of  the  Empire.  A  narrow  spirit  of  monopoly  and 
exclusion  or  a  cosmopolitan  fiscal  policy  advocated  by 
doctrinaires  would  greatly,  and  perhaps  fatally,  hamper 
the  Empire's  development  in  population  and  wealth. 

The  War,  as  has  been  shown  at  the  beginning  of  this 
chapter,  may  cost  about  £7,500,000,000.  That  is  a  colossal 
burden,  and  the  British  Empire  should  endeavour  to  pay  off 


Great  Probleins  of  British  Statesmanship     291 

the  debt  with  reasonable  speed.  The  War  was  waged  not 
merely  for  the  benefit  of  the  United  Kingdom,  but  for  that 
of  the  British  Empire  as  a  whole.  It  seems  therefore  only- 
fair  that  the  British  Dominions  should  assume  their  full 
share  of  the  cost  of  the  War,  especially  as  the  assumption 
of  their  part  of  the  burden  should  prove  highly  beneficial 
to  them, 

A  large  increase  in  taxation  throughout  the  Dominions 
would  most  powerfully  stimulate  production.  Hitherto  the 
development  of  the  Empire  has  been  hindered  very  seriously 
by  the  fact  that  too  many  emigrants  have  endeavoured  to 
make  a  living  not  by  production,  but  by  trade  and  specula- 
tion. Nearly  40  per  cent,  of  the  inhabitants  of  Australia 
live  in  the  five  capital  towns,  while  the  vast  expanses  of 
the  country  remain  empty.  Nearly  50  per  cent,  of  the 
inhabitants  of  New  South  Wales  and  Victoria  live  in  Sydney 
and  Melbourne.  Several  years  ago,  when  I  was  in  the  West 
of  Canada,  I  found  that  the  principal  industry  consisted  in 
gambling  in  real  estate.  The  Dominions  have  developed 
so  slowly  very  largely  because  money  was  too  cheap,  taxes 
were  too  low,  and  life  was  too  easy.  Men  could  make  a 
good  living  by  little  work.  If  Great  Britain  should,  by 
the  unwillingness  of  the  Dominions,  be  forced  to  take  over 
an  unduly  large  share  of  the  war  debt,  it  may  be  ruinous  not 
only  to  the  Mother  Country,  but  to  the  Empire  as  a  whole, 
especially  if  the  Dominions  should  practise  at  the  same  time, 
an  exclusive  policy  towards  British  manufactures.  Happily 
this  seems  unlikely. 

The  War  has  been  waged  not  only  for  the  present  genera- 
tion, but  for  future  generations  as  well.  It  seems  therefore 
only  fair  that  part  of  the  cost  should  be  borne  by  future 
generations.  It  might  be  thrown  in  part  on  the  latent  and 
undeveloped  resources  of  the  Empire,  which  might  be  pooled 
for  the  purpose  of  repaying  the  war  debt.  The  other  part 
of  the  cost,  to  be  paid  by  the  present  generation,  might  be 
allocated  to  the  various  States  of  the  Empire  according  to 
the  number  of  the  people  and  their  wealth  per  head,  so  that 


292     Britain's  Coming  Industrial  Supremacy 

the  burden  should  be  borne  fairly  and  equally  by  all. 
Periodically  the  allocation  might  be  revised  and  a  redis- 
tribution effected  in  accordance  with  changing  circum- 
stances. 

The  latent  resources  of  the  Empire  are  boundless.  There 
is  every  reason  to  believe  that  the  British  Empire,  if  wisely 
governed  and  administered,  will  exceed  the  United  States 
in  white  population  and  in  wealth  in  a  few  decades. .  The 
War  will  apparently  devour  a  sum  equal  to  about  one-half 
of  Great  Britain's  national  wealth,  but  that  fact  need  not 
disturb  us.  The  Civil  War  cost  the  United  States  a  sum 
which  was  equal  to  about  two-thirds  their  national  wealth 
at  the  time.  During  the  fifty  years  which  have  elapsed  since 
its  conclusion,  the  wealth  of  the  United  States  has  grown  at 
so  rapid  a  rate,  largely  in  consequence  of  that  war,  that 
to  the  present  generation  the  gigantic  war  cost  seems  almost 
trifling.  The  sum  of  £7,500,000,000,  though  equal  to  one- 
half  of  Great  Britain's  national  wealth,  comes  only  to  about 
one- fourth  of  the  Empire's  national  wealth.  In  a  few  decades 
the  cost  of  the  World  War  may  appear  as  small  to  the  citizens 
of  the  British  Empire  as  that  of  the  Civil  War  appears  now 
to  most  Americans  and  that  of  the  Napoleonic  War  to  most 
Englishmen  of  the  present.  The  war  with  Napoleon  created 
England's  economic  supremacy.  The  Civil  War  created 
the  industrial  supremacy  of  the  United  States.  The  present 
War  should  give  the  industrial  supremacy  of  the  world  to 
the  British  Empire. 


CHAPTEE  IX 

DEMOCEACY    AND    THK   IRON    BEOOM    OF   WAR  ^ 
AN    ANALYSIS    AND    SOME    PROPOSALS  ^ 

Gold  is  tested  by  fire  and  nations  by  war.  The  World 
War  has  glaringly  revealed  the  improvidence,  the  inefficiency, 
and  the  wastefulness  of  the  democratically  governed  States. 
France,  though  utterly  defeated  by  Germany  in  1870-71, 
and  frequently  threatened  by  her  with  war  since  then, 
especially  in  1905  and  in  1911,  when  a  German  attack  seemed 
almost  inevitable,  was  quite  unprepared  for  her  ordeal. 
A  fortnight  before  the  fatal  ultimatum  was  launched  upon 
Serbia,  at  a  moment  when  the  tension  was  very  great, 
and  when  Germany  was  possibly  hesitating  whether  she 
should  strike  or  not.  Senator  Humbert  revealed  to  the 
world  in  an  official  report  which  created  an  enormous 
sensation  throughout  Europe,  that  the  French  fortresses 
were  unable  to  resist  efficiently  a  modern  siege,  that  the 
French  Army  lacked  heavy  guns,  ammunition,  rifles,  and 
uniforms,  that  France  had  in  stock  per  soldier  only  a  single 
boot,  thirty  years  old.  Belgium  separates  France  from 
Germany.  The  numerous  purely  strategical  railways  which 
Germany  had  constructed  towards  the  Belgian  frontier 
had  clearly  revealed  her  hostile  intentions  towards  her 
small  neighbour.     Belgium,  having  a  population  of  8,000,000, 

^  The  Nineteenth  Century  and  After,  February,  1916. 

*  Most  of  the  '  proposals  '  contained  in  the  following  pages  were  carried 
out  by  Mr.  Lloyd  George  on  his  taking  over  the  premiership,  eleven  months 
after  their  publication  in  The  Nineteenth  Century  review.  This  was  probably 
duo  purely  to  coincidence,  for  the  reforms  introduced  in  the  national  organisa- 
tion were  logical  and  necessary. 

293 


294    Democracy  and  the  Iron  Broom  of  War 

might  easily  have  raised  an  army  of  500,000  or  1,000,000 
men.  Such  an  army,  supported  by  modern  fortresses,  would 
certainly  have  caused  Germany  to  respect  Belgium's 
neutrality.  The  test  of  war  found  the  Belgian  fortresses 
and  army  totally  inadequate.  Except  for  her  Fleet,  Great 
Britain  was  equally  unprepared  for  the  War.  She  has 
since  then  raised  a  huge  army,  but  disappointment  and 
failure  have  been  the  result  of  her  diplomatic  action  in 
Turkey  and  Bulgaria,  and  of  her  military  efforts  at  the 
Dardanelles,  on  the  .Vardar,  in  Mesopotamia,  and  elsewhere. 
Poor  and  backward  Eussia,  on  the  other  hand,  surprised 
the  world  by  her  preparedness,  and  invaded  Eastern  Prussia 
and  Galicia  soon  after  the  opening  of  hostihties. 

Comparison  of  the  improvidence,  inefficiency,  and  waste- 
fulness displayed  by  democratic  France,  Belgium,  and  Great 
Britain  with  the  war-readiness  and  efficiency  of  the  auto- 
craticallj'-  governed  States,  and  especially  of  Germany, 
has  clearly  revealed  the  inferiority  of  democracy  in  war- 
fare and  in  national  organisation.  It  is  easy  to  make 
sweeping  generalisations.  Many  people  have  proclaimed 
that  democracy  has  proved  a  failure,  that  the  doom 
of  democracy  is  at  hand,  that  the  iron  broom  of  war  will 
sweep  it  into  the  hmbo  of  forgotten  things.  England  has 
invented  modern  representative  and  democratic  govern- 
ment. The  national  organisation  of  most  civilised  States 
is  modelled  upon  that  of  this  country.  Let  us  then  inquire 
whether  democracy  is  indeed  a  failure,  or  whether,  hke 
every  institution  in  this  world,  it  has  merely  certain 
failings  which  can  be  remedied.  If  it  possesses  grave  but 
remediable  defects,  let  us  try  to  find  a  cure.  England, 
who  has  evolved  representative  Government,  should  be 
the  first  to  deal  with  its  faults  and  to  introduce  the  necessary 
changes. 

In  the  fourth  century  before  Christ  Aristotle  wrote 
in  his  book  '  Politics  '  :  '  It  is  not  for  what  is  ancient,  but 
for  what  is  useful,  that  men  of  sense  ought  to  contend  ; 
and  whatever  is  distinguished  by  the  former  quality  cannot 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     295 

be  expected  to  possess  much  of  the  latter.'  About  the 
same  time  Thucydides  stated  in  his  history  :  '  It  is  the 
custom  of  mankind,  even  where  their  own  country  is  con- 
cerned, to  acquiesce  with  complacent  credulity  in  the  tradi- 
tions of  former  ages  without  subjecting  them  to  the  test 
of  critical  examination.'  Flattery  and  misplaced  admira- 
tion are  far  more  dangerous  than  honest  hostility.  The 
British  Constitution  has  suffered  more  from  its  friends 
than  from  its  enemies.  It  has  been  dealt  with  in  innumer- 
able books,  but  unfortunately  most  of  these  are  written 
in  a  spirit  of  bhnd  and  uncritical  admiration.  Besides, 
practically  all  who  have  written  on  the  British  Constitu- 
tion treat  it  as  if  it  were  an  ancient  Gothic  cathedral  or  some 
other  venerable  relic  of  the  past.  They  look  upon  it  with 
awe  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  antiquary,  the  historian, 
the  artist,  and  true  believer.  They  do  not  recognise  that 
a  constitution  is  in  the  first  place  not  a  work  of  art,  but 
an  instrument  of  government.  They  describe  to  us  in  full 
detail  its  ancient  history,  the  gradual  changes  it  has  under- 
gone, its  Gothic  intricacies  and  ,irregularities,  and  its 
present  aspects,  but  they  fail  as  a  rule  to  inquire  whether  it 
answers  its  practical  purposes.  Walter  Bagehot,  one  of 
the  very  few  men  who  endeavoured  to  consider  it  from  the 
practical  point  of  view,  wrote  in  his  book  '  The  English 
Constitution'  : 

The  characteristic  merit  of  the  English  Constitution  is 
that  its  dignified  parts  are  very  complicated  and  somewhat 
imposing,  very  old  and  rather  venerable  ;  while  its  efficient 
part,  at  least  when  in  great  and  critical  action,  is  decidedly 
simple  and  rather  modern.  We  have  made,  or  rather 
stumbled,  on  a  constitution  which — though  full  of  every 
species  of  incidental  defect,  though  of  the  worst  workmanship 
in  all  out-of-the-way  matters  of  any  constitution  in  the  world 
— yet  has  two  capital  merits  :  it  contains  a  simple  efficient 
part  which,  on  occasion  and  when  wanted,  can  work  more 
simply  and  easily,  and  better,  than  any  instrument  of  govern- 
ment that  has  yet  been  tried  ;    and  it  contains  likewise 


296    Democracy  and  the  Iron  Broom  of  War 

historical,  complex,  august,  theatrical  parts  which  it  has 
inherited  from  a  long  past — which  take  the  multitude — 
which  guide  by  an  insensible  but  an  omnipotent  influence 
the  associations  of  its  subjects.  Its  essence  is  strong  with 
the  strength  of  modern  simplicity  ;  its  exterior  is  august 
with  the  Gothic  grandeur  of  a  more  imposing  age. 

In  view  of  the  experience  of  the  World  War,  or,  indeed,  of 
any  great  war  in  which  this  country  has  been  engaged, 
Bagehot's  emphatic  assertion  that  the  English  Constitution 
*  in  great  and  critical  action  is  decidedly  simple  and  rather 
modern,'  that  '  when  wanted  it  can  work  more  simply  and 
easily,  and  better,  than  any  instrument  of  government 
that  has  yet  been  tried,'  can  only  be  described  as  a  ludicrous 
travesty  and  perversion  of  fact.  Unfortunately  his  view 
is  representative  of  that  of  most  constitutional  writers. 

Statesmanship  is  not  an  abstract  science,  not  a  science 
based  upon  theory,  but  an  eminently  practical  science,  a 
science  which  is  based  on  experience.  A  serious  disease 
should  not  be  subjected  to  empiric  treatment.  A  wise 
physician  will  carefully  diagnose  the  case  submitted  to  him 
before  considering  the  remedy.  Let  us  then  consult  some 
of  the  greatest  and  wisest  statesmen  of  all  times.  Their 
opinions,  which  are  based  on  unrivalled  experience,  will 
provide  us  with  invaluable  guidance,  and  the  importance  of 
the  views  given  in  the  following  pages  will  be  greatly  en- 
hanced by  the  fact  that  most  of  them  will  be  new  to  British 
readers. 

Aristotle,  the  friend  and  teacher  of  Alexander  the  Great, 
whose  book  '  Politics  '  should  be  read  by  every  statesman 
and  politician,  wrote  :  '  An  error  in  the  original  structure 
of  government  often  proves  ruinous  both  to  repubHcs  and 
to  aristocracies,'  The  ancient  Greeks  had  much  experience 
of  the  practical  working  of  democracy.  They  saw  their 
democracies  first  assailed  by  the  military  obligarchy  of  Sparta 
and  then  destroyed  by  the  Macedonian  autocracy  under 
King  Philip.     Their  greatest  thinkers  believed  that  their 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship      297 

downfall  was  due  not  to  the  chance  of  war,  but  to  '  a  fatal 
error  in  the  original  constitution  of  their  government.'  They 
beheved  that  democracy  was,  owing  to  its  very  nature,  a 
less  efficient  form  of  government  than  monarchy.  Aristotle 
wrote  in  his  book  '  Politics '  :  '  , 

That  which  is  a  common  concern  to  all  is  very  generally 
neglected.  The  energies  of  man  are  stimulated  by  that 
which  depends  on  himself  alone,  and  of  which  he  only  is 
to  reap  the  whole  profit  or  glory.  In  concerns  common  to 
him  with  others,  he  employs  with  reluctance  as  much  atten- 
tion and  activity  as  his  own  interest  requires.  He  neglects 
that  of  which  he  thinks  other  men  will  take  care,  and  as 
other  men  prove  equally  negligent,  the  general  interest 
is  universally  abandoned.  Those  famihes  are  commonly 
the  worst  served  in  which  the  domestics  are  the  most 
numerous. 

Isocrates,  one  of  the  greatest  Greek  orator-statesmen, 
whose  works  are  very  little  known,  wrote  in  his  '  Third 
Oration  '  : 

Democracies  honour  those  who  by  delusive  eloquence 
govern  the  multitude,  but  monarchies  those  who  are  most 
capable  in  managing  the  affairs  of  the  nation.  Monarchies 
surpass  democratic  governments  not  only  in  the  ordinary 
routine  of  administration,  but  especially  in  war,  for  mon- 
archies are  more  able  than  are  democracies  to  raise  troops, 
to  use  them  to  advantage,  to  arm  in  secret,  to  make  military 
demonstrations,  to  win  over  some  neighbours,  and  to  over- 
awe others. 

All  are  acquainted  with  the  mihtary  events  which  brought 
about  the  downfall  of  Athens,  the  wealthiest  and  most 
powerful  Greek  republic,  whose  fleet  ruled  the  sea,  but  few 
know  its  hidden  causes.  In  the  second  century  before 
Christ  the  Greco-Eoman  Polybius,  the  most  statesman-like 
historian  of  antiquity,  who  was  not  only  a  great  writer,  but 
a  diplomat  and  general  as  well,  and  who  wrote  history  from 
the  point  of  view  of  tho  statesman,  stated  that  Athens  fell 


298    Democracy  and  the  Iron  Broom  of  War 

because  a  change  in  her  constitution  had  deprived  her  of  a 
single  head.     He  wrote  : 

Athens,  having  been  raised  by  the  abihty  of  Themistocles 
to  the  greatest  height  of  power  and  glory,  shortly  afterwards 
sank  into  weakness  and  disgrace.  The  cause  of  this  sudden 
change  lay  in  the  inappropriate  constitution  of  the  Govern- 
ment, for  the  Athenian  State  was  like  a  ship  without  a 
captain. 

His  views  are  confirmed  by  Thucydides,  a  contemporary 
of  Pericles,  who  was  an  eye-witness  of  the  decline  and  fall 
of  Athens.  Writing  in  the  fourth  century  before  Christ, 
he  tells  us  that  in  the  time  of  Pericles,  Athens,  though 
a  republic  in  name,  was,  owing  to  the  great  prestige  of 
Pericles,  a  monarchy  in  fact,  and  that  her  greatness  declined 
when,  after  his  death,  the  State  became  a  true  democracy 
and  a  prey  to  party-political  strife.     He  wrote  : 

Pericles,  a  man  of  acknowledged  worth  and  ability,  whose 
integrity  was  undoubtedly  proof  against  corruption,  kept 
the  people  in  order  by  gentle  management,  and  was  not 
directed  by  them,  but  was  their  principal  director.  He  had 
not  wormed  himself  into  power  by  dubious  methods.  There- 
fore he  was  not  obliged  to  soothe  and  praise  their  caprices, 
but  could  oppose  and  disregard  their  anger  with  peculiar 
dignity.  Whenever  he  saw  them  bent  on  projects  injurious 
or  unreasonable,  he  terrified  them  so  much  by  the  force  of 
his  eloquence  that  he  made  them  tremble  and  desist,  and 
when  they  were  disquieted  by  groundless  apprehensions,  he 
animated  them  afresh  into  brave  resolution.  The  State, 
under  him,  though  called  a  democracy,  was  in  fact  a  mon- 
archy. His  successors  were  more  on  a  level  with  one 
another,  and  as  every  one  of  them  aspired  to  be  their 
leader,  they  were  forced  to  cajole  the  people,  and  so  to  neg- 
lect the  concerns  of  the  public.  This  was  the  source  of 
many  grievous  errors  of  statesmanship,  as  must  unavoidably 
be  the  case  in  any  great  community  which  is  possessed  of 
large  dominions. 

Pericles  had  introduced  the  pernicious  system  of  con- 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     299 

verting  into  an  object  of  gain  those  services  rendered  to  the 
nation  which  formerly  were  rendered  gratuitously  and  which 
had  been  considered  a  trust  and  an  honour.  He  died,  and 
politicians  desirous  of  power  endeavoured  to  obtain  it  by 
cajoling,  flattering, and  bribing  the  masses,  by  outbidding  and 
by  attacking  one  another.  Aristotle  has  told  us  in  his  book, 
'  Pontics  '  : 

Pericles,  by  granting  fees  to  the  judges  and  jurymen, 
and  converting  a  matter  of  duty  into  an  object  of  gain,  still 
further  debased  the  composition,  and  increased  the  tyranny, 
of  the  x\thenian  tribunals.  What  Pericles  had  left  imperfect, 
succeeding  demagogues  supplied.  One  democratical  regula- 
tion followed  another,  until  the  government  assumed  its 
present  form,  or  rather  its  present  deformity. 

Henceforth  domestic  poHtics  monopolised  pubHc  atten- 
tion in  Athens.  Politicians  anxious  for  power,  for  votes, 
filled  the  ears  of  the  people  with  promises  and  with  mutual 
denunciations,  and  in  the  heat  and  passion  of  the  faction 
fight  the  national  interests  were  completely  neglected. 
Thucydides  informs  us  : 

Engaged  in  contests  for  power,  the  Athenians  did  not 
pay  sufficient  attention  to  the  army  abroad  and  were  em- 
broiled in  mutual  altercations  at  home.  .  .  .  They  would 
not  have  been  conquered,  had  not  their  own  domestic  feuds 
at  last  utterly  disabled  them  from  resisting  their  enemies. 

Men  strongly  divided  with  regard  to  domestic  politics 
and  goaded  to  passion  against  one  another  by  their  leaders 
will  not  easily  bury  their  feuds  and  act  in  common  if  united 
action  is  urgently  wanted  to  preserve  the  State  from  destruc- 
tion. Besides  men  who  have  become  used  to  hear  all  sides 
cannot  in  any  case  decide  quickly.  If  opinions  differ, 
influence  necessarily  takes  the  place  of  reason,  and  if  the 
opposing  parties  cannot  unite  on  energetic  action,  a  weak, 
and  probably  foolish,  middle  course,  acceptable  to  both 
parties  will  be  adopted  after  infinite  procrastination  and 
delay.    Machiavelli,   who,   as   Secretary   of   State   to   the 


300    Democracy  and  the  Iron  Broom  of  War 

Eepublic  of  Florence,  knew  a  great  deal  of  the  practical 
working  of  democratic  institutions  in  time  of  national 
emergency,  wrote  in  his  '  Discorsi '  : 

In  all  matters  of  difficulty  wherein  courage  is  needed  for 
resolving,  vacillation  will  always  be  met  with  whenever 
those  who  have  to  deliberate  and  decide  are  weak.  Not  less 
mischievous  than  doubtful  resolves  are  those  which  are  late 
and  tardy,  especially  when  they  have  to  be  made  on  behalf 
of  a  friend.  From  their  lateness  they  help  none,  but  hurt 
ourselves.  Tardy  resolves  are  due  sometimes  to  want  of 
spirit  or  want  of  strength,  or  to  the  perversity  of  those  who 
have  to  determine.  Sometimes  they  are  due  to  the  secret 
desire  of  pohticians  to  overthrow  their  opponents  or  to 
carry  out  some  selfish  purpose  of  their  own.  Hence  these 
men  prevent  the  forming  of  a  decision,  and  only  thwart 
and  hinder. 

Vacillation,  lateness,  and  tardiness  are  in  Machiavelli's 
opinion  the  characteristics  of  divided  counsels  which  are 
habitually  found  in  Governments  by  discussion — in  demo- 
cracies. His  statement  that  vacillation  and  delay  are 
particularly  harmful  if  a  friendly  nation  requires  support 
is  strikingly  illustrated  by  the  fatal  delay  of  democratic 
Britain  and  France  in  coming  to  Serbia's  aid. 

Frequently  during  the  War  the  British  Government  has 
been  reproached  in  innumerable  newspaper  articles  that  it 
is  always  too  late  both  in  its  diplomatic  and  in  its  military 
activities,  that  statesmen  are  discussing  when  they  should 
be  acting,  that  they  lack  initiative,  that  they  are  always 
surprised  by  the  enemy,  that  they  are  acting  only  after  the 
event,  that  nothing  is  done  in  time.  These  reproaches 
irresistibly  remind  one  of  similar  taunts  levelled  at  the 
Athenians  by  that  great  statesman  and  patriot  Demos- 
thenes, who,  like  the  late  Lord  Eoberts,  tried  in  vain  to 
arouse  the  misguided  and  pleasure-loving  citizens  to  a 
sense  of  the  danger  which  threatened  them  from  an  am- 
bitious neighbour  King  and  his  powerful  national  army. 
In  his  '  First  Philippic,'  that  great  orator  said  : 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     801 

Why,  Athenians,  are  the  festivals  in  honour  of  Athenae 
and  of  Dionysus  always  celebrated  at  the  appointed  time — 
festivals  which  cost  more  treasure  than  is  usually  expended 
upon  a  whole  fleet  and  attended  by  larger  numbers  and 
greater  magnificence  than  any  other  event  in  the  world — 
while  all  your  expeditions  have  been  too  late,  as  that  to 
Methone,  that  to  Pegasae,  and  that  to  Potidaea  ?  I  will 
tell  you  the  reason.  Everything  relating  to  your  amuse- 
ments is  carefully  studied  and  ordered  beforehand.  So 
everyone  of  you  knows  long  before  the  event  who  is  to 
conduct  the  various  entertainments,  what  he  is  to  receive, 
where  he  is  to  go,  and  what  he  has  to  do.  Nothing  is  left 
uncertain  or  undetermined.  But  in  affairs  of  war  and  in 
warlike  preparations  there  is  no  order,  no  certainty,  no 
regulation.  Only  when  events  alarm  us  we  appoint  our 
Trierarchs.  Having  done  so,  we  dispute  with  them,  and 
lastly  we  consider  the  question  of  supphes  for  war.  .  .  . 
It  is  shameful,  Athenians,  that  we  deceive  ourselves  by  allow- 
ing all  disagreeable  news  to  be  suppressed,  that  we  hsten 
only  to  the  pleasing  speeches  of  our  leaders,  and  that  we 
thus  delude  ourselves ;  that  by  putting  off  everything 
unpleasant,  we  never  move  until  it  is  too  late  ;  that  we 
refuse  to  understand  that  those  who  would  wage  war  suc- 
cessfully should  not  follow,  but  direct,  events. 

In  the  '  Fourth  Philippic  '  Demosthenes  stated  : 

You,  Athenians,  have  never  made  the  necessary  disposi- 
tion in  your  affairs,  or  armed  yourselves,  in  time,  but  have 
ever  been  led  by  events.  Then,  when  it  proves  too  late  to 
act,  you  lay  down  your  arms.  If  another  incident  alarms 
you,  your  preparations  are  once  more  resumed  in  general 
tumult  and  confusion.  But  this  is  not  the  way  to  obtain 
success.  .  .  .  When  Philip  was  preparing,  you,  instead  of 
doing  the  like  and  making  counter-preparations,  remained 
listless,  and,  if  anyone  spoke  a  word  of  warning,  shouted 
him  down.  When  you  receive  news  that  any  place  is  lost 
or  besieged,  then  you  listen  and  prepare.  But  the  time  to 
have  heard  and  consulted  was  when  you  declined  to  listen, 
and  the  time  to  act  and  employ  your  preparation  is  now 
when  you  are  hearing  me.    Such  being  your  habits,  you  are 


302     Democracy  and  the  Iron  Broom  of  War 

the  only  people  who  adopt  this  singular  course.  Other 
nations  deliberate  before  action.  You  deliberate  after 
action. 

While  King  Phihp  was  preparing  everything  for  his 
attack  upon  Athens,  the  leaders  of  the  Athenian  democ- 
racy were  fighting  one  another  for  votes  and  influence,  for 
place  and  power.  Demosthenes  sadly  stated  in  his  '  First 
Philippic  '  : 

If  we  sit  at  home  listening  to  the  mutual  recriminations 
of  our  orators  we  cannot  expect  the  slightest  success  in  any 
direction.  .  .  .  They  may  promise  and  assert  and  accuse 
this  person  or  that,  but  to  such  proceedings  we  owe  the  ruin 
of  our  affairs. 

In  his  '  Oration  for  the  Liberty  of  the  Ehodians ' 
we  read  ; 

You,  Athenians,  must  fight  a  double  battle.  Like  others, 
you  have  your  open  enemies,  but  you  have  enemies  still 
more  dangerous  and  alarming.  You  have  to  overcome  in 
the  first  place  the  opposition  of  those  of  your  own  citizens 
who,  in  this  assembly,  are  systematically  engaged  against 
the  interests  of  their  own  country.  And,  as  they  are  ever 
strenuous  in  their  opposition  to  all  useful  measures,  it  is  no 
wonder  that  many  of  our  designs  are  frustrated. 

Athens  owed  her  downfall  to  her  party-political  divisions, 
to  the  fact  that  she  had  many  heads,  but  no  head,  to  the 
fact  that  the  Athenians,  engaged  in  an  unending  struggle 
for  power,  were  taught  to  place  party  above  country  and 
self  above  the  State.  Trusting  to  their  democratic  orator- 
politicians,  who  desired  to  be  popular,  who  desired  to  please, 
the  misguided  people  delayed  preparation  and  action  against 
their  enemies  until  it  was  too  late. 

If  we  study  the  history  of  Athens  at  its  source,  it  becomes 
clear  that  that  great  republic  rose  to  eminence  during  the 
time  when  it  was  a  democracy  in  name  but  not  in  fact  ; 
that  it  was  a  great,  efficient,  and  wisely  governed  Power  as 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     303 

long  as  it  was  ruled  by  an  aristocracy  and  was  guided  by  a 
single  man  of  great  ability,  such  as  Aristides,  Themistocles, 
Cimon,  Pericles  ;  that  it  began  to  decline  when  it  became 
a  true  democracy,  when  the  controlling  power  in  the  State 
fell  into  the  hands  of  the  people,  when  ambitious  or  needy 
politicians  and  adventurers,  contending  for  power,  divided 
the  nation,  corrupted  and  destroyed  the  patriotism  of  the 
people,  and  taught  them  to  exploit  the  State  and  to  consider 
it  as  an  institution  which  existed  mainly  to  administer  to 
their  wants  and  their  vices,  to  their  love  of  ease  and  of  self. 
The  policy  of  Athens  was  bound  to  be  improvident,  hasty, 
reckless,  and  foolish  when  the  affairs  of  State  were  no  longer 
directed  by  the  ability  of  the  experienced  few  or  by  the 
wisdom  of  a  single  eminent  man,  but  by  the  momentary 
emotions  and  the  shortsightedness  of  the  crowd. 

In  Athens  public  affairs  were  discussed  and  decided  by 
the  people,  assembled  in  their  thousands  in  the  market-place. 
It  may  therefore  be  objected  that  the  Athenian  democracy 
cannot  in  fairness  be  compared  with  modern  democracies 
which  have  evolved  highly  developed  representative  institu- 
tions. It  may  be  said  that  in  Great  Britain  not  the  people 
nor  the  elected  representatives,  but  a  small  and  select  body, 
the  Cabinet,  enjoying  great  latitude  for  action,  discusses 
policy  and  decides  and  directs  in  the  greatest  secrecy.  Let 
us  then  study  the  cause  of  the  decline  and  fall  of  another 
great  commercial,  maritime,  and  colonising  republic,  of 
Venice.  The  case  of  Venice  should  be  particularly  interest' 
ing  because  the  Constitution  of  that  State  curiously  re- 
sembles that  of  this  country  as  estabhshed  in  the  eighteenth 
entury.  In  fact,  it  may  be  said  that  the  British  Constitu- 
tion, as  we  know  it  now,  was  modelled  upon  that  of  Venice. 
Venice,  like  Great  Britain,  did  not  possess  a  written 
and  fixed  Constitution.  The  Venetians  recognised  that 
government  by  a  crowd  is  bound  to  be  a  failure.  The  con- 
trolling power  of  the  State,  which  at  first  had  been  held  by 
the  Doge  and  then  by  representative  assemblies,  passed  into 
the  hands  of  the  Council  of  Ten,  which  originally  had  been 


304    Democracy  and  the  Iron  Broom  of  War 

merely  a  judicial  committee.  The  Senate  of  Venice  may 
fairly  be  compared  to  the  British  House  of  Commons,  and 
the  Council  of  Ten  to  the  British  Cabinet.  The  Council  of 
Ten  acted  in  conjunction  with  the  Senate,  and  its  power  was 
practically  unhmited.  Like  the  British  Cabinet,  it  carried 
on  its  work  in  absolute  secrecy.  It  was  not  dependent  upon 
public  opinion.  The  Doge,  the  Duke,  who  had  been  all- 
powerful  at  the  time  when  Venice  rose  from  insignificance 
to  greatness,  had  been  deprived  of  all  authority.  He  was 
a  mere  figure-head.  He  was,  as  we  are  told, '  rex  in  purpura, 
senator  in  curia,  in  urbe  captivus,  extra  urbem  privatus.' 
The  Doge  was  indeed  a  captive  in  a  golden  cage.  He  was 
not  allowed  to  open  the  despatches  which  were  addressed 
to  him,  as  the  head  of  the  State,  by  foreign  sovereigns.  His 
palace,  and  even  his  person,  were  liable  to  be  searched  at 
any  moment.  In  fact,  he  was  a  prisoner  of  the  Ten.  To 
make  his  revolt  unlikely,  only  very  old  and  feeble  men  were 
elected  Doge.  He  was  held  responsible  during  his  lifetime 
with  his  liberty  and  his  head,  and  after  his  death  with  his 
estate.  Venice  was  an  aristocratic  republic.  The  people 
were  powerless.  Owing  to  the  absence  of  anything  resem- 
bling popular  control  or  public  opinion,  the  authority  of 
the  Ten,  acting  in  conjunction  with  the  Senate,  was  of  the 
greatest. 

Although  much  power  was  thus  concentrated  into  the 
hands  of  a  small  secret  Council,  Venice  declined  and  decayed. 
Government  by  councils  and  committees  proved  fatal  to  her. 
In  1677  was  published  a  remarkable  book,  '  Histoire  du 
Gouvernement  de  Venise.'  It  was  written  by  Amelot  de  la 
Houssaye,  a  diplomat  and  a  keen  student  of  poHtical  affairs, 
who  during  several  years  was  attached  to  the  French 
Embassy  in  Venice,  and  who  had  made  a  special  study  of 
that  wonderful  State.  In  a  chapter  '  On  the  Principal 
Causes  of  the  Decline  of  Venice  '  we  read  : 

The  Kepubhc  of  Venice  has  had  the  same  fate  as  that  of 
Sparta.    Both  were  flourishing  as  long  as  they  were  small. 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     505 

Both  have  dechnecl  after  extending  their  territory.  Herein 
lies  the  first  cause  of  the  dechne  of  Venice.  Its  second  cause 
may  be  found  in  the  slowness  of  its  deliberations.  Slow- 
ness of  action,  it  is  true,  is  a  fault  which  is  found  in  all  de- 
mocracies, but  it  is  extreme  in  Venice.  Their  Senate  seems 
to  be  sometimes  asleep.  So  difficult  it  is  at  times  to  cause 
it  to  move. 

The  Venetians  were  advised  in  good  time  of  the  prepara- 
tions made  by  Turkey  for  invading  the  Island  of  Crete. 
Nevertheless,  they  did  not  think  of  preparing  their  defence, 
as  if  they  had  never  suffered  from  the  perfidy  of  the  Turks, 
or  as  if  Heaven  had  assured  them  that  the  powerful  expe- 
dition prepared  by  Turkey  was  not  directed  against  their 
own  possessions.  Their  confidence  was  founded  upon  the 
promises  of  a  Turk  who  had  told  them  that  the  military 
preparations  of  the  Porte  were  directed  against  Malta. 
They  were  blind  to  their  danger,  and  they  refused  to  heed 
the  advice  of  Sorance,  the  Venetian  ambassador  at  Con- 
stantinople, who  had  warned  them  of  their  peril  and  en- 
treated them  unceasingly  to  take  precautions.  Fearing  to 
offend  the  Turks  by  showing  their  suspicion,  they  did  not 
arm,  but  trusted  for  their  security  to  their  alliance  with  the 
Turks,  which  had  recently  been  renewed.  Thus  their  fortress 
of  Saint  Theodore  was  taken  by  surprise  and  Candia  besieged. 
Only  then  would  they  believe  that  the  Turks  were  hostile 
to  them.  .  .  . 

The  Venetians  lost  Cyprus  in  a  similar  manner.  They 
could  not  make  up  their  mind  what  to  do,  although  Jerome 
Zane,  their  admiral,  and  Pascal  Cicogne,  their  general  at 
Candia,  urged  them  not  to  wait  until  attacked  by  the  Turks, 
but  to  fight  the  Turkish  fleet  on  the  sea,  and  so  prevent  a 
hostile  landing. 

By  similar  irresolution  the  Senate  lost  in  the  last  cen- 
tury the  whole  of  the  Venetian  territory  on  the  mainland. 
The  Venetian  government  could  not  make  up  its  mind  as 
to  the  policy  to  be  pursued  until  the  sovereigns  united  in 
the  League  of  Cambray  had  invaded  the  Venetian  posses- 
sions. .  .  . 

The  third  cause  of  the  disorder  in  the  affairs  of  Venice 
lies  in  the  fact  that   the  Senate  is  composed  of   a   large 


30G    Democracy  and  the  Iron  Broom  of  War 

number  of  members.  Hence  bad  proposals  are  more  likely 
to  be  adopted  than  good  ones,  especially  if  a  bad  policy  is 
outwardly  attractive,  and  therefore  popular,  while  a  wise 
pohcy  seems  unpleasant.  In  Venice,  as  in  ancient  Athens, 
wise  men  may  propose,  but  fools  deliberate.  The  resolu- 
tions are  formed  by  a  majority.  The  votes  of  fools  have  as 
much  weight  as  the  votes  of  wise  men,  and  fools  are  more 
numerous  than  are  men  of  understanding. 

Lastly,  the  Venetian  Senate  is,  in  time  of  danger,  liable 
to  steer  a  middle  course,  which  is  the  worst  course  of  all. 
If  two  different  policies  are  proposed,  one  brave  and  daring, 
and  the  other  timorous  and  cowardly,  the  Venetians  are 
apt  to  follow  a  policy  which  is  partly  brave  and  partly 
cowardly  without  inquiring  whether  it  is  wise  and  whether 
it  will  avert  the  danger. 


The  extracts  given  from  the  book  of  the  French  diplomat 
make  it  clear  that  Venice,  in  times  of  great  emergency, 
when  rapid  and  decisive  action  was  required,  was  as  short- 
sighted, vacillating,  and  hesitating  as  was  Athens,  that  in 
the  later  centuries  of  her  existence  she  was  never  prepared 
for  war,  and  was  always  forestalled  by  her  enemies,  all  timely 
warnings  notwithstanding.  Three  centuries  ago  Turkey 
fooled  Venice  in  exactly  the  same  manner  in  which  she  fooled 
Great  Britain  in  1914  and  in  which  Bulgaria  fooled  her  in 
1915.  Over  the  grave  of  Venice,  as  over  that  of  Athens, 
the  words  '  Too  late  '  may  be  inscribed.  Venice,  like  ancient 
Athens  in  the  time  of  her  decline,  had  many  heads  but  no 
head.  Improvidence  and  irresolution  arising  from  divided 
counsels  destroyed  both. 

If  we  survey  the  history  of  the  world  we  find  that  nearly 
all  true  democracies  have  been  exceedingly  short-lived,  that 
they  have  gone  the  way  of  Athens.  The  republics  which 
flourished  were,  like  Carthage  and  like  Athens  in  the  time 
of  her  greatest  glory,  aristocracies  directed  by  single  men  of 
genius.  The  Eepublic  of  the  Netherlands,  like  that  of 
Venice,  was  an  aristocracy.  William  the  Silent,  her  Stadt- 
holder,  was  her  Themistocles.     He  estabhshed  the  power 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     307 

of  the  Eepublic,  and  his  successors  of  the  House  of  Orange, 
the  Princes  Maurice,  Frederick  Henry,  and  William  the 
Second,  maintained  it.  At  that  time  she  ruled  the  sea, 
colonised  the  world,  dominated  the  world's  trade,  and  was 
the  richest  State  in  Europe.  In  1650  the  Dutch  Eepublic 
changed  its  Constitution.  It  abolished  the  Stadtholder, 
whose  supreme  position  had  aroused  the  envy  of  the  demo- 
crats. The  politicians  were  established  in  power.  From 
1650  to  1672  the  Netherlands  were  a  true  Eepubhc.  Her 
poHticians  quarrelled  among  themselves  like  those  of  Athens 
and  Venice.  Her  counsels  were  divided,  and  during  the 
twenty-two  years  of  democratic  control  she  experienced 
defeat  after  defeat  and  lost  her  naval  supremacy,  her  world 
trade,  and  her  greatness.  The  Dutch  wealth  and  power  fell 
to  England,  ruled  by  one  man,  by  Cromwell.  Improvidence 
and  irresolution  springing  from  the  rule  of  political  com- 
mittees brought  about  her  decline. 

It  is  only  natural  that  aristocratic  or  oligarchial  repubhcs 
have  shown  a  greater  vitality  than  democratic  ones.  Aris- 
tocratic Venice  existed  during  nearly  a  thousand  years. 
The  wealth  of  the  wealthy  can  be  preserved  only  by  pru- 
dence, foresight,  and  timely  energy.  It  may  be  destroyed 
by  a  defeat,  and  it  may  be  preserved  or  increased  by  a  timely 
victory.  Wealthy  men  are  therefore  apt  to  take  more  pro- 
vident and  more  statesmanlike  views  in  matters  of  foreign 
policy  than  the  labouring  masses,  which  live  from  day  to 
day.  Besides,  the  wealthy  and  the  powerful  are  as  a  rule 
far  better  informed  on  foreign  affairs  than  the  poor  and  the 
ignorant,  who  may  easily  be  deluded  by  wily  agitators.  If 
one  set  of  politicians  proposes  to  the  people  a  wise  and 
patriotic,  though  costly,  policy  of  military  preparedness  in 
view  of  possible  dangers  from  without,  while  another  set 
promises  them  peace,  higher  wages  or  a  reduced  cost  of 
living,  and  disarmament,  and  holds  up  the  former  policy— 
which  is  supported  by  the  well-informed  rich — and  its 
supporters  to  odium,  the  people  will  readily  vote  for  a 
policy  of  unpreparedness  and  for  a  reduction  of  armaments. 


808    Democracy  and  the  Iron  Broom  of  War 

Before  the  War  the  French,  Belgian,  and  British  armies 
were  starved,  and  national  defence  was  neglected  because 
the  workers  were  told  by  their  leaders  that  not  Germany, 
but  domestic  capitalism,  was  their  greatest  enemy.  Before 
the  War  adequate  military  preparation  was  systematically 
opposed  in  France,  Belgium,  and  Great  Britain  by  politicians 
who  pandered  to  the  short-sighted  and  ill-informed  masses. 
The  story  of  Athens  in  the  time  of  Demosthenes  repeated 
itself. 

The'question  now  arises  whether  inefficiency  and  improvi- 
dence are  inseparably  connected  with  democracy,  whether 
it  is  not  possible  to  combine  the  advantages  possessed  by 
democracy  with  the  governmental  efficiency  and  foresight 
which  are  found  in  highly  organised  and  semi-military  States 
such  as  Germany,  whether  it  is  not  possible  to  blend  repre- 
sentative government  and  one-man  rule.  Before  deciding 
whether  this  is  feasible  we  must  inquire  into  the  causes  of 
the  governmental  efficiency  which  is  found  in  the  most 
highly  developed  monarchical  States. 

The  efficiency  of  a  nation,  as  of  any  commercial  or 
industrial  undertaking,  depends  mainly  on  two  factors  :  its 
organisation  and  its  direction,  its  Constitution  and  its 
director  or  directors. 

If  we  study  the  organisation  of  the  most  successful 
monarchies  of  all  time,  we  find  two  different  types.  Some 
have  been  ruled  by  a  prince  of  the  greatest  genius  who 
governed  in  person,  who  was  his  own  Prime  Minister,  such 
as  Peter  the  Great  of  Russia.  Some  have  been  ruled  by  men 
of  moderate,  or  even  of  small,  capacity  who  have  entrusted 
an  able  Minister  with  the  task  of  government,  such  as 
Germany  under  WilHam  the  First  and  Bismarck.  It  is 
frequently  asserted  that  the  combination  of  a  William  the 
First  and  of  a  Bismarck  is  unique  or  almost  unique.  That 
view  is  erroneous.  A  wise  king  rules,  but  does  not  govern. 
Monarchy  is  a  business  which  is  best  carried  on  through  a 
manager.  The  direct  rule  of  the  sovereign  is  dangerous 
for  the  nation  and  for  himself,  even  if  the  monarch  is  a  man 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     309 

of  the  greatest  genius.  That  may  be  seen  by  the  example 
of  Napoleon  the  First.  For  psychological  reasons  alone 
the  highly  technical  and  laborious  task  of  government  is  as 
a  rule  far  more  ably  fulfilled  by  a  patient  and  painstaking 
Minister  who  lives  for  his  work  than  by  a  high-spirited, 
though  able,  sovereign  who  necessarily  can  only  devote  part 
of  his  time  to  the  dry  and  tedious  details  of  administration. 

The  most  successful  States  have  been  raised  to  greatness 
not  through  a  great  ruler  but  through  a  great  statesman, 
such  as  Bismarck,  working  mider  a  ruler  of  moderate  ability. 
Civilisation  arose  in  the  East.  Every  Eastern  ruler  has  his 
manager,  his  Vizier.  Moses  had  his  Aaron,  Pharaoh  his 
Joseph,  and  Solomon  his  Asaph.  According  to  the  Moham- 
medan tradition,  these  were  the  Viziers  of  Moses,  Pharaoh, 
and  Solomon.  The  foundation  of  the  greatness  of  France 
was  laid  by  the  co-operation  of  the  able  Henry  the  Fourth 
and  of  Sully,  his  great  Minister,  and  by  Eichelieu  and 
Mazarin,  who  governed  France  in  the  King's  name  under  the 
rule  of  the  incapable  Louis  the  Thirteenth  and  during  the 
minority  of  Louis  the  Fourteenth.  These  statesmen  raised 
France  to  the  greatest  glory  and  made  her  wealthy  and 
powerful.  Louis  the  Fourteenth,  though  personally  highly 
gifted  and  well  supported  by  great  Ministers  such  as  Colbert 
and  Louvois,  wishing  to  govern  himself,  weakened  France 
through  his  impetuousness  and  pride.  As  the  greatness 
of  Germany  has  been  established  by  Bismarck  working  under 
the  conscientious  but  moderately  gifted  William  the  First, 
and  that  of  France  by  three  all-powerful  Ministers,  Sully, 
Eichelieu,  and  Mazarin,  so  that  of  Sweden  was  the  work  of 
Oxenstierna,  who  co-operated  with  the  great  genius  King 
Gustavus  Adolphus.  His  work  was  destroyed  by  the 
rashness  and  pride  of  Charles  the  Twelfth  as  that  of  Bis- 
marck seems  likely  to  be  destroyed  by  the  pride  and  vanity 
of  William  the  Second. 

Many  Englishmen  are  interested  in  the  science  of  legis- 
lation, but  only  a  few  in  that  of  national  administration  and 
organisation,  although  the  latter  is  infinitely  more  important 


310    Democracy  and  the  Iron  Broom  of  War 

than  tho  former.  While  the  Hterature  dealing  with  legis- 
lation and  with  domestic  politics  in  all  its  branches  is  exceed- 
ingly vast,  there  is  not  a  single  book  in  the  English  language, 
except  perhaps  the  American  Federalist,  which  deals  ade- 
quately and  critically  with  the  science  of  national  organisa- 
tion and  administration.  As  the  nation-builders  of  England 
have  apparently  not  recorded  their  views  as  to  the  best  form 
of  national  organisation,  we  must  turn  for  information  to 
the  great  constructive  statesmen  of  the  Continent  and  of 
the  United  States. 

Eichelieu,  the  great  organiser  of  Prance,  one  of  the 
wisest  statesmen  of  all  time,  stated  his  views  on  government 
in  his  little-known  '  Testament  Politique.'  It  was  written 
for  the  use  and  guidance  of  King  Louis  the  Thirteenth,  to 
whom  it  was  dedicated,  and  for  that  of  his  successors  and  of 
the  future  Ministers  of  France.  In  Chapter  VIII.  '  Du 
Conseil  du  Prince,'  which  might  be  translated  '  On  the 
Cabinet,'  we  read  : 

Among  statesmen  it  is  a  much  debated  question  whether 
it  is  better  that  a  sovereign  should  govern  the  State  in 
person,  according  to  his  own  views,  or  whether  he  should  be 
largely  guided  by  his  Council  and  do  nothing  without  its 
advice.  Either  form  of  government  might  be  advocated  in 
bulky  volumes. 

The  worst  government,  in  my  opinion,  is  one  which  is 
entirely  in  the,  hands  of  a  sovereign  who  is  so  incapable, 
and  at  the  same  time  so  presumptuous,  that  he  pays  no 
attention  whatever  to  any  council.  The  best  government 
of  all  is  one  where  the  mainspring  is  the  will  of  the  sovereign 
who,  though  capable  of  deciding  for  himself,  possesses  so 
much  modesty  and  judgment  that  he  does  nothing  unless 
he  is  supported  by  good  advice,  acting  on  the  principle 
that  several  eyes  see  more  than  a  single  one.  .  .  . 

A  highly-gifted  ruler  is  a  great  treasure  to  his  State,  and 
an  able  council  in  the  fullest  sense  of  the  word  is  no  less 
precious.  But  the  co-operation  of  an  able  ruler  and  a  good 
council  is  of  inestimable  value  because  on  such  co-operation 
is  founded  the  happiness  of  States. 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     311 

There  are  no  doubt  only  few  sovereigns  who  can  govern 
their  States  without  assistance,  but  even  if  there  were  many- 
such  gifted  men  they  should  not  endeavour  to  administer 
it  by  themselves.  .  .  . 

Many  qualities  are  required  in  a  good  minister,  and  the 
most  important  are  four  :  ability,  faithfulness,  courage,  and 
industry. 

The  abihty  of  ministers  does  not  consist  in  that  form  of 
self-conceit  which  is  usually  found  in  pedants.  Nothmg  is 
more  dangerous  for  a  State  than  men  who  endeavour  to 
govern  it  by  means  of  abstract  principles  drawn  from  books. 
Such  men  have  completely  ruined  States  because  the  rules 
of  the  past  cannot  always  be  apphed  to  the  present,  for  time, 
place,  and  persons  differ.  .  .  . 

In  considering  the  ability  of  ministers,  two  facts  are  of 
particular  importance.  In  the  first  place,  men  of  the 
greatest  natural  genius  are  often  more  dangerous  than  useful 
in  handling  affairs  of  State  unless  they  have  more  lead 
than  quicksilver  in  their  composition.  Many  men  are  fertile 
in  good  ideas.  They  abound  with  original  thoughts.  How- 
ever, such  men  are  often  so  changeable  in  their  plans  that 
in  the  evening  they  have  abandoned  their  intentions  of  the 
morning.  They  have  so  little  staying  power  and  logic 
that  they  change  their  good  plans  as  readily  as  their  bad 
ones,  and  never  steadily  pursue  any  policy.  I  may  say  with 
truth,  and  I  know  from  experience,  that  the  unsteadiness 
and  changeableness  of  such  people  is  no  less  dangerous 
in  the  management  of  national  affairs  than  the  ill-will  of 
others. 

The  second  fact  which  must  be  borne  in  mind  is  that 
nothing  can  be  more  dangerous  for  a  State  than  to  give  a 
position  of  great  authority  to  men  who  have  not  sufficient 
gifts  to  guide  themselves,  but  who,  nevertheless,  believe  that 
they  have  so  much  ability  that  they  need  not  be  guided  by 
others.  Men  of  that  stamp  can  neither  form  a  good  plan  for 
themselves  nor  follow  the  advice  of  those  who  might  give 
them  good  counsel.  Hence  they  commit  constantly  very 
great  mistakes.  One  of  the  greatest  vices  which  a  public 
man  may  possess  is  presumption.  Although  humility  is  not 
required  in  those  whose  destiny  it  is  to  administer  a  State, 


312    Democracy  and  the  Iron  Broom  of  War 

they  should  possess  modesty.  Modesty  is  absolutely  neces- 
sary to  them,  especially  as  the  most  capable  men  are  often 
least  able  to  bear  with  assistance  and  advice,  without  which 
even  the  ablest  men  are  little  fit  to  govern.  Men  of  the 
greatest  genius,  unless  possessed  of  modesty,  are  so  much 
enamoured  with  their  own  ideas  that  they  are  apt  to  condemn 
the  proposals  of  all  other  people,  even  if  their  views  are  better 
than  their  own  Hence  their  natural  pride  and  their  high 
position  are  apt  to  make  them  altogether  unbearable.  Even 
the  very  ablest  man  must  often  listen  to  the  advice  of  men 
whom  he  believes  to  be  less  able.  It  is  prudent  for  a  minister 
to  speak  little  and  to  listen  much,  for  one  can  profit  from  all 
kinds  of  advice.  Good  advice  is  valuable  for  itself,  while 
bad  advice  confirms  the  good.  .  .  . 

The  leading  men  must  be  industrious,  as  I  have  stated. 
However  it  is  not  necessary  that  a  man  directing  public 
affairs  should  be  working  unceasingly.  On  the  contrary, 
nothing  is  more  harmful  for  him  than  unceasing  labour. 
The  nature  of  affairs  of  State  makes  relaxation  necessary, 
and  the  more  important  the  office  is  the  more  necessary  is 
relaxation.  The  physical  and  mental  strength  of  man  is 
limited,  and  unceasing  labour  exhausts  both  in  little  time. 
It  is  necessary  that  those  who  manage  affairs  of  State  should 
make  these  their  principal  pre-occupation,  and  that  they 
should  devote  to  them  their  whole  mind,  their  whole  thought, 
and  all  their  strength.  Their  greatest  pleasure  should  con- 
sist not  in  their  amusement,  but  in  their  success.  States- 
men directing  the  affairs  of  a  country  should  survey  the 
whole  world  in  order  to  be  able  to  foresee  the  events  of  the 
future.  Then  they  will  be  able  to  take  measures  against 
the  evils  which  may  come,  and  to  carry  through  those 
measures  which  are  required  in  the  national  interest. 

As  the  number  of  the  physicians  is  often  responsible  for 
the  death  of  the  patient,  even  so  the  number  of  ministers  is 
more  often  harmful  than  advantageous  to  the  State.  I 
would  add  that  no  more  than  four  ministers  can  be  usefully 
employed,  and  one  of  these  should  be  invested  with  superior 
authority.  This  leading  minister  should  be  the  mainspring 
of  the  State.  He  should  be  like  the  sun  in  the  firmament. 
He  should  be  guided  only  by  his  intelligence  and  should  guide 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     313 

those  around  him.  I  hesitate  to  put  forward  this  idea,  for 
I  may  appear  to  be  pleading  my  own  cause.  Still,  I  should 
find  it  easy  to  prove  from  Holy  Writ,  and  from  authoritative, 
sacred,  and  profane  writers,  the  necessity  of  a  principal 
minister.  Besides,  I  would  say  that  the  confidence  with 
which  your  Majesty  has  always  honoured  me  during  the  time 
when  I  have  guided  the  policy  of  France  was  due  to  your 
own  free  will.  Posterity  will  find  that  the  authority  which 
I  have  always  enjoyed  in  your  councils  has  been  legitimate. 
Therefore,  I  believe  that  I  may  freely  speak  upon  the  subject 
without  being  suspected  of  questionable  motives. 

The  envy  which  naturally  arises  among  men  of  equal 
authority,  as  among  States  of  equal  power,  is  too  well  known 
to  make  it  necessary  that  I  should  prove  at  length  the  truth 
of  the  fact  that  a  single  minister  should  occupy  the  pre- 
eminent position  described  above.  My  experiences  have  been 
so  convincing  with  regard  to  this  principle  that  I  think  I 
should  fail  in  my  duty  before  God  did  I  not  state  in  formal 
terms  in  this  my  testament  that  there  is  nothing  more 
dangerous  to  a  State  than  to  entrust  its  administration 
and  government  to  a  number  of  men  enjoying  power  and 
authority.  A  step  which  one  minister  desires  to  undertake  is 
liable  to  be  opposed  by  another,  and  unless  the  minister  who 
possesses  the  best  idea  is  at  the  same  time  most  skilful  in 
steering  them  through,  his  plans  will  always  be  brought  to 
nought  by  an  opponent  gifted  with  greater  power  of  persua- 
sion. Each  of  the  opposing  ministers  will  have  his  followers. 
These  will  form  parties  in  the  State,  and  thus  the  strength  of 
the  country,  which  ought  to  be  united,  will  be  divided.  As 
the  sicknesses  and  death  of  man  are  caused  by  the  oppos- 
ing humours  of  his  body,  even  so  the  peace  of  States  is  dis- 
turbed by  the  disunion  and  the  conflict  of  men  of  equal 
power,  who  direct  the  fate  of  nations,  and  these  dissensions 
are  apt  to  produce  evils  which  at  last  may  bring  about  the 
downfall  of  the  nation. 

If  it  is  true  that  monarchical  most  closely  resembles 
divine  government  by  its  outward  form,  if  it  is  true  that  a 
monarchy  is  superior  to  all  other  forms  of  government,  as 
the  greatest  sacred  and  profane  writers  have  told  us,  one  may 
boldly  state  that  the  sovereign  should  entrust  the  manage- 


314    Democracy  and  the  Iron  Broom  of  War 

ment  of  the  State  to  one  particular  person  above  all  others, 
for  he  cannot,  or,  if  he  could,  would  not,  have  his  eye  con- 
stantly on  the  chart  and  on  the  compass.  That  stands  to 
reason.  Exactly  as  several  pilots  never  direct  simultaneously 
the  rudder,  even  so  the  rudder  of  the  ship  of  State  should 
never  be  controlled  by  more  than  one  man  at  a  time.  The 
steersman  of  the  ship  of  State  may  well  receive  the  advice 
of  other  men,  and  he  should  even  ask  for  it.  Still,  it  is  for 
him  to  examine  the  advice  given,  and  to  direct  the  course  of 
the  ship  to  the  right  or  to  the  left  according  to  his  judg- 
ment, in  order  to  avoid  rocks  and  to  steer  his  course.  .  .  . 
I  am  well  acquainted  with  the  ability,  honesty,  and  courage 
which  are  required  in  ministers  of  State.  As  the  controlling 
minister  of  whom  we  have  spoken  must  stand  above  the 
other  ministers  in  power  and  authority,  so  he  must  be 
superior  to  them  by  his  personal  qualities.  Consequently 
the  character  of  the  person  chosen  to  direct  the  State  must 
be  carefully  examined  before  appointment. 

The  sovereign  must  personally  know  the  man  whom  he 
entrusts  with  so  great  a  responsibility.  But  although  the 
leading  minister  must  be  appointed  by  the  sovereign,  his 
choice  should,  if  possible,  find  the  approval  of  the  public,  for 
general  approval  will  increase  the  minister's  ability  to  do 
good.  It  is  easy  to  depict  the  qualities  which  a  principal 
minister  should  possess,  but  it  is  difficult  to  find  these  gifts 
united  in  any  single  person.  Still,  it  must  be  stated  that 
the  happiness  or  the  misfortune  of  States  depends  upon  the 
choice  made.  Hence  sovereigns  are  compelled  either  to 
undertake  themselves  the  heavy  burden  of  government,  or 
to  select  a  man  who  will  so  conduct  the  affairs  of  the  nation 
that  their  selection  is  approved  qI  in  earth  and  in  Heaven. 

Eichelieu  believed  a  monarchy  to  be  the  best  form  of 
government.  He  thought  that  the  best  organised  monarchy 
was  not  one  which  was  governed  by  the  monarch  in  person, 
be  he  ever  so  gifted,  but  one  which  was  governed  by  an  able 
monarch  supported  by  an  able  Council  of  Ministers,  because 
even  a  ruler  of  inferior  ability  could  rule  well  by  entrusting 
the  national  government  to  eminent  Ministers.  He  attached 
the  greatest  value  to  their  ability,  experience,  and  character. 


Ch'eat  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     315 

In  Eichelieu's  opinion,  as  in  that  of  Prince  Bismarck,  the  worst 
ministers  are  brilliant  and  dazzling  men,  lacking  thorough- 
ness, and  men  of  book-learning  and  of  preconceived  notions, 
doctrinaires.  Unfortunately,  men  of  these  two  types  easily 
impose  upon  the  masses.  Hence  they  are  usually  found  in 
democratic  Cabinets.  Eichelieu  thought  it  most  important 
that  Ministers  should  possess  that  quiet  modesty  which  is 
always  found  in  men  who  thoroughly  know  their  business, 
in  great  experts.  He  wished  that  Ministers  should  devote 
their  activities  entirely  to  their  office,  concentrating  all 
their  thoughts  and  ambitions  upon  their  departments.  He 
thought  that  the  Council  of  Ministers  should  be  small  ob- 
viously because  only  a  small  council  can  deliberate  in  secret 
and  can  decide  rapidly.  He  advised  that  the  Cabinet  should 
consist  of  no  more  than  four  men,  that  one  of  the  four  should 
be  given  authority  above  the  remaming  three,  and  that  these 
three  Mmisters  should  not  be  the  equals  of  the  principal 
Minister  but  his  assistants,  his  subordinates.  Particular 
attention  should  be  paid  to  the  fact  that  Eicheheu  attached 
the  very  highest  value  to  the  subordination  of  the  Ministers 
to  a  principal  Minister,  and  that  he  condemned  emphatically 
a  Cabinet  of  Ministers  possessing,  at  least  nominally,  equal 
authority  such  as  those  who  form  the  British  Cabinet.  In 
Eichelieu's  words  :  '  There  is  nothing  more  dangerous  to 
a  State  than  to  entrust  its  administration  and  government 
to  a  number  of  men  enjoying  equal  power  and  authority.' 
His  arguments  in  favour  of  concentrating  all  ministerial 
responsibihty  into  the  hands  of  a  single  presiding  and 
directing  Minister  are  unanswerable.  Lastly,  Eichelieu  re- 
commended that  the  position  of  principal  Minister  should  be 
entrusted  only  to  a  man  most  eminent  both  in  ability  and 
in  personal  character,  and  that,  if  possible,  a  popular  man 
should  be  chosen.  The  ideal  Prime  Minister  and  his  minis- 
terial assistants  should  not  bo  overburdened  with  work, 
but  should  have  sufficient  leisure  to  be  able  to  think  ahead, 
and  to  prepare  for  the  future,  for  otherwise  he  would  be 
worn  out  with  labour,  and,  being  too  much  occupied  with 


316     Democracy  and  the  Iron  Broom  of  War 

current  affairs,  would  be  surprised  by  the  march  of  events. 
It  will  be  noticed  that  government  by  means  of  a  Cabinet, 
as  practised  in  this  country,  is  in  every  particular  dia- 
metrically opposed  to  the  form  of  national  organisation 
which  the  great  Cardinal  described  as  the  most  perfect  and 
the  most  efficient. 

Eichelieu  lived  three  centuries  ago.  Nevertheless,  the 
broad  principles  of  efficient  government  expounded  by  him 
have  not  been  superseded.  Experience  has  proved  their 
worth.  Let  us  now  trace  the  development  of  modern 
national  organisation  m  the  best  organised  State,  in  Germany. 

Brandenburg-Prussia  has  had  the  rare  good  fortune  of 
having  possessed  some  most  highly  gifted  rulers  endowed 
with  administrative  genius  and  ability  of  the  highest  kind  : 
Frederick  William  the  Great  Elector,  who  ruled  from 
1640  to  1688,  Frederick  William  the  First,  who  ruled  from 
1713  to  1740,  and  Frederick  the  Great  who  ruled  from 
1740  to  1786.  These  three  sovereigns,  who  together  ruled 
during  no  less  than  121  years,  raised  Brandenburg-Prussia 
by  their  personal  labours  from  insignificance  to  the  rank 
of  a  prosperous  Great  Power.  They  governed  the  country 
in  person,  and  directed  and  controlled  themselves  the  whole 
administration.  They  presided  over  the  ministerial  councils, 
heard  and  weighed  the  opinions  of  their  counsellors,  and 
then  decided.  They  established  the  tradition  that  the 
ruler  of  Prussia  is  his  own  Prime  Minister,  a  doctrine  to 
which  Eichelieu  was  strongly  opposed.  Capable  rulers 
were  followed  by  lamentably  incapable  ones.  The  personal 
misgovernment  of  Frederick  William  the  Second  and 
Frederick  William  the  Third  brought  about  Prussia's  decline 
and  downfall. 

The  Napoleonic  War  had  ended  in  the  triumph  of  Great 
Britain.  At  the  peace  England  was  richer  and  more  power- 
ful than  she  was  when  the  war  began.  Her  prestige  in 
Europe  was  unlimited.  All  nations  desired  to  copy  her 
political  institutions  and  her  economic  policy.  The  British 
Government    was    carried    on    by    a    Cabinet    of   jointly 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship)     317 

responsible  Ministers,  presided  over  by  a  Prime  Minister. 
It  was,  therefore,  only  natural  that  Prussia,  in  reorganising 
the  country,  created  a  Cabinet  of  jointly  responsible  Ministers 
presided  over  by  a  Prime  Minister.  However,  there  was 
a  profound  difference  between  the  two  Cabinets.  The 
Prussian  Prime  Minister  was  to  be  the  King's  Manager. 
Bismarck  stated  on  January  24,  1882  : 

In  Prussia  the  King  himself  governs.  The  ministers 
may  put  on  paper  the  orders  which  the  King  has  given,  but 
they  do  not  govern.  In  the  words  of  the  Prussian  Constitu- 
tion, '  The  King  alone  possesses  the  power  of  the  executive.' 
Cabinet  Ministers  are  not  mentioned  in  that  document. 

The  Prussian  Ministers  are  the  King's  servants,  not  the 
country's. 

The  great  characteristic  of  Bismarck  was  his  clear  critical 
faculty.  He  refused  to  believe  that  a  form  of  government 
or  an  economic  policy  was  best  because  it  existed  in  England. 
He  thought  government  by  means  of  a  jointly  responsible 
Cabinet  an  evil,  even  if  it  were  directed,  or  presided  over, 
by  the  King  who  was  able  to  order  the  Ministers  whom 
he  had  appointed  to  do  this  or  that,  whether  they  approved 
or  disapproved.  He  shared  Eichelieu's  opinion  that  '  there 
is  nothing  more  dangerous  to  a  State  than  to  entrust  its 
administration  and  government  to  a  number  of  men  enjoying 
equal  power  and  authority.'  He  considered  that  joint 
responsibility  meant  irresponsibihty,  friction,  delay, 
inefficiency.  Therefore,  when  he  created  in  1866  the  North 
German  Federation,  the  forerunner  of  the  German  Empire, 
he  concentrated  all  power  into  the  hands  of  a  single  principal 
Minister,  giving  him  sole  responsibility  and  making  the 
other  Ministers  his  subordinates.  This  organisation  was 
later  on  taken  over  by  the  German  Empire.  The  Empire 
has  only  a  single  responsible  Minister,  the  Imperial  Chan- 
cellor, and  the  subordination  of  his  ministerial  assistants 
has  been  emphasised  in  thoir  very  title.  While  Prussia 
has    a   number   of   Ministers    and   a   Prime  Minister   the 


318    Democracy  and  the  Iron  Broom  of  War 

German  Empire  has  a  Chancellor  supported  by  a  number  of 
'  Secretaries  of  State.' 

As  the  German  Liberals,  who  loudly  advocated  Free 
Trade  and  Cabinet  Government  '  as  in  England  '  for  the 
North  German  Federation  and  the  German  Empire,  were 
opposed  to  the  absolute  supremacy  of  a  single  Minister, 
Bismarck  had  to  defend  this  form  of  government  on 
numerous  occasions.  He  stated,  for  instance,  in  the  Eeichstag 
of  the  North  German  Federation,  on  April  16,  1869  : 

A  strong,  active,  and  progressive  Government  is  required. 
Yet  it  is  desired  that  for  every  decision  several  Ministers  of 
equal  authority  should  be  responsible.  It  is  believed  that 
by  their  appointment  all  the  evils  of  this  world  may  be 
cured.  A  man  who  has  been  at  the  head  of  a  Cabinet  and  who 
has  been  forced  to  form  decisions  on  his  own  responsibility 
is  not  afraid  to  act,  though  he  alone  is  responsible,  but  he 
shrinks  from  the  necessity  of  convincing  seven  people  that 
his  measures  are  really  the  best.  That  task  is  more  difficult 
than  that  of  governing  a  State.  All  members  of  a  Cabinet 
have  an  honest  and  firm  conviction.  The  more  honest 
and  the  more  capable  Ministers  are,  the  more  difficult  they 
will  find  it  to  give  way  to  any  other  man.  Every  one  of  the 
Ministers  is  surrounded  by  a  number  of  pugnacious  perma- 
nent officials,  who  also  have  convictions  of  their  own.  In 
any  case  it  is  difficult  to  convince  a  man.  One  persuades 
a  man  occasionally,  or  gains  him  over  through  courtesy, 
but  one  has  to  do  this  seven  times.  I  am  firmly  convinced, 
and  my  opinion  has  been  created  by  practical  experience, 
that  government  by  means  of  a  Cabinet,  by  means  of  a 
board,  is  a  constitutional  error  and  mistake  which  every 
State  should  endeavour  to  get  rid  of  as  soon  as  possible. 
I  would  not  lend  a  hand  to  impose  that  mistaken  institution 
of  a  Cabinet  upon  the  North  German  Federation.  I  believe 
that  Prussia  would  make  an  immense  step  forward  if  she 
would  adopt  the  principle  of  the  North  German  Federation, 
according  to  which  only  a  single  Minister  is  responsible. 

Eesponsibility  is  possible  only  in  the  case  of  a  single 
individual  who  in  his  person  can  be  held  responsible  for  his 
action.     If  the  same  individual  is  member  of  a  Cabinet,  he 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     319 

may  answer  that  he  has  been  outvoted  by  his  colleagues,  or 
he  may  say  that  the  opposition  he  experienced  made  his 
intended  measures  impracticable,  that  a  bill  he  intended  to 
bring  in  has  been  delayed  for  seven  years  because  seven 
honest  men  could  not  agree  on  its  text.  Besides,  in  every 
board  discussion  the  moment  arrives  at  last  when  the  decision 
has  to  be  left  to  chance,  to  the  toss  of  a  coin. 

He  said  in  the  Eeichstag  on  December  1,  1874  : 

What  guarantee  of  moral  responsibility  have  you  in  the 
case  of  any  institution  unless  responsibility  is  borne  by 
a  single  person  ?  Absolutely  none.  Who  is  responsible 
in  a  Cabinet,  consisting  of  eight  or  ten  independent  Ministers, 
none  of  whom  can  take  an  important  measure  unless  the 
majority  of  his  colleagues  support  it  ?  Who  is  responsible 
for  the  resolutions  of  a  parliamentary  majority  ?  It  is 
clear  that  it  cannot  be  sought  for  in  any  individual,  because 
in  the  case  of  a  majority  vote  everybody  is  entitled  to  say 
that  he  was  not  in  favour  of  the  measure  taken,  but  that 
others  were  opposed  to  him.  .  .  . 

I  beheve  that  national  affairs  can  be  conducted  in  a 
spirit  of  unity  only  if  the  Government  is  presided  over  by  a 
man  who  is  able  to  give  orders.  I  should,  of  course,  raise 
difficulties  to  myself  if  I  should  frivolously  or  too  easily 
make  use  of  that  power.  On  the  other  hand,  the  ability 
to  give  orders  is  a  weapon,  the  possession  of  which  is  known 
to  all,  and  therefore  it  becomes  rarely  necessary  to  use  it. 

He  stated  in  the  Eeichstag  on  November  22,  1875  :    . 

The  position  of  a  Prime  Minister  of  Prussia  is  ungrateful 
because  of  his  powerlessness.  One  can  be  responsible  only 
for  that  which  one  does  with  one's  own  free  will.  A  board  is 
irresponsible,  for  later  on  it  is  impossible  to  discover  the 
men  who  formed  the  majority  which  passed  this  or  that 
measure.  Joint  responsibility  is  a  fiction.  It  may  be  very 
convenient  to  leave  resolutions  to  a  Cabinet  and  to  say  the 
Cabinet  has  resolved  to  do  this  or  that.  However,  if  you 
inquire  how  the  resolution  was  arrived  at,  every  Minister 
will  shrug  his  shoulders  and  tell  a  different  talo,  for  if  there 
has  been  failure  no  one  cares  to  assume  responsibility. 


320    Democracy  and  the  Iron  Broom  of  War 

In  his  posthumous  memoirs,  his  pohtical  testament, 
we  read  : 

Official  decisions  do  not  gain  in  honesty  and  moderation 
by  being  arrived  at  collectively,  for,  apart  from  the  fact  that, 
in  the  case  of  voting  by  majority,  arithmetic  and  chance 
take  the  place  of  logical  reasoning,  that  feeling  of  personal 
responsibility  in  which  lies  the  essential  guarantee  for  the 
conscientiousness  of  the  decision  is  lost  directly  it  comes 
about  by  means  of  anonymous  majorities.  ... 

The  board  character  of  the  Prussian  Ministry,  with  its 
majority  votes,  daily  compels  Ministers  to  compromise  and 
surrender  to  their  colleagues.  A  real  responsibility  in  high 
pohtics  can  only  be  undertaken  by  one  single  directing 
Minister,  never  by  a  numerous  board  with  majority  voting 

Many  similar  pronouncements  of  his  might  easily  be 
given. 

Bismarck  was  a  keen  student  of  history,  and  had  learned 
its  lessons.  He  was  aware  that  divided  counsels  had  been 
responsible  for  confusion  in  pohcy  and  administration  and 
for  the  downfall  of  States  since  the  earhest  times  ;  that 
divided  councils  had  sapped  the  strength,  and  destroyed, 
kingdoms  and  oligarchies,  aristocracies  and  democracies  ; 
that  no  organisation  can  be  efficient  which  is  nominally 
controlled  by  many  heads — which  has  no  real  head  but 
at  best  a  figurehead  ;  that  a  nation,  like  an  army,  or 
like  a  commercial  undertaking,  can  be  successfully  and 
responsibly  directed  and  controlled  only  by  one  man. 

Kichelieu  and  Bismarck  were  the  greatest  civihan  states- 
men of  modern  times,  and  Frederick  the  Great  and  Napoleon 
the  First  were  the  greatest  military  statesmen.  They  were 
certainly  at  least  as  eminent  as  organisers  and  adminis- 
trators as  they  were  as  generals.  Not  unnaturally  both 
were  in  favour  of  a  single  and  undivided  control  of  the 
national  government  and  administration,  and  were  abso- 
lutely opposed  to  divided  control  because  the  latter 
means  no  control,  but  drift,  delay,  inefficiency,  intrigue, 
and  disaster. 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     321 

Frederick  the  Great  stated  in  his  '  Essai  sur  les  Formes  de 
Gouvernement '  of  1777  : 

If  a  ruler  abandons  the  helm  of  the  ship  of  State  and 
places  it  into  the  hands  of  paid  men,  of  Ministers  appointed 
by  him,  one  will  steer  to  the  right  and  another  to  the  left. 
A  general  plan  is  no  longer  followed.  Every  Minister  disap- 
proves of  the  actions  of  his  predecessor,  and  makes  changes 
even  if  they  are  quite  unnecessary,  wishing  to  originate  a  new 
policy  which  is  often  harmful.  He  is  succeeded  by  Ministers 
who  also  hasten  to  overthrow  the  existing  institutions  in 
order  to  show  their  ability.  In  consequence  of  the  numerous 
innovations  made  none  can  take  root.  Confusion,  disorder, 
and  all  the  other  vices  of  a  bad  administration  arise, 
and  incapable  or  worthless  officials  blame  the  multitude  of 
changes  for  their  shortcomings. 

Men  are  attached  to  their  own.  As  the  State  does  not 
belong  to  the  Ministers  in  power  they  have  no  real  interest 
in  its  y/elfare.  Hence  the  Government  is  carried  on  with 
careless  indifference,  and  the  result  is  that  the  administra- 
tion, the  public  finances,  and  the  army  deteriorate.  Thus 
the  monarchy  becomes  an  oligarchy.  Ministers  and  generals 
direct  affairs  in  accordance  with  their  fancy.  Systematic 
administration  disappears.  Everyone  follows  his  own 
notions.  No  link  is  left  which  connects  the  directing 
factors.  As  all  the  wheels  and  springs  of  the  watch  serve 
together  the  single  object  of  measuring  time,  all  the  springs 
and  wheels  of  a  Government  should  be  so  arranged  and  co- 
ordinated that  all  the  departments  of  the  national  adminis- 
tration work  together  with  the  single  aim  of  promoting  the 
greatest  good  of  the  State.  That  aim  should  not  be  lost 
sight  of  for  a  single  moment.  Besides,  the  individual 
interests  of  Ministers  and  generals  usually  cause  them  to 
oppose  each  other.  Thus  personal  differences  often  prevent 
the  carrying  through  of  the  most  necessary  measures. 

National  disasters  of  the  greatest  magnitude  are  obviously 
the  most  searching  tests  of  the  value  of  the  national  organisa- 
tion. The  Seven  Years'  War  was  fought  chiefly  on  Prussian 
soil.     The  country  had  been  overrun  by  hostile  troops,  had 


322    Democracy  and  the  Iron  Broom  of  War 

been  utterly  devastated,  and  had  in  part  become  abandoned 
by  man.  Yet,  ten  years  after  the  war  the  population,  the 
income  and  the  wealth  of  Prussia  were  considerably  greater 
than  at  its  beginning,  as  I  have  shown  very  fully  in  another 
book  which  supplies  a  mass  of  documentary  information 
on  Frederick  the  Great  as  an  organiser  and  administrator.^ 
In  it  will  be  found  copious  extracts  from  the  King's  writings, 
and  especially  from  his  two  Political  Testaments,  which 
have  not  previously  been  published  in  English. 

Now  let  us  see  what  the  administration  of  Napoleon 
the  first  can  teach  us. 

Napoleon  the  First  was  an  organising  genius.  His 
military  triumphs  proved  ephemeral,  but  in  the  domain 
of  national  organisation  and  administration  his  work  has 
endured.  Professor  Pariset  wrote  justly  in  the  '  Cambridge 
Modern  History '  : 

Bonaparte  directed  the  reorganisation  of  France,  and 
never  perhaps  in  history  was  a  work  so  formidable  accom- 
plished so  quickly.  Order  and  regularity  were  established 
in  every  branch  of  the  administration.  The  greater  part 
of  the  institutions  founded  during  the  Consulate  have  sur- 
vived to  the  present  day,  and  it  is  no  exaggeration  to  state 
that  it  was  Bonaparte  who  created  contemporary  France. 

The  French  Eevolution  had  destroyed  the  work  of 
eight  centuries  and  had  left  nothing  but  ruin  and  disorder. 
The  Treasury  was  empty.  The  taxes  failed  to  come  in. 
The  paper  money  was  greatly  depreciated.  No  loans  could 
be  raised.  The  nation  had  repeatedly  become  bankrupt. 
The  consecutive  revolutionary  Governments  were  govern- 
ments of  many  heads.  Although  the  revolutionary  leaders 
were  men  of  the  greatest  ability,  divided  councils  and  the 
influence  of  popular  passion  had  caused  them  to  adopt 
the  most  insane  measures.  They  had  madly  destroyed 
the  national  organisation  and  the  national  credit.  In 
1796  the  louis  d'or  of  twenty-four  francs  was  worth  from 

*  The  Foundations  of  Germamj,  Smith,  Elder  &  Co.,  1916. 


Great  Problems  of  British  StatesmanshijJ     323 

6107  francs  to  8137  francs  in  assignats.  A  pair  of  boots 
which  cost  thirty  francs  in  gold  cost  about  10,000  francs 
in  paper.  In  1799,  at  the  end  of  which  Napoleon  became 
First  Consul,  the  5  per  cent.  Eente  reached  the  minimum 
price  of  seven,  yielding  thus  7H  per  cent,  to  the  purchaser. 
Unrestricted  self-government  had  produced  administrative 
anarchy  throughout  the  provinces.  Edmond  Blanc  tells  us  in 
his  '  Napoleon  I,  ses  Institutions  Civiles  et  Administratives  ' : 

For  a  long  time  no  money  had  been  available  for  con- 
structing or  repairing  roads  and  bridges,  and  these  had 
fallen  into  decay.  Koads  no  longer  existed.  Where  they 
had  been,  the  ground  was  full  of  holes  yards  wide  and 
deep,  in  which  carts  and  carriages  disappeared.  Fourcroy 
reported  that  in  travelling  from  Tours  to  Poitiers  and  to  La 
Eochelle,  and  thence  to  Nantes,  his  carriage  was  broken  six 
times,  and  that  eleven  times  he  was  compelled  to  employ 
several  teams  of  oxen  for  drawing  it  out  of  the  mire.  Carters 
would  only  proceed  in  numbers  so  as  to  be  able  to  assist  one 
another,  and  would  frequently  travel  across  the  cultivated 
fields  because  passage  through  them  was  easier  than  along 
the  so-called  roads.  At  night  the  roads  were  unusable,  and 
carters  could  often  do  no  more  than  three  or  four  miles  per 
day. 

This  state  of  affairs  had  made  transport  by  road  very 
expensive.  The  internal  trade  of  France  came  almost  to 
an  end.  Wheat  which  fetched  18  francs  in  the  market  at 
Nantes  cost  36  francs  at  Brest.  Hence,  scarcity  prevailed 
in  many  departments.  During  the  first  years  of  the  Direc- 
toire,  out  of  85,000  people  in  Eouen  no  less  than  64,000  had 
to  be  supplied  v.ith  bread  by  public  distribution.  During 
the  Directoire  and  the  first  few  years  of  the  Consulate  the 
problem  how  to  feed  the  people  was  the  principal  preoccupa- 
tion of  the  Government.  France,  like  modern  India,  lived 
under  the  dread  of  impending  famine. 

The  canals  of  France  were  as  neglected  as  the  roads. 
The  harbours  of  Eochefort  and  Frejus  were  filled  with  mud. 
The  vast  drainage  works  of  the  time  of  Louis  the  Fourteenth 
had  fallen  into  ruin,  and  so  had  the  dykes  which  protected 
the  country  against  floods.     The  roads  were  infested  with 


324    Democracy  and  the  Iron  Broom  of  War 

robbers.  The  administration  of  the  law  had  broken  down, 
and  the  prevaiHng  insecurity  had  led  to  the  standstill  of 
business. 

On  December  24,  1799,  Napoleon  was  made  First  Consul, 
and  on  the  evening  of  that  day  he  dictated  to  his  friend 
Eoederer  a  proclamation  in  which  he  promised  to  the  people 
not  only  independence  and  glory,  but  also  the  creation 
of  an  orderly  administration,  the  re-establishment  of  the 
national  finances,  the  reform  of  the  laws  and  the  re-creation 
of  the  prosperity  of  the  utterly  impoverished  nation.  To 
the  surprise  of  the  world  he  carried  out  that  colossal  pro- 
gramme within  a  few  years.  He  created  order  in  the  local 
and  national  government  and  security  of  the  person  and 
of  property.  Soon  the  taxes  were  once  more  regularly 
paid.  Eapidly  the  laws  were  improved  and  codified.  Eoads; 
canals,  and  public  works  of  every  kind  were  constructed. 
A  new  France  arose.  The  5  per  cent.  Eente,  which  in 
1799  had  touched  seven,  touched  44  in  1800,  68  in  1801, 
and  93-40  in  1807.  According  to  a  statement  which  on 
February  25, 1813,Comte  de  Montalivet,  Napoleon's  Minister 
of  the  Interior,  placed  before  the  Corps  Legislatif,  France 
spent,  from  1804  to  1813  alone,  the  following  gigantic 
sums  on  public  works  : 


Fortresses,  arsenals,  and  barracks 

Roads  and  highways     ..... 

Bridges         ....... 

Canals,  river  regulation,  and  draining  of  swamps 
Sea  liarbotrrs  and  dykes         .... 

Public  works  in  Paris   ..... 

Public  buildings  in  the  provinces  . 
Imperial  residences  and  Crown  properties 


Francs 
143,669,600 
277,484,549 

30,605,356 
122,587,898 
117,328,710 
102,421,187 
149,108,550 

62,054,583 


Total 1,005,260,433 

Napoleon  had  an  unlimited  power  for  work.  His 
Ministers,  like  those  of  Eichelieu,  Bismarck,  and  Frederick 
the  Great,  were  his  servants.  They  were  independent  of 
Parliament.  The  initiative  for  legislation  and  adminis- 
tration was  given  to  the  Conseil  d'Etat,  a  most  interesting 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     325 

and  most  valuable  institution  which  had  the  same  function 
in  the  State  that  a  powerful  General  Staff  has  in  an  army. 
It  contained  men  of  the  very  highest  ability  and  distinction 
belonging  to  all  parties — red  revolutionaries,  moderates, 
royalists,  exiled  and  former  nobles,  administrators,  generals, 
admirals,  and  great  lawyers.  It  possessed  five  sections  for 
Finance,  Legislation,  War,  Navy,  Home  Affairs.  Each 
section  discussed  and  prepared  its  own  measures,  and  these 
were  then  submitted  to,  and  discussed  by,  the  whole  council. 
The  Code  Napoleon  was  thus  evolved.  Napoleon  himself 
took  a  very  active  part  in  these  plenary  sittings,  attending 
often  during  seven  or  eight  hours  and  scrutinising  every 
proposal.  As  the  Conseil  d']£tat  worked  behind  closed 
doors,  no  speeches  addressed  to  the  electors  were  made  in 
it.  Discussion  was  carried  on  by  brief  and  telling  argument. 
No  time  was  wasted.  The  result  was  that  innumerable 
vast  reforms  were  brought  forward  at  almost  incredible 
speed,  and  that  every  Government  measure  was  wise  and 
was  carefully  w^orked  out  in  all  details,  embodying  not  only 
the  views  of  the  technical  experts  but  the  experience  of  the 
foremost  men  of  France  as  well. 

Both  Frederick  the  Great  and  Napoleon  the  First  by 
concentrating  all  the  administrative  power  into  their  own 
hands,  were  able  to  repair  in  a  few  years  unprecedented 
ravages  and  to  convert  chaos,  poverty,  and  starvation 
into  order,  wealth,  and  plenty.  Boards  and  councils  are 
slow-moving  and  timorous  bodies  wedded  to  precedent 
and  hampered  by  obstruction,  intrigue,  and  sheer  stupidity. 
No  Cabinet  of  Ministers  could  have  achieved  a  tithe  of 
the  national  reconstruction  and  reorganisation  accom- 
plished so  rapidly  by  Frederick  and  Napoleon. 

The  greatest  statesmen  of  the  New  World  agree  with 
the  greatest  statesmen  of  the  Old  in  believing  that  the 
national  government  should  be  controlled  and  directed  not 
by  a  Cabinet,  not  by  a  number  of  men  of  equal  authority, 
but  by  a  single  individual  supported  by  a  council  of  able 
men  of  his  own  choosing,  his  subordinates.     The  founders 


326    Democracy  and  the  Iron  Broom  of  War 

of  the  United  States  placed  the  Executive  into  the  hands 
of  a  practically  irresponsible  President  who  was  free  to 
appoint  his  Ministerial  subordinates  who  cannot  be  forced 
out  of  office  by  a  parhamentary  vote.  The  American 
President  is  an  elected  king  possessed  of  vast  power,  and  in 
time  of  war  he  is  the  actual  commander-in-chief  of  the 
Army  and  Navy.  The  greatest  American  statesmen,  the 
makers  of  the  Constitution,  entrusted  the  Executive  to  a 
single  man,  beheving  that  only  thus  efficiency  and  true 
responsibility  could  be  ensured.  I  have  given  their  views 
very  fully  in  the  following  chapter,  to  which  I  would  refer 
those  who  desire  detailed  information.  Alexander  Hamilton, 
the  greatest  constructive  statesman  of  the  United  States, 
wrote  in  the  Federalist  : 

Wherever  two  or  more  persons  are  engaged  in  any  com- 
mon enterprise  or  pursuit  there  is  always  danger  of  difference 
of  opinion.  If  it  be  a  public  trust  or  office,  in  which  they  are 
clothed  with  equal  dignity  and  authority,  there  is  peculiar 
danger  of  personal  emulation  and  even  animosity.  .  .  . 
Men  often  oppose  a  thing  merely  because  they  have  had  no 
agency  in  planning  it,  or  because  it  may  have  been  planned 
by  those  whom  they  dislike.  But  if  they  have  been  con- 
sulted and  have  appeared  to  disapprove,  opposition  then 
becomes,  in  their  estimation,  an  indispensable  duty  of  self- 
love.  ...  No  favourable  circumstances  palliate  or  atone 
for  the  disadvantages  of  dissension  in  the  executive  depart- 
ment. Here  they  are  pure  and  unmixed.  There  is  no  point 
at  which  they  cease  to  operate.  They  serve  to  embarrass 
and  weaken  the  execution  of  the  plan  or  measure  to  which 
they  relate,  from  the  first  step  to  the  final  conclusion  of  it. 
They  constantly  counteract  those  qualities  in  the  Executive 
which  are  the  most  necessary  ingredients  in  its  composition, 
vigour  and  expedition,  and  this  without  any  counterbalancing 
good.  In  the  conduct  of  war,  in  which  the  energy  of  the 
Executive  is  the  bulwark  of  the  national  security,  everything 
would  be  to  be  apprehended  from  its  plurality.  .  .  . 

But  one  of  the  weightiest  objections  to  a  plurality  in  the 
Executive  is  •  that  it  tends  to    conceal  faults  and  destroy 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     327 

responsibility.  ...  It  often  becomes  impossible,  amidst 
mutual  accusations,  to  determine  on  whom  the  blame  or  the 
punishment  of  a  pernicious  measure,  or  a  series  of  pernicious 
measures,  ought  really  to  fall.  It  is  shifted  from  one  to 
another  with  so  much  dexterity,  and  under  such  plausible 
appearances,  that  the  public  opinion  is  left  in  suspense  about 
the  real  author.  ...  'I  was  overruled  by  my  council. 
The  council  were  so  divided  in  their  opinions  that  it  was 
impossible  to  obtain  any  better  resolution  on  the  point.' 
These  and  similar  pretexts  are  constantly  at  hand,  whether 
true  or  false.  And  who  is  there  that  will  either  take  the 
trouble  or  incur  the  odium  of  a  strict  scrutiny  into  the 
secret  springs  of  the  transaction  ? 

Alexander  Hamilton's  views  curiously  agree  with  those 
of  Prince  Bismarck  previously  given. 

To  the  readers  of  these  pages  it  will  be  clear  that  the 
greatest  statesmen  of  the  European  Continent  and  of  the 
United  States  were  absolutely  opposed  to  entrusting  the 
control  of  the  national  government  and  administration  to  a 
Cabinet  of  jointly  responsible  Ministers,  believing  that 
efficiency  was  incompatible  with  that  form  of  government. 
It  will  be  clear  to  them  that  the  greatest  statesmen  of  modern 
times  believed  a  body,  such  as  the  British  Cabinet,  a  source 
of  division,  of  weakness,  and  of  danger  ;  that  they  considered 
that  such  a  body  would,  owing  to  its  divided  councils,  create 
disorganisation  and  confusion ;  that  joint  responsibility 
would  destroy  all  real  responsibility  ;  that  the  control  of 
affairs  by  a  number  of  men  would  chiefly  be  productive 
of  hesitation,  vacillation,  and  delay,  and  make  secrecy  and 
rapid  action  impossible. 

Those  who  write  or  speak  about  the  British  Constitution 
habitually  treat  the  control  of  national  affairs  by  a  number 
of  jointly  responsible  directors,  who  are  supposed  to  act 
unanimously  in  all  matters  of  importance,  as  if  this  arrange- 
ment were  a  matter  of  course,  as  if  it  had  existed  since  time 
immemorial  and  had  by  its  very  antiquity  proved  its  excel- 
lence.   They  treat  it  as  if  it  were  the  last  word  and  the 


328    Democracy  and  the  Iron  Broom  of  War 

highest  expression  of  national  organisation.  In  reality 
the  national  organisation  of  Great  Britain,  which  formerly 
was  highly  centraUsed .  and  extremely  efficient,  has  gradu- 
ally much  deteriorated.  Let  us  see  what  we  can  learn 
from  that  most  important  part  of  Britain's  history  which 
is  usually  not  mentioned  in  the  text-books. 

In  the  olden  days  Great  Britain  was  governed  by  powerful 
Kings  with  the  assistance  of  a  Council.  The  local  adminis- 
tration was  entrusted  to  great  noblemen  who  acted  as  the 
King's  representatives,  for  a  regular  civil  service  with 
salaried  officials  is  a  very  modern  invention.  These  noble- 
men were  paid  by  being  allowed  to  exploit  the  land  granted 
to  them  and  the  people  dwelling  thereon,  and  in  return 
they  had  to  keep  order  and  to  support  the  King.  In  course 
of  time  the  power  of  the  noblemen  grew  at  the  cost  of 
the  King,  against  whom  they  frequently  revolted.  They 
considered  themselves  the  nation  and  dominated  Parha- 
ment,  the  King's  Council,  and  the  King  himself,  and  ruled 
the  country.  The  most  powerful  noblemen  occupied  then 
a  position  not  dissimilar  to  that  now  held  by  party  leaders 
and,  like  party  leaders,  they  fought  one  another  for 
supremacy.  They  ruined  the  nation  by  their  personal 
feuds.  These  disorders  and  abuses,  which  might  have 
ended  in  England's  downfall,  were  abolished  by  the  energetic 
rulers  of  the  House  of  Tudor,  who  reorganised  the  dis- 
tracted and  impoverished  country  and  made  it  united,  rich, 
cultured,  and  powerful.  Professor  Marriott  tells  us  in  his 
excellent  book,  '  English  Political  Institutions  ' ; 

From  1404  to  1437  the  King's  Council  was  not  merely 
dependent  upon  Parliament,  but  was  actually  nominated 
by  them.  But  the  result  was  a  dismal  failure.  .  .  .  The 
result  was  that  while  Parliament  was  busy  in  establishing  its 
rights  against  the  Crown,  the  nation  was  sinking  deeper  and 
deeper  into  social  anarchy.  .  .  The  people,  reduced  to 
social  confusion  by  the  weak  and  nerveless  rule  of  the  Lan- 
castrians, emerged  from  the  Wars  of  the  Boses  anxious  for  the 
repose  and  discipline  secured  to  them  by  the  New  Monarchy. 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship)     329 

For  a  century  the  Tudors  continued  to  administer 
the  tonic  which  they  had  prescribed  to  the  patient  suffering 
from  disorder  and  economic  anaemia.  The  evolution 
of  the  Parhamentary  machinery  was  temporarily  arrested, 
but  meanwhile  the  people  grew  socially  and  commer- 
cially. Aristocratic  turbulence  was  sternly  repressed  ; 
extraordinary  tribunals  were  erected  to  deal  with  powerful 
offenders  ;  vagrancy  was  severely  punished  ;  work  was  found 
for  the  unemployed  ;  trade  was  encouraged  ;  the  navy  was 
organised  on  a  permanent  footing  ;  scientific  training  in 
seamanship  was  provided  ;  excellent  secondary  schools  were 
established — in  these  and  in  many  other  ways  the  New 
Monarchy,  despotic  and  paternal  though  it  was,  brought 
order  out  of  chaos  and  created  a  New  England. 

Let  us  now  briefly  survey  how  the  Fredericks  and 
Bismarcks  of  the  Tudor  period  created  this  New  England. 

About  the  year  1470,  during  the  reign  of  King  Edward 
the  Fourth  of  the  House  of  York,  Sir  John  Fortescue,  the 
Chief  Justice  of  the  King's  Bench,  wrote  a  most  interesting 
and  important  treatise,  '  The  Governance  of  England.' 
A  particularly  remarkable  chapter,  the  fifteenth,  deals 
with  the  Cabinet  question,  and  is  entitled  '  How  the  King's 
Council  may  be  Chosen  and  Estabhshed.'  In  slightly 
modernised  Enghsh  it  runs  as  follows  : 

The  King's  Council  was  wont  to  be  chosen  of  great 
princes  and  of  the  greatest  lords  of  the  land,  both  spiritual 
and  temporal,  and  also  of  other  men  that  were  in  great 
authority  and  office.  Which  lords  and  officers  had  in  their 
hands  also  many  matters  of  their  own  to  be  treated  in  the 
Council,  as  had  the  King.  Wherefore,  when  they  came 
together,  they  were  so  occupied  with  their  own  matters, 
and  with  the  matters  of  their  kin,  servants,  and  tenants, 
that  they  attended  but  little,  and  sometimes  not  at  all,  to 
the  King's  business. 

And  also  there  were  but  few  matters  of  the  King's,  but  if 
these  same  matters  touched  also  the  said  counsellors,  their 
cousins,  their  servants,  tenants  or  such  others  as  they  owed 
favour  to,  what  lower  man  was  there  sitting  in  that  Council 


330    Democracy  and  the  Iron  Broom  of  War 

that  durst  speak  against  the  opinion  of  any  of  the  great 
lords  ?  And  why  might  not  then  men,  by  means  of  corrup- 
tion of  the  servants,  counsellors,  and  of  some  of  the  lords, 
move  the  lords  to  partiality,  and  make  them  also  favourable 
and  partial  as  were  the  same  servants  or  the  parties  that  so 
moved  them  ? 

Then  could  no  matter  treated  in  the  Council  be  kept  quiet. 
For  the  Lords  oftentimes  told  their  own  advisers  and  ser- 
vants that  had  sued  to  them  for  those  matters  how  they  had 
sped  in  the  Council  and  who  was  against  them.  How  may 
the  King  be  counselled  to  refrain  giving  away  his  land,  or 
giving  officers  grants  or  pensions  of  abbeys  by  such  great 
lords  to  other  men's  servants,  since  they  most  desire  such 
gifts  for  themselves  and  their  servants  ? 

Which  things  considered,  and  also  many  others  which 
shall  be  showed  hereafter,  it  is  thought  good  that  the  King 
had  a  council  chosen  and  established  in  the  form  that 
follows,  or  in  some  other  form  hke  thereto.  First  that  there 
were  chosen  twelve  ecclesiastics  and  twelve  laymen  of  the 
wisest  and  best  disposed  men  that  can  be  found  in  all  parts 
of  this  land,  and  that  they  be  sworn  to  counsel  the  King  after 
a  form  to  be  devised  for  their  oath.  And,  in  particular, 
that  they  shall  take  no  fee,  no  clothing,  and  no  reward  from 
any  man  except  from  the  King  as  do  the  justices  of  the 
King's  Bench  and  of  the  Common  Pleas  when  they  take 
their  offices.  And  that  these  twenty-four  men  be  permaneiit 
councillors,  but  if  any  fault  should  be  found  in  them,  or  if 
the  King  should  desire  it  by  the  advice  of  the  majority  of 
the  Council,  he  should  change  any  of  them.  And  that  every 
year  be  chosen  by  the  King  four  lords  spiritual  and  four 
lords  temporal  to  be  for  that  year  of  the  same  council, 
exactly  as  the  said  twenty-four  councillors  shall  be. 

And  that  they  all  have  a  head  or  a  chief  to  rule  the 
Council,  one  of  the  said  twenty-four,  and  chosen  by  the 
King  and  holding  his  office  at  the  King's  pleasure,  which  may 
then  be  called  Cajpitalis  consiliarius.  .  .  . 

These  councillors  might  continually,  and  at  such  hours 
as  might  be  assigned  to  them,  discuss  and  deliberate  upon 
the  matters  of  difficulty  that  have  fallen  to  the  King,  and 
upon  the  policy  of  the  realm,  how  the  going  out  of  money 


Ch'eat  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     331 

may  be  restrained,  how  bullion  may  be  brought  into  the 
land,  how  plate,  jewels,  and  money  lately  taken  out  of  the 
country  may  be  got  back  again.  For  all  this  truly  wise 
men  will  soon  find  the  means.  Also  how  the  prices  of 
merchandise  produced  in  this  country  may  be  maintained 
and  increased,  and  how  the  prices  of  merchandise  imported 
into  England  may  be  lowered.  How  our  navy  may  be 
maintained  and  augmented,  and  upon  such  other  points  of 
policy  which  are  of  the  greatest  profit  and  advantage  to  this 
country.  How  also  the  laws  may  be  amended  in  such 
things  in  which  they  need  reform. 

Through  the  activity  of  the  Council  the  Parhament  will 
be  able  to  do  more  good  in  a  month  by  way  of  amending 
laws  than  they  do  now  in  a  year,  if  the  amendments  proposed 
be  debated  and  made  ripe  for  their  hands  by  the  Council. 

Sir  John  Fortescue  complained  that  the  '  greatest  lords  ' 
of  the  King's  Council,  the  Cabinet  of  the  time,  attended 
chiefly  to  their  own  business  and  to  that  of  their  friends  and 
retainers,  neglecting  that  of  the  King  and  Nation,  that  they 
practised  a  shameless  favouritism,  did  not  keep  secret  the 
affairs  of  State,  and  thus  made  a  wise  policy  and  efficient 
administration  impossible.  He  proposed  that  a  new  council 
of  twenty-four  of  the  wisest  and  best-disposed  men  should 
be  established,  one-half  being  laymen,  and  one-half  clerics. 
Before  the  Eeformation  the  Church  represented  learning 
and  was  comparable  to  the  professional  classes  of  the  present 
day.  Besides  Churchmen  had  learnt  the  art  of  organisation, 
of  administration  and  of  government  through  their  Church. 
Lastly,  as  the  Church  was  an  international  body,  Churchmen 
were  best  acquainted  with  international  affairs.  Hence, 
ecclesiastics  were  the  greatest  administrators  and  diplomats 
of  the  time.  The  twenty-four  councillors  were  not  to  be 
'  great  lords,'  corresponding  to  eminent  politicians  of  the 
present.  They  were  to  be  chosen  on  the  ground  of  their 
capacity  for  business  and  to  be  permanently  employed.  In 
modern  language,  they  were  to  be  permanent  officials, 
experts.     They  were  to  be  reinforced  by  four  lords  spiritual, 


332    Democracy  and  the  Iron  Broom  of  War 

and  four  lords  temporal,  corresponding  to  Members  of 
Parliament  of  the  present  day,  but  these  were  not  to  be 
permanent  members  of  the  Council,  for  they  were  to  be 
chosen  every  year.  The  President  of  the  Council,  it  is  worth 
noting,  was  to  be  taken  from  the  permanent  official  members, 
not  from  the  powerful  representatives  of  the  nobiHty  or  the 
Church,  and  he  was  to  act  as  manager  for  the  King  who  was 
to  be  the  real  head  of  the  Council.  Sir  John  Fortescue 
wished  to  create  a  Council  which  combined  the  functions  of 
the  present  Cabinet  with  those  of  Napoleon's  Conseil  d'Etat 
described  in  these  pages,  for  the  Council  was  to  prepare  all 
measures  which  were  to  be  submitted  to  Parliament  making 
them  '  ripe  for  their  hands.' 

Sir  John's  wish  to  reduce  the  power  usurped  by  the 
territorial  and  clerical  magnates  and  to  increase  that  of  the 
King,  for  the  Nation's  good,  and  his  wish  to  have  the 
national  policy  and  administration  controlled  by  a  king, 
supported  by  the  most  eminent  experts,  was  soon  to  be 
fulfilled.  In  1485  the  wise  and  energetic  Henry  the  Seventh 
came  to  the  throne.  He  did  not  allow  the  powerful  nobihty 
to  dominate  him  or  his  Council.  He  governed  the  country 
himself,  supported  by  the  ablest  men  of  the  land.  The 
great  Lord  Bacon  has  told  us  : 

He  was  of  a  high  mind  and  loved  his  own  will,  and  his 
own  way  ;  as  one  that  revered  himself,  and  would  reign 
indeed.  Had  he  been  a  private  man  he  would  have  been 
termed  proud.  But  in  a  wise  prince  it  was  but  keeping  of 
distance,  which  indeed  he  did  towards  all ;  not  admitting 
any  near  or  full  approach,  either  to  his  power  or  to  his  secrets, 
for  he  was  governed  by  none.  .  .  . 

To  his  council  he  did  refer  much  and  sat  oft  in  person, 
knowing  it  to  be  the  way  to  assist  his  power  and  inform  his 
judgment.  In  which  respect  also  he  was  fairly  patient  of 
Hberty,  both  of  advice  and  of  vote,  till  himself  were  declared. 
He  kept  a  straight  hand  on  his  nobihty,  and  chose  rather 
to  advance  clergymen  and  lawyers  which  were  more  ob- 
sequious to  him,  but  had  less  interest  in  the  people,  which 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     333 

made  for  his  absoluteness,  but  not  for  his  safety.  He  was 
not  afraid  of  an  able  man,  as  Louis  the  Eleventh  was  ;  but, 
contrariwise,  he  was  served  by  the  ablest  men  that  were 
to  be  found,  without  which  his  affairs  could  not  have  pros- 
pered as  they  did.  Neither  did  he  care  how  cunning  they 
were  that  he  did  employ,  for  he  thought  himself  to  have  the 
master-reach.  And  as  he  chose  well,  so  he  held  them  up 
well.  .  .  . 

He  was  a  prince,  sad,  serious,  and  full  of  thoughts  and 
secret  observations,  and  full  of  notes  and  memorials  of  his 
own  hand,  especially  touching  persons  ;  as  whom  to  employ, 
whom  to  reward,  whom  to  inquire  of,  whom  to  beware  of, 
what  were  the  dependencies,  what  were  the  factions,  and  the 
like  ;  keeping,  as  it  were,  a  journal  of  his  thoughts. 

King  Henry  the  Seventh,  who  had  found  England 
impoverished  and  distraught,  left  to  his  son,  Henry  the 
Eighth,  a  well-ordered  and  prosperous  country  and  an 
overflowing  treasury. 

Henry  the  Eighth,  his  son,  was  only  eighteen  years  old 
when  he  succeeded  his  father,  and  very  naturally  he  was  not 
able  to  govern  in  person  through  a  Council.  The  Govern- 
ment was  carried  on  by  the  King  through  a  Manager,  first 
through  Cardinal  Wolsey,  who  raised  England's  prestige 
to  the  highest  point  by  his  foreign  policy,  and  afterwards 
through  Thomas  Cromwell,  who  carried  through  the  Refor- 
mation. Henry's  rule  was  of  the  greatest  benefit  to  the 
country.     In  Professor  Pollard's  words  : 

Henry  the  Eighth  took  the  keenest  interest  from  the 
first  in  learning  and  in  the  navy.  ...  No  small  part  of 
his  energies  was  devoted  to  the  task  of  expanding  the  Royal 
authority  at  the  expense  of  temporal  competitors.  Wales 
and  its  marshes  were  brought  into  legal  union  with  the  rest 
of  England,  and  the  Council  of  the  North  was  set  up  to  bring 
into  subjection  the  extensive  jurisdictions  of  the  Northern 
Earls.  ...  It  was  of  the  highest  importance  that  England 
should  be  saved  from  religious  civil  war,  and  it  could  only 
be  saved  by  a  despotic  government.  It  was  necessary  for 
the  future  development  of  England  that  its  governmental 


334    Democracy  and  the  Iron  Broom  of  War 

system  should  be  centralised  and  unified,  that  the  authority 
of  the  monarchy  should  be  more  firmly  extended  over  Wales 
and  the  western  and  northern  borders,  and  that  the  still 
existing  feudal  franchises  should  be  crushed  ;  and  these 
objects  were  worth  the  price  paid  in  the  methods  of  the  Star 
Chamber  and  of  the  Councils  of  the  North  and  of  Wales. 
Henry's  work  on  the  navy  requires  no  apology  ;  without  it 
Elizabeth's  victory  over  the  Spanish  Armada,  the  liberation 
of  the  Netherlands,  and  the  development  of  English  Colonies 
would  have  been  impossible  ;  and  of  all  others  the  year 
1545  best  marks  the  birth  of  the  English  naval  power. 
He  had  a  passion  for  efficiency,  and  for  the  greatness  of 
England  and  himself. 

King  Henry  the  Eighth  died  in  1547,  and  between  that 
year  and  1558  the  country  was  under  the  rule  of  the  child- 
king  Edward  the  Sixth  and  of  Queen  Mary,  Bloody  Mary, 
of  painful  memory.  Under  their  weak  and  only  nominal 
rule,  England  was  once  more  torn  by  party  strife,  and  at 
the  advent  of  Queen  Elizabeth  in  1558  disorganisation  and 
poverty  had  become  great  and  general.  Froude  has  told 
us  in  his  History  : 

On  all  sides  the  ancient  organisation  of  the  country  was 
out  of  joint.  The  fortresses  from  Berwick  to  Falmouth  were 
half  in  ruins,  dismantled,  and  ungarrisoned.  The  Tower 
was  as  empty  of  arms  as  the  Treasury  of  money.  .  .  .  Bare 
of  the  very  necessaries  for  self-defence,  the  Queen  found 
herself  with  a  war  upon  her  hands,  with  Calais  lost,  the 
French  in  full  possession  of  Scotland,  where  they  were 
fast  transporting  an  army,  and  with  a  rival  claimant  to  her 
crown,  whose  right,  by  the  letter  of  the  law,  was  better 
than  her  own.  Her  position  was  summed  up  in  an  address 
to  the  Council  as  follows  :  '  The  Queen  poor  ;  the  realm 
exhausted  ;  the  nobility  poor  and  decayed  ;  good  captains 
and  soldiers  wanting  ;  the  people  out  of  order ;  war  with 
France  ;  the  French  King  bestriding  the  realm,  having  one 
foot  in  Calais  and  the  other  in  Scotland  ;  steadfast  enemies, 
but  no  steadfast  friends.'  The  Spanish  Ambassador,  the 
Conde  de  Feria,  reported  shortly  after  Elizabeth's  accession  : 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     335 

*  His  Majesty  had  but  to  resolve,  and  he  might  be  master  of 
the  situation.  .  .  .  The  realm  is  in  such  a  state  that  we 
could  best  negotiate  here  sword  in  hand.  They  have  neither 
money,  leaders,  nor  fortresses.' 

The  position  was  truly  a  desperate  one.  It  seemed 
inevitable  that  Great  Britain  would  be  conquered  by  France 
and  Spain.  To  the  surprise  of  the  world,  Queen  Elizabeth 
once  more  created  order  in  the  country  and  made  Great 
Britain  more  powerful,  flourishing,  and  cultured  than  she 
had  ever  been  in  the  past.  She  accomplished  that  mar- 
vellous feat  not  through  her  own  genius  but  through  the 
great  ability  of  Lord  Burleigh,  the  Bismarck  of  the  time. 
In  Froude's  words  :  The  wisdom  of  Elizabeth  was  the  wisdom 
of  her  Ministers,  and  her  chief  merit  lay  in  allowing  her  policy 
to  be  guided  by  Lord  Burleigh. 

The  golden  age  of  the  Tudors  was  created  by  three  all- 
powerful  Ministers  who  with  heart  and  soul  worked  for 
their  country.  Both  Cardinal  Wolsey  and  Thomas  Cromwell 
governed  the  country  during  ten  consecutive  years,  and 
Lord  Burleigh  toiled  unceasingly  on  behalf  of  his  Queen 
during  no  less  than  forty  years.  One-man  government 
exercised  through  a  single  responsible  and  all-powerful 
Minister  raised  impoverished  and  diminished  England  to 
the  greatest  glory. 

With  the  death  of  Queen  EHzabeth  in  1603  the  hne  of 
Tudor  monarchs  came  to  an  end.  To  England's  misfortune 
these  able,  energetic,  wise,  and  far-seeing  rulers  were  suc- 
ceeded by  the  weak,  headstrong,  capricious,  and  incapable 
Stuarts,  who  never  felt  at  home  in  England,  James  the 
First,  Charles  the  First,  Charles  the  Second,  and  James 
the  Second.  They  endeavoured  to  govern  through  Court 
favourites.  Thoy  brought  the  Crown  into  contempt.  They 
were  followed  by  foreigners,  by  dull  and  weak  monarchs, 
and  the  prestige  of  the  Crown  dechned  still  further. 
The  capable  William  the  Third,  a  Dutchman,  was  suc- 
ceeded by  Queen  Anne,  the  daughter  of  James  the  Second, 
whose  husband  was  a  Danish  Prince,  and  at  her  death,  in 


336    Democracy  and  the  Iron  Broom  of  War 

1714,  the  Crown  was  given  to  George  the  First,  the  Elector 
of  Hanover,  a  grandson  of  a  daughter  of  James  the  First. 
He  was  installed  by  the  aristocracy,  which  desired  to  keep 
all  power  in  its  own  hands.  George  the  First,  like  a  Venetian 
Doge,  was  to  be  merely  a  shadow-king,  a  puppet  of  those 
who  had  made  him.  He  felt  a  stranger  in  England,  he 
never  liked  the  country  and  the  people,  he  did  not  know 
English,  he  painfully  communicated  with  his  Ministers  in 
broken  and  ungrammatical  Latin,  and  he  was  told  by  those 
who  had  installed  him  that  his  whole  duty  consisted  in 
wearing  his  crown,  drawing  his  pay,  and  saying  ditto  to 
his  Ministers.  According  to  Coxe's  '  Walpole,'  the  French 
Ambassador  reported  to  his  Government  on  July  20,  1724, 
when  George  the  First  had  been  King  for  ten  years  : 

The  King,  leaving  the  internal  government  entirely  to 
Walpole,  is  more  engaged  with  the  German  Ministers  in 
regulating  the  affairs  of  Hanover  than  occupied  with  those 
of  England.  .  .  .  He  has  no  predilection  for  the  English 
nation,  and  never  receives  in  private  any  English  of  either 
sex.  .  .  .  He  rather  considers  England  as  a  temporary 
possession,  to  be  made  the  most  of  while  it  lasts,  than  as  a 
perpetual  inheritance  to  himself  and  family.  He  will  have 
no  disputes  with  the  Parliament,  but  commits  the  entire 
transaction  of  that  business  to  Walpole,  choosing  rather 
that  the  responsibility  should  fall  on  the  Minister's  head 
than  his  own. 

As  the  foreign  King  did  not  preside  over  the  Ministerial 
Councils,  whose  proceedings  he  could  not  follow  owing 
to  his  ignorance  of  Enghsh,  the  Ministers  decided  without 
him  in  his  absence.  Thus  the  present  form  of  Cabinet 
government  arose.  '  • 

George  the  Second,  who  had  a  German  consort,  felt 
almost  as  much  a  stranger  in  England  as  did  his  father. 
He  did  what  he  was  told  by  his  Ministers,  whose  omni- 
potence became  still  more  firmly  established.  He  told  Chan- 
cellor Hardwicke  '  The  Ministers  are  the  King  in  this  country.' 
The    wives    of    George    the    Third,    George    the    Fourth, 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     337 

and  William  the  Fourth  also  were  German  Princesses. 
Monarchy  and  Government  drifted  apart.  England  became 
an  ohgarchy.  Her  government,  as  that  of  Venice,  fell  into 
the  hands  of  aristocratic  factions  which  dominated  Parha- 
ment,  filled  all  offices  with  their  relatives  and  friends, 
fought  one  another  for  place  and  power,  and  divided  the 
country  against  itself.  They  ruled  largely  by  intrigue  and 
corruption  and  they  desired  to  enjoy  power  without 
responsibility. 

The  Cabinet  is  a  Committee  of  the  Privy  Council  fi'om 
which  it  has  sprung.  The  Act  of  Settlement  of  .1700  provided  : 

That  from  and  after  the  time  that  the  further  limitation 
by  this  Act  shall  take  effect,  all  matters  and  things  relating 
to  the  well  governing  of  this  kingdom,  which  are  properly 
recognisable  in  the  Privy  Council  by  the  laws  and  customs  of 
this  realm,  shall  be  transacted  there,  and  all  resolutions 
taken  thereupon  shall  be  signed  by  such  of  the  Privy  Council 
as  shall  advise  and  consent  to  the  same. 

England's  new  rulers  wished  to  replace  the  divine  right 
of  kings  by  the  divine  right  of  party  leaders.  Personal 
responsibility  was  felt  by  the  men  in  power  to  be  an  incon- 
venience. The  paragraph  quoted  was  repealed  in  1706. 
The  fiction  of  the  joint  responsibihty  of  the  Cabinet  was 
created  in  order  to  make  the  responsibihty  of  individual 
Ministers  unascertainable.  The  British  Cabinet  Council, 
Hke  the  Venetian  Council  of  Ten,  its  prototype,  sits  in  secret. 
Nothing  is  transacted  in  writing.  No  notes  are  allowed  to 
be  taken.  No  records  of  the  proceedings  are  kept  for  the 
information  and  guidance  of  future  generations.  As  in 
a  conspiracy,  no  traces  are  left  which  might  help  to  attribute 
the  responsibility  for  decisions  arrived  at  to  any  individuals 
or  enable  posterity  to  discover  the  reasons  why  they  were 
taken. 

Committee  government  through  a  Cabinet  has  proved 
as  improvident,  dilatory,  inefficient,  and  wasteful  in  England 
as  it  has  in  Venice.     The  British  Government  was  a  by- 


338    Democracy  and  the  Iron  Broom  of  War 

word  of  inefficiency  during  the  rule  of  the  Georges,  except 
in  the  time  of  the  elder  Pitt,  the  great  Lord  Chatham. 
Then  it  suddenly  became  most  efficient  because  Pitt's 
powerful  personahty  absolutely  dominated  his  nominal 
colleagues.  Under  his  energetic  direction  England  once 
more  enjoyed  one-man  rule.  Pitt  converted  defeat,  humilia- 
tion, and  disorder  into  efficiency,  order,  and  victory. 
His  ministerial  colleagues  were  his  subordinates.  Important 
decisions  were  taken  by  an  inner  Cabinet  composed  of  Pitt, 
Holderness,  and  Newcastle.  Basil  WiUiams,  in  his  excellent 
*  Life  of  WiUiam  Pitt,'  has  briefly  and  correctly  described 
his  government  as  follows  : 

Much  as  he  asked  from  his  subordinates,  Pitt  gave  more 
himself.  He  had  trained  himself  for  directing  campaigns 
by  his  military  studies,  for  diplomacy  by  his  industry  in 
acquiring  a  knowledge  of  French  history  and  standard 
works  on  treaties  and  negotiations.  .  .  .  Where  his  own 
knowledge  was  deficient  he  was  always  ready  to  learn  from 
those  better  informed.  .  .  .  His  regular  system  of  intelH- 
gence  from  foreign  countries  was  admirably  organised.  .  .  . 
All  these  advantages — a  well-ordered  office,  his  own  industry 
and  knowledge,  good  intelligence — were  subservient  to  the 
daemonic  energy  with  which  he  executed  his  plans.  His 
maxim  was  that  nothing  was  impossible.  When  an  admiral 
came  to  him  with  a  tale  that  his  task  was  impossible,  '  Sir, 
I  walk  on  impossibihties,'  replied  Pitt,  showing  his  two 
gouty  crutches,  and  bade  him  be  off  to  the  impossible 
task.  .  .  . 

Pitt's  Cabinet,  on  the  whole,  worked  well  with  him,  for 
the  members  rarely  ventured  to  oppose  him.  Newcastle 
was  cowed  and  could  always  be  brought  to  reason  by  a 
threat  of  resignation  by  Pitt ;  Holderness  was  too  devoid 
of  convictions  to  give  much  trouble  ;  the  Lord  Keeper 
Henley  had  not  found  his  feet ;  Temple  was  devoted  to  his 
brother-in-law,  and  not  yet  jealous  ;  Anson  and  Ligonier 
were  really  no  more  than  chiefs  of  the  Navy  and  Army 
staffs  ;  Legge  was  timid  ;  Hahfax,  of  the  Board  of  Trade, 
was  only  admitted  on  sufferance  ;  Devonshire  and  Bedford 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     339 

took  little  part  ;  Hardwicke  was  kept  in  order  by  Granville, 
who  had  generally  dined  and  pleased  himself  with  unpalatable 
truths  about  his  colleagues  ;  and  Mansfield,  if  he  ever  had 
an  opinion  to  express,  was  reduced  to  silence  by  Pitt's 
withering  '  The  Chief  Justice  of  England  has  no  opinion  to 
give  on  this  matter.' 

Pitt  made  Cabinet  government  a  success  by  subordinating 
the  Ministers  to  his  imperious  will  and  his  vast  abihty, 
by  not  allowing  his  so-called  colleagues  to  restrain  his 
daemonical  energy  and  his  all-embracing  genius. 

To  those  who  have  studied  Enghsh  history  at  its  source 
it  is  clear  that  Great  Britain  was  most  progressive,  that 
her  government  was  most  efficient,  and  that  her  diplomacy 
and  army  were  most  ably  handled  in  the  time  of  the  Tudors, 
of  Cromwell,  and  of  the  elder  Pitt,  when  she  enjoyed  the 
advantages  of  one-man  government.  England's  experience 
confirms  the  views  of  EicheHeu,  Bismarck,  Frederick  the 
Great,  Napoleon  the  First,  Alexander  Hamilton,  and  of  the 
gi-eatest  statesman  of  antiquity  given  in  these  pages. 

Unfortunately  the  British  Cabinet  tends  to  become  from 
year  to  year  more  unwieldy  and  more  inefficient.  A  friendly 
and  discriminating  American  critic,  Professor  Lowell,  wrote 
in  his  classical  book,  '  The  Government  of  England  '  : 

The  number  of  members  in  the  Cabinet  has  varied  very 
much  at  different  times,  and  of  late  years  it  has  shown,  a 
marked  tendency  to  increase.  .  .  .  The  development  of 
the  parliamentary  system  has  made  it  necessary  for  the 
Cabinet  to  have  an  ever  stronger  and  stronger  hold  upon 
the  House  of  Commons  ;  and,  therefore,  the  different  shades 
of  feeling  in  the  party  that  has  a  majority  in  that  House 
must  bo  more  and  more  fully  represented  in  the  Cabinet. 
This  alone  would  tend  to  increase  the  number  of  its  members  ; 
but  far  more  important  still  is  the  fact  that  a  seat  in  the 
Cabinet  has  become  the  ambition  of  all  the  prominent  men 
in  Parliament.  Consequently  the  desire  to  be  included  is 
very  great,  and  the  disappointment  correspondingly  acute. 
For  these  various  reasons  there  is  a  constant  pressure  to 


340    Democracy  and  the  Iron  Broom  of  War 

increase  the  size  of  the  Cabinet.  The  result  is  not  without 
its  evils.  A  score  of  men  cannot  discuss  and  agree  on  a 
policy  with  the  same  readiness  as  a  dozen.  There  is  more 
danger  of  delay  when  action  must  be  taken.  There  is  a 
greater  probability  of  long  discussions  that  are  inconclusive 
or  result  in  a  weak  compromise.  There  is,  in  short,  all  the 
lack  of  administrative  efficiency  which  a  larger  body  always 
presents,  unless,  indeed,  that  body  is  virtually  guided  and 
controlled  by  a  small  number  of  its  own  members. 

The  unwieldiness  and  inefficiency  of  British  Cabinets 
are  still  further  increased  by  a  very  important  factor  which 
Professor  Lowell  has  not  mentioned.  The  Prime  Minister 
and  other  influential  Ministers  who  wish  to  control  the 
national  policy  through  the  Cabinet  endeavour  to  strengthen 
their  position  by  keeping  some  of  the  ablest  men  outside 
the  charmed  circle  and  by  introducing  into  it  a  number  of 
nonentities,  a  bodyguard  of  their  own,  which  increases 
their  influence  and  voting  power  and  correspondingly 
diminishes  the  Cabinet's  efficiency.  This  residuum  of 
nonentities  is  naturally  sometimes  fought  for  by  the  leading 
Ministers  who  wish  to  secure  its  support.  Lord  John  Eussell 
significantly  wrote  to  Lord  Lansdowne  on  May  28,  1854  : 
'  It  seems  to  me  that  the  presence  of  many  able  men  in  the 
Cabinet  tends  to  discordance  of  opinion  and  indecision.'  In 
the  third  volume  of  Morley's  *  Gladstone  '  we  read,  '  A  shght 
ballast  of  mediocrity  in  a  Government  steadies  the  ship 
and  makes  for  unity.' 

Great  Britain  is  governed  by  a  Cabinet  composed  of  the 
most  eminent  party  leaders  and  of  those  of  their  followers 
whom  they  wish  to  have  near  at  hand.  The  management  of 
Army  and  Navy,  the  direction  of  the  diplomatic  service, 
&c.,  are  political  prizes,  are  *  spoils  of  office.'  The  highest 
administrative  positions  have  become  political  perquisites. 
They  are  given  to  men  not  for  their  administrative  qualifica- 
tions, but  exclusively  on  account  of  their  political  and  social 
influence  without  any  regard  to  their  aptitude.  High  office 
is   often  given  to  politicians  who  have  had  no  practical 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     341 

experience  whatever  in  administration,  and  sometimes  to 
men  who  are  utterly  unfitted  for  a  Ministerial  post.  No  one 
can  faithfully  serve  several  masters.  As  a  politician-minister 
has  probably  a  business  of  his  own  to  attend  to  and  must 
devote  much  time  to  party  pohtics  in  the  House  of  Commons, 
ho  can  attend  only  perfunctorily  to  the  business  of  State. 
Naturally,  disorder,  delay,  and  stagnation  in  departmental 
administration  is  the  result.  In  former  ages  the  national 
Government  was  mismanaged  by  Court  favourites.  Their 
place  has  been  taken  by  party  favourite^. 

The  Cabinet  is  supposed  to  decide  all  important  questions 
unanimously.  The  Army,  the  Navy,  the  Diplomatic  Service, 
the  national  finances,  &c.,  are  nominally  directed  by  a 
single  amateur,  but  in  important  questions  each  service  is 
directed  by  the  combined  wisdom  of  some  twenty  amateurs. 
One  of  these  knows  a  httle  of  the  business  in  hand,  and  the 
remaining  twenty-one  know  less.  Thus,  a  party  pohtician, 
who  all  his  hfe  has  done  nothing  except  make  speeches, 
has  suddenly  to  take  over  the  functions  of  a  general,  an 
admiral,  a  diplomat,  an  expert  on  agriculture,  an  authority 
on  shipping  and  finance,  &c.,  in  rapid  succession.  To  do 
this  efficiently  he  must  have  a  greater  and  more  universal 
genius  than  was  vouchsafed  to  Napoleon  the  First  or  to  the 
elder  Pitt.  Jack-of-all-trades  are  masters  of  none.  Napoleon 
wrote  to  Berthier  on  October  24,  1803  : 

L'experience  prouve  que  le  plus  grand  defaut  en  admini- 
stration generale  est  de  vouloir  faire  trop  ;  cela  conduit  a 
ne  point  avoir  ce  dont  on  a  besoin. 

In  former  ages  when  matters  were  simple,  when  the 
public  services  were  rudimentary,  when  a  few  clerks  and  a 
door-keeper  could  handle  the  business  of  one  of  the  great 
Government  departments,  it  was  perhaps  possible  for  an 
amateur  to  direct  successfully  a  department  of  State.  Now, 
when  the  administrative  departments  have  grown  to  gigantic 
size,  and  when  the  Services  have  become  all-embracing  and 
highly  technical,  none  but  great  experts  can  satisfactorily 


342    Democracy  and  the  Iron  Broom  of  War 

manage  a  great  department.     Aristotle  wrote  in  the  fourth 
century  before  Christ : 

A  State  requires  many  assistants  and  many  superin- 
tendents. .  .  .  We  observe  that  the  division  of  labour 
greatly  facilitates  all  pursuits,  and  that  each  kind  of  work 
is  best  performed  when  each  is  allotted  to  a  separate 
workman.  To  the  complicated  affairs  of  Government  this 
observation  is  particularly  applicable. 

If  a  careful  division  of  administrative  labour,  if  Govern- 
ment by  specialists  was  recognised  to  be  necessary  in  the 
tiny  Greek  City- States  2300  years  ago,  how  much  more 
necessary  then  is  expert  government  in  a  modern  world- 
empire  of  400,000,000  inhabitants  ? 

Blackstone  wrote  in  the  time  of  Frederick  the  Great  in 
his  celebrated  '  Commentaries  '  : 

It  is  perfectly  amazing  that  there  should  be  no  other  state 
of  life,  no  other  occupation,  art,  or  science,  in  which  some 
method  of  instruction  is  not  looked  upon  as  requisite,  except 
only  the  science  of  legislation,  the  noblest  and  most  difficult 
of  any.  Apprenticeships  are  held  necessary  to  almost  every 
art,  commercial  or  mechanical :  a  long  course  of  reading 
and  study  must  form  the  divine,  the  physician,  and  the 
practical  professor  of  the  laws  ;  but  every  man  of  superior 
fortune  thinks  himself  born  a  legislator. 

During  the  last  three  centuries  British  national  organisa- 
tion has  progressively  deteriorated. 

Napoleon  wrote  at  St.  Helena  un  mauvais  general  vaut 
mieux  que  deux  hons.  War  is  a  one-man  business.  The 
greatest  generals  of  all  time — lack  of  space  prevents  giving 
their  opinions  in  this  place — have  stated  that  nothing  is 
more  dangerous  in  warfare  than  to  allow  military  operations 
to  be  directed  by  a  military  council,  by  a  council  of  experts. 
The  great  War  was  for  a  long  time  directed  not  by  a  council 
of  miUtary  experts,  but  by  a  council  of  pohticians,  by  the 
Cabinet.    When  Mr.  Churchill  was  reproached  for  the  failure 


Great  Problems  of  British  StatesmanshijJ     343 

of  the  Dardanelles  Expedition,  Mr.  Asquith  declared  in  the 
House  of  Commons  that  Mr.  Churchill  was  not  to  blame,  that 
it  had  been  approved  of  '  by  the  Cabinet  as  a  whole,'  and 
the  House  and  the  country  were  perfectly  satisfied  with 
that  explanation.  No  one  asked  whether  that  expedition 
had  been  originated  and  approved  of  by  the  experts  !  As 
long  as  mihtary  operations  are  jointly  directed  by  a  body 
of  amateurs,  disaster  is  more  likely  to  be  the  result  than 
success.  The  British  Government,  as  hitherto  constituted, 
is  not  the  organisation  of  efficiency,  but  its  negation.  It 
is  an  organisation  similar  to  that  which  caused  the  down- 
fall of  Poland.  It  is  the  organisation  of  disorganisation. 
Amateurs  are  bound  to  govern  amateurishly,  and  their 
insufficiency  will  be  particularly  marked  if  they  have  to 
run  an  unworkable  Government  machine  and  are  pitted 
against  perfectly  organised  professionals. 

The  assertion  that  inefficiency  is  inseparable  from 
democracy  is  not  true.  Democracy  means  popular  control, 
but  popular  control  need  not  mean  disorganisation.  It 
need  not  mean  government  by  amateurs.  A  highly  suc- 
cessful business  may  have  a  number  of  amateur  directors, 
but  these  will  in  reality  be  merely  supervisors.  The  actual 
management  and  direction  will  be  left  to  an  expert  manager. 
Similarly,  a  jury  of  tw^elve  good  men  and  true  does  not 
expound  the  law,  but  leaves  that  technical  duty  to  a  single 
expert,  the  judge.  The  fact  that  democracy  and  the  highest 
efficiency  are  compatible  is  illustrated  by  the  British  police, 
which  is  at  the  same  time  the  most  democratic,  the  most 
efficient,  and  the  least  corrupt  police  force  in  the  world. 
However,  the  London  police  are  directed  not  by  a  board 
of  politicians,  but  by  a  single  great  expert,  who  possesses 
vast  powers,  and  who  is  controlled  by  politicians  to  whom 
he  is  personally  responsible.  Committees  are  excellent 
for  investigation  and  deliberation — twenty  eyes  see  more 
than  two — but  they  are  totally  unsuitable  for  decisive 
and  rapid  action,  especially  in  the  age  of  railways  and 
telegraphs.     Only  one  man  can  usefully  command  a  ship, 


344    Democracy  and  the  Iron  Brooni  of  War 

conduct  an  orchestra,  manage  a  business,  or  direct  a  State, 
especially  in  difficult  times. 

The  rules  of  good  organisation  are  simple  and  few. 
They  demand 

(1)  That  a  single  man  of  the  highest  directing  ability 
should  be  in  sole  control  and  should  be  solely  responsible. 

(2)  That  he  should  be  supported  by  a  number  of  expert 
assistants,  and  that  he  should  be  able  to  draw  either  on 
their  individual  or  their  combined  advice,  according  to  the 
nature  of  the  problem  before  him. 

(3)  That  every  man  should  have  only  one  job,  and  that 
every  man  should  attend  only  to  his  own  job. 

A  commercial  business  directed  jointly  by  twenty-two 
amateur  directors  of  nominally  equal  authority,  who  can 
only  act  when  they  are  unanimous,  would  go  bankrupt  in 
a  very  short  time.  A  business  so  incompetently  organised 
does  no  exist.  If  such  an  organisation  is  totally  unsuitable 
for  a  business  where,  after  all,  only  a  sum  of  money  is  at 
stake,  how  much  more  unsuitable  then  is  it  for  a  nation  and 
empire  where  the  existence  of  400,000,000  people  is  at  stake  ? 
The  British  Empire  has  poured  out  lives  and  treasure  with- 
out stint,  and  the  results  achieved  so  far — the  action  of 
the  Fleet  excepted — have  been  far  from  encouraging. 
The  return  for  the  gigantic  sacrifices  made  has  been  totally 
inadequate.  The  strength  of  Great  Britain  and  of  the 
Empire  cannot  indefinitely  be  wasted  with  impunity.  The 
organisation  of  Great  Britain  cries  for  immediate  reform. 
Continuance  of  organised  disorganisation,  of  haphazard 
warfare,  directed  by  inexpert  committees,  may  have  the 
gravest  consequences  to  this  country. 

A  democracy  has  a  great  advantage  over  a  monarchy 
by  being  more  able  to  adapt  its  constitution  to  changing 
conditions.  The  wonderful  vitality  of  Ancient  Eome  was 
largely  due  to  its  adaptability,  to  the  fact  that  the  State 
had  an  institution,  the  Dictatorship,  by  which  the  Eepublic 
could  rapidly  be  converted  into  a  monarchy  in  time  of 
danger.    Machiavelli  has  told  us  in  his  '  Discorsi '  : 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     345 

Among  the  institutions  of  Kome,  that  of  the  Dictator- 
ship deserves  our  special  admiration.  The  ordinary  institu- 
tions of  a  Commonwealth  work  but  slowly.  No  Councillor 
or  magistrate  has  authority  to  act  alone.  In  most  cases 
several  must  agree,  and  time  is  required  to  reconcile  their 
differences.  Hesitation  is  most  dangerous  in  situations 
which  do  not  brook  delay.  Hence  every  republic  ought 
to  have  some  resource  upon  which  it  can  fall  back  in  time 
of  need.  When  a  repubhc  is  not  provided  with  some  such 
safeguard,  it  will  either  be  ruined  by  observing  its  Constitu- 
tional forms,  or  it  will  have  to  violate  them.  However,  in  a 
repubhc  nothing  should  be  done  by  irregular  methods,  for 
though  the  irregularity  may  be  useful,  it  would  fm^nish  a 
pernicious  precedent.  Every  contingency  cannot  be  fore- 
seen and  provided  for  by  law.  Hence  those  repubhcs  which 
cannot  in  a  sudden  emergency  resort  to  a  Dictator  or  some 
similar  authority  may  in  time  of  danger  be  ruined. 

The  Dictator  was  originally  called  Magister  'populi. 
Accordmg  to  Dionysius  he  was  nominated  by  the  Senate 
and  approved  of  by  the  people.  Later  on  he  was  appointed 
by  the  Consuls,  the  highest  civil  authorities,  whom  he 
superseded.  He  was  not  a  high-handed  tyrant  but  a 
popular  leader  elected  by  the  representatives  of  the  nation. 
While  the  Consuls  could  act  only  with  the  co-operation  of 
the  Senate,  the  Dictator  could  act  on  his  own  responsibility. 
However,  his  power  was  umited.  He  was  appointed  only 
for  six  months.  He  had  no  power  over  the  Treasury,  but 
had  to  come  to  the  Senate  for  money.  The  power  of  the 
purse  remained  with  the  representatives  of  the  nation. 
Kome  was  repeatedly  saved  from  ruin  by  a  Dictator  when 
its  Civil  Government  was  unable  to  deal  with  the  situation. 
We  may  learn  from  Eome's  example.    A  Dictator  is  wanted. 

As  the  Cabinet  in  its  original  shape  has  proved  totally 
unsuitable  for  conducting  a  great  war,  an  inner  Cabinet  of 
six  has  been  evolved.  It  remains  to  be  seen  whether  six  can 
successfully  accomplish  the  work  of  direction  which,  accord- 
ing to  the  greatest  statesmen  and  the  practical  experience 
of  all  time,  should  be  left  to  a  single  man.     If  the  committee 


346    Democracy  and  the  Iron  Broom  of  War 

of  six  should  prove  unsatisfactory,  the  Government  should 
frankly  declare  its  inability  to  deal  efficiently  with  the 
situation  and  ask  Parliament,  without  delay,  for  power 
to  effect  the  necessary  constitutional  changes.  The  leading 
politicians  themselves  must  surely  recognise  that  they  can- 
not successfully  direct  a  war.  The  simplest  way  of  con- 
centrating control  into  one  hand  would  obviously  consist 
in  increasing  the  authority  of  the  Prime  Minister,  making 
him  solely  responsible  to  Parliament  for  the  conduct  of  the 
national  business  in  all  its  branches,  making  the  other 
Ministers  distinctly  his  subordinates  and  appointing  to  the 
direction  of  every  Department  not  politicians  but  the  best 
experts  that  can  be  found.  Only  the  Prime  Minister  should 
attend  Parliament,  for  ministers  cannot  at  the  same  time 
attend  to  Parliament  and  their  Departments.  The  greatest 
administrative  experts  would  undoubtedly  furnish  a  far 
stronger  advisory  council  to  the  Prime  Minister  than  a 
Cabinet  of  pohticians,  however  eminent  and  of  whatever 
party.  Statesmanship  and  party  politics  must  be  kept 
strictly  apart.  The  direction  of  the  nation  and  the  lead- 
ing of  the  House  require  totally  different  qualij&cations. 
To  enable  the  Prime  Minister  to  give  his  undivided  atten- 
tion to  national  affairs  the  two  offices  should  be  separated 
by  law.  Otherwise  national  affairs  will  continue  to  be  sub- 
ordinated to  party  matters  and  be  perfunctorily  attended  to 
for  lack  of  time.  In  addition,  an  advisory  Council  modelled 
upon  Napoleon's  Conseil  d'fitat,  as  described  in  these  pages 
and  foreshadowed  by  Sir  John  Fortescue  in  his  *  Governance 
of  England,'  might  be  created  by  resuscitating  the  moribund 
Privy  Council.  The  Privy  Council  might  once  more  become 
a  most  valuable  institution,  a  national  intelHgence  depart- 
ment, for  investigating  matters,  preparing  laws,  &c.  Its 
ranks  should  be  greatly  strengthened.  At  present  it  includes 
too  many  politicians  and  society  leaders  and  too  few  experts. 
It  should  be  composed  of  the  ablest  men  in  every  branch 
of  human  knowledge  and  activity.  It  is  noteworthy  that 
at  present  science  is  quite  unrepresented  on  that  Council. 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanshijo     347 

Wars  are  not  won  by  speeches.  The  province  of  poH- 
ticians  is  speech,  that  of  statesmen  action.  Men  of  words 
are  rarely  men  of  action,  and  men  of  action  rarely 
men  of  words.  Richelieu,  Cromwell,  Frederick,  Napoleon, 
Bismarck,  were  wretched  speakers,  and  most  great  speakers, 
the  elder  Pitt  excepted,  wretched  statesmen.  To  entrust 
the  direction  of  the  State  to  men  of  words  seems  as  inappro- 
priate as  to  entrust  a  valuable  racehorse  to  a  plausible 
sporting  journalist.  It  is  questionable  whether  another 
set  of  amateurs  will  do  better  than  the  present  one,  for 
the  fault  hes  chiefly  with  the  system.  Government  by 
debating  society  has  proved  a  failure.  It  should  be  abohshed 
before  it  is  too  late.  The  situation  seems  to  call  for  three 
reforms  :  (1)  A  solely  responsible  Prime  Minister  exclu- 
sively engaged  with  national  business  ;  (2)  the  replacing  of 
politician-ministers  by  the  best  experts  ;  (3)  the  creation  of 
an  efficient  Privy  Council  to  serve  as  a  national  intelhgence  " 
department. 

The  traditional  organisation  of  Great  Britain  is  an 
anachronism  and  a  danger.  Every  statesman  must  be 
convinced  of  its  insufficiency  and  inaptitude.  Happily 
it  can  easily  be  modernised  and  immensely  strengthened. 
The  advantage  of  democracy,  which  means  popular  control 
over  the  Government,  can  easily  be  combined  with  an  efficient 
and  well-ordered  administration  carried  on  by  experts. 
If  the  national  organisation  were  reformed  in  the  manner 
indicated.  Great  Britain  would  no  longer  suffer  disappoint- 
ment after  disappointment  in  war  through  inexpert  direc- 
tion and  divided  councils.  She  would  no  longer  be  surprised 
by  events.  The  Alhes  would  no  longer  offer  a  chiefly  passive 
resistance  to  Germany's  onslaughts.  The  War  would  be 
greatly  shortened.  Efficiency  would  be  met  with  efficiency, 
and  greater  numbers  and  resources  would  rapidly  prevail. 
England's  example  of  reorganisation  would  no  doubt  be 
followed  tlii-oughout  the  world.  The  saying  that  democracy 
means  improvidence,  inefficiency,  wastefulness,  bunghng, 
amateurishness,  and  delay  would  cease  to  be  true.    Well- 


348    Democracy  and  the  Iron  Broorn  of  War 

organised  Great  Britain  would  become  an  example  to 
democracy  throughout  the  world.  The  democratic  form  of 
government  which,  in  consequence  of  the  War,  has  lost 
prestige  everywhere,  would  be  rehabilitated  and  obtain  a 
new  lease  of  life. 


CHAPTEE  X 

HOW    AMERICA    BECAME    A    NATION    IN    ARMS  :  ^ 

SOME     LESSONS     FOR     PEACEFUL     DEMOCRACIES     AND     THEIR 

LEADERS  - 

On  December  10,  1914,  Professor  C,  K.  Webster  stated 
in  his  inaugural  lecture  delivered  before  the  University 
of  Liverpool : 

You  will  look  in  vain  for  the  books  which  can  teach 
Englishmen  the  connection  of  their  own  country  with  the 
political  life  of  the  Continent  during  the  nineteenth  century. 
Such  books  cannot  be  improvised  on  the  spur  of  the  moment 
in  the  midst  of  a  national  crisis.  .  .  .  Few  will  dispute 
that  the  study  of  our  diplomatic  history  in  the  past  century 
is  of  real  and  immediate  importance  to-day.  Yet  the  work 
has  scarcely  been  begun.  There  is,  for  example,  as  yet  no 
adequate  record  of  the  part  England  played  in  the  great 
reconstruction  of  Europe  after  the  Napoleonic  Wars.  .  .  . 
Neither  Canning  nor  Palmerston  is  known  to  us,  except  by 
loose  and  inadequate  records. 

This  statement  is  exceedingly  humiliating.  It  seems 
incredible,  but  unfortunately  it  is  only  too  true.  While 
the  art  of  vote-catching,  called  politics,  has  been  assiduously 
studied  in  all  its  branches,  the  science  of  statesmanship 
in  the  broadest  sense  of  the  word,  has  been  completely 
neglected.     The  most  important  of  all  human  sciences  is 

1  The  Nineteenth  Century  and  After,  September,  1915. 
*  The  recommendations  contcainod  in  the  following  pages  have  since 
been  adoj)tcd. 

349 


350    How  America  became  a  Nation  in  Arms 

apparently  thought  unworthy  of  study.  It  is  not  taught 
at  any  of  the  British  Universities,  and  it  is  disregarded  by 
those  who  strive  to  obtain  place  and  power  by  way  of  the 
ballot-box.  Fifty  years  ago  the  United  States  fought 
a  gigantic  war,  in  the  course  of  which  they  became  a  nation 
in  arms.  Yet  there  is  in  the  English  language  no  adequate 
documentary  account  of  that  struggle,  from  which  the 
Anglo-Saxon  democracies  may  derive  the  most  necessary 
and  the  most  salutary  lessons  for  their  guidance,  lessons 
which  should  be  invaluable  to  them  at  the  present  moment. 
The  fact  that  the  United  States  introduced  conscription 
during  the  Civil  War  is  scarcely  known  in  England.  In  a 
lengthy  article  on  conscription  in  the  '  Encyclopaedia 
Britannica,'  an  historical  and  philosophical  account  of 
compulsory  service  in  France  and  Germany  is  given,  but 
the  fact  that  America  introduced  conscription  is  not  even 
mentioned  !  Ninety-nine  out  of  every  hundred  well-edu- 
cated Englishmen  ignore  the  means  whereby  the  United 
States  raised  milHons  of  soldiers  at  a  time  when  their  popu- 
lation was  very  much  smaller  than  that  of  the  United 
Kingdom  is  at  present. 

The  main  facts  and  the  principal  documents  relating 
to  the  American  Civil  War  arc  buried  deeply  in  the  contem- 
porary journals  and  in  bulky  official  publications  such  as 
the  '  Official  Kecords  of  the  Union  and  Confederate  Armies  ' 
published  by  the  American  Government  between  1880  and 
1900,  a  work  which  is  about  five  times  as  large  as  the 
'  Encyclopaedia  Britannica,'  but  which  is  practically  un- 
usable because  it  is  merely  an  inchoate,  incoherent,  and 
confusing  collection  of  documents  which  lacks  an  index. 
In  the  following  pages  an  attempt  will  be  made  to  rescue 
the  most  important  facts  and  documents  from  oblivion 
and  to  deduce  from  them  the  principal  lessons  which  they 
supply  to  the  Anglo-Saxon  peoples  of  both  hemispheres 
for  their  encouragement  and  their  guidance  in  the  present 
crisis. 

The  American  Civil  War  began  on  April  12,  1861,  at 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     351 

4.30  A.M.,  when  the  Southern  Army  commenced  the  bom- 
bardment of  Fort  Sumter,  which  dominates  the  mouth  of 
Charleston  Harbour,  and  which  was  garrisoned  by  Union 
troops.  In  the  Southern  States  secession  and  rebelHon 
had  been  preparing,  both  secretly  and  openly,  for  a  long 
time.  Yet  the  United  States  Government  had  neglected 
making  any  preparations  for  the  inevitable  struggle.  Pre- 
sident Buchanan,  who  was  in  o£Bce  from  1857  to  1861, 
was  well-meaning,  scrupulously  honest,  kindly,  but  weak. 
He  was  deeply  religious  and  philanthropical,  and  he  loved 
peace  and  his  ease.  He  disliked  trouble  and  wished  to 
leave  the  settlement  of  the  gravest  problem  of  his  country 
to  the  next  President.  Fearing  to  precipitate  the  struggle, 
he  made  no  preparation  to  meet  the  crisis,  and  allowed  the 
Southern  forts  and  arsenals  to  be  seized  by  the  secessionists. 
Abraham  Lincoln  had  been  elected  as  his  successor.  He 
was  inaugurated  on  March  4,  1861,  at  a  moment  of  the 
severest  tension  between  North  and  South,  only  five  weeks 
before  the  cannon  began  to  speak.  He  was  a  minority 
President,  for  the  voting  at  the  Presidential  contest  had 
been  as  follows  : 

For  Lincoln  (Republican  Party)       .         .  ,  1,857,610  votes 

For  Douglas  (Democratic,    non-Interventionist, 

Party) 1,365,976     „ 

For  Breckinridge  (Democratic,  pro-Slavery,  Party)    .        847,953     „ 
For  Bell  (Constitutional  Union  Party)  .        690,631     „ 


Total  ....     4,062,170  votes 

As  at  the  Presidential  Election  of  1912,  the  largest  American 
party  had  split  in  two  and  had  failed  to  return  the  President. 
Only  40  per  cent,  of  the  people  had  voted  for  Lincoln. 
His  position  was  one  of  unexampled  difficulty.  He  was  a 
novice  at  his  office,  he  had  entered  it  at  a  moment  of  the 
gravest  danger,  he  was  quite  inexperienced  in  dealing  with 
national,  as  distinguished  from  local  affairs,  he  represented 
only  a  minority  of  the  people,  and  he  was  surrounded  by 
treason  and  intrigue.  On  January  1,  1861,  the  United 
States  Army  was  only  16,402  men  strong,  and  of  these  1745 


352    How  America  became  a  Nation  in  Arms 

were  absent.  These  few  troops  were  distributed  in  small 
parcels  all  over  the  gigantic  territory  of  the  Union  to  hold 
the  marauding  Indians  in  check.  The  Navy  had  been 
scattered  over  distant  seas.  The  arsenals  of  the  North 
were  ill-supplied  with  arms.  Washington,  the  Federal 
capital,  lay  on  the  border  between  North  and  South,  within 
easy  reach  of  the  army  which  the  South  had  collected 
threateningly  close  to  that  city  before  opening  the  attack 
on  Fort  Sumter.  Washington  lies  on  the  left  bank  of  the 
Potomac.  It  is  dominated  by  the  heights  on  the  right 
bank  of  that  river,  and  these  were  in  the  hands  of  the  insur- 
gents. On  April  12,  the  day  when  the  bombardment  of 
Fort  Sumter  began,  the  following  telegram  was  sent  from 
Montgomery,  Alabama,  the  temporary  capital  of  the 
Southern  States,  to  all  parts  of  the  Union  : 

An  immense  crowd  serenaded  President  Davis  and 
Secretary  [of  War]  Walker  at  the  Exchange  Hotel  to-night. 

The  former  is  not  well,  and  did  not  appear.  Secretary 
Walker  appeared  and  declined  to  make  a  speech,  but  in  a 
few  words  of  electrical  eloquence  told  the  news  from  Fort 
Sumter,  declaring  in  conclusion  that  before  many  hours  the 
flag  of  the  Confederacy  would  float  over  that  fortress. 

No  man,  he  said,  could  tell  where  the  War  this  day 
commenced  would  end,  but  he  would  prophesy  that  the  flag 
which  now  flaunts  the  breeze  here  would  float  over  the  dome 
of  the  old  Capitol  at  Washington  before  the  first  of  May. 
Let  them  try  Southern  Chivalry  and  test  the  extent  of 
Southern  resources,  and  it  might  float  eventually  over 
Faneuil  Hall  [in  Boston]  itself. 

Immediately  on  the  outbreak  of  war  the  railways  and 
telegraphs  around  Washington  were  cut.  The  city  was 
completely  isolated  from  the  outer  world.  The  State  of 
Maryland,  to  the  north  of  the  Federal  capital,  prevented 
a  few  rapidly  mobilised  ]\Iilitia  troops  from  New  York  and 
Boston  reaching  the  seat  of  the  national  Government. 
Washington  was  denuded  of  troops  and  was  hastily  barricaded 
to  protect  it  and  the  President  against  a  couf  de   mam. 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     353 

The  gallant  South  had  furnished  to  the  State  a  dispropor- 
tionately large  number  of  able  officers  and  of  high  officials. 
Local  patriotism  was  exceedingly  strong  in  the  Southern 
States.  Hence  many  of  the  best  military  and  naval  officers 
and  many  of  the  ablest  Civil  Servants  resigned  immediately 
after  the  outbreak  of  the  Civil  War  and  joined  the  Southern 
forces,  crippling  simultaneously  the  Army,  the  Navy,  and 
the  national  administration  in  all  its  branches.  On  April  20, 
eight  days  after  the  bombardment  of  Fort  Sumter,  General 
Eobert  E.  Lee,  who  was  considered  to  be  the  ablest  officer 
in  the  United  States  Service,  and  who  had  been  offered  the 
active  command  of  the  Union  Army,  resigned  his  commission 
to  the  general  consternation  of  the  North,  and  crossed  the 
border.  Altogether  313  commissioned  officers  resigned  and 
joined  the  rebellion.  According  to  Moore's  '  Eebellion 
Eecord,'  the  Southern  States  received  from  the  Eegular 
Army  the  following  generals,  most  of  whom  resigned  their 
commissions  between  December  20,  1860,  the  date  when  the 
State  of  South  Carolina  seceded,  and  January  1,  1862  : 

Generals  .........         g  ' 

Lieutenant-Genorals  ......       15 

Major-Generals  .......       48 

Brigadier-Generals     .  .  .  .  .  .  .111 

The  Secretary  of  War,  in  his  Eeport  of  July  1,  1861, 
stated  that  '  but  for  this  startling  defection  the  rebellion 
never  could  have  assumed  its  formidable  proportions.' 

The  guns  bombarding  Fort  Sumter  had  given  the  signal 
for  the  collapse  of  the  Government.  The  position  which 
was  created  by  the  outbreak  of  the  rebellion  was  graphically 
described  by  President  Lincoln  in  his  message  to  Congress  of 
May  26,  1862,  as  follows  : 

The  insurrection  which  is  yet  existing  in  the  United 
States  and  aims  at  the  overthrow  of  the  Federal  Constitution 
and  the  Union  was  clandestinely  prepared  during  the  winter 
of  1860  and  1861,  and  assumed  an  open  organisation  in  the 
form  of  a  treasonable  provisional  Government  at  Mont- 
gomery, in  Alabama,  on  the  18th  day  of  February,  1861. 

2a 


354    How  America  became  a  Nation  in  Arms 

On  the  12th  day  of  April,  1861,  the  insurgents  committed 
the  flagrant  act  of  Civil  War  by  the  bombardment  and  the 
capture  of  Fort  Sumter,  which  cut  off  the  hope  of  imme- 
diate conciliation.  Immediately  afterward  all  the  roads  and 
avenues  to  this  city  were  obstructed  and  the  capital  was  put 
into  the  condition  of  a  siege.  The  mails  in  every  direction 
were  stopped,  and  the  lines  of  telegraph  cut  off  by  the  insur- 
gents, and  military  and  naval  forces  which  had  been  called 
out  by  the  Government  for  the  defence  of  Washington  were 
prevented  from  reaching  the  city  by  organised  and  combined 
treasonable  resistance  in  the  State  of  Maryland.  There 
was  no  adequate  and  effective  organisation  for  the  public 
defence.  Congress  had  indefinitely  adjourned.  There  was 
no  time  to  convene  them.  It  became  necessary  for  me  to 
choose  whether,  using  only  the  existing  means,  agencies, 
and  processes  which  Congress  had  provided,  I  should  let 
the  Government  fall  at  once  into  ruin,  or  whether,  availing 
myself  of  the  broader  powers  conferred  by  the  Constitution 
in  cases  of  insurrection,  I  would  make  an  effort  to  save  it.  .  .  . 

The  leaders  of  the  Secession  movement  had  skilfully 
chosen  the  most  suitable  time  for  action.  They  believed 
that  at  the  critical  moment  all  would  be  confusion  at  Wash- 
ington, that,  lacking  an  adequate  army  and  an  experienced 
leader,  the  Northern  States  would  not  dare  to  act  with 
vigour,  that  the  new  President  would  hesitate  to  adopt  a 
course  which  might  lead  to  civil  war,  and  that,  if  after  all 
war  should  break  out,  they  would  have  numerous  auxiliaries. 
The  Southern  States  had  a  monopoly  in  the  production  of 
cotton.  The  leaders  of  the  South  believed  that  the  demand 
for  cotton  in  England  and  France  would  put  a  speedy  end 
to  any  blockade  of  the  Southern  ports  which  the  United 
States  might  wish  to  undertake.  They  thought  that  the 
great  Democratic  Party  of  the  North,  which,  if  united,  was 
far  stronger  than  the  Eepublican  Party  which  had  elected 
Lincoln,  would  refuse  to  support  the  President  if  he  should 
wish  to  re-take  the  Southern  forts  and  arsenals  by  force. 
They  believed  that  the  industrial  North  had  degenerated 
and  that  it  would  prove  an  inefficient  opponent  to  the 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     355 

agricultural  South  where  every  man  knew  how  to  ride  and 
how  to  handle  a  gun. 

When  the  South  struck  its  blow  for  independence  there 
certainly  was  confusion  in  Washington  and  throughout  the 
States  of  the  North.  In  describing  the  condition  of  the 
country  in  18G1  the  Joint  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the 
War  reported  :  '  There  was  treason  in  the  Executive  Man- 
sion, treason  in  the  Cabinet,  treason  in  the  Senate  and  the 
House  of  Eepresentatives,  treason  in  the  Army  and  Navy, 
treason  in  every  department,  bureau  and  ofSce  connected 
with  the  Government.'  The  position  of  affairs  was  more 
fully  described  in  the  First  Executive  Order  in  Eelation  to 
State  Prisoners,  which  was  issued  on  behalf  of  the  President 
by  Mr.  Edwin  M.  Stanton,  the  Secretary  of  War,  on 
February  14,  1862.     He  wrote  : 

The  breaking  out  of  a  formidable  insurrection,  based  on  a 
conflict  of  political  ideas,  being  an  event  without  precedent 
in  the  United  States,  was  necessarily  attended  by  great 
confusion  and  perplexity  of  the  public  mind.  Disloyalty, 
before  unsuspected,  suddenly  became  bold,  and  treason 
astonished  the  world  by  bringing  at  once  into  the  field 
mihtary  forces  superior  in  numbers  to  the  standing  army 
of  the  United  States. 

Every  Department  of  the  Government  was  paralysed  by 
treason.  Defection  appeared  in  the  Senate,  in  the  House  of 
Eepresentatives,  in  the  Cabinet,  in  the  Federal  Courts  ; 
Ministers  and  Consuls  returned  from  foreign  countries  to 
enter  the  insurrectionary  councils  or  land  or  naval  forces  ; 
commanding  and  other  officers  of  the  army  and  in  the  navy 
betrayed  the  councils  or  deserted  their  posts  for  commands 
in  the  insurgent  forces.  Treason  was  flagrant  in  the  revenue 
and  in  the  post  office  service,  as  well  as  in  the  Territorial 
Governments  and  in  the  Indian  reserves. 

Not  only  Governors,  Judges,  Legislators,  and  Ministerial 
Officers  in  the  States,  but  even  whole  States  rushed,  one  after 
another,  with  apparent  unanimity  into  rebellion.  The 
capital  was  besieged  and  its  connection  with  all  the  States 
cut  off. 


356    How  America  became  a  Nation  in  Arms 

Even  in  the  portions  of  the  country  which  were  most 
loyal  political  combinations  and  secret  societies  were 
formed  furthering  the  work  of  disunion,  while,  from 
motives  of  disloyalty  or  cupidity,  or  from  excited  passions 
or  perverted  sympathies,  individuals  were  found  furnish- 
ing men,  money,  and  materials  of  war  and  supplies  to 
the  insurgents'  military  and  naval  forces.  Armies,  ships, 
fortifications,  navy  yards,  arsenals,  military  posts  and  gar- 
risons, one  after  another,  were  betrayed  or  abandoned  to 
the  insurgents. 

Congress  had  not  anticipated,  and  so  had  not  provided 
for,  the  emergency.     The  municipal  authorities  were  power- 
less and  inactive.     The  judicial  machinery  seemed  as  if  it 
had  been  designed  not  to  sustain  the  Government,  but  to 
embarrass  and  betray  it. 

Foreign  intervention,  openly  invited  and  industriously 
instigated  by  the  abettors  of  the  insurrection,  became 
imminent,  and  has  only  been  prevented  by  the  practice  of 
strict  and  impartial  justice  with  the  most  perfect  moderation 
in  our  intercourse  with  nations.  .  .  . 

Extraordinary  arrests  will  hereafter  be  made  under 
the  direction  of  the  military  authorities  alone. 

At  the  touch  of  war  all  the  factors  of  national  str^gth, 
the  Army,  the  Navy,  and  the  Civil  Administration,  had 
broken  down.  Consternation  and  confusion  were  general. 
At  the  head  of  affairs  was  a  quaint  and  old-fashioned  country 
attorney  from  the  backwoods,  possessed  of  a  homely  wit 
and  infinite  humour,  ignorant  of  national  government, 
surrounded  by  treason  and  besieged  by  a  mob  of  clamorous 
ofifice-seekers  who  blocked  the  ante-rooms  and  the  passages 
at  the  White  House,  sat  on  the  stairs  and  overflowed  into 
the  garden.  Congress  was  not  in  session.  Washington  was 
isolated  and  threatened.  It  was  questionable  whether 
the  two  Houses  of  the  Legislature  would  be  able  to  meet  in 
the  Federal  Capital.  Many  people  in  the  North  sympathised 
secretly  with  the  South.  Few  officials  could  be  trusted. 
The  position  was  desperate.  Everything  had  broken  down 
except  the  Constitution.     In  the  hour  of  the  direst  need  the 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     357 

American   Constitution   proved   a   source   of   the   greatest 
strength  and  it  saved  the  country. 

The  American  Constitution  had  been  planned  not  by 
poHticians  but  by  great  statesmen  and  soldiers,  by  the  able 
and  energetic  men  of  action  who  had  fought  victoriously 
against  England.  They  had  wisely,  and  after  mature 
deliberation,  concentrated  vast  powers  in  the  hands  of  the 
President,  and  had  given  him  almost  despotic  powers  in  a 
time  of  national  danger.  President  Lincoln  unhesitatingly 
made  use  of  these  powers.  It  will  appear  in  the  course  of 
these  pages  that  the  Southern  States  were  defeated  not  so 
much  by  President  Lincoln  and  the  Northern  Armies  as 
by  the  Fathers  of  the  Commonwealth,  who  in  another 
century  had  prepared  for'^  the  use  of  the  President  a 
powerful  weapon  which  would  be  ready  to  his  hand  in 
the  hour  of  peril. 

Those  who  wish  to  understand  the  foundations  of 
American  statesmanship  as  laid  down  by  the  American 
nation-builders,  should  not  turn  to  Lord  Bryce's  excellent 
volumes  but  should  go  to  the  fountain-head,  to  the  pages  of 
TJie  Federalist.  The  Federalist  was  pubhshed  in  a  number  of 
letters  to  the  Press  for  the  information  of  the  pubhc  in 
1787-88,  at  the  time  when  the  American  Constitution  was 
being  painfully  evolved  by  the  Convention  and  was  being 
discussed  by  the  pubhc.  Tlie  authors  of  The  Federalist 
were  three  of  the  greatest  American  statesmen — Alexander 
Hamilton,  James  Madison,  and  John  Jay,  and  the  hon's  share 
was  taken  by  that  great  genius,  Hamilton.  The  Federalist 
was,  and  is  still,  the  ablest  and  the  most  authoritative 
exposition  of  the  Constitution.  It  contains  the  Arcana 
Bei'puhlicae.  It  is  the  American  statesman's  Bible.  It  has 
inspired  America's  leading  men  to  the  present  day,  and 
among  them  Abraham  Lincoln.  If  wo  wish  to  understand 
America's  pohcy  in  the  Civil  War  we  shall  do  well  to  acquaint 
ourselves  at  the  outset  with  some  of  the  most  important 
views  contained  in  Tlie  Federalist. 

The  founders  of  the  American  Eepublic  were  democrats 


358    How  America  became  a  Nation  in  Arms 

but  not  demagogues.  They  were  statesmen  who  feared  the 
rise  of  demagogues.  It  is  highly  significant  that  we  read 
in  the  very  first  letter  of  The  Federalist :  '  History  will 
teach  us  .  .  .  that  of  those  men  who  have  overturned  the 
hbcrties  of  repubhcs,  the  greatest  number  have  begun  their 
career  by  paying  an  obsequious  court  to  the  people  ;  com- 
mencing demagogues  and  ending  tyrants.'  The  Fathers  of 
the  American  Commonwealth  were  not  sentimentalists  but 
statesmen  and  men  of  common  sense.  They  did  not  believe 
that  an  era  of  universal  peace  was  approaching  or  was 
possible,  that  monarchy  meant  war  and  democracy  meant 
peace,  that  popular  government  or  '  democratic  control,' 
as  it  is  now  usually  called,  would  bring  about  the  millen- 
nium. In  the  sixth  and  seventh  letters  of  Tlie  Federalist 
we  read  : 

.  .  .  Nations  in  general  will  make  war  whenever  they 
have  a  prospect  of  getting  anything  by  it.  .  .  . 

.  .  .  There  are  still  to  be  found  visionary  or  designing 
men  who  stand  ready  to  advocate  the  paradox  of  perpetual 
peace  between  the  States  though  dismembered  and  alienated 
from  each  other.  The  genius  of  republics  (say  they)  is 
pacific  ;  the  spirit  of  commerce  has  a  tendency  to  soften 
the  manners  of  men.  .  .  . 

Have  republics  in  practice  been  less  addicted  to  war  than 
monarchies  ?  Are  not  the  former  administered  by  men 
as  well  as  the  latter  ?  Are  there  not  aversions,  predilec- 
tions, rivalships,  and  desires  of  unjust  acquisitions  that 
affect  nations  as  well  as  kings  ?  Are  not  popular  assemblies 
frequently  subject  to  the  impulses  of  rage,  resentment, 
jealousy,  avarice,  and  of  other  irregular  and  violent  pro- 
pensities ?  Is  it  not  well  known  that  their  determinations 
are  often  governed  by  a  few  individuals  in  whom  they  place 
confidence,  and  are,  of  course,  liable  to  be  tinctured  by  the 
passions  and  views  of  those  individuals  ?  Has  commerce 
hitherto  done  anything  more  than  change  the  objects  of 
war  ?  Is  not  the  love  of  wealth  as  domineering  and  enter- 
prising a  passion  as  that  of  power  or  glory  ?  Have  there 
not  been  as  many  wars  founded  upon  commercial  motives 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanshi'p     359 

...  as  were  before  occasioned  by  the  cupidity  of  territory 
or  dominion  ? 

Believing  that  the  United  States  were  Hkely  to  be  in- 
volved in  further  wars,  the  founders  of  the  American  EepubHc 
wished  to  strengthen  the  State  by  making  the  President 
powerful  and  independent,  by  giving  him  almost  monarchical 
authority  in  time  of  peace  and  by  making  him  a  kind  of 
Dictator  in  time  of  war.  The  United  States  Constitution 
states  :  '  The  President  shall  be  Commander-in-Chief  of  the 
Army  and  Navy  of  the  United  States  and  of  the  MiHtia 
of  the  several  States  when  called  into  the  active  service  of 
the  United  States.'  In  time  of  danger  State  rights  were  to 
disappear,  the  miHtary  independence  of  the  individual 
States  was  to  come  to  an  end. 

Unhke  the  British  Prime  Minister,  the  American  Presi- 
dent is  free  from  popular  and  Parliamentary  control.  He 
can  at  any  time  repudiate  a  majority  of  both  Houses.  He 
can  veto  any  act  of  Congress  even  if  it  is  supported  by  large 
majorities,  and  he  has  frequently  done  so,  for  he  is  supposed 
to  act  solely  in  the  interests  of  the  nation  and  in  accordance 
with  his  own  conscience  without  regard  to  party  majorities 
and  party  intrigues.  He  can  place  at  the  head  of  the  Army 
and  Navy  any  man  he  chooses,  or  he  can  command  in  person 
and  no  one  can  question  his  action.  His  Cabinet,  the 
Secretaries  of  State,  are  nominated  by  him,  and  they  are 
his  subordinates.  They  are  the  President's,  nor  the  people's, 
servants.  They  have  no  seat  and  no  voice  in  Congress. 
They  are  supposed  to  stand,  like  the  President,  outside  and 
above  party,  to  be  servants  of  the  nation  as  a  whole.  The 
Ministers,  like  the  President,  cannot  be  removed  by  a  chance 
majority.  The  President  and  his  Secretaries  of  State  are  not 
so  constantly  hampered  in  their  actions  by  the  fear  of  losing 
popularity  and  office  as  are  British  statesmen.  The  founders 
of  the  Commonwealth  gave  to  the  President  a  vast  and 
truly  royal  authority  because  they  believed  that  a  national 
executive  could  be  efficient  only  if  it  was  strong,  and  that 


860    How  America  became  a  Nation  in  Arms 

it  could  be|^  strong  only  if  it  was  independent  of  party  ties 
and  entrusted  to  a  single  man.  We  read  in  the  thirty- 
seventh',  letter  of  The  Federalist,  written  by  Madison  : 

The  genius  of  republican  liberty  seems  to  demand  on  one 
side  not  only  that  all  power  should  be  derived  from  the 
people,  but  that  those  entrusted  with  it  should  be  kept  in 
dependence  on  the  people  by  a  short  duration  of  their 
appointments  ;  and  that  even  during  this  short  period  the 
trust  should  be  placed  not  in  a  few,  but  in  a  number  of  hands. 
Stability,  on  the  contrary,  requires  that  the  hands  in  which 
power  is  lodged  should  continue  for  a  length  of  time  the 
same.  A  frequent  change  of  men  will  result  from  a  frequent 
return  of  elections,  and  a  frequent  change  of  measures  from  a 
frequent  change  of  men,  whilst  energy  in  government  requires 
not  only  a  certain  duration  of  power,  but  the  execution  of  it 
by  a  single  hand. 

Hamilton,  Jay,  Governor  Morris,  John  Adams,  and  other 
leading  men  of  the  time  were  so  much  in  favour  of  a  strong 
executive  that  they  advocated  that  American  Presidents, 
like  British  Judges,  should  be  appointed  for  life  and  should 
be  removable  only  by  impeachment. 

The  doctrine  that  a  Government,  to  be  efficient,  requires 
not  many  heads  but  a  single  head,  that  a  one-man  Govern- 
ment, a  strong  Government,  is  valuable  at  all  times,  and 
especially  in  time  of  national  danger,  was  more  fully 
developed  by  Hamilton  in  the  seventieth  letter  of  The 
Federalist.    He  ^vrote  : 

.  .  .  Energy  in  the  Executive  is  a  leading  character  in 
the  definition  of  good  government.  It  is  essential  to  the 
protection  of  the  community  against  foreign  attacks  ;  it  is 
not  less  essential  to  the  steady  administration  of  the  laws  ; 
to  the  protection  of  property  against  those  irregular  and 
high-handed  combinations  which  sometimes  interrupt  the 
ordinary  course  of  justice  ;  to  the  security  of  liberty  against 
the  enterprises  and  assaults  of  ambition,  of  faction,  and  of 
anarchy.  Every  man  the  least  conversant  in  Eoman  history 
knows  how  often  that  republic  was  obliged  to  take  refuge 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     361 

in  the  absolute  power  of  a  single  man  under  the  formidable 
title  of  Dictator.  .  .  . 

There  can  be  no  need,  however,  to  multiply  arguments 
or  examples  on  this  head.  A  feeble  Executive  implies  a 
feeble  execution  of  the  government.  A  feeble  execution  is 
but  another  phrase  for  a  bad  execution  ;  and  a  government 
ill  executed,  whatever  it  may  be  in  theory,  must  be,  in  prac- 
tice, a  bad  government.  .  .  . 

The  ingredients  which  constitute  energy  in  the  Executive 
are,  first,  unity  ;  secondly,  duration  ;  thirdly,  an  adequate 
provision  for  its  support ;  fourthly,  competent  powers. 

Those  politicians  and  statesmen  who  have  been  the  most 
celebrated  for  the  soundness  of  their  principles  and  for  the 
justice  of  their  views  have  declared  in  favour  of  a  single 
Executive  and  a  numerous  legislature.  They  have,  with 
great  propriety,  considered  energy  as  the  most  necessary 
quahfication  of  the  former,  and  have  regarded  this  as  most 
applicable  to  power  in  a  single  hand  ;  while  they  have,  with 
equal  propriety,  considered  the  latter  as  best  adapted  to 
deliberation  and  wisdom,  and  best  calculated  to  conciliate 
the  confidence  of  the  people  and  to  secure  their  privileges 
and  interests. 

That  unity  is  conducive  to  energy  will  not  be  disputed. 
Decision,  activity,  secrecy,  and  despatch  will  generally 
characterise  the  proceedings  of  one  man  in  a  much  more 
eminent  degree  than  the  proceedings  of  any  great  number  ; 
and  in  proportion  as  the  number  is  increased  these  qualities 
will  be  diminished. 

Great  Britain  is  ruled  by  a  Cabinet,  by  a  number  of  men 
who  are  nominally  equal,  and  the  Prime  Minister  is  their 
President,  he  is  'primus  inter  pares.  The  British  Cabinet 
Ministers  take  resolutions  collectively  and  they  act,  at 
least  in  theory,  with  unanimity.  As  they  act  unanimously, 
there  is  no  individual,  but  only  collective,  responsibility 
for  Cabinet  decisions.  Until  recently  twenty-two  Cabinet 
Ministers  were  collectively  responsible  for  every  important 
decision,  even  if  the  decision  required  high  expert  know- 
ledge which  few,  if  any,  of  them  possessed,  or  if  it  con- 
cerned  only  a  single   Department — such  as   the  Army  or 


362    How  America  became  a  Nation  in  Arms 

Navy — with  which  twenty  Ministers  out  of  twenty-two 
in  the  Cabinet  were  quite  unacquainted.  An  anonymous 
author  wrote  some  years  ago  of  the  British  Cabinet  that 
it  had  many  heads  but  no  head,  many  minds  but  no  mind. 
Government  by  a  crowd  is  a  danger  in  war  time.  Hamilton 
clearly  foresaw  the  weakness  and  danger  of  governing  by 
means  of  a  committee  of  politicians,  especially  in  time  of 
war.  His  opinion  is  so  interesting,  so  weighty,  and  so 
valuable,  and  it  applies  with  such  force  to  Cabinet  Govern- 
ment as  practised  in  Great  Britain  up  to  the  present  crisis, 
that  it  is  worth  while  to  give  it  in  extenso.  He  stated  in 
the  seventieth  letter  of  The  Federalist,  with  regard  to 
government  by  Cabinet,  by  means  of  an  executive  council : 

The  experience  of  other  nations  will  afford  little  instruc- 
tion on  this  head.  As  far,  however,  as  it  teaches  any- 
thing, it  teaches  us  not  to  be  enamoured  of  plurality  in 
the  Executive.  .  .  . 

Wherever  two  or  more  persons  are  engaged  in  any  com- 
mon enterprise  or  pursuit  there  is  always  danger  of  difference 
of  opinion.  If  it  be  a  public  trust  or  office,  in  which  they  are 
clothed  with  equal  dignity  and  authority,  there  is  peculiar 
danger  of  personal  emulation  and  even  animosity.  From 
either,  and  especially  from  all  these  causes,  the  most  bitter 
dissensions  are  apt  to  spring.  Whenever  these  happen,  they 
lessen  the  respectability,  weaken  the  authority,  and  distract 
the  plans  and  operations  of  those  whom  they  divide.  If  they 
should  unfortunately  assail  the  supreme  executive  magis- 
tracy of  a  country,  consisting  of  a  plurality  of  persons,  they 
might  impede  or  frustrate  the  most  important  measures  of 
the  government  in  the  most  critical  emergencies  of  the 
State.  And,  what  is  still  worse,  they  might  split  the  com- 
munity into  the  most  violent  and  irreconcilable  factions, 
adhering  differently  to  the  different  individuals  who  com- 
posed the  magistracy. 

Men  often  oppose  a  thing  merely  because  they  have  had 
no  agency  in  planning  it,  or  because  it  may  have  been 
planned  by  those  whom  they  dislike.  But  if  they  have 
been  consulted  and  have  appeared  to  disapprove,  opposition 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     363 

then  becomes,  in  their  estimation,  an  indispensable  duty  of 
self-love.  ... 

Upon  the  principles  of  a  free  government,  inconveniences 
from  the  source  just  mentioned  must  necessarily  be  sub- 
mitted to  in  the  formation  of  the  legislature  ;  but  it  is  un- 
necessary, and  therefore  unwise,  to  introduce  them  into  the 
constituent  of  the  Executive.  It  is  here,  too,  that  they  may 
be  most  pernicious.  In  the  legislature  promptitude  of 
decision  is  oftener  an  evil  than  a  benefit.  .  .  . 

But  no  favourable  circumstances  palliate  or  atone  for 
the  disadvantages  of  dissension  in  the  executive  depart- 
ment. Here  they  are  pure  and  unmixed.  There  is  no 
point  at  which  they  cease  to  operate.  They  serve  to  em- 
barrass and  weaken  the  execution  of  the  plan  or  measure 
to  which  they  relate,  from  the  first  step  to  the  final  conclu- 
sion of  it.  They  constantly  counteract  those  quahties  in 
the  Executive  which  are  the  most  necessary  ingredients  in  its 
composition,  vigour  and  expedition,  and  this  without  any 
counterbalancing  good.  In  the  conduct  of  war,  in  which 
the  energy  of  the  Executive  is  the  bulwark  of  the  national 
security,  everything  would  be  to  be  apprehended  from  its 
plurality.  .  .  . 

It  must  be  confessed  that  these  observations  apply  with 
principal  weight  to  the  first  case  supposed — that  is,  to  a 
plurality  of  magistrates  of  equal  dignity  and  authority,  a 
scheme,  the  advocates  for  which  are  not  likely  to  form  a 
numerous  sect ;  but  they  apply,  though  not  with  equal, 
yet  with  considerable,  weight,  to  the  project  of  a  council, 
whose  concurrence  is  made  constitutionally  necessary  to 
the  operations  of  the  ostensible  Executive. 

An  artful  cabal  in  that  council  would  be  able  to  distract 
and  to  enervate  the  whole  system  of  administration.  If  no 
such  cabal  should  exist  the  mere  diversity  of  views  and 
opinions  would  alone  bo  sufficient  to  tincture  the  exercise  of 
the  executive  authority  with  a  spirit  of  habitual  feebleness 
and  dilatoriness. 

But  one  of  the  weightiest  objections  to  a  plurahty  in  the 
Executive,  and  which  lies  as  much  against  the  last  as  the 
first  plan,  is  that  it  tends  to  conceal  faults  and  destroy 
responsibihty.    Besponsibihty  is  of  two  kinds — to  censure. 


364     "How  A^nerica  became  a  Nation  in  Arms 

and  to  punishment.  The  first  is  the  more  important  of  the 
two,  especially  in  an  elective  office.  Man,  in  a  public  trust, 
will  much  oftener  act  in  such  a  manner  as  to  render  him 
unworthy  of  being  any  longer  trusted,  than  in  such  a  manner 
as  to  make  him  obnoxious  to  legal  punishment.  But  the 
multiplication  of  the  Executive  adds  to  the  difficulty  of 
detection  in  either  case.  It  often  becomes  impossible, 
amidst  mutual  accusations,  to  determine  on  whom  the  blame 
or  the  punishment  of  a  pernicious  measure,  or  a  series  of 
pernicious  measures,  ought  really  to  fall.  It  is  shifted  from 
one  to  another  with  so  much  dexterity,  and  under  such 
plausible  appearances,  that  the  public  opinion  is  left  in 
suspense  about  the  real  author.  The  circumstances  which 
may  have  led  to  any  national  miscarriage  or  misfortune  are 
sometimes  so  complicated  that,  where  there  are  a  number 
of  actors,  who  may  have  had  different  degrees  and  kinds  of 
agency,  though  we  may  clearly  see  upon  the  whole  that 
there  has  been  mismanagement,  yet  it  may  be  impracticable 
to  pronounce  to  whose  account  the  evil  which  may  have 
been  incurred  is  truly  chargeable. 

'  I  was  overruled  by  my  council.  The  council  were  so 
divided  in  their  opinions  that  it  was  impossible  to  obtain 
any  better  resolution  on  the  point.'  These  and  similar 
pretexts  are  constantly  at  hand,  whether  true  or  false. 
And  who  is  there  that  will  either  take  the  trouble  or  incur  the 
odium  of  a  strict  scrutiny  into  the  secret  springs  of  the 
transaction  ? 

War  is  a  one-man  business.  To  the  founders  of  the 
American  Eepublic  it  seemed  so  essential  and  so  self- 
evident  that  only  a  single  hand  could  direct  the  Army  and 
Navy  efficiently  and  '  with  decision,  activity,  secrecy  and 
despatch  '  that  they  thought  that  the  paragraph  of  the 
Constitution  which  made  the  President  Commander-in- 
Chief  of  both  Services  was  unchallengeable  and  required 
neither  explanation  nor  defence.  That  paragraph  is  curtly 
dismissed  by  Hamilton  in  the  seventy-fourth  letter  of  The 
Federalist,  as  follows  : 

The  President  of  the  United  States  is  to  be  '  Commander- 
in-Chief  of  the  Army  and  Navy  of  the  United  States  and  of 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     365 

the  Militia  of  the  several  States  when  called  into  the  actual 
service  of  the  United  States.'  The  propriety  of  this  provi- 
sion is  so  evident  in  itself,  and  it  is,  at  the  same  time,  so 
consonant  to  the  precedents  of  the  State  constitutions  in 
general,  that  little  need  be  said  to  explain  or  enforce  it. 
Even  those  of  them  which  have  in  other  respects  coupled 
the  chief  magistrate  with  a  council  have  for  the  most  part 
concentrated  the  military  authority  in  him  alone. 

Of  all  the  cares  or  concerns  of  government,  the  direction 
of  war  most  peculiarly  demands  those  qualities  which  dis- 
tinguish the  exercise  of  power  by  a  single  hand.  The  direc- 
tion of  war  implies  the  direction  of  the  common  strength, 
and  the  power  of  directing  and  employing  the  common 
strength  forms  a  usual  and  essential  part  in  the  definition 
of  the  executive  authority. 

War  is  a  one-man  business.  The  maxim  that  a  nation 
at  war  should  be  directed  by  a  single  man,  not  by  a  council, 
which  the  greatest  statesmen  and  soldiers  of  all  times  have 
recognised  and  which  Hamilton  and  Washington  have 
preached,  has  sunk  deeply  into  the  American  mind.  Pre- 
sident Lincoln  illustrated  the  necessity  of  unity  in  the 
direction  of  national  affairs  in  time  of  war  in  his  homely  and 
inimitable  way.  He  wrote  in  his  Message  to  Congress 
of  December  3,  1861  : 

It  has  been  said  that  one  bad  general  is  better  than  two 
good  ones,  and  the  saying  is  true  if  taken  to  mean  no  more 
than  that  an  army  is  better  directed  by  a  single  mind, 
though  inferior,  than  by  two  superior  ones  at  variance  and 
cross-purposes  with  each  other. 

And  the  same  is  true  in  all  joint  operations  wherein  those 
engaged  can  have  none  but  a  common  end  in  view  and  can 
differ  only  as  to  the  choice  of  means.  In  a  storm  at  sea 
no  one  on  board  can  wish  the  ship  to  sink,  and  yet  not 
infrequently  all  go  down  together  because  too  many  will 
direct  and  no  single  mind  can  be  allowed  to  control. 

President  Lincoln,  though  a  great  character  and  a 
great  citizen,  can  scarcely  be  called  an  exceptionally 
great   statesman.     He   certainly   was    not    briUiant.     He 


366    How  America  became  a  Nation  in  Arms 

was  endowed  with  homely  common  sense  and  was  honest, 
unprejudiced,  industrious,  conscientious,  fair-minded,  pains- 
taking, patient,  warm-hearted,  fearless,  determined,  patriotic, 
a  democrat  but  by  no  means  a  demagogue.  He  was  a 
model  citizen  who  quietly  and  resolutely  would  do  his  duty, 
would  do  his  best,  and  who  was  not  afraid  of  responsibility 
if  an  important  decision  had  to  be  taken.  At  the  outbreak 
of  the  Civil  War,  when  all  the  factors  supporting  the  Govern- 
ment's authority  had  broken  down,  President  Lincoln  fell 
back  on  the  Constitution.  He  rather  relied  on  its  spirit 
as  it  appears  in  The  Federalist  than  on  its  wording,  and  he 
did  not  hesitate  to  strain  his  powers  to  the  utmost  in  order 
to  save  the  State.  On  April  15,  immediately  after  the 
bombardment  and  fall  of  Port  Sumter,  he  called  upon  the 
governors  of  the  individual  States  to  raise  75,000  men 
of  State  Militia  in  proportion  to  their  inhabitants  and  to 
place  them  into  the  service  of  the  United  States  and  under 
his  command.  These  75,000  men  were  called  upon  to  serve 
only  for  three  months,  not  because  the  President  or  his 
Cabinet  believed  that  the  War  would  last  only  ninety 
days,  but  because,  according  to  the  Act  of  1795,  the  President 
had  authority  which  permitted  '  the  use  of  the  Militia  so 
as  to  be  called  forth  only  for  thirty  days  after  the  com- 
mencement of  the  then  next  session  of  Congress.' 

A  musty  law  circumscribed  and  hampered  the  President's 
action  but  it  did  not  hamper  it  for  long.  Very  soon  it 
became  evident  that  that  preliminary  measure  was  totally 
insufficient,  that  energy  and  novel  measures  were  required 
to  overcome  the  dangers  which  threatened  the  Northern 
States  from  without  and  from  within.  Kelying  on  the 
spirit  of  the  Constitution  and  on  his  duty  to  defend  the 
Union  at  all  costs.  President  Lincoln,  to  his  eternal  honour, 
did  not  hesitate  to  make  illegal,  but  not  unscrupulous,  use 
of  dictatorial  powers.  On  April  27  he  directed  General 
Scott  to  suspend  the  privilege  of  Habeas  Corpus,  if  necessary, 
in  order  to  be  able  to  deal  with  treason  and  with  opposition 
in  the  Northern  States.     On  May  3  he  decreed  by  procla- 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     367 

mation  that  the  regular  army  should  be  increased  by 
22,714,  or  should  be  more  than  doubled,  and  that  18,000 
seamen  should  be  added  to  the  Navy.  At  the  same  time 
he  called  for  forty  regiments,  composed  of  42,034  volunteers, 
to  serve  during  three  years.  President  Lincoln  candidly 
explained  the  necessity  for  these  high-handed  and  obviously 
illegal  measures  as  follows  in  his  Message  to  Congress  of 
July  4,  1861  : 

.  .  .  Kecurring  to  the  action  of  the  Government,  it  may 
be  stated  that  at  first  a  call  was  made  for  75,000  militia, 
and  rapidly  following  this  a  proclamation  was  issued  for 
closing  the  ports  of  the  insurrectionary  districts  by  proceed- 
ings in  the  nature  of  blockade.  So  far  all  was  believed  to  be 
strictly  legal.  At  this  point  the  insurrectionists  announced 
their  purpose  to  enter  upon  the  practice  of  privateering. 

Other  calls  were  made  for  volunteers  to  serve  for  three 
years,  unless  sooner  discharged,  and  also  for  large  additions 
to  the  regular  army  and  navy.  These  measures,  whether 
strictly  legal  or  not,  were  ventured  upon  under  what  ap- 
peared to  be  a  popular  demand  and  a  public  necessity  ; 
trusting  then,  as  now,  that  Congress  would  readily  ratify 
them.  It  is  believed  that  nothing  has  been  done  beyond 
the  constitutional  competency  of  Congress. 

Soon  after  the  first  call  for  militia  it  was  considered  a 
duty  to  authorise  the  commanding  general  in  proper  cases, 
according  to  his  discretion,  to  suspend  the  privilege  of  the 
writ  of  habeas  corpus,  or,  in  other  words,  to  arrest  and  detain, 
without  resort  to  the  ordinary  processes  and  forms  of  law, 
such  individuals  as  he  might  deem  dangerous  to  the  public 
safety.  This  authority  has  purposely  been  exercised  but 
very  sparingly.  Nevertheless,  the  legahty  and  propriety  of 
what  has  been  done  under  it  are  questioned,  and  the  atten- 
tion of  the  country  has  been  called  to  the  proposition  that 
one  who  has  sworn  to  '  take  care  that  the  laws  be  faithfully 
executed '  should  not  himself  violate  them.  Of  course, 
some  consideration  was  given  to  the  questions  of  power  and 
propriety  before  this  matter  was  acted  upon.  The  whole 
of  the  laws  which  were  required  to  be  faithfully  executed 
were  being  resisted  and  faihng  of  execution  in  nearly  one- 


368    How  America  became  a  Nation  in  Arms 

third  of  the  States.  Must  they  be  allowed  to  finally  fail  of 
execution,  even  had  it  been  perfectly  clear  that  by  the  use 
of  the  means  necessary  to  their  execution  some  single  law, 
made  in  such  extreme  tenderness  of  the  citizen's  liberty 
that,  practically,  it  relieves  more  of  the  guilty  than  of  the 
innocent,  should  to  a  very  limited  extent  be  violated  ?  To 
state  the  question  more  directly,  are  all  the  laws  but  one  to 
be  unexecuted  and  the  government  itself  go  to  pieces  lest  that 
one  be  violated  ?  Even  in  such  a  case  would  not  the  official 
oath  be  broken  if  the  government  should  be  overthrown 
when  it  was  believed  that  disregarding  the  single  law  would 
tend  to  preserve  it  ?  But  it  was  not  believed  that  this 
question  was  presented.  It  was  not  believed  that  any  law 
was  violated.  The  provision  of  the  Constitution  that  '  the 
privilege  of  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus  shall  not  be  suspended 
unless  when,  in  cases  of  rebellion  or  invasion,  the  public 
safety  may  require  it,'  is  equivalent  to  a  provision — is  a 
provision — ^that  such  privilege  may  be  suspended  when,  in 
case  of  rebellion  or  invasion,  the  public  safety  does  require 
it.  It  was  decided  that  we  have  a  case  of  rebellion,  and  that 
the  public  safety  does  require  the  qualified  suspension  of  the 
privilege  of  the  writ  which  was  authorised  to  be  made. 
Now  it  is  insisted  that  Congress,  and  not  the  Executive, 
is  vested  with  this  power.  But  the  Constitution  itself  is 
silent  as  to  which  or  who  is  to  exercise  the  power  ;  and  as 
the  provision  was  plainly  made  for  a  dangerous  emergency,  it 
cannot  be  believed  the  framers  of  the  instrument  intended 
that  in  every  case  the  danger  should  run  its  course  until 
Congress  could  be  called  together,  the  very  assembhng  of 
which  might  be  prevented,  as  was  intended  in  this  case,  by 
the  rebellion. 

Democracy  loves  strength,  loves  plain  speaking,  loves 
a  man.  The  President's  energetic  though  high-handed 
and  unconstitutional  action  was  enthusiastically  approved 
by  the  people  throughout  the  loyal  States,  and  was  later 
on  legalised  by  Congress  by  means  of  a  resolution. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  war  the  Northern^^States^were 
almost  unarmed.  The  Government  had  completely  neg- 
lected the  Army  and  Navy.     In  the  country  was  only  a 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     369 

scanty  supply  of  arms  and  ammunition.  Under  Buchanan's 
presidency  an  incapable,  if  not  a  treacherous,  Secretary  of 
War,  who  later  on  joined  the  Southern  forces,  had  allowed 
large  numbers  of  arms  to  be  removed  from  arsenals  in  the 
North  to  arsenals  in  the  Southern  States,  where  they  were 
seized  by  the  Secessionists.  For  the  supply  of  muskets  the 
Governm.ent  depended  chiefly  on  the  Springfield  Armoury, 
and  upon  that  at  Harper's  Ferry.  The  capacity  of  the  pri- 
vate manufacturers  was  only  a  few  thousand  muskets  a 
year,  and  after  the  destruction  of  the  arsenal  and  armoury 
at  Harper's  Ferry  on  April  19,  1861,  which  contained  15,000 
muskets,  and  which  otherwise  might  have  fallen  into  the 
hands  of  the  Confederates,  the  resources  of  the  Government 
were  seriously  diminished.  The  want  of  arms  limited  the 
call  of  the  President  on  April  15  to  75,000  men,  and  many 
regiments  were  detained  for  a  long  time  in  their  camps  in 
the  different  States  until  muskets  could  be  imported  from 
Europe.  Orders  for  weapons  were  hastily  sent  abroad,  and 
many  inferior  arms  were  imported  at  high  prices.  The 
Springfield  Armoury,  the  capacity  of  which  was  only  about 
25,000  muskets  per  year,  was  rapidly  enlarged,  and  its 
production,  assisted  by  outside  machine  shops,  was  brought 
up  to  about  8000  muskets  per  month  at  the  end  of  1861,  and 
to  about  15,000  per  month  shortly  afterwards.  The  United 
States  had  to  pay  for  their  neglect  of  military  preparations 
in  the  past.  Everything  had  laboriously  to  be  created.  - 
Meanwhile  confusion  was  general.  The  Army  which  had 
been  collected  was  merely  a  mob  of  ill-armed  men.  During 
1861  the  State  of  Indiana,  for  instance,  had  raised  and  sent 
into  the  field  in  round  numbers  60,000  men,  of  whom  58,500 
were  infantry.  The  statement  shown  in  the  table  on 
page  370,  taken  from  '  Appleton's  Annual  Cyclopaedia,' 
shows  what  arms  they  received  during  the  year. 

In  their  need,  anything  that  had  a  barrel  was  used  to 
arm  their  troops.  The  Southern  States  even  fell  back  upon 
shot-guns  and  ancient  fowling-pieces.  Gradually  order  was 
evolved  out  of  chaos.     The  inborn  energy  and  talent  for 

2  B 


370    TJow  America  became  a  Nation  in  Arms 

organisation  of  the  race  asserted  themselves.  The  North 
was  far  superior  to  the  South  in  population,  wealth, 
machinery,  and  appliances  of  every  kind.  In  the  course  of 
time  a  large,  well-organised,  and  well-equipped  army  arose. 
At  the  begirming  of  1862  the  Southern  States  were 
threatened  with  invasion  by  large  armies.  A  great  forward 
movement  of  the  Northern  forces  was  ordered  to  begin  on 
February  22,  and  rapid  progress  was  being  made.  Forts 
Henry  and  Donelson  were  rapidly  captured  from  the  rebels, 
Bowling  Green  and  Columbus  had  to  be  evacuated,  and 


Muskets  and  Rifles. 

Prussian  muskets 

4,006 

United  States  rifles 

5,290 

Padrei  rifles 

5,000 

Belgian  rifles 

957 

New  percussion  muskets 

7,299 

Altered  percussion  muskets 

8,800 

Long-range  rifles  . 

600 

Springfiekl  rifles  . 

1,830 

Short  Enfields      . 

960 

Long  Enfields 

13,898 

Saxony  rifles 

1,000 

Austrian  rifles,  -54  cal. 

3,822 

Mississippi  rifles,  -54  cal. 

362 

Nashville  surrendered.  The  entire  line  of  defence  formed 
by  the  Southern  States  towards  the  west  was  swept  away, 
and  a  march  by  the  Northern  troops  into  the  heart  of  the 
South-western  States  seemed  imminent.  Consternation 
seized  upon  the  Southern  people.  The  Southern  Army  of 
1861  was  composed  chiefly  of  volunteers  who  had  enlisted 
for  twelve  months.  The  voluntary  system  had  yielded 
all  it  could  yield.  It  became  clear  that  the  Southern  States 
could  not  successfully  be  defended  by  volunteers  against  the 
North,  that  national  and  compulsory  service  was  needed. 
Tlie  Southern  Government  was  aroused  to  action,  and  with- 
out hesitation  President  Jefferson  Davis  sent  a  message 
to  the  Confederate  Congress,  in  which  he  laid  down  that  it 
was  the  duty  of  all  citizens  to  defend  the  State,  and  in  which 
he  demanded  the  introduction  of  conscription  for  all  men 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanshijy     371 

between  eighteen  and  thirty-five  years.    This  most  important 
document  was  worded  as  follows  : 


To  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives  of  the 
Confederate  States 

The  operation  of  the  various  laws  now  in  force  for  raising 
armies  has  exhibited  the  necessity  for  reform.  The  frequent 
changes  and  amendments  which  have  been  made  have 
rendered  the  system  so  complicated  as  to  make  it  often  quite 
difficult  to  determine  what  the  law  really  is,  and  to  what 
extent  prior  amendments  are  modified  by  more  recent 
legislation. 

There  is  also  embarrassment  from  conflict  between  State 
and  Confederate  legislation.  I  am  happy  to  assure  you  of 
the  entire  harmony  of  purpose  and  cordiality  of  feeling 
which  has  continued  to  exist  between  myself  and  the 
executives  of  the  several  States  ;  and  it  is  to  this  cause 
that  our  success  in  keeping  adequate  forces  in  the  field  is  to 
be  attributed. 

These  reasons  would  suffice  for  inviting  your  earnest 
attention  to  the  necessity  of  some  simple  and  general  system 
for  exercising  the  power  of  raising  armies  which  is  vested  in 
Congress  by  the  Constitution. 

But  there  is  another  and  more  important  consideration. 
The  vast  preparations  made  by  the  enemy  for  a  combined 
assault  at  numerous  points  on  our  frontier  and  seaboard 
have  produced  results  that  might  have  been  expected.  They 
have  animated  the  people  with  a  spirit  of  resistance  so 
general,  so  resolute,  and  so  self-sacrificing  that  it  requires 
rather  to  be  regulated  than  to  be  stimulated.  The  right  of 
the  State  to  demand  and  the  duty  of  each  citizen  to  render 
mihtary  service  need  only  to  be  stated  to  be  admitted.  It  is 
not,  however,  a  wise  or  judicious  policy  to  place  in  active 
service  that  portion  of  the  force  of  a  people  which  experience 
has  shown  to  be  necessary  as  a  reserve.  Youths  under  the 
age  of  eighteen  years  require  further  instruction  ;  men  of 
matured  experience  are  needed  for  maintaining  order  and 
good  government  at  home,  and  in  supervising  preparations 
for  rendering  efficient  the  armies  in  the  field.    These  two 


372    How  America  became  a  Nation  in  Arms 

classes  constitute  the  proper  reserve  for  home  defence,  ready 
to  be  called  out  in  case  of  any  emergency,  and  to  be  kept 
in  the  field  only  while  the  emergency  exists. 

But  in  order  to  maintain  this  reserve  intact  it  is  neces- 
sary that  in  a  great  war  like  that  in  which  we  are  now 
engaged  all  persons  of  intermediate  ages  not  legally  exempt 
for  good  cause  should  pay  their  debt  of  military  service  to 
the  country,  that  the  burdens  should  not  fall  exclusively 
on  the  ardent  and  patriotic.  I  therefore  recommend  the 
passage  of  a  law  declaring  that  all  persons  residing  within 
the  Confederate  States  between  the  ages  of  eighteen  and 
thirty-five  years,  and  rightfully  subject  to  military  duty, 
shall  be  held  to  be  in  the  military  service  of  the  Confederate 
States,  and  that  some  plain  and  simple  method  be  adopted 
for  their  prompt  enrolment  and  organisation,  repealing  all 
of  the  legislation  heretofore  enacted  which  would  conflict 
with  the  system  proposed. 

It  will  be  noticed  that  President  Jefferson  Davis  demanded 
not  only  conscription,  but  practically  the  total  surrender  of 
State  rights.  He  wished  the  confederation  of  Southern 
States  to  fight  like  a  single  State,  recognising  that  concen- 
tration increases  strength.  A  Conscription  Act  was  rapidly 
passed  on  April  16,  1862. 

As  conscription  for  all  men  from  eighteen  to  thirty-five 
years  did  not  suffice  to  fill  the  depleted  ranks  of  the  Southern 
Army,  it  was  made  more  rigorous.  An  order  by  Brigadier- 
General  John  H.  Winder  dated  August  1,  1862,  stated  : 

The  obtaining  of  substitutes  through  the  medium  of 
agents  is  strictly  forbidden.  When  such  agents  are  employed, 
the  principal,  the  substitute,  and  the  agent  will  be  impressed 
into  the  military  service,  and  the  money  paid  for  the  sub- 
stitute, and  as  a  reward  to  the  agent,  will  be  confiscated  to 
the  Government.  The  offender  will  also  be  subjected  to 
such  other  imprisonment  as  may  be  imposed  by  a  court 
martial. 

As  desertion  from  the  ranks  had  weakened  the  Southern 
Army,  the  Press  appealed  to  the  citizens  of  the  South  to 


Ch'eat  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     373 

assist  in  the  apprehension  of  deserters  and  stragglers.  All 
men  and  women  in  the  country  were  exhorted  to  '  pursue, 
shame  and  drive  back  to  the  ranks  those  who  have  deserted 
their  colours  and  their  comrades  and  turned  their  backs 
upon  their  country's  service.'  Still  further  exertions  were 
required  to  prevent  the  Northern  troops  invading  the 
Southern  States  in  force.  Hence,  in  September  1862,  the 
Confederate  Congress  passed  another  Act  of  Conscription 
which  called  out  for  military  service  all  men  between  the 
ages  of  thirty-five  and  forty-five.  The  most  important  part 
of  this  Act  was  worded  as  follows  : 


An  Act  to  amend  an  Act  entitled  'An  Act  to  provide  further 
for  the  Public  Defence,''  approved  April  16,  1862. 

The  Congress  of  the  Confederate  States  of  America  do 
enact  That  the  President  be  and  he  is  hereby  authorised  to 
call  out  and  place  in  the  military  service  of  the  Confederate 
States  for  three  years,  unless  the  war  shall  have  been  sooner 
ended,  all  white  men  who  are  residents  of  the  Confederate 
States  between  the  ages  of  thirty-five  and  forty-five  years 
at  the  time  the  call  or  calls  may  be  made,  and  who  are  not 
at  such  time  or  times  legally  exempted  from  military  service  ; 
or  such  part  or  parts  thereof  as,  in  his  judgment,  may  be 
necessary  to  the  public  defence,  such  call  or  calls  to  be  made 
under  the  provisions  and  according  to  the  terms  of  the  Act 
to  which  this  is  an  amendment  ;  and  such  authority  shall 
exist  in  the  President  during  the  present  war  as  to  all 
persons  who  now  are  or  may  hereafter  become  eighteen 
years  of  age  ;  and  when  once  enrolled  all  persons  between 
the  ages  of  eighteen  and  forty-five  years  shall  serve  their 
full  time. 

Years  of  fighting  reduced  the  ranks  of  the  Southern 
armies.  They  could  hold  their  own  against  the  over- 
whelming numbers  of  the  North  only  by  extending  the 
age  limit  of  compulsory  military  service  still  further,  by 
making  conscription  still  more  rigorous.  In  February 
1864  a  general  military  Act  was  passed  which  enrolled  all 


374'    How  America  became  a  Nation  in  Arms 

white   men  from   seventeen  to  iifty  years  in  the  Army. 
It  stated  : 

1 .  That .  all  white  men,  residents  of  the  Confederate 
States,'  between  the  ages  of  seventeen  and  fifty  shall  be 
in  the  military  service  of  the  Confederate  States  during 
the  war. 

2.  That  all  between  the  ages  of  eighteen  and  forty-five 
now  in  service  shall  be  retained  during  the  present  war  in 
the  same  organisations  in  which  they  were  serving  at  the 
passage  of  this  Act,  unless  they  are  regularly  discharged  or 
transferred.  ... 

4.  That  no  person  shall  be  relieved  from  the  operation  of 
this  Act  by  reason  of  having  been  discharged  where  no 
disability  now  exists,  nor  by  reason  of  having  furnished  a 
substitute  ;  but  no  person  who  has  heretofore  been  exempted 
on  account  of  religious  opinions  and  paid  the  required  tax, 
shall  be  required  to  render  military  service. 

5.  That  all  between  seventeen  and  eighteen  years  and 
forty-five  and  fifty  years  of  age  shall  form  a  reserve  corps, 
not  to  serve  out  of  the  State  in  which  they  reside.  .  .  . 

7.  That  any  person  of  the  last-named  failing  to  attend  at 
the  place  of  rendezvous  within  thirty  days,  as  required  by 
the  President,  without  a  sufficient  reason,  shall  be  made  to 
serve  in  the  field  during  the  war. 

The  American  Civil  War  had  begun  in  April  1861.  At 
its  commencement  the  people  in  the  North  had  believed 
that,  owing  to  their  overwhelming  superiority  in  numbers, 
in  wealth,  and  in  resources  of  every  kind,  they  would  be  able 
to  subdue  the  insurgent  States  by  armies  raised  on  the 
voluntary  principle  within  a  reasonable  time.  However, 
the  war  dragged  on  interminably.  Enthusiasm  for  volun- 
teering diminished,  men  became  cool  and  indifferent.  Owing 
to  the  reduced  number  of  workers  wages  rose  very  greatly 
throughout  the  Union,  and  men  turned  rather  to  the  factory 
than  to  the  Army.  Week  by  week  the  expenditure  in  blood 
and  treasure  increased.  At  last  the  people  in  the  North 
began  to  see  the  necessity  of  abandoning  the  voluntary 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     375 

system  and  of  imitating  the  Southern  States  by  introducing 
compulsory  service.  It  will  be  of  interest  to  see  the  way  in 
which  public  opinion  veered  round.  In  his  Eeport  of 
March  17,  1866,  the  Provost-Marshal-General  James  B.  Fry, 
the  head  of  the  great  Eecruiting  Department  of  the  Northern 
armies,  described  this  change  in  opinion  under  the  heading 
'  Pubhc  Eecognition  of  the  Necessity  of  a  General  Conscrip- 
tion,' as  follows  : 

During  the  latter  part  of  1862  the  necessity  for  a  radical 
change  in  the  method  of  raising  troops  in  order  to  prosecute 
the  war  to  a  successful  issue  became  more  and  more  apparent. 
The  demand  for  reinforcements  from  the  various  armies  in 
the  field  steadily  and  largely  exceeded  the  current  supply 
of  men.  The  old  agencies  for  filling  the  ranks  proved  more 
and  more  ineffective.  It  was  evident  that  the  efforts  of  the 
Government  for  the  suppression  of  the  rebellion  would  fail 
without  resort  to  the  unpopular,  but  nevertheless  truly 
republican,  measure  of  conscription.  The  national  authori- 
ties, no  less  than  the  purest -and  wisest  minds  in  Congress, 
and  intelligent  and  patriotic  citizens  throughout  the  country, 
perceived  that,  besides  a  more  reliable,  regular,  and  abundant 
supply  of  men,  other  substantial  benefits  would  be  derived 
from  the  adoption  and  enforcement  of  the  principle  that 
every  citizen,  not  incapacitated  by  physical  or  mental 
disability,  owes  military  service  to  the  country  in  the  hour  of 
extremity.  It  would  effectually  do  away  with  the  unjust 
and  burdensome  disproportion  in  the  number  of  men 
furnished  by  different  States  and  localities. 

But  it  was  not  easy  to  convince  the  public  mind  at  once 
of  the  justice  and  wisdom  of  conscription.  It  was  a  novelty, 
contrary  to  the  traditional  military  policy  of  the  nation. 
The  people  had  become  more  accustomed  to  the  enjoyment 
of  privileges  than  to  the  fulfilment  of  duties  under  the 
General  Government,  and  hence  beheld  the  prospect  of 
compulsory  service  in  the  Army  with  an  unreasonable  dread. 
Among  the  labouring  classes  especially  it  produced  great 
uneasiness.  Fortunately  the  loyal  political  leaders  and 
Press  early  reahsed  the  urgency  of  conscription,  and  by 
judicious  agitation  gradually  reconciled  the  public  to  it. 


370    How  America  became  a  Nation  in  Arms 

When  the  enrolment  Act  was  introduced  in  Congress  in 
the  following  winter  the  patriotic  people  of  the  North 
were  willing  to  see  it  become  a  law. 

Early  in  1863  the  Bill  introducing  conscription  was 
placed  before  Congress  at  Washington,  and  was  discussed 
by  both  Houses.  The  debates  were  brief  and  the  speeches 
delivered  are  most  interesting  and  enlightening  at  the 
present  moment,  when  the  principle  of  conscription  is  still 
discussed  not  only  in  Great  Britain  but  throughout  the 
British  Empire.  Let  us  listen  to  the  principal  arguments 
in  favour  of  conscription. 

jj.,.  Mr.  Dunn,  representative  of  Indiana,  urged  the  necessity 
of  conscription  in  the  following  words  : 

The  necessity  is  upon  us  to  pass  a  Bill  of  this  character. 
We  have  many  regiments  in  the  field  greatly  reduced  in 
numbers.  ...  It  is  due  to  the  gallant  men  remaining  in 
these  regiments  that  their  numbers  should  be  promptly 
filled  up.  This  cannot  be  done  by  voluntary  enlistment, 
on  account  of  the  iniiuence  of  just  such  speeches  as  are  made 
here  and  elsewhere  denouncing  the  war  ;  many  make  a 
clamour  against  the  war  as  an  excuse  for  not  volunteering. 
Moreover,  a  draft  is  the  cheapest,  fairest,  and  best  mode  of 
raising  troops.  It  is  to  be  regretted  this  mode  was  not 
adopted  at  first.  Then  all  would  have  shared  alike  in  the 
perils  and  glories  of  the  war.  Every  family  would  have 
been  represented  in  the  field,  and  every  soldier  would  have 
had  sympathy  and  support  from  his  friends  at  home.  The 
passage  of  this  Bill  will  give  evidence  to  the  rebels  that  the 
nation  is  summoning  all  its  energies  to  the  conflict,  and  it  will 
be  proof  to  foreign  nations  that  we  are  prepared  to  meet 
promptly  any  intermeddling  in  our  domestic  strife.  The 
Government  has  a  right  in  war  to  command  the  services  of 
its  citizens,  whom  it  protects  in  war  as  well  as  in  peace. 
We,  as  legislators,  must  not  shrink  from  the  discharge  of 
our  high  responsibility. 

Mr.  Thomas,  Eepresentative  of  Massachusetts,  stated  : 

For  the  last  six  or  nine  months  a  whole  party — a  strong 
party — has  deliberately  entered  into  a  combination  to  dis- 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     377 

courage,  to  prevent,  and  as  far  as  in  it  lay  to  prohibit,  the 
volunteering  of  the  people  of  the  country  as  soldiers  in  our 
army.  Members  of  that  party  have  gone  from  house  to 
house,  from  town  to  town,  and  from  city  to  city  urging  their 
brethren  not  to  enlist  in  the  armies  of  the  nation,  and  giving 
them  all  sorts  of  reasons  for  that  advice.  .  .  . 

Mr.  Speaker,  this  is  a  terrible  Bill ;  terrible  in  the  powers 
it  confers  upon  the  executive,  terrible  in  the  duty  and  burden 
it  imposes  upon  the  citizen.  I  meet  the  suggestion  by  one 
as  obvious  and  cogent,  and  that  is  that  the  exigency  is  a 
terrible  one  and  calls  for  all  the  powers  with  which  the 
Government  is  invested.  .  .  . 

The  powers  of  Congress,  within  the  scope  of  the  Constitu- 
tion, are  supreme  and  strike  directly  to  the  subject  and  hold 
him  in  its  firm,  its  iron  grasp.  I  repeat  what  at  an  early  day 
I  asserted  upon  this  floor,  that  there  is  not  a  human  being 
within  the  territory  of  the  United  States,  black  or  white, 
bond  or  free,  whom  this  Government  is  not  capable  of 
taking  in  its  right  hand  and  using  for  its  military  service 
whenever  the  defence  of  the  country  requires,  and  of  this 
Congress  alone  must  judge.  The  question  of  use  is  a  question 
of  pohcy  only.  ...  It  is,  in  effect,  a  question  to  this  nation 
of  life  or  death.     We  literally  have  no  choice. 

Mr.  Wilson,  Senator  for  Massachusetts,  said  : 

We  are  now  engaged  in  a  gigantic  struggle  for  the  pre- 
servation of  the  life  of  the  nation.  ...  If  we  mean  to  main- 
tain the  supremacy  of  the  Constitution  and  the  laws,  if  we 
mean  to  preserve  the  unity  of  the  Republic,  if  we  mean 
that  America  shall  live  and  have  a  position  and  name  among 
the  nations,  we  must  fill  the  broken  and  thinned  ranks  of  our 
wasted  battalions. 

The  issue  is  now  clearly  represented  to  the  country  for 
the  acceptance  or  rejection  of  the  American  people  :  an 
inglorious  peace  with  a  dismembered  Union  and  a  broken 
nation,  on  the  one  hand,  or  war  fought  out  until  the  rebellion 
is  crushed  beneath  its  iron  heel.  Patriotism  accepts  the 
bloody  issues  of  war,  rather  than  peace  purchased  with  the 
dismemberment  of  the  Republic  and  the  death  of  the  nation. 

If  we  accept  peace,  disunion,  death,  then  we  may  speedily 


378    How  America  became  a  Nation  in  Arms 

summon  home  again  our  armies  ;  if  we  accept  war,  until  the 
Hag  of  the  Kepubhc  waves  over  every  foot  of  our  united 
country,  then  we  must  see  to  it  that  the  ranks  of  our  armies, 
broken  by  toil,  disease,  and  death,  are  filled  again  with  the 
health  and  vigour  of  hfe.  To  fill  the  thinned  ranks  of  our 
battalions  we  must  again  call  upon  the  people.  The  im- 
mense numbers  already  summoned  to  the  field,  the  scarcity 
and  high  rewards  of  labour,  press  upon  all  of  us  the  convic- 
tion that  the  ranks  of  our  wasted  regiments  cannot  be 
filled  again  by  the  old  system  of  volunteering.  If  volunteers 
will  not  respond  to  the  call  of  the  country,  then  we  must 
resort  to  the  involuntary  system.  .  .  . 

Senator  MacDougall  of  Cahfornia  stated  : 

I  regretted  much,  when  the  war  was  first  organised,  that 
the  conscription  rule  did  not  obtain.  I  went  from  the  ex- 
treme east  to  the  extreme  west  of  the  loyal  States.  I  found 
some  districts  where  some  bold  leaders  brought  out  all  the 
young  men  and  sent  them  or  led  them  to  the  field.  In  other 
districts,  and  they  were  the  most  numerous,  the  people  made 
no  movement  towards  the  maintenance  of  the  war  ;  there 
were  whole  towns  and  cities,  I  may  say,  where  no  one  volun- 
teered to  shoulder  a  musket  and  no  one  offered  to  lead  them 
into  the  service.  The  whole  business  has  been  unequal 
and  wrong  from  the  first.  The  rule  of  conscription  should 
have  been  the  rule  to  bring  out  men  of  all  classes  and  make 
it  equal  throughout  the  country.  .  .  . 

Mr.  Sargent,  Eepresentative  of  California,  said  : 

For  a  want  of  a  general  enrolment  of  the  forces  of  the 
United  States  and  a  systematic  calhng  out  of  those  forces, 
we  have  experienced  all  the  inconveniences  of  a  volunteer 
system,  with  its  enormous  expense,  ill  discipline  and  irregular 
efforts,  and  have  depended  upon  spasmodic  efforts  of  the 
people,  elated  or  depressed  by  the  varying  fortunes  of  war 
or  the  rise  or  fall  of  popular  favourites  in  the  Army.  I 
believe  I  hazard  nothing  in  saying  that  we  should  have  lost 
fewer  men  in  the  field  and  from  disease  and  been  much 
nearer  the  end  of  this  destructive  war  had  we  earher  availed 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanshi'p     379 

ourselves  of  the  power  conferred  by  the  Constitution  and  at 
last  proposed  to  be  adopted  by  this  Bill.  For  short  and 
irregular  efforts  no  force  can  be  better  than  a  volunteer 
army.  With  brave  and  skilful  officers  and  a  short  and  active 
term  of  service,  volunteer  troops  are  highly  efficient.  But 
when  a  war  is  to  last  for  years,  as  this  will  have  done,  how- 
ever soon  we  may  see  its  termination,  it  must  depend  for 
its  success  upon  regular  and  systematic  forces.  .  .  .  Such 
lilling  up  is  not  possible  to  any  degree  under  the  volunteer 
system,  as  the  Government  has  had  occasion  to  know  in 
this  war.  .  .  . 

The  practical  operation  of  the  volunteer  system  has  been 
that  the  earnest  lovers  of  the  country  among  the  people,  the 
haters  of  the  rebellion,  the  noblest  and  best  of  our  citizens, 
have  left  their  homes  to  engage  in  this  war  to  sustain  the 
Constitution  ;  while  the  enemies  of  civil  liberty,  those  who 
hate  the  Government  and  desire  its  failure  in  this  struggle, 
have  stayed  at  home  to  embarrass  it  by  discontent  and 
clamour.  By  this  sj^stem  we  have  had  the  loyal  States 
drained  of  those  who  could  be  relied  upon  in  all  political  con- 
tests to  sustain  the  Government ;  going  forth  to  fight  the 
manly  foe  in  front,  the  covert  foe  left  behind  has  opened  a 
fire  in  the  rear.  Under  the  garb  of  democracy,  a  name  that 
has  been  so  defiled  and  prostituted  that  it  has  become  synony- 
mous with  treason  and  should  henceforth  be  a  byword  and 
hissing  to  the  American  people,  these  demagogues  in  this  hall 
and  out  of  it  have  traduced  the  Government,  misrepresented 
the  motives  of  loyal  men.  .  .  .  The  Bill  goes  upon  the  pre- 
sumption that  every  citizen  not  incapacitated  by  physical 
or  mental  disability  owes  military  service  to  the  country  in  its 
hour  of  extremity,  and  that  it  is  honourable  and  praise- 
worthy to  render  such  service. 

The  views  given  fairly  sum  up  the  opinion  held  by  the 
majority  of  the  American  people  in  the  North  and  by  that  of 
their  representatives  at  Washington  who  passed  the  Conscrip- 
tion Act  without  undue  delay  against  a  rather  substantial 
minority.  The  principal  provisions  of  the  Act  of  March  3, 
1863,  establishing  compulsory  military  service  and  exempt- 
ing certain  citizens,  furnish  so  valuable  and  so  interesting 


380    How  America  became  a  Nation  in  Arms 

a  precedent  to  the  fighting   democracies  that  it  is  worth 
while  giving  them  in  this  place.     We  read  in  the  Act : 

Be  it  enacted  by  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives 
of  the  United  States  of  America  in  Congress  assembled  :  That 
all  able-bodied  male  citizens  of  the  United  States,  and  per- 
sons of  foreign  birth  who  shall  have  declared  on  oath  their 
intention  to  become  citizens  under  and  in  pursuance  of  the 
laws  thereof,  between  the  ages  of  twenty  and  forty-five  years, 
except  as  hereinafter  excepted,  are  hereby  declared  to 
constitute  the  national  forces,  and  shall  be  liable  to  perform 
military  duty  in  the  service  of  the  United  States  when  called 
out  by  the  President  for  that  purpose. 

Section  2.  And  be  it  further  enacted  :  That  the  following 
persons  be  and  they  are  hereby  excepted  and  exempt  from 
the  provisions  of  this  Act,  and  shall  not  be  liable  to  military 
duty  under  the  same,  to  wit  :  Such  as  are  rejected  as  physi- 
cally or  mentally  unfit  for  the  service  ;  also,  first,  the  Vice- 
President  of  the  United  States,  the  heads  of  the  various 
Executive  Departments  of  the  Government,  and  the  Gover- 
nors of  the  several  States.  Second,  the  only  son  liable  to 
military  duty  of  a  widow  dependent  upon  his  labour  for 
support.  Third,  the  only  son  of  aged  or  infirm  parent  or 
parents  dependent  upon  his  labour  for  support.  Fourth, 
where  there  are  two  or  more  sons  of  aged  or  infirm  parents 
subject  to  the  draft,  the  father,  or  if  he  be  dead  the  mother, 
may  elect  which  son  shall  be  exempt.  Fifth,  the  only 
brother  of  children  not  twelve  years  old,  having  neither 
father  nor  mother  dependent  upon  his  labour  for  support. 
Sixth,  the  father  of  motherless  children  under  twelve  years 
of  age  dependent  upon  his  labour  for  support.  Seventh, 
where  there  are  a  father  and  sons  in  the  mihtary  service  of 
the  United  States  as  non-commissioned  officers,  musicians, 
or  privates,  the  residue  of  such  family  and  household,  not 
exceeding  two,  shall  be  exempt.  And  no  person  but  such 
as  herein  excepted  shall  be  exempt.  Provided,  however, 
that  no  person  who  has  been  convicted  of  any  felony  shall 
be  enrolled  or  permitted  to  serve  in  said  forces. 

In  each  district  a  Provost-Marshal,  acting  under  the 
Provost-Marshal- General,    an  examining    surgeon,    and    a 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     381 

commissioner  constituted  the  Board  of  Enrolment.  The 
enrolHng  officers  were  directed  to  enrol  all  able-bodied  per- 
sons within  the  prescribed  ages  and  to  judge  of  age  by  the 
best  evidence  they  could  obtain.  They  were  required  to 
make  two  classes  in  their  returns,  the  first  of  all  men  between 
twenty  and  thirty-five  years,  and  the  second  of  all  between 
thirty-five  and  forty-five  years.  If  we  wish  to  learn  how 
the  Conscription  Act  worked  in  the  unruly  North,  where  an 
enormous  percentage  of  the  population  liable  to  military 
service  consisted  of  immigrant  foreigners  who  often  were 
ill- acquainted  with  the  English  language,  we  should  turn 
to  the  Keport  which  the  Provost-Marshal- General  made  to 
the  Secretary  of  War  on  March  17,  1866.    We  read  : 

The  Act  of  Congress  creating  the  office  of  Provost-Mar- 
shal-General was  approved  March  3, 1863.  I  was  appointed 
to  it  March  17,  1863. 

Within  a  few  weeks  from  that  date  the  network  of  organi- 
sation adopted  under  the  law  was  extended  over  the  loyal 
States  and  the  counties  and  towns  of  the  same,  and  the 
principal  duties  of  the  Bureau  [the  Provost-Marshal- 
General's],  to  wit,  the  arrest  of  deserters,  the  enrolment  of 
the  national  forces  for  draft,  and  the  enlistment  of  volun- 
teers had  been  commenced. 

When  the  Bureau  was  put  in  operation  the  strength  of 
the  Army  was  deemed  inadequate  for  offensive  operations. 
Nearly  400,000  recruits  were  required  to  bring  the  regiments 
and  companies  then  in  service  up  to  the  legal  and  necessary- 
standard.  Disaster  had  been  succeeded  by  inactivity,  and 
the  safety  of  the  country  depended  on  speedy  and  continued 
reinforcement  of  the  Army.  The  insufficiency  of  the  system 
of  recruitment  previously  pursued  had  been  demonstrated, 
and  the  Army  was  diminishing  by  the  ordinary  casualties 
of  war,  but  more  rapidly  by  the  expiration  of  the  terms  for 
which  the  troops  had  engaged  to  serve.  To  meet  the  emer- 
gency a  new  system  of  recruitment  was  inaugurated.  The 
General  Government,  through  this  Bureau,  assumed  direct 
control  of  the  business  which  had  heretofore  been  transacted 
mainly  by  the  State  Governments.  .  .  . 


382    How  America  became  a  Nation  in  Arms 

The  following  is  a  condensed  summary  of  the  results  of 
the  operations  of  this  Bureau  from  its  organisation  to  the 
close  of  the  war  : 

(1)  By  means  of  a  full  and  exact  enrolment  of  all  persons 
liable  to  conscription  under  the  law  of  March  3,  and  its 
amendments,  a  complete  exhibit  of  the  military  resources 
of  the  loyal  States  in  men  was  made,  showing  an  aggregate 
number  of  2,254,063  men,  not  including  1,000,516  soldiers 
actually  under  arms  when  hostilities  ceased. 

(2)  1,120,621  men  were  raised  at  an  average  cost  (on 
account  of  recruitment  exclusive  of  bounties)  of  9-84  dols. 
per  man  ;  while  the  cost  of  recruiting  the  1,356,593  raised 
prior  to  the  organisation  of  the  Bureau  was  34*01  dols.  per 
man.  A  saving  of  over  70  cents  on  the  dollar  in  the  cost  of 
raising  troops  was  thus  effected  under  this  Bureau,  not- 
withstanding the  increase  in  the  price  of  subsistence,  trans- 
portation, rents,  &c.,  during  the  last  two  years  of  the  war. 

(3)  76,526  deserters  were  arrested  and  returned  to  the 
Army. 

The  vigilance  and  energy  of  the  officers  of  the  Bureau  in 
this  branch  of  business  put  an  effectual  check  to  the  wide- 
spread evil  of  desertion,  which  at  one  time  impaired  so  seri- 
ously the  numerical  strength  and  efficiency  of  the  Army. 

(4)  The  quotas  of  men  furnished  by  the  various  parts 
of  the  country  were  equalised  and  a  proportionate  share  of 
military  service  secured  from  each,  thus  removing  the  very 
serious  inequality  of  recruitment  which  had  arisen  during 
the  first  two  years  of  the  war,  and  which,  when  the  Bureau 
was  organised,  had  become  an  almost  insuperable  obstacle 
to  further  progress  in  raising  troops.  .  .  . 

The  introduction  of  compulsion  acted  as  a  powerful 
stimulus  to  voluntary  enlistment  throughout  the  Union,i 
and,  in  consequence  of  this  revival  of  voluntary  enlistment, 
the  number  of  men  compulsorily  enlisted  was  not  as  great 
as  it  might  have  been,  especially  as  the  compulsory  system 
was  not  exploited  to  the  full.  Only  a  comparatively  moderate 
number  of  those  who  by  law  were  declared  to  be  liable  for 

^  This  was  due  to  the  fact  that  the  individual  States  vied  with  one 
another  to  fill  their  quota  so  as  to  make  compulsion  unnecessary. 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     383 

military  service  were  called  upon  to  join  the  Army.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  moral  effect  of  the  passing  of  the  Con- 
scription Act  was  very  far-reaching  and  salutary.  The 
Provost-Marshal-General's  Eeport  stated  : 

The  historian  who  would  trace  accomphshed  results  to 
theirtrue  and  genuine  causes  must  assignto  the  law  constitut- 
ing this  Bureau  a  most  important  place  among  the  agencies 
by  which  the  great  work  of  restoring  the  national  authority 
has  been  so  happily  accomplished.  The  true  turning-point 
of  the  War  was  reached  when  the  first  '  draft  wheel '  began 
to  revolve,  under  the  provisions  of  the  Act  of  March  3, 
1863.  The  general  effect  of  this  law  throughout  the  country 
has  been  highly  favourable  to  loyalty.  No  one  department 
has  brought  its  operations  so  directly  and  closely  home  to 
the  people,  or  has  given  such  a  feeling  of  security,  such  a 
confidence  in  and  such  assurance  of  the  power  of  the  Govern- 
ment to  preserve  itself,  conquer  its  enemies,  and  protect  all 
its  citizens.  Next  to  the  success  of  its  arms,  the  ability  of 
the  Government  to  bring  men  into  the  field  at  its  call,  and 
the  manner  in  which  it  has  been  done  by  this  Bureau  in 
the  execution  of  the  '  enrolment  act,'  in  spite  of  innum- 
erable and  apparently  insuperable  difficulties,  has  best  de- 
monstrated that  power. 

The  Conscription  Act  of  1863  was  a  most  beneficial 
measure,  but  it  had  several  grave  defects.  It  failed  to 
place  upon  the  men  liable  for  military  service  the  duty 
of  coming  forward  without  delay.  Hence  the  Government 
had  to  search  them  out.    The  Official  Eeport  tells  us  : 

Instead  of  endeavouring  to  search  out  and  hunt  up  every 
person  liable  to  military  service  through  the  agency  of  a 
vast  multitude  of  petty  enrolling  officers,  upon  whose  capa- 
city and  fidelity  it  is  not  possible  in  all  cases  to  rely,  I  think 
the  Government  should  impose  its  supreme  demands  directly 
upon  the  people  themselves,  and  require  them,  under  the 
sternest  penalties,  to  report  themselves  for  enrolment. 
If  the  Government  has  a  right  to  the  military  service  of 
its  citizens  in  times  of  public  peril,  rebellion,  and  war,  it 


384    How  America  became  a  Nation  in  Arms 

has  a  right  to  secure  such  services  in  the  simplest,  cheapest, 
and  most  direct  manner. 

Enrolled  men  whose  names  had  been  drawn  from  the 
wheel  for  service  and  who  failed  to  obey  the  call  were  liable 
to  the  extreme  penalty,  for  the  Provost-Marshal-General 
published  the  following  opinion  of  the  Solicitor  of  the  War 
Department  to  all  concerned  : 

When  a  person  has  been  drafted  in  pursuance  of  the 
Enrolment  Act  of  March  3, 1863,  notice  of  such  draft  must  be 
served  within  ten  days  thereafter,  by  a  written  or  printed 
notice,  to  be  served  on  him  personally,  or  by  leaving  a  copy 
at  his  last  place  of  residence,  requiring  him  to  appear  at 
a  designated  rendezvous  to  report  for  duty.  Any  person 
failing  to  report  for  duty  after  notice  left  at  his  last  place 
of  residence  or  served  on  him  personally  without  furnishing 
a  substitute  or  paying  300  dols.,  is  pronounced  by  law  to  be 
a  deserter  ;  he  may  be  arrested  and  held  for  trial  by  court- 
martial  and  sentenced  to  death.  If  a  person,  after  being 
drafted  and  before  receiving  the  notice,  deserts,  it  may  still 
be  served  by  leaving  it  at  his  last  place  of  residence,  and  if 
he  does  not  appear  in  accordance  with  the  notice,  or  furnish 
the  substitute,  or  pay  the  300  dols.,  he  will  be  in  law  a  deser- 
ter, and  must  be  punished  accordingly.  There  is  no  way  or 
manner  in  which  a  person  once  enrolled  can  escape  his  public 
duties,  when  drafted,  whether  present  or  absent,  whether  he 
changes  his  residence  or  absconds  ;  the  rights  of  the  United 
States  against  him  are  secured,  and  it  is  only  by  performance 
of  his  duty  to  the  country  that  he  will  escape  liability  to  be 
treated  as  a  criminal. 

Deserters  were  proceeded  against  with  great  energy. 
Death  sentences  for  desertion  were  not  infrequent,  but 
in  many  cases  they  were  commuted.  Still,  from  the  table 
given  later  on  it  appears  that  261  soldiers  of  the  Northern 
Army  were  executed.  Among  these  were  a  good  many 
deserters. 

The  Union  Government  had  made  the  unfortunate 
mistake  of  allowing  men  who  had  been  enrolled  as  liable 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     385 

for  military  duty  and  who  had  afterwards  been  '  drafted  ' 
for  service  to  escape  their  duties  by  the  undemocratic 
expedient  of  finding  a  substitute  or  of  paying  $300.  That 
provision  was  naturally  much  resented  by  the  poorer  classes, 
and  especially  by  ahen  immigrants  in  the  large  towns. 
The  Opposition  made  the  utmost  use  of  their  opportunity, 
denounced  the  Government,  and  incited  the  masses  to 
resistance.  The  Provost-Marshal-General's  Eeport  tells 
us  that  the  people  were  incited  against  the  Government 
'  by  the  machinations  of  a  few  disloyal  political  leaders, 
aided  by  the  treasonable  utterances  of  corrupt  and  profli- 
gate newspapers  .  .  .  by  a  steady  stream  of  pohtical  poison 
and  arrant  treason.'  While  the  Government  was  obeyed 
in  the  country,  these  incitements  led  to  sanguinary  riots 
among  the  worst  ahen  elements  in  several  towns,  especially 
in  New  York,  Boston,  and  Troy.  A  large  part  of  New 
York  was  during  several  days  devastated  by  the  mob,  and 
the  suppression  of  the  rising  cost  more  than  1000  lives. 
When  order  had  been  re-established  Mr.  Horatio  Seymour, 
the  Governor  of  New  York,  expressed  doubt  whether  con- 
scription was  constitutionally  permissible,  and  asked  Presi- 
dent Lincoln  to  obtain  a  judicial  decision  on  that  point. 
The  President  replied  on  August  7  : 

.  .  .  We  are  contending  with  an  enemy  who,  as  I  under- 
stand, drives  every  able-bodied  man  he  can  reach  into  his 
ranks,  very  much  as  a  butcher  drives  bullocks  into  a  slaugh- 
ter-pen.    No  time  is  wasted,  no  argument  is  used. 

This  produces  an  army  which  will  soon  turn  upon  our 
now  victorious  soldiers  already  in  the  field,  if  they  shall  not 
be  sustained  by  recruits  as  they  should  be.  It  produces  an 
army  with  a  rapidity  not  to  be  matched  on  our  side,  if  we  first 
waste  time  to  re-experiment  with  the  voluntary  system, 
already  deemed  by  Congress,  and  palpably  in  fact,  so  far 
exhausted  as  to  be  inadequate  ;  and  then  more  time  to  ob- 
tain a  court  decision  as  to  whether  the  law  is  constitutional 
which  requires  a  part  of  those  not  now  in  the  service  to 
go  to  the  aid  of  those  who  are  already  in  it,  and  still  more 

2  c 


386    How  America  became  a  Nation  in  Arms 

time  to  determine  with  absolute  certainty  that  we  get  those 
who  are  to  go  in  the  precisely  legal  proportion  to  those  who 
are  not  to  go. 

My  purpose  is  to  be  in  my  action  just  and  constitutional, 
and  yet  practical,  in  performing  the  important  duty  with 
which  I  am  charged — of  maintaining  the  unity  and  the  free 
principles  of  our  common  country. 

Shortly  afterwards  conscription  was  enforced  through- 
out New  York  with  the  energetic,  assistance  of  Governor 
Seymour,  who  clearly  recognised  the  pertinence  of  the  Presi- 
dent's arguments. 

Let  us  now  consider  the  principal  facts  and  figures  relat- 
ing to  the  Civil  War. 

It  began  on  April  12,  1861,  with  the  bombardment  of 
Fort  Sumter  ;  it  ended  on  April  9,  1865,  with  the  surrender 
of  General  Lee  and  his  army  to  General  Grant  at  Appomat- 
tox Court  House.  Except  for  three  days  the  war  lasted 
exactly  four  years.  The  history  of  the  Civil  War  is  at 
the  same  time  inspiring  and  humiliating.  It  is  inspiring 
because  of  the  patriotism,  the  heroism,  the  abihty,  and  the 
resourcefulness  which  were  displayed  by  both  combatants. 
Both  showed  that  it  was  possible  to  improvise  huge  and 
powerful  armies.  It  is  deeply  humiliating  because  the  Civil 
War  is  a  gigantic  monument  of  democratic  improvidence 
and  of  unreadiness,  of  governmental  short-sightedness, 
and  of  criminal  waste,  of  bungling,  and  of  muddle.  The 
North  possessed  so  overwhelming  a  superiority  in  population 
and  in  resources  of  every  kind,  and  had  had  so  ample  a 
warning  of  the  threatening  danger  long  before  the  trouble 
began,  that  the  war  would  probably  never  have  broken  out 
had  the  Northern  statesmen  exercised  in  time  some  ordinary 
foresight  and  caution,  as  they  easily  might  have  done  and 
as  they  ought  to  have  done.  If  some  precautions  had  been 
taken,  and  if,  nevertheless,  the  Southern  States  had  revolted, 
their  subjection  might  have  been  effected  within  a  few 
months  at  a  comparatively  trifling  expenditure  of  blood 
and    treasure.    How    crushing    the    numerical    superiority 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     387 

of  the  North  was  over  the  South  will  be  seen  from  the 
Census  figures  of  1860,  which  supply  the  following  picture  : 

American  Population  in  1860. 

Population  of  Northern  and  Western  States  .  22,339,978 

White  Population  of  Southern  States  .     5,449,463 

Coloured      „  „  „  „  .     3,653,880      9,103,343 


Total 31,443,321 

If  we  compare  the  total  population  of  the  antagonists, 
it  appears  that  the  North  had  twenty-five  inhabitants  to 
every  ten  in  the  South,  both  white  and  coloured.  However, 
as  the  Southern  negroes  did  not  furnish  soldiers  during  the 
war,  we  must  deduct  their  number.  Thus  we  find  that 
for  every  ten  possible  combatants  in  the  South  there  were 
no  fewer  than  forty  in  the  North.  In  1860  the  Northern 
States  had  two-and-a-half  times  as  many  inhabitants  and 
four  times  as  many  men  able  to  bear  arms  as  had  the 
Southern  States.  In  addition,  the  Northern  States  possessed 
infinitely  greater  wealth,  and  infinitely  greater  resources 
of  every  kind,  than  did  their  opponents.  James  Ford 
Ehodes,  in  his  excellent  '  History  of  the  United  States  from 
the  Compromise  of  1850,'  briefly  and  correctly  compared 
their  position  as  follows  : 

The  Union  had  much  greater  wealth,  was  a  country  of  a 
complex  civilisation,  and  boasted  of  its  varied  industries  ; 
it  combined  the  farm,  the  shop,  and  the  factory.  The 
Confederacy  was  but  a  farm,  dependent  on  Europe  and  on 
the  North  for  everything  but  bread  and  meat,  and  before 
the  war  for  much  of  those.  The  North  had  the  money 
market,  and  could  borrow  with  greater  ease  than  the  South. 
It  was  the  iron  age.  The  North  had  done  much  to  develop 
its  wealth  of  iron,  that  potent  aid  of  civilisation,  that  necessity 
of  war  ;  the  South  had  scarcely  touched  its  own  mineral 
resources.  In  nearly  every  Northern  regiment  were  me- 
chanics of  all  kinds  and  men  of  business  training  accustomed 
to  system,  while  the  Southern  army  was  made  up  of  gentle- 
men and  poor  whites,  splendid  fighters  of  rare  courage  and 


388    How  America  became  a  Nation  in  Arms 

striking  devotion,  but  as  a  whole  inferior  in  education  and 
in  a  knowledge  of  the  arts  and  appliances  of  modern  life 
to  the  men  of  the  North.  The  Union  had  the  advantage  of 
the  regular  Army  and  Navy,  of  the  flag,  and  of  the  prestige 
and  machinery  of  the  national  Government ;  the  Ministers 
from  foreign  countries  were  accredited  to  the  United  States  ; 
the  archives  of  what  had  been  the  common  Government 
were  also  in  the  possession  of  the  Union.  .  .  . 

From  the  official  statistics  available  it  appears  that 
the  wealth  of  the  Union  was  in  1860  about  fifteen  times 
as  great  as  that  of  the  Southern  States,  which  were  merely 
producers  of  food  and  raw  materials.  In  the  course  of  the 
war  the  economic  supremacy  of  the  North  increased  very 
greatly,  for  while  the  manufacturing  power  of  the  Northern 
States  expanded  rapidly,  the  economic  position  of  the 
Southern  States  deteriorated  continually.  Northern  warships 
blockaded  the  coast  of  the  South,  and  the  Southerners 
could  neither  sell  their  staple  products — especially  cotton 
and  tobacco — nor  import  the  machines,  weapons,  and 
manufactures  of  every  kind  which  they  needed.  While 
the  North  was  self-supporting  and  could  freely  import 
from  abroad  all  it  required,  the  South  was  thrown  on  its 
own  resources,  and  before  long  the  people  lacked  even  the 
most  essential  things.  Hence  their  sufferings  were  terrible, 
while  the  people  in  the  North  lived  in  relative  comfort 
and  affluence. 

The  people,  both  in  the  South  and  in  the  North,  made 
a  most  gigantic  military  effort.  The  Secretary  of  War 
laid  before  Congress  information  from  which  it  appeared 
that  the  Northern  States  furnished  altogether  the  gigantic 
number  of  2,653,062  soldiers.  If  this  colossal  aggregate 
is  reduced  to  a  three-years'  standard,  they  furnished  no 
less  than  2,129,041  men.  If  we  compare  this  figure  with 
the  total'population  of  the  Northern  States  given  above,  we 
find  that  the  North  sent  to  the  army  10  per  cent,  of  the 
total  population.  The  official  figures  relating  to  the  mili- 
tary effort  of  the  South  are  incomplete  and  not  reliable. 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     389 


Estimates  vary.  However,  when  we  draw  the  average 
of  the  various  estimates  it  appears  that  the  Southern  States 
furnished  to  the  army  about  one  miUion  men,  or  approxi- 
mately 20  per  cent,  of  the  white  population. 

The  war  entailed  colossal  losses  in  men  and  money. 
According  to  the  accounts  furnished  in  the  Official  Kecord 
the  war  losses  of  the  Northern  Army  were  as  follows  : 

Losses  of  Northern  Army 


Volunteers 

Officers 

Jlen 

Total 

Killed  in  action ..... 

4,057 

61,654 

65,711 

Of  wounds  received  in  action 

2,164 

39,912 

42,076 

Of  disease.         ..... 

2,688 

218,806 

221,494 

Accidental  (except  drowned) 

141 

3,869 

4,010 

Drowned    ...... 

102 

4,749 

4,851 

Murdered  ...... 

36 

468 

504 

Killed  after  capture    .... 

14 

89 

103 

Suicide       ...... 

24 

340 

364 

Executed  by  U.S.  military  authorities. 

— 

261 

261 

Executed  by  enemy    .... 

4 

60 

64' 

Sunstroke.          ..... 

5 

301 

306 

Other  known  causes    .... 

61 

1,910 

1,971 

Causes  not  stated        .... 
Aggregate            .... 

28 

11,987 

12,015 

9,324 

344,406 

353,730 

Losses  of  Northern  Regular  Army 
Grand   Aggregate — Regulars   and 

260 

5,538 

5,798 

Volunteers       .... 

9,584 

349,944 

359,528 

These  figures  are  considered  by  many  authorities  to  be 
an  under-statement.  Some  estimate  that  the  Northern 
States  lost  approximately  500,000  Hves  through  the  war. 
Through  death  the  Northern  Armies  lost  about  20  per 
cent,  of  their  men,  and  the  losses  come  to  about  2  per  cent, 
of  the  whole  population.  The  war  losses  of  the  Southern 
States  were  approximately  as  great  as  those  of  the  North. 
Apparently  about  one-half  of  the  Southern  Army  died, 
and  the  deaths  caused  by  the  war  equal  almost  10  per 
cent,  of  the  white  population  of  the  South.  Altogether 
the  American  States  combined  lost  between  700,000  and 
1,000,000  lives  in  four  years'  warfare. 


390    How  America  became  a  Nation  in  Arms 

The  economic  losses  caused  by  the  war  were  enormous. 
Estimates  vary,  but  the  most  rehable  one  gives  the  figure 
of  10,000,000,000  dollars,  or  £2,000,000,000.  The  war-bill 
of  the  United  States  continues,  mounting  up  through  the 
payment  of  pensions  which  entail  at  present  an  expenditure 
of  about  £30,000,000  a  year.  The  Civil  War  crippled  the 
North  financially  for  many  years,  but  it  ruined  the  South. 
Between  1860  and  1870  the  taxable  wealth  of  Virginia 
decreased  from  793,249,681  dollars  to  327,670,503  dol- 
lars ;  that  of  South  Carolina  from  548,138,754  dollars  to 
166,517,591  dollars;  that  of  Georgia  from  645,895,237 
dollars  to  214,535,366  dollars,  &c. 

Let  us  consider  now  the  principal  lessons  of  the  Civil 
War. 

If  the  American  statesmen  had  exercised  merely  reason-, 
able  caution  and  foresight,  the  war  would  probably  never 
have  occurred.  The  principal  towns  of  the  South  lie  near 
the  sea  border  in  spacious  bays  or  up-river.  They  were 
protected  against  an  attack  from  the  sea  by  strong  forts. 
By  adequately  garrisoning  these  forts  in  time,  as  General 
Scott,  the  Head  of  the  Army,  had  advised  President 
Buchanan,  the  American  Government  could  have  dominated 
the  rebellious  towns,  and  could  have  cut  their  connection 
with  the  sea,  as  had  been  done  with  the  best  success  at  the 
time  of  the  nullification  troubles  of  1832.  Unfortunately, 
President  Buchanan  paid  no  attention  to  the  views  of  his 
military  experts. 

Washington  said  in  his  fifth  Annual  Address  :  '  If  we 
desire  to  avoid  insult  we  must  be  able  to  repel  it.  If  we 
desire  to  secure  peace,  it  must  be  known  that  we  are  at  all 
times  ready  for  war.'  He  and  many  of  the  founders  of  the 
Republic  had  pointed  out  in  Tlie  Federalist  and  elsewhere 
that  it  was  dangerous  for  the  country  to  rely  merely  on 
an  untrained  militia,  and  had  urged  the  necessity  of  main- 
taining an  adequate  standing  army.  Unfortunately  their 
warnings  were  not  heeded  by  the  short-sighted  and  unscrupu- 
lous politicians.    Had  the  United  States  possessed  a  small 


Great  Prohle^ns  of  British  Statesmanshi]^     391 

standing  army  ready  for  war  the  Southern  States  would 
scarcely  have  dared  to  rise,  and  had  they  done  so  their 
power  could  easily  have  been  broken.  In  the  opinion  of 
many  American  military  experts  a  standing  army  of  50,000 
men  would  have  sufficed  to  end  the  war  in  a  few  months. 
The  disregard  of  the  views  of  the  military  experts,  and  the 
criminal  levity  and  recklessness  of  self-seeking  politicians 
cost  the  United  States  approximately  a  million  lives  and 
£2,000,000,000.  They  paid  dearly  for  their  previous  improvi- 
dence and  their  neglect  of  military  preparations. 

When  the  bombardment  of  Fort  Sumter  began,  when 
the  army,  navy,  and  the  whole  administrative  and  judicial 
apparatus  broke  down,  the  dissolution  of  the  Great  Eepublic 
seemed  inevitable.  The  Union  was  saved  by  a  man  of 
sterhng  character  but  of  merely  moderate  ability,  by  a  great 
citizen,  but  scarcely  a  statesman  of  the  very  first  rank. 
Abraham  Lincoln  was  animated  by  an  unwavering  faith 
in  the  Union  and  in  the  righteousness  of  its  cause.  Undis- 
mayed by  disaster,  he  rallied  the  waverers,  encouraged 
the  downhearted,  and  created  harmony  among  the  quarrel- 
ling parties.  When  matters  seemed  desperate,  he  mobi- 
lised the  country,  raised  a  huge  army,  and  saved  the  State 
by  his  exertions.  Had  a  Buchanan  or  a  Johnson  been  in 
power  the  Union  would  undoubtedly  have  been  lost.  He 
did  not  hesitate  to  exceed  his  constitutional  powers  and 
to  act  as  a  Dictator  when  the  fate  of  his  country  was  at  stake. 
In  Lord  Bryce's  words,  '  Abraham  Lincoln  wielded  more 
authority  than  any  single  EngHshman  has  done  since  Oliver 
Cromwell.'  One-man  rule  undoubtedly  saved  the  United 
States. 

A  democratic  Government  which  at  any  moment  may 
be  overturned  by  a  hostile  majority  lives  precariously 
by  popularity,  by  votes.  Popularity  is  therefore  indispens- 
able to  the  politicians  in  power.  It  is  more  necessary  and 
more  precious  to  them  than  national  security  and  adminis- 
trative efficiency.  The  result  is  that  a  Government  which 
is  dependent  from  hour  to  hour  for  its  life  on  the  popular 


392    How  Ainerica  became  a  Nation  in  Arms 

will  and  the  popular  whim  must  be  guided  by  the  momontaiy 
moods  and  impulses  of  the  ill-informed  masses.  It  must 
pursue  a  hand-to-mouth  policy.  Fearing  to  endanger  its 
position  by  taking  the  initiative,  it  will,  as  a  rule,  wait  for 
a  popular  demand  for  action.  It  will  often  refuse  to  act 
with  foresight  and  even  with  common  sense,  but  will 
readily  obey  the  clamour  of  the  noisiest  but  least  well- 
informed  section  of  the  Press  and  the  public.  Hence  a 
democratic  Cabinet  cannot  act  with  foresight.  It  cannot 
unite  on  necessary,  wise,  and  far-sighted  action.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  disunited  ministers,  who  are  merely  waiting 
for  a  popular  lead,  will  readily  agree  on  some  useless,  foolish, 
or  even  mischievous  measure,  provided  it  is  popular,  provided 
it  is  demanded  with  sufficient  clamour  and  insistence  by 
the  prejudiced,  and  by  those  who  live  by  pandering  to  the 
short-sightedness  and  to  the  momentary  moods  and  emotions 
of  the  masses  and  act  as  their  spokesmen. 

The  founders  of  the  American  Commonwealth,  like  all 
great  statesmen,  recognised  that  a  Government  can  act 
with  energy,  sagacity,  foresight,  secrecy,  and  despatch — 
qualities  which  are  indispensable  in  critical  times,  and 
especially  in  war — only  if  there  is  absolute  unity  of  purpose, 
if  the  executive  is  in  the  hands  of  a  single  man  who  is 
assisted  by  eminent  experts.  In  Great  Britain  a  Cabinet 
composed  of  twenty-two  personages  was  supreme.  Of  these 
only  one  man.  Lord  Kitchener,  was  a  military  expert.  As, 
according  to  tradition,  the  Cabinet  forms  its  decisions  unani- 
mously, it  is  clear  that  that  unwieldy  and  inexpert  body 
could  act  neither  with  energy  nor  with  secrecy,  neither  with 
despatch  nor  with  foresight.  It  could  scarcely  act  with 
wisdom  or  with  common  sense.  It  is  difficult  to  secure 
agreement  among  twenty-two  men.  As  an  energetic  and 
provident  policy  will  probably  be  opposed  by  the  timorous, 
or  the  short-sighted,  a  compromise  between  action  and 
inaction,  between  wisdom  and  folly,  becomes  necessary,  for 
otherwise  the  Cabinet  will  split.  Hence  a  safe  common- 
place policy,  a  weak  and  dilatory,  shilly-shally  pohcy,  a 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     398 

policy  of  vacillation,  of  make-believe,  and  of  drift,  was 
likely  to  be  adopted.  Foresight  became  impossible.  At 
best  half- measures  were  taken,  and  urgently  necessary 
energetic  action  was  delayed  until  it  was  too  late,  until 
disasters,  which  could  no  longer  be  explained  away,  had 
occurred  and  had  demonstrated  even  to  the  dullest  and  to 
the  most  obstinate  members  of  the  Cabinet  the  folly  of 
their  opposition. 

Frederick  the  Great,  Napoleon,  Nelson,  Moltke,  indeed 
all  great  generals  and  admirals  whose  views  are  known,  have 
stated  that  war  is  a  one-man  business,  that  in  war  the  worst 
possible  direction  is  that  of  a  military  council.  It  is  true 
that  great  commanders  have  often  called  councils  of  war, 
but  they  have  done  so  only  for  advice,  not  for  direction. 
If,  according  to  the  greatest  leaders,  it  is  dangerous  to 
entrust  the  direction  of  military  or  naval  operations  to  a 
council  of  war  composed  of  great  experts,  how  much  more 
dangerousthen  will  it  be  to  entrust  it  to  a  council  of  politicians 
unacquainted  with  war  !  Apparently  the  twenty-two  men 
who  formed  the  late  Cabinet  had  the  supreme  direction  not 
only  of  the  country's  domestic  and  administrative  policy, 
but  that  of  its  armies  and  fleets  as  well.  Herein  lay  the 
reason  that  more  than  once  during  the  war  we  have  seen 
inadequacy,  vacillation,  hesitation,  improvidence,  and 
incompetence ;  that  belated  half-measures  and  quarter- 
measures  have  sometimes  been  taken  when  immediate 
and  energetic  action  was  imperatively  called  for.  Unani- 
mity, energy,  foresight,  secrecy,  and  despatch,  in  one  word, 
efficiency,  is  difficult  enough  in  business  jointly  transacted 
by  twenty-two  men  belonging  to  one  party.  Will  it  be 
easier  to  obtain  unanimity  in  Cabinet  decision,  will  the 
Government  act  with  greater  wisdom,  foresight,  energy, 
and  rapidity  when  there  is  a  Coalition  Cabinet,  when  one 
half  the  Ministers  belong  to  one  party  and  the  other  half 
to  the  late  Opposition  ? 

It  is,  of  course,  highly  desirable  that  in  a  time  of  crisis 
the  country  should  possess  a  strong  national  Government, 


394    How  America  became  a  Nation  in  Arms 

a  Government  representing  not  a  party  but  the  nation  as 
a  whole.  However,  as  a  Cabinet  cannot  possibly  act  with 
unanimity,  foresight,  energy,  rapidity,  and  secrecy,  it  seems 
indispensable  that  the  Cabinet  should  entrust  the  supreme 
direction  of  affairs  to  a  single  strong  man  supported  by  a 
small  number  of  expert  advisers  who  are  not  his  equals 
but  distinctly  his  subordinates.  A  democracy  at  war  I 
requires  for  its  salvation  a  kind  of  Dictator,  an  Abraham 
Lincoln,  and  British  statesmen  will  do  well  to  ponder  over 
the  most  important  views  of  the  founders  of  the  American 
Commonwealth  given  in  the  beginning  of  this  chapter. 

Many  politicians  and  numerous  organs  of  the  Press 
have  urged  that  the  situation  calls  for  a  Dictator,  and  have 
regretted  that  no  man  of  transcendent  ability  has  come 
forward  to  whom  the  Government  could  be  entrusted  for  the 
duration  of  the  War.  It  is,  however,  perhaps  unnecessary 
to  wait  for  the  advent  of  a  Chatham.  Government  by  a 
single  man  of  moderate,  or  even  of  inferior,  ability,  will  prob- 
ably prove  far  more  ef&cient  than  government  by  twenty- 
two  very  able  men,  non-experts,  who  possess,  at  least 
theoretically,  equal  power  and  authority  in  directing  the 
affairs  of  the  nation.  The  British  Constitution  is  unwritten, 
is  fluid,  is  adaptable  to  the  necessities  of  the  moment. 
It  has  been  created  by  gradual  evolution,  and  it  lends  itself 
easily  to  the  creation  of  a  one-man  Government  for  the 
duration  of  the  War.  The  Prime  Minister  need  only  be 
made  solely  responsible  for  the  conduct  of  the  Government 
in  all  its  branches  during  the  War.  By  thus  increasing 
the  power  of  the  Prime  Minister,  the  Cabinet  Ministers 
would  be  made  responsible  merely  for  their  departments. 
They  would  be  responsible  to  the  Prime  Minister,  and  he 
to  Parliament.  Cabinet  Ministers  could  therefore  devote 
themselves  practically  entirely  to  their  administrative 
duties.  They  would  become  the  Prime  Minister's  subordin- 
ates. He  would  assume  sole  responsibility  for  important 
decisions.  He  would  consult  the  Cabinet  Ministers,  but 
could  no  longer  be  hampered  in  his  action  by  the  opposition 


Qtxat  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     395 

of  one  or  several  of  his  colleagues.  The  direction  of  affairs 
would  no  longer  be  in  the  hands  of  an  unwieldy  body,  such 
as  could  not  successfully  direct  any  business.  The  State 
would  possess  a  managing  director,  as  does  every  business, 
and  thus  foresight,  unity,  energy,  despatch,  and  secrecy 
in  action  might  be  secured. 

Many  Englishmen  extol  the  voluntary  system  and 
oppose  compulsory  service  because  in  their  opinion  compul- 
sion, conscription,  is  undemocratic.  Most  of  these  are  quite 
unaware  that  the  greatest,  the  freest,  and  the  most  unruly 
democracy  in  the  world  gladly  submitted  to  conscription 
half  a  century  ago,  and  appear  to  forget  that  France  and 
Switzerland  recognise  that  the  first  duty  of  the  citizen 
consists  in  defending  his  country.  If  the  United  States 
found  conscription  necessary  to  prevent  the  Southern 
States  breaking  away  and  forming  a  government  of  their 
own,  how  much  more  necessary  is  the  abandonment  of 
the  voluntary  system  when  not  merely  the  integrity  but  the 
existence  of  Great  Britain  and  of  the  Empire  is  at  stake  ! 

The  American  War  was  unnecessarily  protracted  because 
the  North  had  never  enough  troops  to  crush  the  rebellion. 
On  July  3,  1862,  President  Lincoln  wrote  despairingly  a 
confidential  letter  to  the  Governors  of  various  States  worded 
as  follows  : 

I  should  not  want  the  half  of  300,000  new  troops  if  I 
could  have  them  now.  If  I  had  50,000  additional  troops 
here  now,  I  believe  I  could  substantially  close  the  War  in 
two  weeks.  But  time  is  everything,  and  if  I  get  50,000  new 
men  in  a  month  I  shall  have  lost  20,000  old  ones  during  the 
same  month,  having  gained  only  30,000,  with  the  difference 
between  old  and  new  troops  still  against  me.  The  quicker 
you  send,  the  fewer  you  will  have  to  send.  Time  is  every- 
thing.    Please  act  in  view  of  this.  .  .  . 

While  the  Southern  States  armed  their  whole  able-bodied 
population  at  an  early  date,  the  Northern  States  were  late 
in  introducing  conscription.     Besides,  conscription  was  with 


396    How  America  became  a  Nation  in  Arms 

them  only  a  half-measure,  as  has  been  shown.  They  in- 
troduced it  only  on  March  3,  1863,  two  years  after  the 
outbreak  of  the  war,  and  as  they  failed  to  arm  all  available 
men  the  war  dragged  on  for  two  whole  years  after  conscrip- 
tion had  been  introduced.  The  four-fold  superiority  in 
able-bodied  men  and  the  fifteen-fold  superiority  in  wealth 
would  undoubtedly  have  given  to  the  Northern  States  a 
rapid  and  complete  victory  had  they  acted  with  their  entire 
national  strength  at  the  outset. 

The  United  Kingdom  and  the  British  Empire  have  made 
enormous  efforts,  but  greater  ones  will  be  needed.  The 
United  States  have  provided  this  country  with  a  great  and 
inspiring  precedent.  The  Northern  States  placed  10  per 
cent,  and  the  Southern  States  20  per  cent,  of  their  entire 
population  in  the  field,  as  has  been  shown  on  another  page. 
If  Great  Britain  should  follow  the  example  of  the  Northern 
States  she  alone  should  be  able  to  raise  4,500,000  men. 
If  she  should  follow  the  example  of  the  South  she  should  be 
able  to  provide  9,000,000  soldiers.  The  British  losses  during 
the  first  years  of  war  have  been  appalling,  but  they  are  small 
if  compared  with  those  incurred  by  the  Americans  in  the 
Civil  War.  If  Great  Britain  should  lose  men  at  the  same 
rate  as  the  Northern  States,  her  dead  would  number  about 
1,000,000.  At  the  proportion  of  the  Southern  States  her 
dead  would  number  about  4,000,000.  Great  Britain  and 
her  daughter-States  have  an  opportunity  of  demonstrating 
to  the  world  that  they  have  as  much  energy,  resourcefulness, 
patriotism,  and  vitality  as  the  men  who  laid  down  their  lives 
in  the  terrible  campaign  of  1861-65.  If  the  United  States 
were  ready  to  make  the  greatest  sacrifices  for  preserving 
their  Union,  the  United  Kingdom  and  the  Dominions  shoula 
be  willing  to  make  sacrifices  at  least  as  great  for  the  sake  of 
their  existence. 

The  story  of  the  Civil  War  provides  invaluable  lessons 
to  this  country.  It  shows  that  the  United  States  were 
saved  by  two  factors,  by  one-man  government  and  by 
conscription.    It  shows  that  far  greater  exertions  than  those 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     397 

made  hitherto  are  wanted  by  Motherland  and  Emph'e — and 
that  they  can  be  made.  It  shows  that  the  sooner  con- 
scription is  introduced  throughout  the  Empire,  the  more 
energetically  national  service  is  enforced,  and  the  more  fully 
the  whole  manhood  of  the  Empire  States  is  employed  in 
the  War,  the  smaller  will  be  its  cost  in  blood  and  money,  and 
the  sooner  it  will  be  over.  At  the  same  time,  the  Civil 
War  furnishes  the  gravest  warnings  to  the  United  States. 
It  should  show  them  the  danger  of  unpreparedness.  The 
European  crisis  may  become  their  crisis  as  well. 

At  the  dedication  of  the  Soldiers'  Cemetery  in  1863, 
Abraham  Lincoln  pronounced  the  following  immortal 
words  : 

It  is  for  us  to  be  here  dedicated  to  the  great  task  remaining 
before  us — that  from  these  honoured  dead  we  take  increased 
devotion  to  that  cause  for  which  they  gave  the  last  full 
measure  of  devotion — that  we  here  highly  resolve  that  these 
dead  shall  not  have  died  in  vain,  that  this  nation  under 
God  shall  have  a  new  birth  of  freedom,  and  that  government 
of  the  people,  by  the  people,  for  the  people,  shall  not  perish 
from  the  earth. 

These  words  are  known  by  heart  by  every  American 
schoolboy.  They  may  well  serve  as  a  memento  and  as  a 
motto  to  Englishmen  of  the  present  generation  and  inspire 
them  in  the  heavy  task  which  lies  before  them. 


CHAPTER  XI 

AN   ANGLO-AMERICAN    REUNION  ^ 

On  Christmas  Eve,  1814,  iii  the  old  Carthusian  Convent  in 
the  city  of  Ghent,  a  peace  was  signed  which  brought  to  an 
end  the  Anglo-American  War  of  1812-14,  and  on  Christmas 
Eve,  1914,  occurred  the  one  hundredth  anniversary  of  that 
memorable  event.  To  celebrate  worthily  the  Hundred 
Years'  Peace  between  the  British  nation  and  the  United 
States  powerful  committees  were  formed  in  the  United 
States,  in  Canada,  and  in  this  country,  and  they  resolved 
to  observe  it  by  religious  services  and  various  festivities, 
by  purchasing,  by  popular  subscription,  Sulgrave  Manor, 
Washington's  ancestral  home  in  England,  by  placing  a 
statue  of  George  Washington  in  Westminster  Abbey,  by 
erecting  monumental  arches  and  columns  on  the  United 
States-Canadian  boundary,  by  erecting  imposing  memorial 
buildings  in  London,  New  York,  and  elsewhere,  by  creating 
a  park  at  the  Niagara  Falls  and  a  toll-free  International 
Peace  Bridge  over  the  Niagara  River  which  separates  the 
United  States  from  Canada,  and  by  giving  prizes  for 
improved  text-books  on  Anglo-American  history,  designed 
to  improve  relations  between  the  two  countries.  Senator 
Burton  introduced  a  Bill  in  the  United  States  Senate  pro- 
viding for  the  creation  of  a  Peace  Celebration  Committee, 
and  appropriating  £1,500,000  to  be  spent  on  the  celebration 
provided  that  the  nations  of  the  British  Empire  would 
furnish  '  such  sum  or  sums  as  will  equal  the  amount  or 

^  The  Nineteenth  Century  and  After,  September,  1913. 
398 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     399 

amounts  thus  appropriated.'     The  War  has  interfered  with 
the  planned  celebration,  and  perhaps  it  is  for  the  best. 

The  promoters  of  the  movement  obviously  intended  to 
celebrate  the  Hundred  Years'  Peace  by  improving  the 
relations  between  the  British  and  American  peoples,  and 
they  were  prepared  to  spend  money  lavishly  for  that  purpose. 
But  would  they  have  achieved  their  aim  by  giving  large 
commissions  to  a  number  of  sculptors,  architects,  and  monu- 
mental masons,  who  might  only  have  succeeded  in  producing 
monumental  eyesores,  and  by  creating  on  the  Niagara 
frontier  a  park  and  a  toll-free  Peace  Bridge  ?  The  Niagara 
is  the  American  Blackpool.  It  is  visited  every  year  by  more 
than  a  million  cheap  trippers,  who  are  conveyed  there  at 
a  very  small  price  in  railway  trains  which  are  crowded  to 
their  utmost  capacity.  Apart  from  the  two  railway  bridges 
there  is  akeady  an  excellent  passenger  bridge  over  the 
Niagara  which  people  can  cross  by  electric  tram  for  the 
modest  sum  of  ten  cents.  Did  the  promoters  of  the  peace 
celebrations  seriously  believe  that  they  could  bridge  the  gulf 
which  until  lately  mifortmiately  still  divided  the  British 
and  American  nations  by  constructing  promiscuously  and 
at  very  large  expense  a  number  of  imposing  and  possibly 
unbeautiful  stone  monuments  and  a  totally  unnecessary 
bridge,  which  would  have  no  practical  benefit  except  that 
of  saving  the  trifling  sum  of  ten  cents  per  head  to  swarms 
of  hilarious  excursionists,  who,  anxious  to  see  the  sights 
on  the  other  side,  or  to  get  something  to  eat,  would  rush 
across  the  toll-free  bridge  without  giving  a  moment's 
thought  to  its  symbolical  meaning  ?  Were  not  the  excellent 
people  on  the  Peace  Celebration  Committees  bent  upon 
spending  their  money  and  their  energy  in  the  wrong 
direction  ? 

On  Christmas  Eve  the  angels  sang  *  On  earth  peace, 
goodwill  toward  men.'  The  Peace  of  Ghent  was  most 
auspiciously  signed  on  Christmas  Eve,  and  the  idea  of 
celebrating  its  centenary  by  taking  steps  which  would 
increase   the  goodwill  between  the  two  great  branches  of 


400  An  Anglo-American  Reunion 

the  Anglo-Saxon  race  and  secure  their  peace  for  all  time 
was  excellent.  However,  experience  teaches  us  that  peace 
and  goodwill  between  nations  cannot  be  secured  by  wasting 
money  on  stone  monuments  and  bridges  and  that  inter- 
national agitation  by  private  committees  does  httle  to  bring 
nations  together.  From  the  invasion  by  William  the 
Conqueror  in  1066  to  the  surrender  of  Fashoda  in  1898 
England  and  France  have  passionately  hated  one  another 
and  have  almost  incessantly  been  at  war.  Yet  to-day 
France  and  Great  Britain  are  excellent  friends.  How  has 
that  marvellous  and  almost  incredible  change  been  brought 
about  ?  By  the  Anglo-French  Agreement  of  April  8,  1904, 
concluded  between  Lord  Lansdowne  and  Monsieur  Delcasse, 
which  settled  all  outstanding  questions  and  abohshed  all 
friction  between  the  two  nations,  and  by  the  conclusion  of 
an  understanding  whereby  the  two  countries  have  resolved 
to  support  one  another  in  case  of  need.  Through  the  action 
of  their  leading  statesmen,  France  and  Great  Britain  have 
discovered  that  they  need  one  another  and  that  they  ought, 
in  their  own  interest,  to  support  one  another.  The  long- 
continued  efforts  of  well-meaning  individuals  in  France 
and  Great  Britain  to  bring  the  two  countries  together  proved 
fruitless.  It  is  worth  noting  that  France  and  Great  Britain 
had  become  firm  friends  long  before  the  great  War,  although 
many  of  the  text-books  used  in  the  French  schools  still 
described  Great  Britain  as  the  hereditary  enemy  of  France, 
and  although  many  of  the  books  used  in  the  British  schools 
reciprocated  the  compHment. 

After  all,  the  influence  of  well-disposed  private  indi- 
viduals, of  bodies  such  as  Chambers  of  Commerce,  and  of 
the  schools  is  very  much  overrated.  Nowadays  the  people 
receive  their  political  education  not  from  schoolmasters 
and  social  leaders  but  from  the  Press.  The  newspapers 
exercise  a  far  more  powerful  influence  upon  public  opinion 
than  school  and  society  combined.  Diplomacy,  the  actions 
of  statesmen,  not  schoolmasters  and  social  leaders,  brought 
France  and  Great  Britain  together  overnight,  and  soon  the 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     401 

French  and  British  nations  unlearnt  what  they  had  been 
taught  about  one  another  in  the  schools,  and  learnt  to 
respect  and  trust  one  another,  and,  in  case  of  need,  to  defend 
one  another. 

If  statesmanship  was  able  to  bring  together  France  and 
Great  Britain,  two  nations  of  different  race,  different  ideas, 
different  habits,  different  thought,  and  different  speech, 
which  have  fought  one  another  almost  unceasingly  during 
nine  centuries,  it  should  surely  not  be  impossible  to  bring 
the  United  States  and  Great  Britain  once  more  together  by 
the  conclusion  of  a  second  and  final  peace  treaty,  by  a  treaty 
whereby  the  two  great  Anglo-Saxon  nations  might  pledge 
themselves  to  support  one  another  in  perpetuity  in  case 
of  a  great  emergency,  by  a  treaty  which  would  most  fitly 
be  concluded  on  the  next  anniversary  of  the  Treaty  of 
Ghent,  and  which  would  secure  their  peace  and  security 
practically  for  all  time.  That  would,  I  venture  to  assert, 
be  its  most  appropriate  celebration.  I  shall  endeavour  to 
show  the  necessity  of  such  a  treaty  in  the  following  pages, 
but  before  doing  so  I  think  I  ought  to  deal  briefly  with 
the  causes  which  until  recently  have  kept  the  two  nations 
asunder. 

The  fact  that  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  have 
been  at  war  has  been  almost  forgotten  in  this  country,  but 
it  is  keenly  remembered  in  America.  That  is  only  natural. 
In  the  course  of  her  long  and  chequered  history  Great  Britain 
has  been  at  war  with  many  powerful  nations,  but  the  United 
States  have  had  only  one  great  foreign  war,  and,  owing  to 
their  geographical  position,  they  have  had  hitherto  a  possible 
enemy  only  in  that  nation  which  is  supreme  at  sea.  If 
the  American  history-books  had  not  contained  long  and 
highly-coloured  accounts  of  '  America's  fight  for  freedom 
against  England's  tyranny,'  and  of  '  America's  heroism 
and  England's  treachery,'  they  would  have  made  very  dull 
and  uninspiring  reading  indeed. 

National  patriotism  demands  to  be  inflamed  by  the  heroic 
deeds  of  one's  ancestors.     The  Americans  have  every  reason 

2  D 


402  An  Anglo-American  Reunion 

to  be  proud  of  their  fight  against  England,  and  it  is  only- 
right  and  proper  that  they  have  made  the  most  of  it  and  so 
strengthened  their  spirit  of  patriotism  and  of  nationalism. 
However,  although  all  Americans  are  proud  of  their  victory 
over  England,  a  large  and  constantly  growing  number  of 
them  have  begun  to  recognise  that  the  Enghsh  nation  is 
not  a  nation  of  tj^rants  and  of  inhuman  monsters,  that  at 
the  time  of  the  American  Eevolution  not  all  the  wrong  was 
on  the  side  of  England  and  all  the  right  on  that  of  the 
American  Colonists,  that  the  war  was  caused  rather  by 
mutual  misunderstandings  than  by  the  evil  dispositions  of 
the  English  Government  and  the  English  people,  and  there- 
fore they  feel  a  little  ashamed  of  the  patriotic  exuberance 
of  some  of  their  countrymen. 

Nations  are  usually  welded  together  by  war.  Without 
the  Anglo-American  war  there  might  have  been  American 
States,  but  these  w^ould  scarcely  have  formed  a  firmly  knit 
American  State  and  an  American  nation.  Besides,  no 
great  State,  and  especially  no  great  democratic  State,  and 
no  great  federation  of  States,  has  ever  been  established 
without  war.  In  every  family  of  strong,  healthy,  and 
high-spirited  boys  there  are  fights.  However,  these  do  not 
lead  to  eternal  enmity  or  to  a  permanent  estrangement, 
but  to  increased  mutual  respect  and  to  a  better  understand- 
ing. There  have  been  great  fraternal  fights  in  Great  Britain, 
Germany,  Switzerland,  France,  and  in  the  United  States 
themselves,  and  it  was  only  natural  that  there  should  have 
been  such  a  fight  between  the  United  States  and  Great 
Britain.  Lastly,  the  losses  and  sufferings  which  the  Anglo- 
American  war  caused  to  the  Americans  have  been  much 
exaggerated.  When  I  was  in  the  United  States  I  was 
seriously  informed  by  eminent  and  competent  men  that  the 
yearly  celebration  of  the  Fourth  of  July,  the  day  of  the 
Declaration  of  Independence,  when  patriotism  impels 
Americans  to  let  off  in  the  streets  fireworks  and  revolvers, 
had  in  the  course  of  time  claimed  a  heavier  hecatomb  of 
life  than  the  Anglo-American  war. 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     403 

In  the  American  school  books  Great  Britain  is  usually 
described  as  the  hereditary  enemy  of  the  United  States. 
It  is  true  that  much  bitterness  against  the  United  States 
prevailed  in  England  long  after  the  conclusion  of  the  Anglo- 
American  Peace  Treaty.  It  was  only  natural  that  the  loss 
of  our  greatest  possession  created  abiding  resentment, 
especially  as  Americans  kept  open  the  sore  by  numerous 
provocations  and  by  frequent  endeavours  to  damage  Great 
Britain  and  Canada.  Of  course  provocation  met  with 
counter  provocation.  However,  it  should  in  fairness  be 
remembered  in  the  United  States  that,  notwithstanding 
all  mutual  misunderstandings  and  disputes  which  have 
taken  place  in  the  past,  Great  Britain  has  more  than 
once  acted  as  America's  good  friend.  Great  Britain  has 
preserved  the  United  States  more  than  once  from  the  in- 
tended intervention  of  European  Powers,  she  has  prob- 
ably preserved  them  from  dangerous  wars,  and  she  has 
undoubtedly  been  responsible  for  the  promulgation  and 
the  defence  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  which  has  estab- 
lished the  principle  '  America  for  the  Americans.'  The 
fact  that  Great  Britain  was  responsible  for  the  declaration 
of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  so  important  and  is  at  the  same 
time  so  little  known  both  in  Great  Britain  and  in  the 
United  States  that  it  is  worth  while  to  give  briefly  the 
secret  history  of  that  doctrine,  which  has  become  the 
fmidamental  principle  and  the  sheet  anchor  of  America's 
foreign  policy. 

After  the  Napoleonic  Wars  a  reign  of  reaction  began 
on  the  Continent  of  Europe.  The  Holy  Alliance  strove  to 
destroy  the  democratic  governments  and  institutions  which 
the  revolutionary  period  had  called  into  being  throughout 
the  world,  and  to  introduce  a  universal  despotism.  At 
Verona,  on  November  22,  1822,  the  Powers  which  had 
fought  against  Napoleon  signed  a  secret  treaty,  to  which, 
however,  only  the  names  of  Metternich  (Austria),  Chateau- 
briand (France),  Bemstorff  (Prussia),  and  Nesselrode 
(Kussia)  were  appended,  for  England  refused  to  be  a  party. 


404  An  Anglo-American  Reunion 

The  first  two  Articles  of  this  instrument  are  of  special  interest, 
for  they  read  as  follows  : 

The  undersigned,  specially  authorised  to  make  some 
additions  to  the  treaty  of  the  Holy  Alliance,  after  having 
exchanged  their  respective  credentials,  have  agreed  as 
follows  : 

Article  I.  The  high  contracting  Powers,  being  con- 
vinced that  the  system  of  represantative  government  is 
as  incompatible  with  the  monarchical  principles  as  the 
maxim  of  the  sovereignty  of  the  people  is  with  the  divine 
right,  engage  mutually,  in  the  most  solemn  manner,  to  use 
all  their  efforts  to  put  an  end  to  the  system  of  representative 
government,  in  whatever  country  it  may  exist  in  Europe, 
and  to  prevent  its  being  introduced  in  those  countries  where 
it  is  not  yet  known. 

Article  II.  As  it  cannot  be  doubted  that  the  hberty  of 
the  Press  is  the  most  powerful  means  used  by  the  pretended 
supporters  of  the  rights  of  nations,  to  the  detriment  of  those 
of  Princes,  the  high  contracting  parties  promise  reciprocally 
to  adopt  all  proper  measures  to  suppress  it,  not  only  in  their 
own  States,  but  also  in  the  rest  of  Europe. 

In  Henderson's  '  American  Diplomatic  Questions '  we 
read  : 

The  Congress  adjourned  with  the  understanding  that 
France,  in  the  name  of  the  Holy  Alhes,  should  send  an 
army  into  Spain  '  to  put  an  end  to  the  system  of  repre- 
sentative government '  which  was  strugghng  for  existence 
beyond  the  Pyrenees.  A  French  army,  under  the  Due 
d'Angouleme,  crossed  the  frontier,  and  after  a  feeble 
resistance  from  the  revolutionists  restored  Ferdinand  to  a 
despotic  throne.  The  next  step  of  the  alHes  seemed  to  be 
reasonably  certain — a  movement  agamst  the  South  Amercian 
revolutionists. 

The  advisabihty  of  taking  such  a  step  had  already  been 
broached  at  Vienna,  and  freely  discussed  at  Verona. 
Eeports  of  these  contemplated  movements  in  the  Americas 
had  reached  Washington,  and  had  impressed  the  administra- 
tion with  a  deep  feehng  of  concern.     It  was  feared  that 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     405 

France    might    demand    Cuba    as    a    price    for    restoring 
Ferdinand. 

Through  its  agents  the  British  Government  had  become 
aware  of  the  danger  threatening  the  United  States  from  the 
Continent  of  Europe.  Mr.  Canning,  the  British  Foreign 
Secretary,  sought  an  interview  with  Mr,  Eichard  Eush,  the 
United  States  Minister  to  Great  Britain,  and  Mr.  Eush 
reported  the  gist  of  his  conversation  with  Mr.  Canning 
immediately  to  Mr.  J.  Q.  Adams,  the  Secretary  of  State  at 
Washington.  Mr.  Eush  referred  to  a  note  which  Mr. 
Canning  had  previously  sent  to  the  British  Ambassador  in 
Paris.  In  that  note  the  British  Foreign  Secretary  had 
stated  :  '  As  his  Britannic  Majesty  disclaimed  all  intention 
of  appropriating  to  himself  the  smallest  portion  of  the  late 
Spanish  possessions  in  America,  he,  Mr.  Canning,  was 
satisfied  that  no  attempt  would  be  made  by  France  to  bring 
any  of  Spain's  possessions  under  her  dominion  either  by 
conquest  or  by  cession  from  Spain,'  Commenting  upon 
this  important  note  Mr.  Eush  reported  to  the  United  States 
Secretary  of  State : 

By  this  we  are  to  understand  in  terms  sufficiently 
distinct,  that  Great  Britain  would  not  be  passive  under  such 
an  attempt  by  France,  and  Mr.  Canning,  on  my  having 
referred  to  this  note,  asked  me  what  I  thought  my  Govern- 
ment would  say  to  going  hand  in  hand  with  the  British 
Governmant  in  the  same  sentiment ;  not,  as  he  added,  that 
any  concert  in  action  under  it  could  become  necessary 
between  the  two  countries,  but  that  the  simple  fact  of  our 
being  known  to  hold  the  same  sentiment  would,  he  had  no 
doubt,  by  its  moral  effect,  put  down  the  intention  on  the 
part  of  France,  admitting  that  she  should  ever  entertain 
it.  .  .  .  Eevertmg  to  his  first  idea,  he  again  said  that  he 
hoped  that  France  would  not,  should  even  events  in  the 
Peninsula  be  favourable  to  her,  extend  her  views  to  South 
America  for  the  purpose  of  reducing  the  colonies,  nominally, 
perhaps,  for  Spain,  but  in  effect  to  subserve  ends  of  her 
own ;   but  that,  in  case  she  should  meditate  such  a  policy, 


406  An  Anglo-American  Reunion 

he  was  satistied  that  the  knowledge  of  the  United  States 
being  opposed  to  it,  as  well  as  Great  Britain,  could  not  fail 
to  have  its  influence  in  checking  her  steps.  In  this  way  he 
thought  good  might  be  done  by  prevention,  and  peaceful 
prospects  all  around  increased.  As  to  the  form  in  which 
such  knowledge  might  be  made  to  reach  France,  and  even 
the  other  Powers  of  Europe,  he  said,  in  conclusion,  that 
that  might  probably  be  arranged  in  a  manner  that  would 
be  free  from  objection. 

On  August  20,  a  few  days  after  this  conversation,  Mr. 
Canning  sent  to  Mr.  Eush  a  letter  marked  '  Private  and 
confidential '  in  which  he  said  : 

Before  leaving  town  I  am  desirous  of  bringing  before  you 
in  a  more  distinct,  but  still  in  an  unofficial  and  confidential 
shape,  the  question  which  we  shortly  discussed  the  last 
time  that  I  had  the  pleasure  of  seeing  you.  .  .  .  We  con- 
ceive the  recovery  of  the  American  colonies  by  Spain  to 
be  hopeless.  .  .  .  We  aim  not  at  the  possession  of  any 
portion  of  them  ourselves.  We  could  not  see  any  portion 
of  them  transferred  to  any  other  Power  with  indifference. 
If  these  opinions  and  feelings  are,  as  I  firmly  believe  them 
to  be,  common  to  your  Government  with  ours,  why  should 
we  hesitate  mutually  to  confide  them  to  each  other  and  to 
declare  them  in  the  face  of  the  world  ? 

If  there  be  any  European  Power  which  cherishes  other 
projects,  which  looks  to  a  forcible  enterprise  for  reducing 
the  colonies  to  subjugation,  on  the  behalf  or  in  the  name  of 
Spain,  or  which  meditates  the  acquisition  of  any  part  of 
them  to  itself,  by  cession  or  by  conquest,  such  a  declaration 
on  the  part  of  your  Government  and  ours  would  be  at  once 
the  most  effectual  and  the  least  offensive  mode  of  intimating 
our  joint  disapprobation  of  such  projects.  .  .  .  Nothing 
could  be  more  gratifying  to  me  than  to  join  with  you  in 
such  a  work. 

Commenting  upon  the  foregoing  letter  Mr.  Eush  reported 
to  Mr.  Adams  on  August  23,  1823  : 

.  .  .  The  tone  of  earnestness  in  Mr.  Canning's  note, 
and  the  force  of  some  of  his  expressions,  naturally  start  the 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     407 

inference  that  the  British  Cabinet  cannot  be  without  its 
serious  apprehensions  that  ambitious  enterprises  are  medi- 
tated against  the  independence  of  the  South  American 
States.  Whether  by  France  alone  I  cannot  now  say  on 
any  authentic  grounds. 

On  August  23  Mr.  Canning  sent  to  Mr.  Eush  another 
*  Private  and  confidential '  letter,  in  which  he  said  : 

I  have  received  notice — but  not  such  notice  as  imposes 
upon  me  the  necessity  of  any  immediate  answer  or  proceed- 
ing— that  as  soon,  as  the  military  objects  in  Spain  are 
achieved  (of  which  the  French  expect,  how  justly  I  know 
not,  a  very  speedy  achievement)  a  proposal  will  be  made  for 
a  Congress,  or  some  less  formal  concert  and  consultation, 
especially  upon  the  affairs  of  Spanish  America. 

Mr.  Adams,  the  American  Secretary  of  State,  communi- 
cated the  news  which  he  had  received  from  Mr.  Eush  to 
the  President  of  the  Eepublic,  Mr.  Monroe,  and  President 
Monroe  wrote  for  advice  to  his  eminent  predecessors  in 
office,  Mr.  Jefferson  and  Mr.  Madison,  two  of  the  surviving 
founders  of  the  American  Eepublic,  who  had  co-operated 
with  George  Washington  and  Benjamin  Franklin. 

Mr.  Jefferson  replied  on  October  24,  1823  : 

Our  first  and  fundamental  maxim  should  be,  never  to 
entangle  ourselves  in  the  broils  of  Europe  ;  our  second, 
never  to  suffer  Europe  to  intermeddle  with  cis-Atlantic 
affairs.  America,  North  and  South,  has  a  set  of  interests 
distinct  from  those  of  Europe,  and  particularly  her  own.  .  .  . 
One  nation,  most  of  all,  could  disturb  us  in  this  pursuit ; 
she  now  offers  to  lead,  aid,  and  accompany  us  in  it.  By 
acceding  to  her  proposition  we  detach  her  from  the  bands, 
bring  her  mighty  weight  into  the  scale  of  free  government, 
and  emancipate  a  continent  at  one  stroke,  which  might 
otherwise  hnger  long  in  doubt  and  difficulty.  Great  Britain 
is  the  nation  which  can  do  us  the  most  harm  of  any  one,  or 
all,  on  earth  ;  and  with  har  on  our  side  we  need  not  fear  the 
whole  world.  With  her,  then,  we  should  most  sedulously 
cherish  a  cordial  friendship  ;   and  nothing  would  tend  more 


408  An  Anglo-American  Reunion 

to  knit  our  affoctions  than  to  be  fighting  onc3  more,  side 
by  side,  in  the  same  cause. 

Mr.  Madison  wrote  to  Mr.  Jefferson  on  November  1; 
1823  : 

With  the  British  power  and  navy  combined  with  our 
own  we  hav3  nothing  to  fear  from  the  rest  of  the  world  ; 
and  in  the  great  struggle  of  the  epoch  between  hberty  and 
despotism  we  owe  it  to  ourselves  to  sustain  the  former, 
in  this  hemisphere  at  least. 

From  the  sixth  volume  of  the  '  Memoirs  '  of  Mr.  J.  Qi 
Adams,  who  at  the  time  was  the  United  States  Secretary 
of  State,  we  learn  that  he  did  not  believe  that  the  Holy 
Alliance  had  any  intention  of  ultimately  attacking  the 
United  States  ;  but,  if  they  should  subdue  the  Spanish 
provinces,  they  might  recolonise  them  and  partition  them 
out  among  themselves.  Eussia  might  take  California,  Peru, 
and  Chile ;  France  Mexico,  where  she  had  been  intrigumg 
to  get  a  monarchy  under  a  Prince  of  the  House  of  Bourbon, 
as  well  as  at  Buenos  Ayres ;  and  Great  Britain,  if  she 
could  not  resist  this  course  of  things,  would  take  at  least 
the  island  of  Cuba  as  her  share  of  the  scramble.  Then 
what  would  be  the  situation  of  the  United  States — Eng- 
land holding  Cuba,  and  France  Mexico  ? 

The  danger  that  France,  supported  by  the  Powers  of 
the  Holy  Alliance,  would  interfere  on  the  American  Con- 
tinent was  great,  and  this  was  generally  recognised  in 
America.  In  the  North  American  Beview  for  October, 
1823,  we  read,  for  instance  : 

If  success  should  favour  the  alhed  monarchs,  would  they 
be  satisfied  with  reforming  the  Governmant  of  Spain  ? 
Would  not  the  Spanish  colonies,  as  part  of  the  same  Empire, 
then  demand  their  parental  attention  ?  And  might  not 
the  United  States  be  next  considered  as  deserving  their 
kind  guardianship  ? 

On  December  2,  1823,  President  Monroe  published  his 


Ch'eat  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     409 

annual  message,  which  contains  the  declaration  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine — one  ought  really  in  fairness  to  call  it  the 
Canning-Monroe  Doctrine — in  the  following  words  : 

The  occasion  has  been  judged  prop?r  for  asserting  as  a 
principle  in  which  ths  rights  and  interasts  of  the  United 
States  are  involved,  that  the  American  continents,  by  the 
free  and  independent  condition  which  they  have  assumed 
and  maintain,  are  henceforth  not  to  be  considered  as  subjects 
for  future  colonisation  by  any  European  Powers.  .  .  .  We 
owe  it,  therefore,  to  candour,  and  to  the  amicable  relations 
existing  between  the  United  States  and  those  Powars,  to 
declare  that  we  should  consider  any  attempt  on  their  part 
to  extend  their  system  to  any  portion  of  this  hemisphere 
as  dangerous  to  our  peace  and  safety.  With  the  existing 
colonies  or  dependencies  of  any  European  Power  we  have 
not  interfered  and  shall  not  interfere.  But  with  the  govern- 
ments who  have  declared  their  independence  and  main- 
tained it,  and  whose  independence  we  have,  on  great  con- 
sideration and  on  just  principbs,  acknowledged,  we  could 
not  view  any  interposition  for  the  purpose  of  oppressing 
them,  or  controlhng  in  any  other  manner  their  destiny  by 
any  European  Power,  in  any  other  light  than  as  the  mani- 
fistation  of  an  unfriendly  disposition  toward  the  United 
States. 

After  the  reading  of  President  Monroe's  famous  message 
Mr.  Henry  Clay,  Speaker  of  the  House  of  Representatives, 
caused  the  following  resolution  to  be  introduced  : 

Eesolved  by  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives 
of  the  United  States  of  America  in  Congress  assembled, 
That  the  people  of  these  States  would  not  see,  without 
serious  inquietude,  any  forcible  intervention  by  the  allied 
Powers  of  Europe,  in  behalf  of  Spain,  to  reduce  to  their 
former  subjection  those  parts  of  the  continent  of  America 
which  have  proclaimed  and  estabhshed  for  themselves, 
respectively,  independent  governments,  and  which  have 
been  solemnly  recognised  by  the  United  States. 

Commenting  upon  the  genesis  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine 


410  An  Anglo-American  Reunion 

Mr.  Henderson  wrote  in  his  book,  '  American  Diplomatic 
Questions ' : 

If  England  had,  after  all,  joined  the  allies  in  their  schemes 
it  is  much  to  be  doubted  whether  the  President's  message 
of  1823  would  have  seriously  embarrassed  them  in  the 
ultimate  perfection  of  their  Spanish- American  plans ;  but 
the  realisation  that  Great  Britain,  with  her  powerful  navy, 
endorsed  in  the  main  the  sentiments  of  President  Monroe 
cast  a  gloom  over  the  propagandists  of  divine  right,  and 
the  great  South  American  project  was  abandoned. 

The  American  Civil  War  broke  out  in  the  beginning  of 
1861. •  Mexico  was  at  that  time  in  the  throes  of  a  revolution, 
and  she  refused  to  satisfy  her  Spanish  and  French  creditors 
and  to  do  justice  to  Great  Britain  for  having  broken  into 
the  British  Legation  and  carried  off  £152,000  in  sterling 
bonds  belonging  to  British  subjects.  The  British  claims 
were  substantial  and  hona-fide.  The  French  and  Spanish 
claims  were  more  or  less  doubtful.  Great  Britain,  France, 
and  Spain  agreed  upon  joint  action  for  the  protection  of 
theii'  interests,  and  British,  French,  and  Spanish  warships 
sailed  for  Vera  Cruz  with  the  avowed  intention  of  taking 
possession  of  the  Custom  Houses  of  two  or  three  Mexican 
ports  for  the  purpose  of  satisfying  the  claims  of  their  Govern- 
ments. However,  within  a  few  weeks  after  the  arrival  of 
these  ships,  and  before  the  Allies  had  done  much  more  than 
seize  Vera  Cruz,  the  English  and  Spanish  commanders 
became  dissatisfied  with  the  adventurous  action  of  the 
French  and  the  EngHsh  and  Spanish  forces  withdrew  in 
April,  1862.  While  Great  Britain  and  Spain  merely  sought 
to  obtain  satisfaction  for  the  claims  of  their  citizens,  France, 
taking  advantage  of  the  American  Civil  War,  evidently 
intended  to  violate  the  Monroe  Doctrine  and  to  establish 
herself  firmly  and  permanently  on  the  American  Continent 
under  the  pretext  of  satisfying  some  very  shadowy  demands 
of  her  subjects  upon  Mexico.  It  is  a  well-known  fact  that 
it  was  one  of  the  favourite  projects  of  Napoleon  the  Third 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     411 

to  create  ou  the  American  Continent  a  great  Latin- American 
State  or  Confederation  controlled  by  France,  a  monarchical 
comiterpoise  to  the  United  States.  We  can  therefore  not 
be  surprised  that  the  secret  instructions  which  Napoleon 
the  Thii-d  sent  to  General  Forey,  the  Commander-in-Chief 
of  the  French  Expedition,  contained  the  following  statement 
of  France's  policy : 

If  Mexico  preserves  her  independence  and  maintains 
the  integrity  of  her  territory,  and  if  a  suitable  Government 
be  constituted  there  with  the  assistance  of  France,  we  shall 
have  restored  to  the  Latin  race  on  the  other  side  of  the  ocean 
its  strength  and  prestige.  .  .  .  Mexico  thus  regenerated 
will  always  be  favourable  to  France.  ...  As  now  our 
mihtary  honour  is  pledged,  the  exigencies  of  our  pohcy  and 
the  interests  of  our  industry  and  our  commerce  make  it 
our  duty  to  march  upon  Mexico,  to  plant  there  boldly 
our  standard,  and  to  estabhsh  there  a  monarchy,  if  this  is 
not  incompatible  with  the  national  sentiment  of  the  country, 
but  at  all  events  a  government  which  promises  some  stabiUty, 

Takmg  advantage  of  the  embarrassment  of  the  United 
States,  Napoleon  the  Third  endeavoured  not  only  to  create 
a  powerful  monarchy  on  American  soil  but  to  intervene 
in  the  struggle  between  the  North  and  the  South  with  the 
object  of  permanently  weakening  the  United  States.  Li 
Moore's  '  Digest  of  the  International  Law  of  the  United 
States  '  we  read  : 

On  October  30,  1862,  Napoleon  instructed  the  French 
ambassadors  to  Great  Britain  and  Eussia  to  invite  those 
Powers  to  join  France  in  requesting  the  belhgerents  to 
agree  to  an  armistice  of  six  months,  so  as  to  consider  some 
plan  for  bringing  the  war  to  an  end.  .  .  .  Great  Britain 
promptly  and  unquaUfiedly  dechned  the  proposition. 

Napoleon's  policy  was  frustrated  partly  by  the  mis- 
management of  the  French  Generals,  partly,  and  probably 
chiefly,  by  the  unsympathetic  attitude  of  Great  Britain. 
If  Great  Britain  had  actively,  or  merely  passively,  supported 


412  An  Anglo-American  Reunion 

Napoleon,  the  American  Civil  War  might  have  had  a  very- 
different  ending.  The  great  American  Eepublic  might 
have  been  divided  against  itself  for  all  time. 

During  the  Civil  War  Great  Britain  rendered  midoubtedly 
very  valuable  services  to  the  United  States.  However, 
Great  Britain's  attitude  towards  the  United  States  and  her 
unflmching  opposition  to  European  intervention  on  the 
American  Continent,  first  by  the  Holy  Alliance  and  then 
by  France,  was  soon  completely  forgotten  because  of  the 
unfortunate  Alabama  occm'rence.  So  great  was  America's 
anger  at  the  Alabama  incident  that  when,  shortly  after  the 
close  of  the  Civil  War,  the  British  Government  promoted 
the  unification  of  her  Canadian  possessions  by  the  creation 
of  a  single  Dominion,  violent  objections  were  made  in  the 
United  States  that  Great  Britain's  action  was  in  violation 
of  the  spirit  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  and  the  United  States 
Congress  considered  a  resolution  which  voiced  the  uneasi- 
ness of  the  country  at  witnessing  '  such  a  vast  conglomera- 
tion  of  American  States  established  on  the  monarchical 
principle  in  contradiction  to  the  traditionary  and  constantly 
declared  principles  of  the  United  States,  and  endangering 
their  most  important  interests.'  Great  Britain  agreed 
to  go  to  arbitration  on  the  American  Alabama  claims. 
The  United  States  demanded  the  colossal  .  sum  of 
£9,476,166  13s.  4d.  for  the  damage  done  by  that  cruiser. 
By  an  impartial  international  tribunal  they  were  awarded 
£3,229,166  13s.  4d.  (note  the  13s.  M. !),  which  was  paid  to 
them  by  Great  Britain,  but  even  that  sum  was  twice  as 
large  as  it  ought  to  have  been,  for,  after  all  claims  had  been 
satisfied,  there  remained  a  surplus  of  £1,600,000  in  the 
hands  of  the  United  States  Government. 

During  the  Spanish-American  War  of  1898  all  Europe 
was  hostile  to  the  United  States  except  Great  Britain. 
Before  Manila  a  collilion  between  the  German  and  the 
American  fleets  was  prevented  with  difficulty.  France  and 
other  Powers  seemed  strongly  disposed  to  take  Spain's 
part.    Once  more,  joint  action  by  European  Powers  against 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     413 

the  United  States  appeared  to  be  impending.  Great 
Britain  was  sounded,  but  once  more  she  refused  to  support 
or  to  countenance  Em'opean  intervention.  The  Power 
which  is  supreme  at  sea  once  more  protected  the  Monroe 
Doctrine. 

In  1902  Great  Britain  was  induced  by  Germany  to 
blockade,  in  company  with  her,  the  Venezuelan  ports,  in 
order  to  obtain  satisfaction  for  flagi-ant  wrongs  done  by 
Venezuela  to  her  citizens.  However,  as  British  public 
opinion  was  strongly  opposed  to  co-operation  with  Germany 
on  the  American  Continent,  Great  Britain  readily  con- 
sented to  arbitration. 

History,  as  Napoleon  the  First  has  told  us,  is  a  fable 
agreed  upon,  and  often  it  is  a  tissue  of  fables.  According 
to  many  of  the  popular  history  books  used  in  the  United 
States  schools  Great  Britain  is  a  Power  which,  animated 
by  tyranny  and  selfishness,  has  always  been  hostile  to  the 
United  States.  In  the  United  States  the  fact  that  Great 
Britain  was  largely  responsible  for  the  formulation  and  the 
proclamation  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  and  that  she  has 
consistently  defended  that  doctrine  by  placing  her  fleet 
between  the  military  Powers  of  Europe  and  the  United 
States,  is  scarcely  ever  mentioned,  and  the  fact  that  Great 
Britain  is  and  always  has  been  as  strongly  opposed  to  the 
settlement  of  one  of  the  great  military  Powers  in  the  New 
World  as  are  the  United  States  themselves,  is  practically 
unknown.  It  is  an  error  to  speak  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
as  the  leading  principle  of  American  policy,  for  the  Monroe 
Doctrine — one  ought  in  justice  always  to  call  it  the  Canning- 
Mom:oe  Doctrine — is  also  a  leading  principle  of  British 
f(Oreign  policy.  It  is  an  Anglo-American  doctrine.  Bis- 
marck once  described  the  Monroe  Doctrine  as  '  an  inter- 
national impertinence.'  Perhaps  it  is  an  international 
impertinence.  Still,  the  European  Great  Powers  have 
respected  it  even  at  a  time  when  the  American  fleet  was 
quite  insignificant.  Why  have  they  done  so?  Because 
they  knew  that  the  British  fleet  would,  in  case  of  need, 


414  An  Anglo- American  Reunion 

protect  the  United  States.  Foreign  nations  have  discovered 
that  the  route  to  New  York  and  to  Washington  goes  via 
London.  But  for  the  British  fleet  the  Powers  of  Europe 
would  long  ago  have  torn  the  Monroe  Doctrine  to  shreds 
and  have  established  themselves  on  the  American  Continent. 

Englishmen,  when  discussing  Anglo-American  relations 
with  Americans,  are  apt  to  adopt  an  apologetic  attitude 
because  of  the  mistakes  which  their  Government  and  their 
forefathers  made  in  the  time  of  George  the  Third.  That 
attitude  of  penitence  is,  I  think,  uncalled  for.  Mistakes 
were  made  on  both  sides  at  the  time  of  the  American  Kevolu- 
tion  and  afterwards  ;  fights  between  blood  relations  are 
natural  and  common  ;  and  since  the  time  of  the  Anglo- 
American  Peace  Great  Britain  has  powerfully  supported 
the  United  States  whenever  an  opportunity  arose,  making 
their  interests  her  own. 

The  late  Professor  Seeley's  frequently  quoted  assertion 
that  Great  Britain  has  created  the  British  Empire  '  in  a  fit 
of  absence  of  mind  '  is  scarcely  correct.  Great  Britain 
follows  neither  a  pohcy  of  absent-mindedness,  as  Professor 
Seeley  has  told  us,  nor  a  policy  of  sordid  self-interest  as  her 
adversaries  maintain.  Great  Britain  follows  a  poHcy  not 
of  interest  but  of  sentiment.  She  has  consistently  striven 
to  enlarge  her  dominions,  not  in  order  to  exploit  them — it 
is  very  doubtful  indeed  whether  on  balance  her  possessions 
yield  a  profit  to  the  Motherland— but  in  the  instinctive  desire 
of  reserving  the  vast  and  fruitful  territories  of  the  New  World 
to  the  Anglo-Saxon  race.  She  has  been  actuated  not  by 
blood-lust  nor  by  lust  of  conquest  but  by  race-instinct,  and 
she  has  acquired  her  vast  possessions  not  for  herself  but 
for  the  Anglo-Saxon  race.  Therefore  she  views  not  with 
jealousy  but  with  approval  America's  prosperity  and 
America's  expansion.  Her  policy  has  been  racial,  senti- 
mental, and,  on  the  whole,  possibly  unprofitable  to  her 
citizens.  That  cannot  too  frequently  be  stated.  If  Great 
Britain's  policy  were  guided  by  self-interest,  envy,  perfidious- 
ness,  and  trade  jealousy,  as  we  are  so  often  told,  she  would 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     415 

have  worked  for  the  downfall  of  the  United  States,  and 
would  at  the  same  time  have  avenged  her  former  defeats 
and  ridded  herself  of  a  powerful  competitor.  She  has  had 
many  opportunities  to  expose  the  United  States  to  the 
greatest  dangers,  without  any  risk  to  herself,  by  merely 
allowing  the  Em-opean  Powers  to  attack  them,  but  she  has 
steadfastly  resisted  their  temptations  to  countenance  Euro- 
pean aggression. 

The  great  democratic  Eepublic  is  naturally  not  beloved 
by  the  miHtary  monarchies  of  Europe.  They  see  in  it  a 
great  danger  and  desire  its  downfall.  Hence  many  Conti- 
nental writers  have  recommended  that  a  pan-European 
coahtion  should  be  formed  against  the  United  States.  Time 
after  time  the  States  of  the  Continent  have  endeavoured 
to  secure  Great  Britain's  support,  or  at  least  her  neutrality, 
in  order  to  be  able  to  encroach  upon  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
or  to  strike  at  the  United  States,  but  they  have  always  failed. 
Great  Britain's  refusal  to  countenance  European  aggression, 
even  passively,  has  sprung  from  her  race  instinct,  not  from 
her  fear  of  losing  Canada.  In  the  first  place,  the  United 
States  would  have  had  no  cause  to  attack  Canada  if  Great 
Britain  merely  maintained  a  strict  neutrality  in  the  event 
of  a  war  between  the  United  States  and  some  European 
Power  or  Powers.  Secondly,  the  United  States  would  not 
find  it  very  easy  to  conquer  the  Dominion.  Last,  and  not 
least,  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that,  while  the  Continental 
Powers  could  never  obtain  Great  Britain's  support  against 
the  United  States,  Great  Britain  herself  would  probably 
very  readily  have  received  the  support  of  the  Continental 
Powers  against  the  great  Republic  had  she  gone  to  war  with 
that  country.  If,  for  instance.  President  Cleveland's  high- 
handed action  regarding  Venezuela  in  1895  should  unhappily 
have  led  to  an  American  attack  upon  Canada,  Great  Britain 
need  not  have  stood  alone.  That  fact  should  be  borne  in 
mind  by  all  those  on  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic  who  beheve 
that  Great  Britain's  attitude  towards  the  United  States 
has  in  the  past  been  dictated  by  her  fear  of  losing  Canada. 


416  An  Anglo-American  Reunion 

An  Anglo-Saxon  reunion  is  highly  desirable  upon  ideal 
grounds,  and  it  is  equally  necessary  to  the  British  Empire 
and  to  the  United  States  for  the  most  potent  practical 
reasons.  The  first  instinct  of  nations,  as  of  individuals, 
is  that  of  self-preservation,  and  their  principal  requirements 
are  peace  and  security.  At  first  sight  the  British  Empire 
and  the  United  States  appear  to  be  very  differently  situated. 
The  one  is  a  widely  scattered  island-Empire  which  is 
extremely  vulnerable,  being  exposed  to  attacks  on  many 
sides,  while  the  other  is  a  firmly  knitted  and  homogeneous 
Continental  State,  difficult  to  attack  and  impossible  to 
conquer.  However,  these  outward  geographical  and 
structural  differences  merely  obscure  the  fact  that  the 
British  Empire  and  the  United  States  are  similar  in 
character,  that  they  have  identical  interests,  that  they  are 
threatened  by  the  same  dangers,  that  they  suffer  from  the 
same  disadvantage  of  lacking  powerful  standing  armies, 
that  both  can  be  attacked  only  by  sea,  and  therefore  depend 
upon  their  fleet  for  their  security  from  attack,  and  that 
consequently  both  are  equally  strongly  interested  that 
neither  one  of  the  great  military  Powers  nor  a  combination 
of  military  Powers  should  become  supreme  at  sea. 

Admiral  Mahan,  the  great  American  naval  writer,  said, 
in  1890,  in  the  Atlantic  Monthly  : 

While  Great  Britain  is  undoubtedly  the  most  formidable 
of  our  possible  enemies,  both  by  her  great  navy  and  by  the 
strong  positions  she  holds  near  our  coasts,  it  must  be  added 
that  a  cordial  understanding  with  that  country  is  one  of 
the  first  of  our  external  interests.  Both  nations  doubtless, 
and  properly,  seek  their  own  advantage  ;  but  both,  also, 
are  controlled  by  a  sense  of  law  and  justice,  drawn  from  the 
same  sources,  and  deep-rootsd  in  their  instincts.  What- 
ever temporary  aberration  may  occur,  a  return  to  mutual 
standards  of  right  will  certainly  follow.  A  formal  alHance 
between  the  two  is  out  of  the  question,  but  a  cordial  recogni- 
tion of  the  similarity  of  character  and  ideas  will  give  birth 
to  sympathy,  which  in  turn  will  facihtate  a  co-operation 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     417 

beneficial  to  both ;  for  if  sentimentality  is  weak,  sentiment 
is  strong. 

If  we  look  more  closely  into  the  circumstances  of  the 
British  Empire  and  of  the  United  States,  we  find  that  they 
are  in  a  very  similar  position.  The  United  States  are  no 
longer  an  invulnerable  continental  State.  Their  interests, 
which  were  formerly  pm'ely  continental,  have  become 
world-wide.  By  the  acquisition  of  Hawaii,  the  Philippine 
Islands,  Porto  Eico,  Guam,  Samoa,  the  Panama  Canal, 
and  by  their  interest  in  Cuba  and  many  other  islands  and 
territories  which  are  of  great  strategical  importance  to 
them,  they  also  have  become  a  widely  scattered  and  very 
vulnerable  Empire,  and  their  vulnerability  is  all  the  greater, 
as  the  United  States  army  and  navy  are  considerably  weaker 
than  are  the  British  army  and  navy.  The  loss  of  the 
magnificent  Pearl  Harbour  on  the  island  of  Oahu,  which 
lies  midway  between  the  Pacific  Coast  and  Asia,  would, 
as  is  generally  recognised  in  America,  be  as  serious  a  loss 
to  the  United  States  as  the  loss  of  Gibraltar  would  be  to 
Great  Britain,  and  the  loss  of  the  Panama  Canal  would 
probably  be  more  serious  to  them  than  the  simultaneous 
loss  of  the  Mediterranean  route  and  the  Cape  route  to  the 
East  would  be  to  Great  Britain  and  the  British  Empire. 

In  1894  Admiral  Mahan  published  in  the  Norih  Ameri- 
can Revieiv  a  paper  entitled  '  Possibilities  of  an  Anglo-- 
American  Pieunion,'  in  which  he  said  : 

Partners,  each,  in  the  great  commonwealth  of  nations 
which  share  the  blessings  of  European  civilisation,  Great 
Britain  and  the  United  States  alone,  though  in  varying 
degrees,  are  so  severed  geographically  from  all  existing 
rivals  as  to  be  exempt  from  the  burden  of  great  land  armies  ; 
while  at  the  same  time  they  must  depend  upon  the  sea,  in 
chief  measure,  for  the  intercourse  with  other  members  of 
the  body  of  nations  upon  which  national  well-being  depends. 

To  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States,  if  they  rightly 
estimate  the  part  they  may  play  in  the  great  drama  of  human 

2  E 


418  An  Anglo-American  Reunion 

progress,  is  entrusted  the  maritime  interest,  in  the  broadest 
sense  of  the  word. 

I  am  convinced  firmly  that  it  would  be  to  the  interests 
of  Great  Britain  and  of  the  United  States  and  for  the  benefit 
of  the  world  that  the  two  nations  should  act  together 
cordially  on  the  seas. 

Admiral  Mahan  was  right.  As  Great  Britain  and  the 
United  States  have  no  enormous  standing  armies,  as  they 
are  not  likely  ever  to  have  standing  armies  capable  of 
facing  those  of  the  great  military  States,  and  as  they  do 
not  desire  to  become  a  nation  in  arms  in  the  continental 
sense,  they  must  perforce  control  the  seas  so  as  to  be  able 
to  keep  the  huge  armies  of  Europe,  and  perhaps  of  Asia 
as  well,  at  arm's  length.  Let  the  great  military  nations 
of  Europe  share  the  rule  of  the  land  in  Europe,  but  let  the 
Anglo-Saxons  share  between  them  the  rule  of  their  own 
seas  in  which  they  are  equally  vitally  interested.  Whether 
Great  Britain  or  whether  the  United  States  rule  the  seas 
is,  after  all,  of  minor  importance.  The  thing  that  matters 
is  that  the  seas  should  be  ruled  by  the  peaceful  Anglo- 
Saxons  and  not  by  a  great  military  nation. 

Providence  and  the  wisdom  and  energy  of  its  early 
rulers  and  colonisers  have  greatly  favoured  the  Anglo-Saxon 
race.  A  glance  at  the  map  shows  that  practically  all  the 
most  valuable  and  the  most  promising  territories  and 
strategical  positions  in  the  world  are  owned  or  controlled 
by  the  Anglo-Saxon  nations.  To  civilised  nations  the  value 
of  extensive  territories  lies  chiefly  in  this,  that  they  afford 
an  outlet  to  their  surplus  population.  The  more  thinly 
populated  territories  situated  in  a  temperate  zone  are,  the 
greater  is  their  value  to  them. 

The  policy  of  powerful  nations  is  guided  not  by  their 
momentary  dispositions  but  by  their  great  and  abiding 
interests.  Self-preservation  is  their  first  instinct  and  their 
first  duty.  All  the  great  military  nations  of  the  Continent 
of  Europe,  Eussia  alone  excepted,  and  China  and  Japan, 
are  greatly   over-populated,   and   are  therefore   in  urgent 


Great  Problems  of  British  State smanshij)     419 

need  of  territories  in  a  temperate  zone,  for,  without  the 
possibihty  of  expansion  under  the  national  flag,  they  are 
bound  to  stand  still  and  then  to  decline  in  relative  power 
and  influence.  The  future  belongs  evidently  to  those 
countries  which  possess  vast  reserves  of  thinly  populated 
territories.  How  happy,  in  this  respect,  is  the  position  of 
the  United  States  and  the  British  Empire  will  be  seen  from 
the  following  table  : 

Population  at  Last  Census 


United  Kingdom 

In  1911 

45,216,665  pc 

ople  =372-6  per  sq.  mile 

Japan  . 

,,     — 

49,582,505 

,       =335-8 

Germany 

„  1910 

64,925,993 

,       =331-0 

Italy    . 

„  1911 

34,687,000 

„       =313-5 

China  Proper 

„   — 

407,253,029 

„       =266-0 

Aastria 

„  1910 

28,571,934 

,      =246-7 

France . 

„  1911 

39,601,509      , 

,       =191-2 

Hungary 

.,  1910 

20,886,487 

„      =166-6 

Russia  in  Europe 

.     „  1897 

105,413,775 

„      =  55-2 

British  Empire 

.     „  1911 

417,148,000 

„       =  36-8 

United  States  and 

Possessions 

„  1910 

101,840,367 

„      =   13-7 

The  British  Empire  and  the  United  States  have  room  for 
hundreds  of  millions  of  people.  Therefore  it  is  only  natural 
that  the  mihtary  Powers,  which  have  a  population  of  200 
people  and  300  people  and  more  per  square  mile,  look  with 
longing  and  envy  to  the  vast,  fruitful,  highly  mineralised 
and  thinly  populated  territories,  situated  in  a  temperate 
zone,  which  are  owned  and  controlled  by  the  Anglo-Saxon - 
nations,  especially  as  these  hold  in  addition  all  the  most 
important  strategical  points  which  command  the  approaches 
to  their  world-wide  possessions. 

The  Continent  of  America  lies  midway  between  over- 
populated  Europe  and  over-populated  Asia.  Its  east  coast 
is  coveted  by  the  overcrowded  European,  and  its  west 
coast  by  the  overcrowded  Asiatic,  nations.  How  thinly 
some  of  the  most  desirable  parts  of  the  United  States  are 
populated  is  seen  by  comparing  the  size  and  the  population 
of  some  of  the  American  States  with  the  size  and  popula- 
tion of  some  great  empires.     The  German  Empire  has  a 


420  An  Anglo-American  Reunion 

territory  of  208,770  square  miles  and  a  population  of 
64,925,993.  The  single  State  of  Texas  is  considerably  larger, 
for  it  contains  205,896  square  miles.  Yet  Texas  has  a 
population  of  only  3,896,542.  Per  square  mile  there  are 
14-8  people  in  Texas  and  331*0  in  Germany.  As  Texas 
has  a  rich  soil,  an  excellent  climate,  and  great  natural 
resources,  it  could  probably  support  a  population  of 
40,000,000. 

It  has  often  been  asserted  by  men  anxious  to  make 
mischief  that  the  Japanese  are  casting  covetous  eyes  upon 
California.  They  have  certainly  every  reason  to  envy  the 
Americans  the  possession  of  that  paradisaical  country, 
but  they  are  scarcely  likely  to  contemplate  seriously  its 
acquisition.  Still  the  temptation  is  there.  The  Empire 
of  Japan  contains  147,057  square  miles,  while  California 
contains  158,297  square  miles.  Japan  has  49,582,505 
inhabitants,  but  California,  though  it  is  slightly  larger  than 
Japan,  has  only  2,877,549  inhabitants.  Per  square  mile 
there  are  335*8  people  in  Japan  but  only  15*3  in  California. 
The  two  other  American  States  on  the  Pacific  Coast,  Oregon 
and  Washington,  extend  to  165,826  square  miles,  and 
their  population  is  only  1,814,755.  How  vast  the  territories 
of  the  United  States  are  may  be  seen  from  the  fact  that 
the  United  States  without  Alaska  are  exactly  twice  as 
large  as  is  the  enormous  Empire  of  China,  that  they  are 
fifteen  times  as  large  as  Germany,  and  twenty-five  times  as 
large  as  the  United  Kingdom. 

The  nations  of  the  world  envy  the  British  Empire  and 
the  United  States,  not  so  much  for  their  industries,  their 
trade,  and  their  wealth,  as  for  their  boundless  latent 
resources,  which  promise  to  give  them  the  dominion  of  the 
world,  or  at  least  world-wide  predominance,  if  they  are 
united.  The  United  States  receive  perhaps  a  greater  share 
of  ill-will  than  does  the  British  Empire.  They  are  disliked 
owing  to  their  enormous  wealth,  their  ruthless  energy,  their 
aggressive  methods,  and  especially  owing  to  the  Monroe 
Doctrine.     On  the  Continent  of  Europe  it  is  generally  con- 


Ch'eat  Problems  of  British  State smanshijD     421 

sidered,  and  not  without  reason,  that  by  that  doctrine  the 
United  States  have  virtually  declared  a  protectorate  over 
the  whole  of  Central  and  South  America,  and  that  they  will 
annex  these  countries  Avhen  time  and  opportunity  are 
favom'able. 

The  Monroe  Doctrine  is  an  American  doctrine,  not  an 
international  one.  It  is,  as  Bismarck  truly  remarked,  an 
international  impertinence.  It  can  become  generally  ac- 
cepted and  respected  only  if  the  United  States  are  strong 
enough  to  defend  it  against  all  comers.  Hitherto  they  have 
been  able  to  leave  the  defence  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  largely 
to  Great  Britain,  as  has  been  shown  in  the  foregoing  pages. 
Many  thoughtful  Americans  believe  that,  in  view  of  the 
insufficiency  of  their  military  and  naval  armaments,  the 
Mom-oe  Doctrine  is  a  provocation  to  the  world  at  large  and 
a  danger.  A  distinguished  American  military  author, 
Mr.  Homer  Lea,  wrote  m  '  The  Valor  of  Ignorance,'  a  book 
which  received  the  highest  praise  from  President  Eoosevelt : 

In  the  liistory  of  mankind  never  before  has  one  nation 
attempted  to  support  so  comprehensive  a  doctrine  as  to 
extend  its  political  suzerainty  over  two  continents,  com- 
prising one-fourth  of  the  habitable  earth  and  one-half  of  its 
unexploited  wealth,  in  direct  defiance  of  the  whole  world 
and  A\dthout  the  shghtest  semblance  of  military  power. 

The  Monroe  Doctrine  is  Promethean  in  conception  but 
not  so  in  execution.  It  was  proclaimed  in  order  to  avoid 
wars  ;  now  it  invites  them. 

The  Monroe  Doctrine,  if  not  supported  by  naval  and 
mihtary  power  sufficient  to  enforce  its  observance  by  all 
nations,  singly  and  in  coalition,  becomes  a  factor  more 
provocative  of  war  than  any  other  national  policy  ever 
attempted  in  modern  or  ancient  times. 

The  maintenance  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  requires  un- 
doubtedly a  fleet  strong  enough  to  defend  America  against 
any  Power  or  any  conceivable  combination  of  Powers.  It 
can  be  defended  only  by  irresistible  force.  Li  Admiral 
Mahan's   words,    *  There    is    no    inalienable  right   in   any 


422  An  Anglo-American  Reunion 

community  to  control  the  use  of  a  region  when  it  does  so  to 
the  detriment  of  the  world  at  large.'  The  maintenance  of 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  not  founded  on  right  but  on  might. 
The  Panama  Canal  will  greatly  increase  the  vulnerability 
of  the  United  States,  A  distinguished  United  States  Govern- 
ment Commission,  presided  over  by  Admiral  Walker, 
reported  : 

The  Canal  is  but  one  link  in  a  chain  of  communications 
of  which  adjacent  links  are  the  Caribbean  Sea  on  the  east 
and  the  waters  of  the  Pacific,  near  the  Canal's  entrance, 
on  the  west.  Unless  the  integrity  of  all  the  links  can  be 
maintained,  the  chain  will  be  broken.  The  Power  holding 
any  one  of  the  links  can  prevent  the  enemy  from  using 
the  communication,  but  can  itself  use  it  only  when  it  holds 
them  all.  The  Canal  would  l)e  a  prize  of  extraordinary 
value  ;  it  would  be  beyond  the  reach  of  reinforcement  if 
the  enemy  controlled  the  sea. 

The  enormous  importance  of  the  Canal  becomes  clear 
by  giving  the  matter  a  little  thought.  If,  for  instance,  in 
a  war  with  the  United  States,  Japan  should  seize  the  Panama 
Canal,  she  could  attack  the  Atlantic  coast  of  the  EepubHc, 
and  if  Germany  should  seize  it  she  could  attack  the  United 
States  simultaneously  on  her  Atlantic  and  Pacific  coasts. 

Of  late  all  the  great  military  Powers  have  increased  their 
navies  with  feverish  haste.  Between  1900  and  1913  the 
naval  expenditure  of  the  eight  Great  Powers  has  exactly 
doubled,  increasing  from  £87,000,000  to  £174,000,000, 
while  their  military  expenditure  has  increased  by  only  40 
per  cent.  Germany  trebled  her  naval  expenditm*e  from 
£7,900,000  in  1900  to  £23,400,000  in  1913,  and  so  did  Austria 
and  Italy  by  increasing  theirs  from  £6,400,000  to  £18,100,000 
during  the  same  time.  The  Japanese  also  have  greatly 
increased  their  fleet.  The  Great  War  has  been  largely  a 
maritime  war,  a  war  for  maritime  objects,  for  sea  power 
and  colonies. 

Germany  and  Japan  and  many  other  countries  urgently 
require  colonies.     The  fact  that  Germany  requires  them  is 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     423 

of  course  known,  but  it  is  generally  believed  that  Japan 
has  acquired  adequate  outlets  for  her  surplus  population 
in  her  wars  with  China  and  Eussia.  That  is  not  the  case. 
Her  new  possessions  are  very  densely  populated,  and  there- 
fore give  very  little  scope  to  the  Japanese.  The  population 
of  Korea  is  115*9  per  square  mile,  that  of  Formosa  is  215*6 
per  square  mile,  and  that  of  Kwantung  is  341*6  per  square 
mile ;  while  that  of  California  is  only  15"3,  and  that  of 
Mexico  17'7  per  square  mile. 

Twenty  years  ago  the  German  Emperor  proclaimed 
*  Germany's  future  lies  upon  the  water.'  Not  only  Germany 
but  the  other  great  and  over-populated  military  States  of 
Europe  and  Japan  as  well  have  become  convinced  that 
their  future  also  lies  upon  the  water,  that  they  can  secure 
sufficient  elbow-room  only  by  wTesting  adequate  territories 
situated  in  a  temperate  zone  from  those  nations  which, 
fortunately  for  them,  lack  large  armies.  Herein  lies  the 
reason  that  the  great  military  States  have  been  creating 
large  navies  with  the  utmost  speed,  and  the  danger  is  great 
that  some  of  them  should  at  some  time  or  other  combine 
for  the  purpose  of  destroying  the  land  monopoly  of  the 
Anglo-Saxons  and  of  securing  for  themselves  '  a  place  in 
the  sun,'  as  the  German  Emperor  picturesquely  called  it. 
Besides,  the  Anglo-Saxon  nations  are  not  loved  abroad. 
Democracy  dislikes  militarism  and  militarism  fears,  hates, 
and  despises  democracy. 

For  many  years  American  military  and  naval  men  have 
been  watching  Germany  and  Japan  with  concern,  and  have 
been  wondering  what  attitude  Great  Britain  would  adopt 
in  case  the  United  States  should  be  involved  in  a  war  either 
with  one  of  these  nations  or  with  both,  and  what  attitude 
the  United  States  should  adopt  should  Great  Britain  be 
seriously  menaced  by  Germany.  Admiral  Mahan  wrote 
in  his  book  '  Naval  Strategy,'  published  in  1911  : 

If  Germany  should  wish  to  embark  her  fleet  in  a 
trans-Atlantic  venture,  how  far  will  her  relations  with  other 
European  States  allow  her  to  do  so  ? 


424  An  Anglo-American  Reunion 

Should  our  Pacific  coast  citizens  precipitate  us  into  a 
war,  or  even  into  seriously  strained  relations,  with  Japan, 
that  pressure  upon  us  would  add  to  the  force  of  Germany's 
fleet. 

Where  ought  Great  Britain  to  stand  in  case  we  have 
troubles  with  Germany  ?  And  where  ought  we  to  stand 
in  the  reverse  case  ? 

Great  Britain  does  for  the  moment  hold  Germany  so 
far  in  check  that  the  German  Empire  can  do  no  more  than 
look  after  its  European  interests  ;  but  should  a  naval 
disaster  befall  Great  Britain,  leaving  Germany  master  of 
the  naval  situation,  the  world  would  see  again  a  predominant 
fleet  backed  by  a  predominant  army,  and  that  in  the  hands 
not  of  a  State  satiated  with  colonial  possessions  as  Great 
Britain  is,  but  of  one  whose  late  entry  into  world  conditions 
leaves  hsr  without  any  such  possessions  at  all  of  any  great 
value.  Although  the  colonial  ambitions  in  Germany  are 
held  in  abeyance  for  tha  moment,  the  wish  cannot  but  exist 
to  expand  her  territory  by  foreign  acquisitions. 

It  is  this  line  of  reasoning  which  shows  the  power  of  the 
German  navy  to  be  a  matter  of  prime  importance  to  the 
United  States.  The  power  to  control  Germany  does  not 
exist  in  Europe  except  in  the  British  navy. 

Admiral  Mahan,  the  most  eminent  naval  writer  of  modern 
times,  reconimended  the  co-operation  of  Great  Britain  and 
the  United  States,  not  for  ideal  reasons,  but  because  he 
believed  that  Anglo-American  co-operation  on  the  seas  is 
a  necessity. 

Great  possessions  are  to  their  owners  a  responsibility 
and  a  danger  unless  they  are  adequately  guarded.  Neither 
the  United  States  nor  Great  Britain  are  hkely  ever  to 
possess  standing  armies  that  can  be  pitted  against  the  vast 
military  hosts  of  the  Continental  Great  Powers  and  of 
Japan,  because  the  spirit  of  the  people  is  impatient  of  com- 
pulsion, restraint,  and  discipline,  in  time  of  peace.  As  it 
takes  a  long  time  to  improvise  armies,  they  must  put  their 
trust  in  their  fleets. 

Before  the  Great  War  the  American  fleet  was  weaker 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     425 

than  the  German  fleet  and  was  inferior  to  it  in  organisation, 
in  certain  types  of  ships,  and  in  armaments,  especially  in 
reserve  stores  of  guns  and  ammunition.  The  American 
fleet  was  then  on  paper  about  50  per  cent,  stronger  than  the 
Japanese  fleet,  but  it  seemed  questionable  whether  the 
American  fleet  equalled  the  Japanese  fleet  in  organisation, 
preparedness,  and  efficiency. 

The  British  fleet  is  the  strongest  in  the  world.  It  is 
more  powerful  than  it  has  ever  been,  but  with  the  advent 
of  the  submarine,  the  influence  of  maritime  power  has  been 
greatly  weakened  unless  it  is  overwhelming. 

The  great  military  nations  of  the  M'orld  naturally  base 
their  hopes  of  expansion  at  the  cost  of  the  Anglo-Saxons — 
as  the  world  is  divided  they  can  expand  only  at  the  cost  of 
the  Anglo-Saxons — upon  the  inadequacy  of  the  Anglo- 
Saxon  fleets  and  the  dismiion  of  the  two  great  Anglo-Saxon 
nations,  for  they  know  full  well  that  it  would  be  hopeless 
to  challenge  Anglo-Saxon  supremacy  on  the  seas  if  Great 
Britain  and  the  United  States  were  firmly  united.  In 
endeavouring  to  build  up  large  navies  they  may  in  the  future 
strain  their  resources  to  the  utmost,  hoping  that  by  combin- 
ing they  will  be  able  to  overwhelm,  or  to  overawe,  either 
Great  Britain  or  the  United  States.  While  Great  Britain 
and  the  United  States  may  in  the  future  not  be  able  to  defeat 
single-handed  any  conceivable  combination  of  naval  Powers 
which  may  attack  them,  they  can  face  the  world  if  they  are 
united.  Herein  lies  the  necessity  for  their  reunion.  Admiral 
Mahan  wrote  in  his  book  '  Eetrospect  and  Prospect' :  '  As  the 
world  is  now  balanced,  the  British  Empire  is  in  external 
matters  our  natural,  though  not  our  formal,  ally.' 

The  race  instinct  is  strong  on  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic. 
In  Great  Britain  and  in  the  United  States  it  is  instinctively 
felt  that  one  nation  depends  for  its  security  largely  upon  the 
other,  and  that  neither  nation  can  allow  the  other  to  go 
down.  The  United  States  and  Great  Britain  are  in  the  same 
boat.  Great  Britain  realises  that  it  would  be  a  calamity 
to  see  the  United  States  defeated  by  a  great  mihtary  nation, 


426  An  Anglo-American  Reunion 

which  would  probably  settle  on  the  American  Continent 
and  militarise  it,  and  the  United  States  recognise  that  they 
would  become  the  immediate  neighbours  of  the  military 
Great  Powers  of  Europe  if  the  British  fleet  should  be  de- 
stroyed. So  far  militarism  in  its  most  objectionable  form  has 
been  restricted  to  the  European  Continent  and  to  Japan. 
The  defeat  of  the  United  States  or  of  Great  Britain  might 
bring  about  the  militarisation  of  the  world. 

The  greatest  interest  of  the  overcrowded  military  nations 
of  Europe  and  Asia  is  expansion.  The  greatest  interest 
of  the  Anglo-Saxon  nations  is  peace,  security,  and  the 
restriction  of  armaments.  These  blessings  can  scarcely 
be  obtained  by  the  federation  of  the  world,  dreamt  of  by 
the  late  Mr.  Stead,  or  by  the  federation  of  Europe,  proposed 
by  other  dreamers,  but  only  by  the  federation  of  the  Anglo- 
Saxon  nations.  Experience  shows  that  the  world  can  be  at 
peace  only  if  it  is  controlled  by  one  nation.  It  will  be  at 
peace  only  when  the  paa;  Bomana  has  been  replaced  by  the 
fax  Britannica,  by  the  peace  of  the  Anglo-Saxons,  when  the 
military  Great  Powers  have,  owing  to  the  growth  of  the 
Anglo-Saxon  nations,  become  military  small  Powers.  The 
world  must  either  become  Anglo-Saxon  or  fall  a  prey  to 
militarism. 

The  arguments  in  favour  of  an  Anglo-American  Eeunion 
are  overwhelming.  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  are 
one  in  language,  spirit,  and  tradition — in  short,  in  all  the 
things  that  count.  The  argument  that  they  cannot  com- 
bine because  one  is  a  monarchy  and  the  other  is  a  republic 
is  a  fallacious  one.  Both  are  democracies.  They  differ 
only  in  the  outer  form,  but  not  in  the  essence  and  the  spirit, 
of  their  government.  Great  Britain  has  an  hereditary 
president  and  the  United  States  have  an  elected  king. 
Kightly  considered.  Great  Britain  is  the  more  democratic 
nation  of  the  two.  The  King  of  England  has  far  less  power 
than  the  President  of  the  United  States.  Besides,  the  will 
of  the  people  is  more  likely  to  prevail  in  Great  Britain  than 
in  the  United  States,  because  Great  Britain  has  an  unwritten, 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     427 

flexible,  and  therefore  truly  democratic,  constitution,  while 
.the  United  States  have  a  written,  almost  unchangeable, 
and  therefore  somewhat  antiquated,  constitution.  King- 
doms and  rejDublics  may  be  joined  in  a  single  federation. 
The  Empire  of  Germany,  for  instance,  contains  three  repub- 
lics. Last,  but  not  least,  democratic  nations  combine  not 
because  their  outward  forms  of  government  are  identical 
but  because  they  are  of  one  race  and  have  the  same  interests. 
The  United  States  and  Great  Britain  should  be  united  on  a 
basis  of  race  solidarity  and  of  the  identity  of  their  vital 
interests.  The  objection  that  Great  Britain  is  a  European 
nation  with  European  interests  is  contradicted  by  Professor 
Coolidge,  of  Harvard  University,  in  his  book  '  The  United 
States  as  a  World  Power,'  as  follows  : 

Are  we  to  regard  Imperial  Britain  as  a  European  Power, 
when  the  greater  part  of  her  external  interests  and  difficulties 
are  connected  with  her  situation  on  other  continents  ?  Are 
not  the  vast  majority  of  Englishmen  more  in  touch  in  every 
way  with  Australians,  Canadians,  Americans  than  they 
are  with  Portuguese,  Italians  or  Austrians  of  one  sort  or 
another  ?  What  strictly  European  interests  does  England 
represent  ? 

Eome  was  not  built  in  a  day.  The  reunion  of  the  Anglo- 
Saxon  nations  will  take  time,  but  it  is  bound  to  take  place 
for  it  is  logical  and  inevitable.  The  growth  of  the  military 
Powers  and  the  rapid  increase  of  their  fleets  must  auto- 
matically bring  about  an  Anglo-Saxon  reunion  earlier  or 
later.  The  Hundred  Years'  Peace  would,  I  think,  be  most 
appropriately  celebrated  by  the  conclusion  on  its  next 
anniversary  of  a  treaty  of  defence  by  the  two  great  Anglo- 
Saxon  nations,  of  a  treaty  which  would  guarantee  to  them 
their  peace  and  the  secure  possession  of  their  territories, 
and  which  would  deprive  foreign  nations  of  the  temptation 
to  attack  them  singly.  Such  a  step  would  slacken,  or  bring 
to  a  stop,  the  naval  armament  race. 

Great  Britain  extends  a  fraternal  hand  to  her  kinsmen 
across  the  sea.    How  completely  she  has  forgotten  the  revolt 


428  An  Anglo-American  Reunion 

of  her  colonies  may  be  seen  by  the  fact  that  Earl  Grey  pro- 
posed m  1913  to  erect  the  statue  of  George  Washington  hi 
Westminster  Abbey  among  England's  heroes,  and  to  present 
by  pubHc  subscription  Sulgrave  Manor,  the  ancient  family 
home  of  the  Washingtons  in  England,  to  the  American  nation. 
Never  in  the  history  of  the  world  has  a  revolutionary  leader 
been  more  greatly  honoured  by  those  against  whom  he 
took  up  arms. 

Since  the  time  when  these  pages  were  written  the  Great 
War,  which  I  had  foreseen  and  frequently  foretold,  has 
broken  out,  the  United  States  have  jomed  the  Allies  in 
their  fight  for  freedom  and  against  tyranny,  a  new  chapter 
has  been  opened  in  the  history  of  the  world.  An  Anglo- 
American  reunion  has  come  within  the  limits  of  possibihty. 
The  World  War  may  wipe  out  completely  the  memory 
of  past  misunderstandings  and  of  ancient  wrongs.  The 
firmest  cement  between  nations  is  the  remembrance  of 
dangers  borne  in  common. 

The  fathers  of  the  American  Eepublic  who  had  cut 
themselves  adrift  from  England,  thought  that  the  Great 
Eepublic  should  pursue  a  purely  American  policy.  In  his 
celebrated  Farewell  Address  of  1796,  his  pohtical  testament, 
Washington  laid  down  the  principles  of  America's  foreign 
policy  in  the  following  words,  which  are  known  to  every 
American  citizen : 

Observe  good  faith  and  justice  towards  all  nations. 
Cultivate  peace  and  harmony  with  all.  Eeligion  and 
morality  enjoin  this  conduct ;  and  can  it  be  that  good 
policy  does  not  equally  enjoin  it  ?  It  will  be  worthy  of  a 
free,  enlightened,  and,  at  no  distant  period,  a  great  nation, 
to  give  to  mankind  the  magnanimous  and  too  novel  example 
of  a  People  always  guided  by  an  exalted  justice  and 
benevolence.  .  .  . 

Against  the  insidious  wiles  of  foreign  influence,  I  conjure 
you  to  believe  me,  fellow-citizens,  the  jealousy  of  a  free 
people   ought   to   be   constantly  awake,   since  history   and 


Ch'eat  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     429 

experience  prove  that  foreign  influence  is  one  of  the  most 
baneful  foes  of  repubhcan  Government.  .  .  . 

The  great  rule  of  conduct  for  us,  in  regard  to  foreign 
nations,  is,  in  extending  our  commercial  relations,  to  have 
with  them  as  little  Political  connection  as  possible.  So  far 
as  we  have  already  formed  engagements,  let  them  be  ful- 
filled with  perfect  good  faith  Hero  let  us  stop.  Europe 
has  a  set  of  primary  interests,  which  to  us  have  none,  or  a 
very  remote,  relation.  Hence  she  must  be  engaged  in 
frequent  controversies,  the  causes  of  which  are  essentially 
foreign  to  our  concerns.  Hence,  therefore,  it  must  be 
unwise  in  us  to  implicate  ourselves,  by  artificial  ties,  in  the 
ordinary  vicissitudes  of  her  politics,  or  the  ordinary  com- 
binations and  collisions  of  her  friendships  or  enmities. 

Our  detached  and  distant  situation  invites  and  enables 
us  to  pursue  a  different  course.  .  .  .  Why  forego  the 
advantages  of  so  peculiar  a  situation  ?  Why  quit  our  own 
to  stand  upon  foreign  ground  ?  Why,  by  interweaving 
our  destiny  with  that  of  any  part  of  Europe,  entangle  our 
peace  and  prosperity  in  the  toils  of  European  ambition, 
rivalship,  interest,  humour,  or  caprice  ?  'Tis  our  true 
policy  to  steer  clear  of  permanent  alliances  with  any  portion 
of  the  foreign  world. 

The  policy  of  isolation  and  non-interference  recom- 
mended by  Washington  and  his  contemporaries  has  had 
to  be  abandoned.  America  has  become  a  true  World- 
Power.  Commenting  upon  Washington's  Farewell  Address 
and  the  necessity  of  abandoning  the  traditional  pohcy 
of  the  United  States,  I  wrote  in  The  Nineteenth  Century 
Review  in  May,  1914,  in  commenting  upon  the  Mexican 
imbroglio  : 

Washington  wrote  in  his  Farewell  Address,  '  Europe 
has  a  set  of  primary  interests  which  to  us  have  none,  or  a 
very  remote,  relation.'  That  assertion  was  formerly  correct, 
but  is  so  no  longer.  Nowadays  Great  Britain  is  vitally  inter- 
ested in  American,  and  the  United  States  are  equally  vitally 
interested  in  European,  policy.  Neither  can  safely  allow 
that  the  position  of  the  other  should  become  jeopardised. 


430  An  Anglo-American  Reunion 

Both  are  vitally  interested  in  the  maintenance  of  the  balance 
of  power  in  Europe.  Both  are  vitally  interested  in  seeing 
the  military  Great  Powers  of  the  world  divided  against 
themselves.  If  these  should  combine,  or  if  one  of  them 
should  obtain  the  supremacy  in  Europe,  it  might  mean 
the  end  not  only  of  Great  Britain  but  also  of  the  United 
States. 

When  Washington  wrote,  '  'Tis  our  true  policy  to  steer 
clear  of  permanent  alliances  with  any  portion  of  the  foreign 
world,'  the  United  States  could  stand  alone.  At  that  time 
a  combination  of  military  Powers  possessed  of  powerful 
navies  was  inconceivable.  Besides,  formerly  the  United 
States  could  be  attacked  by  no  European  nation  except 
Great  Britain,  because  all  the  other  nations  lacked  ships. 
As  the  United  States  cannot  safely  meet  single-handed 
a  joint  attack  by  the  Great  Powers,  they  must  endeavour 
to  meet  a  hostile  combination  by  a  counter-combination. 
If  serious  complications  should  arise  out  of  the  Mexican 
War,  we  must  stand  shoulder  to  shoulder  with  the  United 
States,  with  or  without  a  treaty  of  alliance.  In  defending 
the  United  States  against  a  joint  attack  of  the  military 
Great  Powers  we  defend  ourselves.  Policy  should  be  not 
merely  national  but  should  be  racial.  Accidents  have 
divided  the  two  great  branches  of  the  Anglo-Saxon  race, 
but  necessity  may  again  bring  them  together.  Herein 
lies  the  hope  of  the  future.  We  may  not  approve  of  Mr. 
Wilson's  policy,  but  we  must  bear  in  mincl  that  he  has 
acted  with  the  best  intentions.  America's  troubles  are 
our  troubles.  We  cannot  afford  to  see  the  United  States 
defeated  or  humiliated.  The  present  moment  seems 
eminently  favourable  not  only  for  offering  to  the  United 
States  our  unconditional  support  in  case  of  need,  but  for 
approaching  them  with  a  view  to  the  conclusion  of  a  care- 
fully limited  defensive  alliance.  Such  an  alliance  would  be 
the  strongest  guarantee  for  the  maintenance  of  the  world's 
peace.  The  Mexican  War  may  have  the  happiest  conse- 
quences upon  Anglo-American  relations,  and  it  may  eventu- 
ally bring  about  an  Anglo-American  reunion. 

At  the  time  these  lines  were  written  the  political  horizon 


Great  Problems  of  British  Statesmanship     431 

of  Europe  seemed  free  from  clouds.  On  the  other  hand, 
it  appeared  possible  that  the  Mexican  trouble  might  involve 
the  United  States  in  difficulties  with  some  European  military 
Power  or  Powers.  It  seemed  more  likely  that  Great  Britain 
might  have  to  come  to  the  aid  of  the  United  States  than  the 
United  States  to  the  aid  of  Great  Britain.  Providence 
has  "wdlled  it  otherwise,  and  perhaps  it  is  better  so.  If,  as 
is  devoutly  to  be  hoped,  the  Anglo-American  brotherhood 
in  arms  should  lead  to  the  establishment  of  a  great  brother- 
hood in  peace  of  all  the  Enghsh-speaking  peoples — to  an 
Anglo-American  reunion — a  great  step  would  have  been 
taken  in  strengthening  the  cause  of  freedom  and  the  peace 
of  the  world.  The  British  Empire  and  the  United  States 
combined  would  not  dominate  the  world.  Anglo-Saxondom 
has  no  desire  for  such  domination.  Possessing  only  small 
standing  armies,  merely  a  police  force,  other  States  need 
not  fear  their  aggression.  On  the  other  hand,  the  numbers 
of  their  citizens,  the  power  of  their  industries  which  can 
be  mobilised  for  war,  and  their  great  wealth,  would  make 
the  combined  Anglo-Saxon  nations  the  most  powerful  factor 
in  preserving  the  peace  of  the  world,  while  their  own  peace 
would  in  all  probability  be  secured  by  their  reunion  for 
an  indefinite  period.  Nowhere  in  the  world  does  the  white 
population  increase  more  rapidly  than  in  the  United  States 
and  in  the  British  Dominions.  To  all  who  have  the  welfare 
of  the  Anglo-Saxon  race  at  heart  it  must  be  clear  that  not 
the  least  benefit  of  the  Great  War  would  consist  in  the 
reunion  of  the  two  branches  of  the  Anglo-Saxon  race,  in 
the  recreation  of  the  British  Empire  in  its  greatest  glory. 
The  hope  to  secure  the  peace  of  the  world  by  arbitration 
treaties  or  by  some  great  international  organisation  such 
as  a  federation  or  a  great  league  of  nations,  may  prove  an 
illusion.  All  attempts  to  eliminate  war  by  mutual  agree- 
ment among  States  have  failed  since  the  time  when  the 
Greek  States  created  their  Amphyctionic  Council.  All 
endeavours  to  link  together  the  satisfied  and  the  land- 
hungry  nations  and  to  combine  them  for  the  defence  of  the 


432  An  Anglo-American  Reunion 

territorial  status  quo  may  prove  futile.  The  peace  of  the 
world  can  most  easily  be  maintained  not  by  creating  an 
artificial  and  mmatural  partnership  between  nations  of 
different  and,  perhaps,  iiTeconcilable  aims  and  interests, 
a  partnership  which  will  break  do-\vn  at  the  first  opportunity, 
but  by  creating  a  permanent  partnership  between  the 
freedom-loving  and  peace-loving  Anglo-Saxon  nations 
which  in  addition  have  the  advantage  of  belonging  to  the 
same  race,  of  speaking  the  same  language,  of  having  the 
same  ideals,  the  same  laws,  and  the  same  traditions.  A 
British- American  union  devised  for  the  protection  of  their 
possessions  against  foreign  attack  should  be  the  most 
powerful  instrument  imaginable  not  only  for  protecting 
the  future  peace  of  the  Anglo-Saxons  but  also  for  protecting 
the  peace  of  the  world. 


ANALYTICAL  INDEX. 


Note. — The  letter  '  f  '  following  a  page  number  signifies  '  and  following 
page  ' ;    '  ff,'  '  and  following  pages.' 


Adriatic,  Position  on  the      ..... 

Agriculture,  British  and  German  compared     . 
„      Development  of,  1800-43 
„  „      Reason  of  backwardness  of 

Alabama  Incident         ...... 

Alexander  I  and  Lord  Castlereagh  at  Vienna  Congrcsss 
„  and  Napoleon  I  .  .  .  . 

,,  Czartoryski  on  character   of 

Alexander  II,  Policy  of,  towards  Poland 
Alliance,  Austro-German,  of  1879,  Text  of 

„        Holy,  Activities  of,  in  Spain  and  New  World 
„  „     Treaty  and  text  of  .  .  . 

„  „  „       Additions  to,  made  in  Vt  rona 

Alsace-Lorraine,  Importance  of  iron  beds  in  . 
Amelot  de  la  Houssaye  on  Government  of  Venice   . 
America — See  United  States. 
Anglo-American  Differences,  how  kept  alive 
Anglo-American  Reunion,  Admiral  Mahan  on 
Anglo-French  Agreement  of  1904  .... 

Arabia,  Strategical  value  of  .... 

Aristotle  on  Democracy  and  Government         .  294, 

Army,  American — *S'ee  United  States. 

Army,  British.     See  England. 

Asia  Minor,  Populousness  of,  in  antiquity 

„         „       Strategical  and  ( conomic  significance  of 
Asiatic  Turkey,  Danger  of  integrity  of  . 
„  „       Danger  of  partition  of  . 

„  „        England  should  become  its  guardian 

„  ,,        England's  claims  to        .  .  . 

„  „        France's  claims  to  .  .  . 

„  „       German  leaders  on  value  of  . 

„  „       Greece's  claims  to  .  .  . 

„  „       Italy's  claims  to    . 

„  „       Nationalities  of     . 

„  „        Neutralisation  of,  desirable,    . 

„  „        Position  of,  resembles  that  of  Switzerland 

„  „       Russia's  claims  to  ... 

433 


4,  130  ff 
247  ff 
.  229 
.  249 
.  412 
.  36  f 
.  24  ff 
.  23  f 
.  172  ff 
.201  ff 
.403  ff 
.  36  ff 
.403  f 
.  286  f 
304  ff 

401  ff 

423  f,  425 

.     400 

.    94  f 

296,  297,  299,  342 


416  ff 


68 


.       66 

6,  56  ff 

f,  70  f,  102 

70 

101  ff 

77 

77  ff 

60  ff 

76  f 

77 

68 

101  ff 

72  ff 

75  f 


74  ff, 


2f 


434 


Analytical  Index 


PAOE 

60,  05 
.  56  ff 
57  ff,  61  ff 
.  95  ff 
.294  ff 
.119  ff 
.119  ff 
114  f,  116  f 
.     112 
.  124  f 
.130  ff 
.  113  f 
.     113 
.  115  f 
.     109 
.106  ff 
112,  114 
143  ff 
.     Ill 
6  ff,  105  ff 
.125  ff 
.130  ff 
.120  ff 
.140  ff 
120,  121,  124 
„  „        Possibility  of  acquisition  of  South  German  States 

and  Silesia  by      .         .         .         .  6  f,  128  ff 

„        Press  of 112  f,  117  f 

„  ,.         Prince  Lichnowsky's  opinion  of  .         .         .         .     106 

„  „        Probability  of  disintegration  of   .         .         .         .  141  f 

„  „        Religions  in        .  .         .         .         .         •         .113 

Revolution  of  1848  in 118  ff 

„  .,        Suppression  of  nationalities  in     .         .         .         .115  ff 

„  „         The  Emperor  is  the  State  in        ...         •     112 

The  problem  of 105  ff 

„  „         tried  to  Germanise  nationalities  under  Joseph  II       117 

Austro-German  Alliance  Treaty  of  1879,  Text  of     .         .         .  201  ff 


Asiatic  Turkey,  Sparse  population  of  ... 

„  ,,       Strategical  and  economic  significance  of 

„  „       Value  of,  in  hands  of  strong  military  Power 

Assyria  and  Babylonia,  Ancient  prosperity  of 

Athens,  Causes  of  decline  of . 

Ausgleich  of  1867  in  Austria-Hungary    . 

Austria-Hungary,  Ausgleich  of  1867  in  . 

„  „         Characteristic  ingratitude  of 

^,  ,,         Church  in,  is  part  of  the  bureaucracy 

„  „        has  created  Ukrainian  movement 

„  „        Hates  and  persecutes  the  Italians 

„  „        Illegitimacy  in  . 

„  „        Illiteracy  in       ...         . 

„  „        Ill-treatment  of  Serbia  by,  since  1690 

„  „        is  a  mediseval  survival 

„  „        is  and  may  remain  a  German  vassal 

„  „        is  governed  by  the  maxim  Divide  et  Impera 

„  „         may  establish  a  federation  after  the  War 

„  „        Nationalities  of,  enumerated 

„  „        Position  of,        ....         . 

„  „  „  Czechs  in 

„  „  „  Italians  in 

„  ,,  »»  Poles  in  . 

„  „  „  Rumanians  in  . 

„  Ruthenians  in  . 


Babylonia  and  Assyria,  Ancient  prosperity  of 
Bacon,  Lord,  on  Cabinet  Government    . 
Bagehot,  on  British  Constitution   . 
Baghdad  Railway  ..... 

Balkan  States       ...... 

Bavaria,  King  of,  and  German  Constitution   . 
Belgium,  Unreadiness  of,  in  1914  . 
Benedek,  Field-Marshal,  ungrateful  treatment  of 
Bismarck,  and  Anglo-Russian  antagonism 

„         Anti-Polish  policy  of,  British  diplomats  on 


,  95  ff 
,  332  f 
.  295  f 
59,  61 
4,  48,  51,  52,  53 
195  ff 
293  f 
115 
44 
173,  175,  176,  177 


laid  down  that  German  Emperor  might  not  declare  war  of 

aggression      ........  198  f 

on  Cabinet  Government         .  .         .         317,  318,  319,  320 

on  his  Polish  policy       .  .  .         .  .  .  173  f,  188 


Analytical  Index 


Bismarck  on  ingratitude  of  liberated  nations 

„         on  Monroe  Doctrine      ...... 

„         on  Political  Testament  of  Peter  the  Great 
„         on  strategical  significance  of  Constantinople     . 
„         on  „  „  of  Egypt  and  Suez  Canal 

„         on    the    German    Constitution    and    the    rights    of 
Emperor        ......        195 

„         opposed  a  war  of  aggression  .... 

„         successfully  opposed  Liberalism  in  Russia 

„  ,,  „       Russian  concessions  to  the  Poles 

Blackstone  on  democracy  and  amateurishness 

Bohemia  and  Moravia,  Position  of  ..... 

Brantome  on  Franco-Turkish  Alliance  .... 

Buchanan,  President,  Weakness  of         ....  , 

Budget,  British,  of  1815,  details  of  ....  . 

Budgets,  British,  of  1792  and  1815  compared 


435 

PAGE 

.  53 
.  413 
.       19 

.  46  f 
.  49  f 

the 

ff,  207  ff 
.  199 
.  172 
.172  ff 
.  342 
.125  ff 
.       79 

351,  391 
.225  flE 
.226  ff 


C 

Cabinet,  British,  and  Act  of  Settlement 
„  „      Lord  John  Russell  on  . 

„  „      Lord  Morley  on 

„        Government,  Alexander  Hamilton  on 
„  „  Bismarck  on 

„  „  Blackstone  on 

,,  „  Evolution  of,  in  England 

„  „  Frederick  the  Great  on 

„  „  Lord  Bacon  on    . 

„  „  Napoleon  I  on     f. 

„  „  Professor  Lowell  on 

„  „  Richelieu  on 

„  ,,  Sir  John  Forescue  on 

Weakness  of  12  f,  312  fl,  317 
William  Pitt  and 
Canning,  George,  and  Monroe  Doctrine 
Canning,  Sir  Stratford,  and  Crimean  War 
Capitulations,  History  of  Turkish 
Oastlereagh,  Lord,  at  Congress  of  Vienna 

Charles,  King  of  Rumania's    protest    against   ill-treatment    of    Ru- 
manians in  Hungary       ........  140  f 

Civil  War— .S^e  United  States. 

Coal,  Prices  of,  in  England  and  elsewhere  compared  .         .         .     241 

„     Production  in  England,  1806-45 231 

».  »  per  man  in  England  and  elsewhere  compared  .  239  ff 

Congress  of  Peace  and  After Iff 

Conseil  d'Etat,  Advantages  of        ......  .  324  f 

Conscription,  American — See  United  States. 

Constantinople,  Bismarck  on  strategical  significance  of   .  .  .    46  f 

Danger  of  neutralising  or  of  giving  it  to  small  Power  4,  52 
Exposed  position  of        .  .  .  .  .  .  47  ff 

in  Russian  hands  would  require  huge  garrison  .    48  f 

is  dominated  by  Balkan  Peninsula  ...       51 

Marmont  on  strategical  significance  of     .  .         .51 

Mazzini  on   .         .         .         .         .         .         .         .52 


.     337 
.     340 
.     340 
326  f,  3G0  f,  362  ff 
317,  318,  319,  320 
.     342 
.327  ff 
.     321 
.  332  f 
.     341 
.  339  f 
.310  ff 
.329  ff 
ff,  343  ff,  361  ff,  391  ff 
.  338  f 
.405  ff 
88  f,  93 
.  79  ff 
36  f,  167  ff 


436 


Analytical  Index 


Constantinople,  Napoleon  I  and     .... 
„  promised  to  Russia  by  Napoleon  I 

„  Russia's  claims  to  .  .  . 

„  Talleyrand  on  strategical  value  of. 

„  The  problem  of    . 

Constitution,  American — See  United  States. 
„  British,  Bagehot  on  . 

„  „      was  modelled  on  that  of  Venice 

„       weakness  of.  .12  f,  294  ff,  343 

„  German,  and  Emperor's  powers 

Co-operative  Societies,  Polish,  Record  of 
Cotton  Industry,  Development  of  British,  1801-45  . 
Cracow,  Republic  of,  Extinguished  by  Austria 
Crimean  War,  Causes  of        ....         . 
Czartoryski,  Prince  Adam,  on  Alexander  I 
Czechs,  Position  of,  in  Austria-Hungary 

„       Prussia  appeals  to  the,  against  Austria  in  186G 


PAOE 

.  If)  fE 
.  25  ff 

.  4  f,  51,  54 
.       51 

.      4  f,  14  ff 

.  295  f 
303  ff,  336  f 
361  ff,  391  ff 
.190ff 
123  f,  183 
.  230 
123,  165  f 
40  ff,  87  ff 
.  23 
.125  ff 
.  125  f 


D 
Dalmatia 4,  130,  133 

Debt,  British  National,  How  to  deal  with  the      10  ff,  249  ff,  287  ff,  291  ff 
„  ,,  „  Increase  of  the  .....  .218  ff 

Democracy  and  Government,  Alexander  Hamilton  on 

326  f,  358,  360  f,  362  ff 

„  „  „  Amelot  de  la  Houssaye  on  .         .304  ff 

Aristotle  on  294,  296,  297,  299,  342 

Bismarck  on     .  .         317,  318,  319,  320 

„  „  „  Blackstone  on  ....     342 

Demosthenes  on  .  .  .    301  f,  302 

„  „  „  Frederick  the  Great  on       .  .  .     321 

.,  „  „  Isocrates  on      ....  .     297 

Lord  Bacon  on  .  .  .  .  332  f 

MachiaveUi  on  .  .  .  .       300,  345 

Napoleon  I  on  .  .  .  322  ff,  341 

„  „  ,,  Professor  Lowell  on  .  .  .  .  339  f 

Polybius  on 298 

Richelieu  on 310  ff 

.,  „  ,,  Sir  John  Fortescue  on         .  .  .329  ff 

Thucydides  on  .  .  .        295,  298,  299 

William  Pitt  on  .  .  .  338  f 

„  Inadequacy  of,  in  war  .....  293  ff 

Demosthenes  on  Democratic  Government        ....    301  f,  302 

Dictatorship,  Advantages  of  .....  344  ff,  394  f 

„  MachiaveUi  on,  .......  344  f 


Egypt,  Bismarck  on  strategical  value  of 

Historic  longing  of  France  for  possession  of 

Napoleon's  desire  for 

Napoleon  on  strategical  value  of 

offered  by  Russia  to  England  in  1853 

Strategical  importance  of  . 

Elizabeth,  Government  of  Queen  . 


49  f 
20  ff 
20  ff 

49  f 

42 

20  ff 

334  f 


Analytical  Index  437 

PAGE 

Emperor,  German — See  German  Emperor. 

Empire,  British,  Bismarck  on  value  of  Egypt  to     .  .  .  .    49  f 

„  „       Insignificance  of,  in  1800       .....     227 

Possibilities  of  the        ,         .11  ff,  258  S,  287  ff,  289  fE 

„  „       should  assume  part  of  War  Debt  .  .  .  11  f,  291  f 

„  ,,       Wealth  and  potentialities  of,  and  of  United  States 

compared         ...  258  S,  287  ff,  290  fi 

„  „       why  envied  by  other  nations  .  .  .  .418  fE 

Engine- power  in  Great  Britain  and  United  States  compared    .  .235  ff 

England,  Agi'icultural  development  of,  1800-43       ....     229 

„         Agriculture  of,  and  German  agriculture  compared     .  .247  ff 

„         and  Russia  at  war  in  time  of  Napoleon  I  ...       33 

„  „  „      Cause  of  distrust  between       .  .  .    15  ff,  44  f 

„  „         „      in  Crimean  War    .         .  .  .  .         .  41  ff 

„         and  United  States  during  Venezuela  trouble      .  .  .     413 

„  „  „  „     how  estranged     .....  401  f 

„  „         „  „     England's  consistently  friendly  attitude 

414  ff,  425  ff 

Attitude  of  .towards  partition  of  Poland  154  ff,  166  ff,  176  ff,  178  ff 

„        Claims  of,  to  part  of  Asiatic  Turkey         ....       77 

„         Coal  production  in 231,  239  ff 

„        Consistently  friendly  policy  of,  towards  United  States  414  ff,  425  ff 
„         Economy,  ftlr.  Asquith  on  necessity  of,  in         .  .  ,  252  f 

„         Evolution  of  Cabinet  Government  in         .  .  .  .327  ff 

„         has  pursued  a  racial,  not  a  national,  jwlicy       .         414  ff,  425  ff 
„         how  reconciled  with  France     ......  400  f 

industrial  development  of  1800-46 229  ff 

„         Luxury  in,  at  beginning  of  the  War  .  .  .  .253  ff 

„        Napoleon  proposes  Indian  invasion  to  strike  at         .    22  f,  31  ff 
„        National  income  of,  in  1814    ......  221  f 

in  1907 216 

„        Neglect  of  history  in       ......         .     349 

„         Production  and  engine-power  per  man  in  .  .  .235  ff 

„         Population,  increase  of,  from  1801-41       ....  228  f 

„        Savings  Banks  Deposits  in  Germany,  United  States,  and  in  251 
„        spent   in    war    against   Napoleon    one-third    of    national 

wealth  and  income  .....  .221  ff 

„        Study  of  statesmanship  neglected  in         .  .  .        '  .  349  £ 

„         supported  United  States  during  war  against  Spain     .  .412  ff 

„        supported  United  States  against  Holy  AlUance  .  .403  ff 

„        supported  United  States  against  Napoleon  III  .         .410  ff 

„         Vast  increase  of  production  in,  during  the  War  .  .282  ff 

„         Vast  war  programme  of  Directoire  against         .  .  .   20  ff 

„        Wages  in,  and  in  United  States  compared  .  .  .243  ff 

„         War  finance  and  economic  future  of         ...  .  216  ff 

„        Wealth  of,  and  of  United  States  compared        .  .         .258  ff 

Executive — See  Cabinet. 

Expenditure,  Increase  of  national,  during  Napoleonic  War       .         .219  ff 

F 

Federalist,  Extracts  from,  on  Government  326  f,  357  ff,  360  f,  362  ff,  364  f 
Eortescue,  Sir  John,  on  Democracy  and  Cabinet  Government  .  .329  ff 
France — See  also  Napoleon. 

„      and  Syria 87  ff 


Analytical  Index 


438 

PAGE 

France,  Claims  of,  to  part  of  Asiatic  Tiukcy  .  .  .     77  ff,  93  f,  104 

,,      Conscil  d'Etat,  Advantages  of     .  .  .  .  .  .  324  f 

„       Economic  ruin  of,  at  French  Revolution      .  .  .  .322  ff 

„       Historic  policy  of,  towards  Turkey      .  .  .  .  .   78  ff 

„      History  of  Protectorate  over  Eastern  Christians    .  .  .  78  fi 

,,      how  reconciled  with  England      ......  400  f 

„      Reorganisation  of,  by  Napoleon  I         .  .  .  .  .322  ff 

,,       should  she  continue  protecting  Eastern  Christians  ?       .  87  If,  93  f 
Franco-Turkish  Alliance,  History  of  the  .  .  .  .  .   78  ff 

Frederick  the  Great  on  Cabinet  Government  .....     321 

„  „         Policy  of,  regarding  Poland      .  .  .  .148  ff 

„  „  „  towards  Austria        ....     159 

,,  „  ,,  towards  Russia  .  .  .  148  ff,  159 

Turkey       .  .  .  .  158  f 

„  ,,         Secret  Treaty  of ,  with  Russia,  regarding  Poland   .149  ff 

,,  ,,        was  moving  spirit  in  partition  of  Poland    .  .    161 

Frederick  William  III  broke  his  promises  to  the  Poles      .  .  .169  f 

Free  Trade  not  responsible  for  Britain's  industrial  development  .228  ff 


6ff, 


G 

Galicia,  Racial  position  in 120,  121,  124  f 

George  I  and  British  Constitution.  ......     336 

German- Austrian  Alliance  of  1879,  Text  of 201  ff 

German  Emperor  has  no  right  to  declare  aggressive  war  .  193  f,  198  ff 

„  ,,         is  not  the  Emperor  of  Germany  .  .  .  .195  ff 

„  „        Position  of  the  ..... 

„  „        Prince  Bismarck  on  rights  and  power  of 

,,  „        was  possibly  tool  of  army  in  declaring  war 

Germany — <See  also  Prussia,  Frederick  the  Great,  Bismarck,  <5 
„        Agricultm-e  of,  and  British  agriculture  compared 
,,        and  Austria-Hungary 
,,        and  Asia  Minor         .... 

„        and  United  States    .... 

„        Bavaria  and  the  Constitution  of 

„        has  been  created  for  defence 

„        has  made  Austria-Hungary  her  vassal 

„       Iron  industry  of,  and  British  iron  industry  compared  245  ff,  286  f 

„  „  ,,         based  on  Alsace-Lorraine  ore  beds         .         .  286  f 

„        is  a  federation,  not  a  single  State       ....  .191  ff 

„       Savings  Banks  Deposits  in         .....         .     251 

,,        Sovereignty  of,  resides  not  in  Emperor       .  .  .  .192  ff 

„        why  pretended  having  been  attacked  in  1914      .  .  .210  ff 

„       would  dominate  Europe  after  absorption  of  Austria-Hungary  107  f 

Ghent,  Treaty  of 398 

Great  Britain — See  England. 

Greece,  Claims  of,  to  part  of  Asiatic  Turkey  .  .         .         .     76  f,  104 


190  ff 
195  ff 
213  ff 


.247  ff 
105  ff 
.  57  ff 
419  f,  422  f,  424 
.195  ff 
.  193  f 
.  106  f 


H 

Habsburgs  follow  a  purely  dynastic  policy 
„  Hereditary  peculiarities  of 

„         Ingratitude  of,  towards  eminent  men 
,,         Matrimonial  and  territorial  policy  of 
Rise  of  ..... 


.112  ff 
.  109 
.  114 
.  109  f 
.  109  f 


Analytical  Index  439 

PAQK 

Habsburgs  tried  to  Germanise  Austria-Hungary      .  .  .  .117 

Hamilton,  Alexander,  on  Cabinet  Government         .        326  f,  360  f,  362  ff 

Hemy  VII,  Government  of 332  f 

Henry  VIII,  Government  of 332  f 

Hohenlohe,  Prince,  quoted    ........       44 

Holy  Alliance,  Activities  of,  in  Spain  and  the  Now  World        .  .403  fE 

Treaty  and  text  of 37  ff 

„  „  „      Additions  made  to,  at  Verona  .  .  .403  ff 

Holy  Places  of  Christianity,  Position  of  .  .  .  .  .  87  ff 

Horse-powers  in  British  and  American  industries  compared      .  .235  ff 

„  Total  in  Great  Britain  and  United  States  compared    .     259 

Hundred  Years' Peace  Celebration .  .....         .398  ff 

Hungary — See  also  Magyars. 

Deak  recommended  racial  toleration  ....     139 

Educational  injustice  in  .  .  .  .  .  .  .138  ff 

Growing  ascendancy  of,  over  Austria         .  .  .  .120  f 

Hostility  to  Austria         ....  116,  117,  119  ff 

is  an  oligarchy        ........     135 

Misleading  racial  statistics  of  .  .  .  .  .  .  134  f 

Oppression  of  nationalities  in  .  .  .  .  .  .  120  f 

„  Rumanians  in     .  .  .  .  .  .139  ff 

Parliamentary  institutions  of,  are  a  fraud ....  135  ff 

Racial  tyranny  of    .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .134  ff 

Revolution  of,  in  1848 118  ff 

I 

Idleness  natural  to  men         ........     232 

Income,  British  national,  in  1814  .......  221  f 

Industry,  development  of  British,  1800-46 229  ff 

India,  Difficulty  of  invading .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .    44  f 

„       Interest  of,  in  Mesopotamia  and  Persian  Gulf       .  .  .    94  ff 

„       Planned  invasion  of,  by  revolutionary  Franco        .  .  .   21  ff 

by  Napoleon  I    .  .  .         .     22  f,  31  ff 

Iron  and  steel  industries,  British,  German  criticism  of    .  .  .      246 

Development  of  British,  1800-46       .  .     231 

„       „        „  „         German,  are  dependent  upon  Lorraine  ore 

beds 286  f 

„       „        „  ,,         in  Germany    and    United    Kingdom    com- 

pared      ....  245  ff,  287 

,,       „        „  ,,  in  United  States  and  United  Kingdom   . 

compared        .....      286 

Irredenta  Itaha 130  ff 

Islam — See  Mohammedanism. 

Isocrates  on  Democracy  and  Government      .....      297 

Istria 4,  130,  133 

ItaUans,  Position  of,  in  Austria-Hungary        .....  130  ff 

Italy,  Claims  of,  to  part  of  Asiatic  Turkey    ....  77,  104 

„      is  hated  by  Austria-Hungary       ......  130  ff 

J 

Japan  and  the  United  States 419  f,  422  f 

Jefferson,  President,  and  Monroe  Doctrine       .....  407  f 

Jerusalem — See  Holy  Places. 

Joseph  II,  tried  to  Germanise  Austria    .         .         .  .         .117 


440 

Kossuth,  Louis,  Policy  of 


Analytical  Index 

K 


PAGE 

119 


Labour,  Productivity  of,  in  Great  Britain  and  United  States 
pared   ...... 

Lincoln,  President,  and  Civil  War 

„  „  Autocratic  power  of 

„  ,,  Character  of    . 

„  „  introduces  conscription 

„  „  Lord  Bryce  on 

„  „  on  advantage  of  one-man 

„  „  on  bitter  need  of  troops 

„  „  on  New  York  draft  riots 

.,  „  Speech  on  the  fallen 

„  „  Suspends  Habeas  Corpus 

„  „  was  elected  by  a  minority 

Lowell,  Professor,  on  Cabinet  Government 


com- 

235  fE 

351,  353  f,  356,  365  ff 

.  391  f 

365  f,  391 

374  If 

391 


Executive 


365 
395 

385  f 
397 

367  f 
351 
339 


M 

Machiavelli  on  advantages  of  Dictatorsliip 

„  on  Democracy  and  Government    . 

Machinery,  in  Great  Britain  and  United  States  compared 
Madison,  President,  and  Monroe  Doctrine 
Magyars,  how  distributed  in  Hungary    . 

„        monopoUso  Civil  Service,  Parliament,  &c. 
„         Racial  tyranny  of  . 
„        Relations  between  Austrians  and 
„         Small  number  of     . 
Mahan,  Admiral,  on  Anglo-American  reunion 

„  „       on  importance  of  Persian  Gulf 

Malta  and  revolutionary  France     .... 

Manufactiiring  industries — ^ee  Industries. 
Maria  Theresa  and  partition  of  Poland  . 
Marmont  on  strategical  value  of  Constantinople 
Mazzini  on  Constantinople     ..... 

Mecca  and  Medina        ...... 

Mesopotamia,  England's  claims  to  .         .  . 

„  Former  prosperity  of         .  .  . 

„  Possibilities  of  irrigation  in 

Metternich,  Prince,  on  Holy  AUiance 

Mexico,  Napoleon  Ill's  designs  on         .  .  . 

Troubles  of,  in  1861  .... 

Mohammedanism,  Position  and  possibilities  of 
Monroe  Doctrine,  Bismarck  on  the 

„  „         Danger  of  the,  to  the  United  States 

„  „         Genesis  of. 

„  „         has  consistently  been  defended  by  England 

„  „         Homer  Lea,  on  . 

„  „         how  regarded  on  the  Continent   . 

„  „         President  Jefferson  and 

„         President  Madison  and 


116 
416 


.  344  f 
.  300 
.235  ff 
.  408 
.  134  f 
.135fE 
.134  ff 

117,  119  ff 
111,  134 

423  f,  425 
.  94  f 
.       21 


.  159 
.  51 
.  52 
63,  101 
.  94  ff 
.  95  ff 
.  98  ff 
.  39  f 
.410ff 
.  410 
.  62  ff 
.  413 
.420  ff 
.403  ff 
.413  ff 
.  421 
,  421 
.  407  f 
.     4-08 


Analytical  Index 


Monroe  Doctrine  proposed  by  England  . 

Text  of  I      . 
Munitions,  British  Ministry  of 


441 

PAGE 

.403  ff 
.  409 
.283  ff 


N 

Napoleon  I,  Achievements  of,  as  an  organiser 
„        t,  advocates  invasion  of  India 
„  advocates  reconciliation  with  Russia 

„     rv^and  Alexander  I  conclude  Peace  and  Treaty  of  Til 
„  [and  Alexander  I  meet  on  the  Niemen 

„  and  Constantinople     ..... 

„       ,  'and  Peter  the  Great's  Political  Testament   . 
„    ]       desires  Russia's  alliance  against  England 
„  Eastern  policy  of         ....  . 

„  '"I       Instructions  of,  regarding  Turkey 
„  on  strategical  value  of  Egypt  and  Suez  Canal 

„  Policy  of,  regarding  Egypt 

„    .     'proposes  partition  of  Turkey 
„    '     "  proposes  that  Russia  should  have  Constantinople 
„  tried  to  dupe  Alexander  I  at  Tilsit 

„  wished  to  push  Russia  back  into  Asia 

Napoleon  Ill's  designs  on  Mexico  in  1861 

National  Debt — See  Debt,  National. 

Nesselrode,  Count,  and  Crimean  War     .... 
„  „      on  neutraility  of  Switzerland 

„  „      Policy  of,  regarding  Turkey 

New  York  draft  riots  ...... 

Nicholas  T,  Pohcy  of,  regarding  Turkey 

Nicholas  II,  quoted     .  ...... 


20 


.322  ff 

f,  31  ff 
26 

26  ff 
26 

16  ff 
19 

24  ff 

25  ff 
86  f 

ff,  49  f 
20  ff 
25  ff 

25  ff 

26  ff 
35 

410  ff 

91  ff 
73  f 

40 
385  f 
40  ff 

44 


O'Meara,  quoted 

One-man  Executive,  Advantage  of 
Organisation,  Riiles  of  good 
Output,  Limitation  of,  in  England 


.      22  f,  50 

308  ff,  344  f,  360  ff 

.   344 

.  246  f,  250 


Palestine — See  Holy  Places. 

Palmerston,  Policy  of,  towards  Turkey  . 

Panama  Canal,  VulnerabiUty  of     . 

Panslavism,  unjustified  fear  of 

Paul  I  of  Russia  and  invasion  of  India 

Peace  Congress,  The,  and  After 

Peace  is  responsible  for  England's  industrial  backwardness 

Pericles,  Character  of  ... 

Persian  Gulf,  Strategical  importance  of 

Peter  the  Great,  Political  Testament  of 

„  „  proposes  partition  of  Poland 

Peter  III,  Secret  Pohsh  treaty  with  Frederick  the  Great 
Pitt,  the  Elder,  and  Cabinet  Government 
Poland  and  Congress  of  Vienna      .... 

„      Bismarck's  policy  towards  ....    172 


.  88  ff 

.     422 

.  142  f 

.    22  f 

.     1  ff 

234,  280  f 

298,  299 

94  f,  100 

.  17  ff 

.     152 

.149  ff 

.338f 

.166  ff 

ff,  180,  188 


442 


Analytical  Index 


Poland  British  diplomatic  reports  on 

154,  156,  157,  173,  175,  176,  177,  178 
First  partition  of,  Catherine  the  Great  and  .  .  .152  fE 

Frederick  the  Great  and  .  .  .  148  fE 

Lord  Salisbury  on  .  .        101,  184,  185 

Mai'ia  Theresa  and  .  .  .  .159 

Peter  III  and  .  .  .  .  .149  fE 

Stanislaus  Augustus'  appeal  to  Catherine 

the  Great         .....     157 

Great  past  of  ........     151 

independent,  value  of,  as  a  buffer  State       .  .  .  .181 

Partition  of,  England's  remonstrance  against        .         166  ff,  178  ff 
„  „    Henry  Wheaton  and  Koch  on.  .  .  .  146  f 

„  „    Lord  Castlereagh's  protest  against    .  .  36,  167  fE 

„  „    Peter  the  Great  and         .  .  .  .  .152 

„    proposed  in  1700 152 

Prussia's  jjolicy  towards,  was  part  of  her  Russian  policy  148  ff,  170  fE 
Record  of  co-operative  societies  in       . 
Recreation  of,  independent,  consequences  of,  to 
Germany    .         .         .         .  .         . 

Rising  of,  in  1863       ..... 

„  „         „     British  diplomatic  reports  on 


123  f. 
Russia  and 


183 


.171  ff 
.175  ff 


173,  175,  176,  177 

.178  ff 

.162  ff 

8  f,  183  ff 

8  f,  146  ff 

165 


„  „       ,,     Earl  Russell's  despatch  on 

Second  partition  of    . 
should  preserve  connection  with  Russia 
The  problem  of  ....  . 

Third  partition  of      . 

Weakness  of  Government  of        .  .  . 

Poles,  Denationalisation  of,  England's  attitude  towards  166  ff. 

Grand  Duke  Nicholas'  appeal  to 
Numbers  of         .....  . 

Position  of,  in  Austria-Hungary  . 
Prussia's  treatment  of  the 

Russia's  policy  towards  the  .  .  .  •        122  ff, 

Polybius  on  Democracy  and  Government 
Prague,  National  position  in  .... 

President,  American,  is  Commander-in-Chief  of  Army  and  Navy 

Power  of  the  ...         326  f,  359^  ff,  391 

Privy  Council,  Advantages  of  efdcient    .  .  329  ff,  332,  337,  346  f 

Production,  British  and  American,  per  worker  compared  .  .235  ff 

,,  British,  -per  worker  has  doubled  during  War  .  .282  ff 

Protectorate,  French,  over  Eastern  Christians  .  .  .  .  78  ff 

Prussia — See  also  Germany. 

,,        Appeals  to  Czechs  against  Austria  in  1866  .  .  .  125  f 

„        Greatness  of,  estabUshed  by  three  great  rulers  .  .  .     316 

„        Land  purchase  policy  of,  in  Polish  districts       .  .  .     183 

„        Polish  policy  of 148  ff,  170  ff,  186  f 

„        Polish  newspapers  on  Government  of         .  .  .         .  186  f 


151  f 
178  ff 
121  f 

183 
120  ff 
169  f 
146  ff 

298 
126  f 
364  f 


R 

Reunion,  an  Anglo-American 
Richelieu,  on  Cabinet  Government 
Rumanians,  Hi-treatment  of,  in  Hungary 


13,  398  ff 
.310  ff 
.140  ff 


Analytical  Index 


Russell,  Lord  John,  and  Crimean  War  . 

Russia,  and  Tmkey  in  Crimean  War     . 

„       Backwardness  of        ...  . 

„       Cause  of  distrust  between  England  and 

„       Claims  of,  to  Asiatic  Tm-key 

„       Claims  of,  to  Constantinople 

„       Economic  value  of  Constantinople  to 

„       Exploitation  of,  by  Germany 

„       Frederick  the  Great's  policy  towards 

„       Fundamental  pcacefulness  of 

„       Interests  of,  in  Holy  Lar.d 

„       offers  England  Egypt  in  1853     . 

„       Polish  policy  of         ...  . 

,,  „  „  was  made  in  Germany 

Ruthcnians  in  Austria-Hungary     . 


443 

PAGE 

.       91 

40  ff,  87  ff 
.    45  f 
15  ff,  44  f 
75  f,  104 
4  f,  19  f 
4  f,  19  f 
.     181 
.148  ff 
45,  142  f 
.    93  f 
.       42 
.147  ff 
.  180  f 
120,  121,  124  f 


S 
St.  Louis,  Letter  of,  to  Maronites  .... 

Salisbmy,  Lord,  on  Crimean  War  .... 

„      on  Poland 161 

Savings  Banks  Deposits,  in  England,  Germany,  and  United  States 
Serbia,  Ill-treatment  of,  by  Austria,  since  1090 

Position  of  ....     3,  4,  48,  51,  5:^ 

Serbians,  Number  of      ......  . 

Slavonic  Congress  of  1908      ...... 

Smith,  Sydney,  on  British  taxation         .... 

Spanish-American  War,  England's  attitude  dming  . 
Statesmanship,  Study  of,  neglected  in  England 
Suez  Canal,  Bismarck  on  strategical  value  of 

„  „      Construction  of,  ordered  by  revolutionary  France 

„  „      Great  increase  in  traffic  of 

„  „      Importance  of    . 

„  „      Napoleon  on  strategical  value  of 

Sumter,  Bombardment  of  Fort       ..... 
Switzerland,  why  neutralised  at  Congress  of  Vienna 
Syria,  French  claims  to  .         •         .         .  • 


78  f 
45 

,  184,  185 
.     251 

115  f,  134 
53,  133  f 
.  134 
.  142 
.  224  f 
.  412 
.349  f 
.  49  f 
.  20 
.  67 
.  100 
.  49  f 
.  351 
.  72  ff 
.  87  ff 


Talleyrand,  diplomatic  activities  of        .  .  . 

„  on  strategical  value  of  Constantinople  . 

Taxation,  British,  in  1792  and  1815  compared 

„  „      in  1815,  details  of        .  .  • 

„  „      Increase  of,  during  Napoleonic  War 

„  „      Sydney  Smith  on        .         .  . 

„         high,  benefit  of  .... 

„  „     reformed  British  industry 

Tax-collector  is  the  greatest  civilising  factor 
Telephones  in  United  States  and  Great  Britain  compared 
Thucydides  on  Democracy  and  Government  . 
Tilsit,  Peace  and  Treaty  of   . 
Trade  unions,  British,  most  dangerous  feature  of 
Trentino      ........ 

Trieste         ........ 


21  f,  27  f 
.  51 
.226  ff 
.225  ff 
.219  ff 
.     224 


10  ff,  232  f 

.232  ff 

.     232 

259 

295,  298,  299 

.  26  ff 

.     247 

.     130 

.      130,  133 


444 


Analytical  Index 


Tiukey  and  Russia  in  Crimean  War 
Asiatic — See  Asiatic  Turkey. 
Frederick  the  Great's  Policy  towartLs 
History  of  Capitulations    .... 
Napoleon  I's  instructions  regarding     . 
Partition  of,  proposed  by  Catherine  the  Great 
„  „  by  Napoleon  I 


Tyrol 


PAGE 

40  fi 

158  f 
79  ff 

SO  f 

20 

25  ff, 

130 


U 

Ukrainian  movement    .........  124  f 

United  Kingdom — See  England. 

United  States — See  also  Lincoln,  Monroe  Doctrine,  Hamilton,  &c. 

„       Advantages  of  Constitution  of    .  12  f,  325  ff,  357  ff,  366  ff 
„  „       and  England,'^England  has  been  consistently  friendly 


towards  former 

414  ff,  425  ff 

„          „        how  kept  estranged    . 
and  Germany       .           ... 
and  Japan          .             ... 
Army,  desertions  from   . 

"  419  f, 

414  ff, 

422  f,  424 

420,  423 

372,  384 

„      strength  of,  in  1861 

, 

.351  f 

Civil  War,  Confusion  during  . 

^ 

,  355  f 

,,         „     Cost  of       .          . 

.262  ff 

,,         ,,     could  have  been  avoided 

13,  390  f 

„         ,,     created  industrial  supremacy 
„         „     defective  armaments 

of 

• 

.  280  f 
.369f 

„         „     Effect  of,  upon  agriculture 
„         ,,           „              ,,     fiscal  policy   . 

263,  268,  269 

.      272 

„  „  ,,    industrial  organisation     .      277 

„    Machinery        .  .268,  275  ff 

.,  „  „    manufacturing  industries 

266  ff,  271  f,  273  ff 
„  „  „      National  Debt  and  taxa- 

tion.        .         .         .263f 
,,  „  „      Population  and  wealth     .264  ff 

„  ,,  ,,      railway  development         .269  ff 

„  Habeas  Corpus  suspended  .  .  .366  ff 
„  Losses  diuring  .....  389  f 
„    Number  of  soldiers  raised  during     .         .  388  f 

„     Outbreak  of 350  ff 

„     President  Lincoln's  difficulties  dming       .351  ff 
„    Treason  during       .....  355  f 
Coal  production  in  Great  Britain  and,  compared       .239  ff 
Engine-power             „               „                     „  .235  ff 
Importance  of  conservation  movement  in          .         .     289 
„             Geological  Survey  in          .          .          .     289 
„            Inter-State  Commerce  Commission  in      289 
Mihtary  achievements  of,  in  Civil  War     .         .    13,  349  ff 
„       Unpreparedness  of,  in  Civil  War          .    13,  351  ff 
Population  and  wealth  of,  before  Civil  War      .          .  387  f 
Potentialities  of  British  Empire  and,  compared         .  260 
President,  Powers  of       ....          .  359  ff 
Production  per  worker  in  Great  Britain  and,  com- 
pared     235  ff 


Analytical  Index 


United  States — Reunion  with  Great  Britain   ,         .         .         .13, 
Railway  mileage  in  British  Empire  and,  compared 
Savings  Banks  Deposits  in  Great  Britain  and,  com- 
pared   ........ 

Situation  in,  before  Civil  War.         .         .         .         . 

Supported  by  England  against  Holy  Alliance  . 
„  „  „     Napoleon  III     . 

„  „        during  war  with  Spain 

Telephones  in  United  Ivingdom  and,  compared 
Total  horse-powers  in  United  Kingdom  and,  com- 
pared    ........ 

Wages  in  Great  Britain  and,  compared    . 

Water- powers  in    . 

Wealth  of,  and  of  British  Empire,  compared 

258  ff,  287  ff, 
were  unified  by  war  with  England 
why  envied  by  other  nations  .         .         .         . 


445 

PAGE 

398  fiE 
,     260 

251 
350  ff 
403  ff 
410  ff 
412  f 
260  f 

259 

243  f 

259 

290  ff 

412 

418  ff 


Vandal,  Albert,  quoted  .         .         .         .         . 

Venezuela  trouble         ...... 

Venice,  Causes  of  decline  of  .  .    -      . 

Venice,  Constitution  of,  resembled  that  of  England 

Verona,  Congress  and  Treaty  of     . 

Vienna,  Congress.  ...... 


.  35 
.  413 
.303  ff 
303  ff,  336  f 
.  403  f 
9  f,  36  f,  72  f,  106  ff 


ff. 


51  ff 
216 


10  ff,  249  ff,  287  ff^ 


W 

Wages  in  Great  Britain  and  United  States  compared 
War,  Beneficial  effect  of,  upon  industry  .  23 

„     Cost  of  the  Great 
„         ,,         „    against  Napoleon  I 
„     Debt,  How  to  deal  with  the 
„      unifies  nations     .... 
Washington,  George,  on  preparedness  for  v.ar 

„  „        Political  Testament  of  ... 

Wealth,  National,  of  United  States  and  British  Empire  compared 
Willcox,  Sir  W.,  on  irrigation  of  Mesopotamia 
WilHam  II  has  violated  the  German  Constitution    . 
„  vowed  to  observe  tho  Constitution 

„  was  possibly  forced  by  army  into  War  in  1914 

Workers,  British,  Production  of,  has  doubled  during  War 


.  243  f 
,  280  ff 
ff,  257 
.218  ff 
,  291  ff 
.  402 
.  390 
.428'ff 
.258  ff 
.  98  ff 
204  ff 
.204  ff 
.  213  f 
.282  ff 


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i 


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da 


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UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  LIBRARY 

Los  Angeles 
This  book  is  DUE  on  the  last  date  stamped  below. 


REC'i  LD-URP 

APR  ]  7  1984 


REC'D  LD-URr 

JUN  0  8  1991 


lOm- 


in's  fo 
Tran; 
Cromer, 


3tive 


AT 

LOS  ANGELES 

LDSRART 


KIDAY,    JUNE    16,    1933 


EST  ilR, 

Nonn  fliiiiis 
[iniyiES 

Knight  Associated  with  Con- 
struction of  Several  N.  Y. 
Tunnels;  Served  War  Board 


LONDON,  June  15  (AP).— The 
death  was  announced  today  of  Sir 
Ernest  William  Moir,  eminent 
engineer,  at  his  home  in  London. 
He  was  71, 

Four  tunnels  under  the  East 
River  were  built  for  the  Pennsyl- 
vania Railroad  by  Sir  Ernest  Wil- 
liam Moir,  and  earlier  he  designed 
the  shields  and  hydraulic  appli- 
ances for  the  Hudson  River  tun- 
nel of  the  Pennsylvania  Railroad 
as  resident  engineer  for  Sir  B. 
Baker. 

ACTIVE  IN  WAR  WORK. 

He  became  a  tunnel  and  bridge 
builder  soon  after  his  graduation 
from  University  College,  London, 
and  one  of  his  most  famous  works 
abroad  was  the  southern  cantilever 
of  the  great  bridge  across  the  Firth 
of  Forth. 

Immediately  before  the  World 
War  and  during  the  conflict  he 
aided  the  British  Government  in 
great  engineering  projects  made  I 
necessary  in  the  conflict.  The  two  ' 
years  he  spent  in  this  country  for 
his,  gnvprnmpnh 10J-6-ia_were^in 


ifnxoi  dpnaa  fijjiifiojsip 

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od  iioiyai  ^^uaimuaaof) 
»  81  ;/  'p^oDA  »  opn 
a  xvf  aiuooin  9i{x„ 

I  AiddJL  siq  ui    -uoissajd 


L  006  358  150  8 


UC  SOUTHERN  REGIONAL  LIBRARY  FAClUn 


AA    000  779  484    5 


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